GDWARD  J.  MGHC 


* 


BADGER'S  STUDIES  IN  SCIENCE 


THE  HIGHER  USEFULNESS  OF 
SCIENCE 

By  William  Emerson  Ritter 

THE  UNITY  OF  THE  ORGANISM 

By  William  Emerson  Ritter 

THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  SCIENCE 

By  Edward  J.  Menge 

THE    PROBABLE    INFINITY    OF 
NATURE    AND    LIFE 

By  William  Emerson  Ritter 


RICHARD  G.  BADGER,  PUBLISHER,  BOSTON 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF 
SCIENCE 

Biologically  and  Psychologically  Considered 


.   By 

EDWARD  J.  MENGE,  M.A.,  PH.D.,  M.Sc. 

Professor  of  Biology  in  the  University  of  Dallas 
Author  of  "Backgrounds  for  Social  Workers" 


BOSTON 

RICHARD  G.  BADGER 

THE    GORHAM   PRESS 


COPYRIGHT,  1918,  BY  RICHARD  G.  BADGER 
All  Rights  Reserved 


Made  in  the  United  States  of  America 


The  Gorham  Press,  Boston,  U.  S.  A. 


TO 

MY  WIFE 

WHOSE  CONSTANT  ENCOURAGEMENT 
AND  NEVER-WAVERING  CONFIDENCE 
HAVE  BEEN  THE  SOURCE  OF  THE 
AUTHOR'S  MOST  FRUITFUL  STUDIES 


/  *<*  f }  t*  *v  o 

<L  U  J  V  i  £ 


PREFACE 

IT  is  now  some  ten  years  since  the  need  of  a  volume  in  non- 
technical language,  describing  the  relationship  between 
Philosophy  and  the  Laboratory  Sciences,  was  brought  home 
to  the  author,  and  with  the  end  in  view  of  filling  that  need, 
he  began  the  series  of  studies  which  have  made  this  book 
possible. 

Six  of  the  chapters  have  already  appeared  in  print  in  the 
University  of  Dallas  Quarterly  Bulletins  during  the  past 
few  years,  while  much  of  the  remaining  material  has  been 
used  in  class-room  and  public  lectures. 

Students  from  all  schools  have  seemed  so  one-sided  in  their 
viewpoint,  that  the  desire  to  make  them  realize  that  many 
varying  conclusions  may  often  be  drawn  from  the  same  facts, 
with  just  as  much  validity,  has  led  to  the  often  repeated 
stressing  of  this  fact  throughout  these  pages;  and,  having 
noticed  that  most  students  lose  the  thread  of  their  reading 
when  too  many  foot-notes  are  employed,  we  have  tried,  where- 
ever  possible,  to  embody  what  is  usually  placed  in  foot-notes,  • 
in  the  main  portion  of  the  paragraph. 

Contrary  to  most  volumes  written  on  any  subject,  we  have 
tried  to  present  both  sides  when  there  were  two,  or  more 
should  that  be  the  case.  We  have  likewise  tried  to  show  where 
much  error  may  be  found  in  the  teaching  of  both  high-school 
and  college  students,  in  that  not  sufficient  stress  is  laid  on 
the  all-important  difference  between  FACTS  and  INTER- 
PRETATIONS— on  the  varying  and  often  contradictory  be- 
liefs of  writers  on  Evolutionary  Science — on  the  deplorable 

9 


10  Preface 

lack  of  logical  and  philosophical  thinking — on  the  fallacy  of 
permitting  the  student  to  assume  that  because  an  hypothesis 
A  is  necessary  for  experimental  purposes,  it  must  be  true ;  and 
that  because  every  teacher  in  a  given  school  may  uphold  a 
doctrine,  it  does  not  follow  that  all  men  hold  it,  for  the  head 
of  the  department  usually  employs  only  those  teachers  who 
think  along  similar  lines,  or  very  often  are  the  result  of 
his  own  training,  they  having  been  his  own  pupils. 

W.  H.  Mallock  has  well  said  that  the  laboratory  man  has 
had  to  go  to  school  to  philosophy,  and  it  is  this  point  we 
wish  to  emphasize  more  than  any  other. 

We  have  therefore  tried  to  present  NECESSARY  STUDIES, 
which  must  form  the  foundation  of  any  vab'd  inter- 
pretation of  any  facts  found,  by  placing  a  goodly  list 
of  books  and  articles  in  our  chapter  on  "Suggested  Read- 
ings" that  will  bring  home  the  ideas  expressed  in  this  Preface 
and  permit  a  far  more  comprehensive  knowledge  of  LIFE  in 
general  than  any  course  or  courses  the  average  student  is 
likely  to  get  at  any  institution,  unless  he  specialize  for  many 
years. 

In  other  words,  the  object  and  aim  of  the  author  has  been 
%      to  show  what  is  necessary  for  a  broad,  logical,  and  clear- 
cut  view  of  Life;  what  theories  are  held  by  able  men  in  all 
v       the  various  walks  of  life;  where  and  how  they  agree  and 
where  and  how  they  do  not  agree — to  give  perspective. 

Great  pains  have  been  taken  to  make  every  statement,  date 
and  reference  accurate,  but  should  any  errors  have  crept  in, 
the  author  will  consider  it  a  favor  to  have  his  attention 
called  to  them. 

Thanks  are  due  to  all  the  members  of  the  faculty  of  the 

University  of  Dallas  for  their  ready  assistance  and  kindli- 

\      ness,  but  especially  to  the  Reverend  Peter  P.  Finney,  C.M., 

Ph.D.,  Professor  of  Philosophy,  whose  kindly  suggestions 


Preface  11 

and  wide  knowledge  in  his  chosen  field  have  been  of  untold 
assistance. 

Thanks  are  also  due  to  my  assistant,  Mr.  Fred  Rich,, 
B,A.,  for  the  careful  drawings  he  has  made  for  these  pages. 

EDWARD  J.  MENGE 

University  of  Dallas,  Texas. 

April  6,  1917. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.     BIOLOGICAL  LABORATORIES     .         ,  .  .  .  15 

II.     PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORIES        .  .  .  «  SO 

III.  GENETICS      .         .         *         .         .  .  ,  ,  47 

IV.  METAPHYSICS  AND  EPISTEMOLOGY  .  .  .  ,  66 
V.     LOGIC    .         .         .         .         .         .  ;  .>.-'  •*  .  84 

VI.     THE  PRESENT  STATUS  OP  EVOLUTIONARY  PHILOSO- 
PHY         .  *  •:.'•«.         .          .          .  »    '  1»  *  99 

VII.     THEORIES  OF  EVOLUTION         .         .  .  .  • '»  119 

VIII.     VITALISM        .         .         .         .         .  .  .  .151 

IX.     THE  IDEAL  .         .         .         .         .  .  .  .  187 

X.     AUTHORITIES          .'        .         .         .  .  .  .  196 

XI.     SUAIMARY     ,.         .         .         .         *  .  .  v  220 

XII.     SUGGESTED  READING      .         .       . .  .,  «  »  231 

INDEX  .  245 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF 
SCIENCE 

CHAPTER  I 

BIOLOGICAL  LABORATORIES 

The  Reason  for  Their  Existence 

MORE  and  more  the  classics  are  being  neglected  for 
the  modern  scientific  courses :  class-room  is  converted 
into  laboratory  and  the  subjects  of  interest  to  a  past  gen- 
eration of  college  men  and  women  seem  to  have  gone  from 
the  halls  of  learning  and  left  in  their  stead  but  echoes — 
echoes  which  are  ever  and  ever  growing  fainter  until  some- 
times it  seems  that  even  they  will  shortly  cease.  And  then 
come  the  questions:  "Why  has  the  college  and  high-school 
curriculum  so  changed?"  and  "Of  what  value  are  the  new 
studies?"  Questions  which  ever  and  ever  become  more  in- 
sistent in  their  demand  for  an  adequate  answer. 

The  student,  when  challenged,  quite  naturally  wishes  to 
defend  himself,  but  how  often  he  fails  we  know  too  well ;  men 
and  women,  though  long  since  away  from  the  class-room,  who 
yet  find  their  interests  along  scientific  lines  and  possess  that 
faculty  of  wanting  to  know  a  "why"  for  everything ;  parents 
who  cannot  understand  why  their  children  should  not  pass 
through  the  same  training  as  did  they ;  and  that  great  mass 
of  boys  and  girls  who  find  themselves  unable  to  attend  any 

15 


16       ,  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

of  our  schools  of  higher  learning,  but  spend  their  leisure 
moments  in  working,  and  dreaming,  and  yearning  for  the 
time  when  better  things  await  them,  and  who  now  treasure 
every  scrap  of  scientific  wisdom  and  fact,  but,  who,  unable 
to  explain  the  practical  value  of  it  all,  find  heartaches  which 
so  often  come  from  being  condemned  and  misunderstood  by 
those  at  home — for  all  these  this  little  volume  is  written,  and 
it  is  hoped  that  what  is  herein  contained,  may  stimulate  to 
efforts  along  lines  that  will  make  its  readers  capable  of 
knowing  "WHY." 

It  is  well  at  the  outset,  to  bear  in  mind  that  practically 
every  discussion  has  at  least  two  sides,  and  often  many  more. 
An  example  that  comes  to  mind  is  the  public  library.  There 
are  those  who  insist  that  the  object  of  a  library  must  be  to 
furnish  those  particular  books  which  people  wish  to  read; 
yet  certainly  something  may  be  said  for  those  who  believe 
that  only  a  few  of  the  wished-for  volumes  should  be  kept, 
and  these  but  incidentally — only  in  order  that  they  may  lead 
men  and  women  to  wish  for  those  that  are  really  worth-while 
— just  as  an  introduction  to  the  literature  that  means  some- 
thing— that  has  been  written  in  the  sweat  and  blood  of  the 
great  and  wondrous  of  all  ages — and  whose  pages  throb  with 
life,  and  show  that  human  nature  is  ever  the  same ;  that  the 
same  hopes,  the  same  longings,  the  same  loves  and  hates,  the 
same  sorrows,  and  the  same  bitterness  as  well  as  the  same 
contentment  and  glory  have  ever  been  with  us  all — may  it 
not  be  that  the  latter  school  have  some  right  to  their  view 
also? 

In  the  educational  world,  the  two  schools  may  be  said  to 
consist  of  those  who  believe  in  "culture"  for  its  own  sake, 
and  those  who,  being  more  in  harmony  with  their  time,  insist 
on  "usefulness."  The  former  believe  that  men  and  women 
who  have  had  the  opportunities  of  gathering  that  which  is 


Biological  Laboratories  17 

best  in  the  world  mentally,  should  form  a  class  by  themselves, 
and  by  their  higher  standards  and  ideals,  cause  others  to 
follow;  the  latter,  that,  as  most  pupils  leave  school  some- 
where around  the  sixth  grade,  and  but  one  out  of  every  hun- 
dred enters  college,  our  educational  system  should  be  made 
to  fit  the  many,  thereby  making  them  better  able  to  cope 
with  their  fellows  in  the  economic  struggle. 

It  would  seem  that  the  very  fact  of  these  two  extremes 
being  defended,  there  might  be  something  said  as  to  a  third 
school,  which  should  attempt  a  happy  medium,  and  try  to 
give  what  culture  it  could,  yet  not  neglect  the  "bread  and 
butter  side." 

From  a  purely  reasonable  viewpoint,  the  proper  way  of 
overcoming  the  difficulty  would  be  to  adopt  something  of  the 
German  method,  and  assign  the  different  children  to  different 
schools — those  who  are  to  enter  the  cultural  fields  taking  one 
course,  and  those  who  are  not,  another,  but  the  difficulties 
attending  any  reasonable  adjustment  are  self-evident  in  a 
democracy,  for  no  parent  would  be  willing  to  say  that  his 
sons  or  daughters  attended  the  "common"  schools  while  his 
neighbor's  attended  one  of  the  "cultural"  type.  And  then, 
further,  it  necessitates  the  parent's  choosing  what  career  his 
child  shall  follow,  and  should  the  child  himself  later  have 
something  to  say  in  opposition  to  the  parental  idea,  the  two 
schools  would  not  lend  themselves  very  well  to  an  exchange 
of  credits  for  actual  work  done. 

But  there  may  be  a  slight  unbending  on  the  part  of  both 
parties,  and  the  new  entries  into  the  curriculum  are  the  re- 
sult of  such  unbending.  French  and  German  as  well  as 
Spanish  have  found  a  place  side  by  side  with  the  classical 
Latin  and  Greek,  and  the  natural  sciences  with  their  labora- 
tory work,  as  well  as  the  vocational  studies,  have  shown  us 
that  sojnething  quite  practical  can  be  accomplished,  while 


18  The  Begmnmgs  of  Science 

yet  holding  to  ideals  that  are  not  low. 

There  is  little  objection  to  the  modern  languages,  but 
every  once  in  a  while  anathemas  are  hurled  against  the 
laboratory  and  the  shop;  not  that  these  in  themselves  are 
bad,  but  that  they  do  not  do  the  work  so  well  as  could  be 
done  under  trained  hands  after  leaving  school  and  at  much 
less  expense,  and  because  the  laboratory  tends  toward  a  one- 
sidedness  and  toward  a  materialistic  bias  that  is  not  pleasant 
for  those  who  look  to  other  ideals. 

But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  to  mankind  at  large  the 
most  positive  and  satisfactory  evidence  possible,  is  "to  see" 
— actually  to  have  the  thing  to  be  studied  and  understood, 
placed  before  one,  felt,  and  handled,  and  seen — for  with  "see- 
ing" and  at  least  one  additional  sense  being  brought  into 
service,  such  as  touch,  the  evidence  is  supposed  to  be  con- 
clusive, and  from  that  moment  the  individual's  faith  in  the 
correctness  of  his  belief  is  unshaken. 

The  laboratory  has  taken  advantage  of  this  sensible  evi- 
dence; in  fact,  that  is  the  laboratory's  justification.  It 
furnishes  understandable  evidence  for  the  thing  the  instruc- 
tor wishes  to  prove  (sometimes,  seemingly  a  great  deal  more 
as  well,  but  we  are  only  speaking  of  the  facts  found,  and  not 
the  interpretations  that  may  be  drawn  from  these  laboratory 
findings),  by  actual  handling  and  personal  observation.  It 
forces  each  student  to  visualize  the  things  studied;  to  call 
his  attention  to  the  wonderful  world  that  he  has  daily  passed 
unseen,  until  his  eye  has  been  trained  to  note  the  minutest 
detail;  to  understand  that  the  so-called  big  things  of  life 
are  really  but  a  very  small  part  of  life  after  all,  and  lastly, 
it  gives  him  the  advantage  over  an  opponent,  in  drawing  his 
examples  and  his  proofs  from  actually  existing  things  which 
he  himself  has  handled,  and  which  by  that  very  handling  and 
the  personal  conviction  resulting  therefrom,  carry  convic- 


Biological  Laboratories  19 

tion  in  their  turn. 

Now,  if  the  only  proof  any  of  us  are  willing  to  accept  is 
laboratory  proof  (proof  that  the  senses  bring),  it  needs 
must  follow  that  for  the  philosopher  as  well  as  the  natural 
scientist,  laboratory  work  is  of  greatest  importance.  We 
are  not  suggesting,  nor  are  we  willing  to  maintain  any  such 
thesis,  that  the  laboratory  alone  is  of  greatest  importance 
in  the  curriculum,  but  we  do  insist  that  it  is  of  the  utmost 
importance  for  the  proper  understanding  of  our  modern 
school  system,  and  for  the  proper  understanding  of  most  of 
our  modern  literature. 

Laboratory-work  means  the  class-work  of  the  science- 
student,  and  the  laboratory  is  but  the  class-room  fitted  with 
the  modern  equipment  necessary  for  weighing  and  measuring, 
for  taking  apart  and  analysing  the  various  objects  that  are 
to  be  studied.  And  by  natural  science  we  mean  "knowledge 
gained  and  verified  by  exact  observation  and  correct  think- 
ing, especially  when  methodically  formulated  and  arranged 
in  a  rational  system,"  *  or  as  Professor  Huxley  put  it,  "clas- 
sified common  sense."  It  is  the  latter  definition  which  will  be 
easier  of  remembrance  than  the  one  preceding  it,  and  it  is 
a  sufficient  definition  for  most  practical  purposes.  But  the 
point  upon  which  we  wish  to  lay  especial  emphasis  is  this, 
that  science  consists  of  KNOWLEDGE  which  we  have  suc- 
ceeded in  forcing  from  nature  by  constant  and  close  observa- 
tion, and  that  then,  we  have  taken  the  -facts  thus  -found  and 
through  our  intellect  have  formulated  them  into  a  system, 
and  read  a  meaning  into  them.  So  that  were  the  writer  asked 
as  to  what  studies  should  and  must  form  a  thorough  back- 
ground for  any  scientific  training,  he  would  unhesitatingly 
say  that  Logic,  Epistemology  and  Metaphysics,  after  at 
least  a  thorough  understanding  of  the  "problems  of  philos- 

aStandard  Dictionary. 


£0  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

ophy"  had  been  mastered,  are  absolutely  essential;  for,  cer- 
tainly observation  and  laboratory-work  mean  but  the  gath- 
ering of  facts;  then  to  use  these  facts  in  the  classification  of 
ideas  and  thought  processes,  the  laws  of  thought  and  of 
knowledge  must  be  known.  And  if  these  laws  were  more  often 
known  than  they  now  are,  a  wondrous  mass  of  hopeless  mis- 
understanding, which  results  only  on  account  of  the  loose- 
ness of  thought,  and  ignorance  of  Logic  and  First  Principles 
which  underlie  correct  thinking,  would  be  obviated. 

That  these  problems  of  philosophy  differ  from  those  of 
science,  but  are  nevertheless  built  upon  them,  as  a  house  of 
brick  must  needs  have  a  foundation  of  at  least  as  solid  a 
material,  is  self-evident.  Professor  Hibben  well  expresses 
the  difference  between  these  studies,  and  the  reader  can 
readily  see  the  necessity  for  them  both  to  make  a  complete 
man,  by  carefully  weighing  his  words :  "the  problem  of 
philosophy  differs  from  the  problem  of  science.  It  is  the 
problem  of  science  as  John  Stuart  Mill  puts  it,  Ho  discover 
what  are  the  fewest  number  of  phenomenal  data,  which  being 
granted,  will  explain  the  phenomena  of  experience.'  Phi- 
losophy probes  deeper.  It  seeks  to  reveal  the  raison  d'etre  of 
these  fundamental  data,  and  their  relation  to  the  thinking 
self  which  observes  them,  and  reasons  about  them,  as  well 
as  their  relation  to  the  power  which  constitutes  and  directs 
their  elemental  energy.  The  philosopher  should  be  the 
'synoptic'  man,  one  who  sees  the  verities  of  life  in  their  true 
relations,  properly  co-ordinated  and  subordinated,  and  who 
in  particular  pursuits,  however  absorbing,  does  not  ignore 
the  unity  of  the  whole,  nor  overlook  the  universal  aspect 
even  of  the  commonplaces  of  life."  2 

It  is  then  the  duty  and  the  ultimate  pursuit  of  the  labora- 
tory-student to  gather  facts,  whether  to  substantiate  a  new 
2  Problems  of  Philosophy,  by  John  Grier  Hibben  (Scribner's). 


Biological  Laboratories  £1 

theory  or  to  break  an  old  one,  but  it  must  always  lie  with  the 
philosopher  who  is  familiar  with  the  laws  of  thought  and  who, 
like  the  general  on  the  battle  field,  can  stand  on  an  eminence 
and  overlook  the  entire  field  of  vision,  rather  than  with  him 
who  keeps  his  eye  glued  to  the  microscope,  to  give  us  the  ac- 
tual results  in  terms  that  are  meaningful,  though,  even  here 
it  is  most  essential  that  he  who  is  the  general  must  know  the 
work  of  all  of  his  subalterns  before  he  himself  is  competent 
to  pass  such  judgment. 

It  can  be  said,  that  any  natural  science  teaches  the  student 
the  value  and  the  necessity  of  the  closest  observation,  so  that 
no  detail  escapes  him,  and  alone  can  give  him  that  sensible 
proof  for  any  statement  he  may  make.  This  is  its  disciplin- 
ary side  and  so  ranks  with  mathematics  and  kindred  dis- 
ciplinary studies. 

Now  as  to  the  practical  value  of  natural  science:  we  shall 
take  Biology  as  our  example;  not  because  it  may  be  of 
greater  value  than  any  other  from  this  viewpoint,  but  be- 
cause embracing  as  it  does  the  entire  study  of  everything 
that  possesses  life,  it  covers  a  wider  field,  and  is  therefore 
more  applicable  to  what  we  are  attempting. 

Biology  comes  from  the  Greek  words  "Bios"  and  "Logos." 
The  former  meaning  "life"  and  the  latter  "a  discourse" ;  or 
as  we  usually  say,  "ology"  means  "science  of".  So  then,  we 
have  Biology  meaning  the  "science  of  life",  that  is,  the  study 
of  all  living  things,  both  plants  and  animals.  In  fact  the 
usual  preliminary  course  in  Biology  consists  of  Botany  (the 
study  of  plant  life)  and  Zoology  (the  study  of  animal  life), 
while  under  these  headings  we  have  as  principal  divisions, 
such  subjects  as  Anatomy  (the  study  of  every  separate  divi- 
sion of  the  plant  or  animal  body  as  displayed  after  death  by 
dissection),  Physiology  (the  study  of  the  functions  of  the 
living  plant  or  animal),  Embryology  (the  study  of  the  plant 


22  The  Begmrwngs  of  Science 

or  animal  from  the  moment  of  conception  until  the  time  it  is 
ready  to  lead  a  more  or  less  independent  existence  as  an  in- 
dividual), Taxonomy  (the  study  of  classification,  so  that 
one  may  at  a  moment's  notice  know  how  to  arrange  any  new 
structure  found,  though  never  having  seen  it  before),  Path- 
ology (the  study  of  diseased  tissues),  Histology  (the  study 
of  the  cellular  structure  of  normal  tissues),  Bacteriology 
(the  study  of  minute  plant  life),  Psychology  (the  study  of 
mental  phenomena),  and  Sociology  (the  study  of  group  for- 
mation, or  social  organization). 

Probably  it  will  be  readily  acceded  to,  that  for  those  who 
study  medicine,  or  follow  similar  lines  of  investigation,  a 
course  in  biology  is  and  must  be  of  supreme  importance ;  but 
why  should  a  man  who  is  to  become  a  lawyer  or  a  merchant, 
or  any  one  of  the  host  of  other  professions  which  our  com- 
plex life  offers,  spend  time  in  mastering  the  details  (for  the 
whole  study  is  practically  a  mass  of  detail-work)  of  a  science 
which  seemingly  he  cannot  use  in  his  chosen  work? 

The  answer  is,  that  as  Biology  is  the  study  of  all  things 
living,  a  knowledge  of  it  is  more  than  essential  to  a  complete 
understanding  of  oneself  physically  and  mentally;  in  other 
words  a  thorough  knowledge  of  what  Biology  can  present, 
means  that  we  have  fulfilled  the  command,  as  completely  as 
it  is  possible  to  fulfill  it,  "Know  Thyself." 

All  too  often  we  forget  that  a  chosen  "career"  is  but  the 
outcome  of  what  he  who  makes  the  "career"  happens  to  be 
physically  and  mentally — it  is  but  an  expression  of  his  Bio- 
logical make-up,  and  surely,  if  this  is  true,  it  means  much  to 
KNOW  what  the  study  of  all  things  biological  can  show  us 
as  to  our  weaknesses  and  our  strength  in  everything  we  are, 
or  can  be.  And  just  as  it  is  the  knowledge  of  his  engine  that 
makes  a  good  engineer,  it  is  the  knowledge  of  himself  that 
makes  the  man  who  makes  the  "career".  Is  it  any  more  un- 


Biological  Laboratories  23 

reasonable  then,  to  suggest  to  each  that  he  understand  him- 
self and  know  how  he  works  (always  using  our  terms  to  in- 
clude both  the  physical  and  the  mental)  than  it  is  to  have 
one  who  only  knows  how  to  pull  a  lever,  handle  an  engine,  and 
suggest  that  if  anything  goes  wrong,  he  call  the  doctor?  Is 
it  any  moVe  unreasonable  to  ask  a  man  to  know  what  not  to 
do,  so  as  to  prevent  misfortune  occurring  to  himself,  than  it 
is  to  insist  on  an  engineer's  knowledge  of  what  is  harmful  to 
his  engine  and  thereby  prevent  misfortune? 

Certain  foods  do  not  agree  with  some  people.  They  learn 
this  from  actual  experience.  This  is  nature's  laboratory 
method.  To  experiment  on  every  detail  of  life  would  take 
far  more  time  than  is  given  to  any  one  man  on  earth,  and 
so  instead  of  using  nature's  laboratory  in  this  way  and  work- 
ing out  every  detail,  great  numbers  of  men  work  on  certain 
problems  for  years  and  outline  representative  experiments 
which  may  be  performed  by  each  individual,  thereby  giving 
to  each  a  sort  of  condensed  experience  of  the  world's  life. 

When  it  is  realized  that  at  least  one-half  of  all  deaths  not 
due  to  old  age,  are  caused  by  plants,  namely  bacteria,  it  will 
be  seen  that  for  any  one  not  particularly  caring  to  shorten 
his  life  by  one-half  or  more,  it  might  prove  of  value  to  pay 
at  least  a  little  attention  to  bacteriology. 

One  of  the  great  German  materialists  said  that  a  "man  is 
what  he  eats"  and  when  we  realize  that  there  is  very  little 
we  eat  except  salt  and  water,  that  we  do  not  get  from  plants, 
even  though  these  plants  are  first  eaten  by  animals  and 
converted  into  meats,  we  get  some  idea  of  the  importance  of 
what  the  study  of  plant-life  might  mean  to  us. 

To  the  stock-breeder  and  the  animal  lover  a  knowledge  of 
the  very  fundamentals  of  life's  process  certainly  must  be  of 
value ;  and  to  the  agriculturist,  the  gardener,  the  rancher, 
or  the  farmer,  the  reasons  why  plants  thrive  better  in  one 


24t  The  Begmnmgs  of  Science 

place  than  another,  the  reasons  why  disease  kills  crops  and 
prevents  the  mortgage  from  being  absolved,  Biology  must 
readily  commend  itself. 

The  merchant  whose  customers  leave  him  because  his  sup- 
ply of  meat  and  eggs  are  not  what  is  wanted,  whose  store's 
appearance  prevents  the  best  customers  from  coming,  might 
quite  readily  learn  the  "why"  of  it  all  did  he  become  inter- 
ested in  what  Biology  can  tell  him  in  this  regard. 

The  family  who  has  seen  one  after  another  of  its  members 
droop  from  some  supposedly  inherited  disease,  constantly 
adding  to  the  list  of  preventable  deaths,  might  realize  what 
it  would  have  meant  to  them,  had  some  member  of  the  family 
known  a  little  about  the  subject. 

And  lastly  for  those  who  appreciate  to  the  fullest,  scrupu- 
lous cleanliness,  both  mentally  and  bodily,  there  is  some 
satisfaction  in  knowing  "why"  they  feel  such  pleasure. 

But  Biology  has  its  drawbacks.  Taught  by  those  who 
have  had  little  or  no  philosophical  training;  who  are  inca- 
pable of  grasping  deep  and  underlying  factors  which  the 
superficial  never  can  grasp  or  understand,  the  great  mass  of 
men  and  women  take  only  the  seen,  and  forget  that  "not  to 
see  a  thing"  does  not  mean  the  same  as  "it  isn't  there." 
There  are  a  great  many  things  we  cannot  see  that  are  exist- 
ent, as  is  so  well  exemplified  by  the  fact  that  when  the  micro- 
scope was  invented  thousands  of  objects  were  displayed  to 
the  eye  that  up  to  that  time  had  never  been  dreamed  of,  and 
the  microscope  is  very,  very  far  from  letting  us  see  all  there 
is.  Let  us  not  then  fall  into  so  crass  an  error  as  denying 
what  cannot  be  seen.  Let  us  rather  put  it  more  truthfully 
and  more  scientifically,  by  saying  "it  has  not  been  seen  and 
that  is  all  we  can  say". 

The  unlike  training  of  philosophical  and  scientific  students 
causes  a  breach  that  is  difficult  to  overcome,  for  neither  one 


Biological  Laboratories  25 

understands  the  other.  Both  sometimes  forget  that  there 
are  minds  which  we  might  term  "legal"  whose  possessors  re- 
quire an  absolute  law,  definitely  stated  with  no  possibility  of 
an  exception,  or  life  is  by  no  means  sweet  and  perfect,  while 
to  another  type  of  mind,  the  impossibility  of  definite  and 
concentrated  formulations  causes  that  vague  "feeling"  that 
things  are  as  they  should  be,  but,  unable  to  defend  these  feel- 
ings, their  possessors  cease  in  time  even  to  care  to  defend 
them,  and  assume  that  unless  another  feels  the  same  way, 
the  idea  of  an  explanation  is  absurd;  while  men  of  still  an- 
other type,  realizing  their  own  inability  to  delve  deep  and 
long  into  a  chosen  study,  and  probably  too,  realizing  their 
own  shortcomings  in  the  possibility  of  making  up  their  own 
minds  when  the  evidence  may  appear  nearly  equal  on  both 
sides,  insist  on  authority  alone. 

We  have  then,  three  types  of  mind  to  consider,  the  Legal, 
the  Emotional,  and  the  Authority-seeking,  and  each  of  these 
requires  a  separate  manner  of  handling.  They  might  all  be- 
lieve and  hold  the  self-same  doctrines  and  yet  be  hopelessly 
at  outs  with  each  other  because  the  same  words  carry  differ- 
ent meanings  to  each. 

Of  the  three  types  mentioned,  the  average  student  is  what 
we  have  called  the  Authority-seeking.  He  is  inclined  to  say 
to  himself,  that  so  and  so  KNOWS  and  he  will  ask  him.  He 
refuses  to  do  his  own  thinking.  If  his  physician  tells  him  a 
thing  should  be  done,  he  supposes  the  physician  knows,  in- 
stead of  getting  a  reasonable  explanation,  and  finding  for 
himself  whether  the  rules  of  correct  thinking  and  common 
sense  are  being  followed. 

So  in  the  lower  school-grades  the  pupil  is  very  definitely 
told  that  a  thing  is  either  so  or  not  so,  as  the  case  may  be. 
He  is  to  believe  without  questioning.  In  high-school,  some 
thought  is  permitted,  but  not  much;  in  college  there  is  still 


86  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

a  little  more  broadening  out,  and  some  one  has  said  that 
graduate  work  is  for  the  sole  purpose  of  learning  that  the 
things  one's  previous  instructors  had  taught  were  not  so. 
In  other  words,  in  graduate  work,  a  man  is  supposed  to  have 
the  fundamentals  of  knowledge ;  to  know  the  laws  of  thought ; 
to  be  able  to  detect  fallacious  reasoning,  and  to  be  able  to 
distinguish  the  false  from  the  true,  and  consequently  he  is 
given  all  the  arguments  for  and  against  a  given  problem  and 
has  to  make  up  his  own  mind.  Very  often  he  may  study  with 
the  same  master  for  years  and  yet  not  know  what  are  this 
instructor's  personal  views  on  a  given  subject. 

It  may  be  stated  that  the  same  person  may  be  of  the  legal, 
emotional  and  authority-seeking  type  of  mind  at  the  same 
time,  or  possess  any  degree  of  any  one  or  all  of  them,  or  in 
his  developmental  period  may  be  one  for  a  time,  gradually 
going  into  one  or  both  of  the  others,  or  he  may  have  certain 
prepossessions  on  which  he  thinks  only  emotionally  while 
using  either  of  the  other  types  of  thought  on  all  other  sub- 
jects. 

It  may  be  that  one  may  have  been  perfectly  satisfied  with 
the  emotional  state,  that  is,  feel  content  to  simply  know  what 
one  thinks  is  so,  but  being  unable  to  tell  others  in  clear-cut 
language  why  the  feeling  of  knowledge  is  there,  and  meet- 
ing some  one  who  has  excellent  and  telling  arguments  against 
the  idea  under  discussion,  the  individual  being  unable  to  de- 
fend himself,  realizes  that  there  is  something,  after  all,  in  the 
legal  type,  and  then  and  there  he  would  give  much  to  be  able 
to  tell  exactly  what  he  -feels  and  why  he  feels  it. 

It  may  be  that  one  of  the  authoritative  type  may  have 
the  utmost  confidence  in  one  whom  he  thinks  knows,  but  find- 
ing the  "knowing-one"  unable  to  cope  with  an  adversary, 
sees  all  foundation  taken  from  under  his  own  feet,  and  then 
he  faces  the  interesting  and  perplexing  question  of  who  is 


Biological  Laboratories  27 

to  be  his  authority,  for  having  found  himself  wrong  in  the 
one  case,  how  can  he  tell  he  will  not  be  wrong  again? 

Does  it  not  all  revert  back  to  the  legal  type?  To  the  one 
who  KNOWS  and  KNOWS  THAT  HE  KNOWS  and  can  definitely 
and  in  understandable  language  give  a  reasonable  account 
for  his  beliefs? 

And  should  one  be  of  the  legal  type,  or  ultimately  become 
so,  and  further,  should  one  likewise  desire  consistency  in  the 
search  for  truth,  one  must  try  to  find  some  First  Principles, 
for  one  cannot  build  without  building  material,  and  First 
Principles  are  the  first  things  we  must  have  in  order  to  be 
able  to  do  any  thinking  or  any  constructive  work  whatever. 
Of  course,  we  cannot  find  any  First  Principles  or  first  causes 
in  Biology,  but  we  can  find  material  on  which  to  build  a  first 
cause;  after  all,  we  have  to  speak  and  think  in  terms  of 
the  sensible — and  sensible  things  are  those  that  come  under 
the  senses — laboratory  evidence. 

So,  then,  as  far  as  we  know,  spirit — or  life — never  shows 
itself  except  through  some  bodily  form.  Every  thought  we 
have  must  be  based  on  physical  experience — that  is,  there 
can  be  nothing  in  the  mind  that  has  not  got  there  through 
the  senses.  We  find  that  different  states  of  the  body  seem 
to  affect  our  mental  state,  such  as  when  we  have  been  work- 
ing arduously  we  cannot  think  clearly,  or  as  a  philosopher 
has  said,  "One  cannot  hoe  cabbage  and  philosophize  at  the 
same  time".  And  yet  there  is  a  very  large  school  of  men 
who  deny  even  this,  that  the  body  can  have  any  effect  what- 
ever on  the  mind  or  the  mind  on  the  body.  They  have  very 
many  good  arguments  to  sustain  their  views  and  they  draw 
them  largely  from  Biology.  The  opposite  side  also  draws 
its  arguments  from  the  same  source,  so  that,  it  is  absolutely 
impossible  for  any  one  accepting  either  side  of  the  argument 
to  be  able  to  defend  his  own  view  or  legitimately  to  find  flaws 


28  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

in  the  opposing  one,  unless  he  is  familiar  with  the  very  fount 
from  which  both  sides  have  drawn  their  evidence. 

If  the  view  is  correct  which  many  hold,  that  the  ultimate 
beginning  of  things  is  wholly  independent  of  any  spiritual 
cause,  and  is  simply  the  mechanistic  working  out  of  some 
fundamental  substance,  then  the  support  for  those  who  con- 
tend that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  absolute  right  and  wrong 
is  withdrawn.  In  other  words,  if  to  obey  the  ten  command- 
ments, for  example,  is  right,  because  a  Supreme  Being  has 
given  them  to  humanity,  if  there  be  no  Supreme  Being,  quite 
naturally  He  could  not  have  given  any  commandments,  and 
no  commandments  having  been  given,  it  is  absurd  to  assume 
the  obeying  of  something  which  doesn't  exist,  is  or  can  be 
right. 

This  chain  of  argument  could  be  followed  out  indefinitely, 
but  the  point  to  be  made  is  simply  this,  that  the  viewpoint  of 
many  very  able  men  is  materialistic,  the  reasons  being,  in  all 
probability  as  Dr.  Martineaux  suggests,  that  as  long  as  our 
education  is  one-sided,  and  men  are  more  under  the  influence 
of  the  seen  than  the  unseen,  this  condition  will  continue  to 
flourish;  but  that  does  not  change  their  view,  and  if  one 
wishes  to  feel  positive  that  one  is  right,  it  is  most  essential 
that  a  defense  can  be  given  to  all  one's  beliefs,  and  no  matter 
to  what  school  a  person  belongs,  if  he  wishes  to  do  this  he 
must  know  something  about  the  natural  sciences,  and  prefer- 
ably some  of  the  laboratory  work  of  Biology. 

If  then,  Biology  is  so  far-reaching,  that  with  it,  and  upon 
its  findings  we  may  apparently  destroy  every  vestige  of  our 
reasons  for  morality,  as  just  shown  in  the  downfall  of  the 
theory  of  right  and  wrong;  if  the  only  evidence  we  accept 
in  proof  of  any  theory  is  laboratory  evidence;  if  every  act 
that  is  done,  every  plant  that  is  grown,  every  thought  that 
the  mind  can  hold,  every  impulse  that  nerve-arcs  may  bring 


Biological  Laboratories  29 

forth,  every  movement  we  may  make,  every  disease  we  may 
have,  every  emotion  we  may  feel,  comes  under  the  study  of 
LIFE,  and  if  Biology  is  the  Science  of  Life  in  all  of  its  many 
manifestations,  is  it  not  worth  our  study? 


CHAPTER  II 

PSYCHOLOGICAL    LABORATORIES 

THIS  chapter  aims  to  do  three  things  and  only  three, 
and  these  are  to  be  treated  as  briefly  as  possible,  con- 
sistent with  clearness  and  simplicity. 

It  aims  to  give  a  short  survey  of  why  men's  interests  have 
gone  from  the  problems  of  the  mind  to  the  gathering  of 
observational  facts ;  to  show  some  of  the  practical  aspects  of 
Modern  Psychology ;  and  lastly  to  point  out  that  it  is  Mod- 
ern Psychology  that  may  yet  prove  the  via  media  by  which 
the  thinker  of  to-day  may  be  brought  back  into  his  own, 
while  yet  not  lessening  the  standing  of  the  sorely  needed  ob- 
server as  well. 

It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  the  distinction  between 
observer  and  thinker  be  thoroughly  understood.  The  former 
attempts  to  find  the  actually  existent  and  to  describe  it,  the 
latter,  too,  is  interested  in  all  things  that  actually  exist,  but 
this  is  not  the  end  he  has  in  view,  for,  to  him  there  are 
^  REASONS  for  all  things,  and  his  end  and  aim  is  to  find  those 
reasons.  It  is  so  often  the  case  that  because  some  one  has 
described  something,  that  many  assume  that  it  has  been  ex- 
plained, but  the  difference  between  a  description  and  an  ex- 
planation is  too  self-evident  to  escape  any  one  who  will  give 
the  matter  the  slightest  attention. 

To  be  an  observer,  then,  requires  a  vast  quantity  of  pa- 
tience and  accuracy.  To  be  a  philosopher  requires  likewise 
these  accomplishments,  but  in  addition  thereto,  one  must 
have  the  ability  to  detach  oneself  from  oneself  and  to  think 


Psychological  Laboratories  31 

not  only  of  the  facts  found,  but  to  think  of  one's  own 
thoughts;  to  analyse,  to  classify,  and  to  see  the  vast  mass 
of  thought  in  its  relation  to  everything  else  connected  with 
it.  It  requires  sustained  mental  effort. 

And  it  is  right  here  that  we  cross  the  line  of  demarcation 
that  separates  knowledge  from  wisdom.  The  knowing  man 
is  he  who  accumulates  a  quantity  of  facts ;  the  wise  man  is 
he  who  knows  how  to  explain  them — to  fit  these  same  facts 
in  their  respective  places  accurately  and  well,  and  who  can 
then  tell  why  they  fit  in  those  particular  places  and  no  other. 
In  other  words,  the  former  seeks  to  perceive  as  much  as  he 
may,  the  latter  to  tell  what  it  all  means  after  the  perceptions 
have  been  gathered. 

The  wise  men  of  the  ancients  were  philosophers ;  the  think- 
ers of  all  times  who  have  changed  the  course  of  thought  on 
this  earth  of  ours,  have  always  and  ever  been  philosophers. 
President  Hibben  of  Princeton  University  means  this  when 
he  says,  "The  standards  of  every  age,  individual,  social  and 
political,  have  been  modified  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  by 
the  influence  of  philosophical  discussion.  The  doctrines  of 
the  schools  become  at  last  the  maxims  of  the  crowd.  The 
eighteenth  century  philosophers  cannot  wash  their  hands  of 
the  blood  of  the  French  Revolution."  * 

Bearing  in  mind  that  for  over  three  thousand  years  the 
wise  man — the  great  man — the  really  worth-while  man — 
was  the  philosopher,  it  is  interesting  to  note  what  causes 
brought  about  this  change  and  why  only  during  the  last 
century  men  have  turned  from  the  realms  of  philosophy  to 
the  realms  of  perception.  But  even  though  this  change  of 
interest  be  a  fact,  we  must  not  forget  that  the  value  of  the 
thinker  is  no  less  among  the  learned,  nor  has  it  ever  been,  but 
it  is  only  to  mankind  at  large,  untrained  to  note  fine  distinc- 

1  Problems  of  Philosophy. 


32  The  Begwnmgs  of  Science 

tions,  that  the  philosopher  has  come  to  be  almost  an  unknown 
figure. 

There  must  be  a  reason  for  this,  and  we  infer  that  it  is 
probably  due  to  the  rapid  increase  in  the  number  of  schools 
taking  place  about  the  same  time  that  the  microscope,  tele- 
scope and  other  revolutionizing  instruments  were  being  per- 
fected. There  are  so  many  things  in  this  world  of  ours — 
our  interests  are  so  varied  and  so  multitudinous — that  such 
an  instrument  as  the  microscope,  offering  as  it  did,  the  ex- 
citement of  new  discoveries — of  findings  that  men  had  not 
even  dreamed  of — brought  forth  such  a  host  of  investigators, 
who  constantly  sought  for  new  wonders  with  which  to  as- 
tonish the  world.  The  many  new  schools  that  were  opening 
in  all  parts  of  the  world  found,  that  to  be  abreast  of  the 
times  they  must  needs  install  one  or  more  of  these  investi- 
gators. Students  who  being  unable  to  sustain  the  strain  of 
constant  philosophic  thinking  in  the  abstract,  and  having 
been  brought  up  amidst  surroundings  that  led  to  no  thought 
of  anything  except  the  material,  knew  not  what  "soul"  or 
"spirit"  meant.  To  them  there  was  only  the  "seen  world" ; 
this  alone  was  real.  Three  or  four  generations  of  such  train- 
ing and  always  we  shall  have  the  same  result.  Men  became 

accustomed  to  the  evidence  of  the  senses  and  would  listen  to 

% 

nothing  else.  All  must  begin  with  the  senses.  Philosophy 
had  not  yet  had  time  to  manage  itself  and  adopt  the  new 
terms,  and  the  excitement  was  so  intense,  that  it  probably 
would  not  have  mattered  anyway,  at  that  time. 

But  starting  with  the  senses  was  the  way  the  thinker  had 
always  begun.  The  philosophy  of  the  past  had  always  in- 
sisted that  there  could  be  nothing  in  the  intellect  that  did  not 
come  through  the  senses ;  but  the  new  men  in  the  field  of  ob- 
servation used  the  terms  of  the  past  in  so  totally  a  different 
way  that  he  who  knew  philosophy  could  no  longer  converse 


Psychological  Laboratories  33 

with  a  colleague  in  terms  that  meant  the  same  to  both,  and 
so  it  became  necessary  for  the  philosopher  to  step  down  from 
his  century-old  throne  and  walk  far  afield  in  order  to  bring 
back  those  who  had  strayed  from  their  ancient  home.  He 
had,  and  still  has,  to  use  the  most  commonplace  examples,  to 
make  his  thoughts  understandable  to  the  observer.  But  what 
cared  the  observer  for  abstract  thought?  He  was  an  ex- 
plorer on  the  then  great  unknown  sea  of  minute  observation 
and  he  was  ever  finding  something  new  with  which  to  astonish 
the  world  and  bring  to  himself  enconiums  and  emolument. 
The  world  was  at  his  feet;  men  wrote  of  him;  spoke  of  him; 
honored  him  and  above  all  paid  him.  But,  just  as  the  in- 
dividual becomes  tired  when  kept  at  a  task  too  long,  so,  too, 
does  the  race.  And  when  volumes  had  been  given  man  with 
one  new  discovery  after  another — when  the  eye  had  told  us 
what  could  be  seen  here  and  there  when  magnified  from  a 
hundred  to  several  thousand  times — the  question  formulated 
itself — well,  what  of  it?  We  admit  what  you  see;  what  you 
say  may  be  there,  but  what  of  it? 

It  was  the  old,  old  yearning  implanted  in  every  man  to 
feel  a  conviction  that  the  things  he  says  or  does  actually 
mean  something.  What  of  it?  We  had  gathered  thousands 
of  facts  and  now  we  wanted  to  know  what  was  to  be  done 
with  them.  That  became  a  vital  question. 

The  great  wave  that  carried  upon  it  so  many  men  into 
observational  fields  quite  naturally  carried  with  it  also  a  few, 
who,  having  broken  loose  from  their  anchorage  in  the  thought 
of  the  past,  and  who,  having  had  the  philosophical  training 
which  bound  them  to  that  past,  could  observe  and  interpret 
as  well.  To  these  men  we  owe  both  the  good  and  the  bad 
that  has  had  any  lasting  influence  in  the  scientific  world. 
Trained  as  they  were  in  the  laws  of  thought,  they  were  often 
wonderful  logicians  and  carried  out  their  thoughts  with  an 


\ 


34  The  Eegmmmgs  of  Science 

inexorableness  that  is  more  than  marvelous.  But  we  must 
never  forget  that  logic  teaches  us  only  the  rules  of  correct 
reasoning.  It  does  not  guarantee  a  true  conclusion.  It 
only  guarantees  a  correct  conclusion  from  the  premise 
originally  adopted.  That  is,  one  may  come  to  a  very  er- 
roneous conclusion,  but  be  perfectly  correct  in  one's  reason- 
ing, because  the  thing  with  which  one  started  was  incorrect. 

Starting  then  as  did  these  men,  with  many  and  many  a 
premis&  that  we  have  since  learned  cannot  be  substantiated, 
they  built  up  logically  a  wonderful  edifice,  all  of  which  has 
crumbled  into  dust  because  the  foundation  upon  which  they 
built  has  been  demolished  by  later  investigators. 

This  is  then  a  short  sketch  of  how  and  why  the  great 
changes  we  are  recounting,  took  place,  and  why  it  is,  that 
now,  no  matter  what  our  subject  may  be,  aside  from  the  First 
Principles  of  Knowledge,  we  must  produce  laboratory  evi- 
dence for  anything  we  wish  to  have  accepted,  for  it  is  still 
true  that  the  great  mass  of  students  in  our  colleges  and  uni- 
versities receive  practically  no  training  whatever  in  the 
grammar  of  thought,  Logic,  but  are  let  run  loose  over  the 
entire  intellectual  field  without  a  single  law  to  guide  them. 
Is  it  to  be  wondered  at  that  so  many  absurd  theories  are 
afloat? 

Now,  philosophy  means  to  love  wisdom  and  a  philosopher 
is  one  who  loves  wisdom,  and  "the  problems  of  philosophy 
are  really  the  problems  of  life,  the  burden  and  the  mystery 
of  existence,  the  origin  and  destiny  of  man,  the  relations 
which  he  sustains  to  the  world  of  which  he  is  a  part,  and  to 
the  unseen  universe  which  lies  about  him.  Though  they  may 
not  be  couched  in  philosophical  language  such  questionings 
of  heart  and  of  mind  we  cannot  wholly  silence."  2 

And  one  of  the  greatest  branches  of  philosophy — the  one 

2Problems  of  Philosophy. 


Psychological  Laboratories  &5 

solving  the  great  problems  of  the  mental  world — is  what 
we  call  Psychology;  the  "science  of  the  soul"  as  it  was 
originally  called  by  the  Greeks,  but  which  we  now  call  the 
"science  of  mental  phenomena."  Again  it  will  be  observed 
that  there  is  an  attempt  made  to  bring  down  the  realms  of 
the  unseen  to  the  laboratory.  The  "science  of  mental  phe- 
nomena," meaning  nearly  always  the  actual  seeable  and 
hearable — in  fact,  all  sensitivity  that  can  be  studied  in  the 
laboratory. 

Not  the  thing  that  is  behind  all  sensitivity;  not  how  and 
why  we  have  this  sensitivity ;  not  what  it  is  for ;  but  what  can 
we  bring  under  the  senses  and  then  what  theories  can  we 
advance  on  our  findings.  This  is  what  we  mean  by  saying 
that  the  philosopher  has  had  to  go  far  afield  to  bring  back 
the  wandering  son. 

It  is  upon  Psychology  then,  that  philosophy  largely  rests, 
for  certainly  if  there  be  no  "mind" — that  is,  no  thinking 
self — we  could  have  no  philosophy  at  all.  So  nearly  three 
thousand  years  ago  the  Grecian  sages  saw  with  their  "mental 
eye"  that  there  was  something  beyond  the  physical  alone. 
They  realized  that  the  physical  eye  could  but  throw  an 
image;  that  the  object  itself  at  which  one  looked  did  not 
enter  the  eye — only  the  image  did  that.  They  found  that 
more  or  less  rapid  movements  of  air  were  converted  into 
sound  when  the  ear  was  normal,  and  they  set  about  trying  to 
find  why  this  was  so. 

This  was  the  birth  of  Psychology,  as  a  defined  part  of 
Philosophy,  but  what  we  now  qualify  by  calling  Rational  or 
Philosophical  Psychology.  It  merely  tried  to  explain  through 
the  process  of  reasoning  and  not  by  experiment,  and  this 
method  has  come  down  to  us  through  the  ages,  honored  by 
the  greatest  minds  of  all  times,  and  still  dominating  the  great 
mass  of  men  and  women.  But,  while  experimentation  has  not 


36  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

been  able  to  overpower  reason,  the  methods  of  the  past  have 
fallen  into  neglect  and  so  we,  who  place  reason  on  the  high- 
est pinnacle,  must  experiment,  in  order  that  the  truths  of  the 
past  doctrines  may  not  be  lost.  Men  do  not  often  accept 
a  priori  reasoning  now.  They  want  to  see  the  evidence.  They 
cannot  sustain  the  great  mental  lengths  of  the  past  and 
reason  it  all  out.  It  must  be  placed  before  them  in  as  simple 
a  form  mentally  as  we  explain  physical  things  to  the  infant, 
so  that  some  have  thought  that  by  actual  non-use  of  our 
reasoning  powers  we  are  as  a  people,  descending  in  the 
realm  of  the  intellect  while  ascending  in  the  realm  of  the  ap- 
plication of  the  things  we  do  hold. 

And  so  Modern  Psychology,  or  Experimental  Psychology, 
or  Physiological  Psychology,  all  meaning  practically  the 
same  thing,  was  born  in  the  laboratory.  It  should  rather 
be  said  thai  the  laboratory  was  its  mother  and  insanity  its 
father,  for  if,  as  Dr.  Henry  Smith  Williams  contends,  Mod- 
ern Psychology  was  born  in  the  year  1795,  when  Dr.  Pinel 
removed  the  shackles  from  the  insane  in  Paris,  and  if,  as  will 
be  observed  in  his  statement  of  that  event,  all  the  past  was 
to  be  heartily  condemned,  we  can  read  into  it  all,  it  would 
seem,  the  ideas  of  one  who  is  not  very  familiar  with  either 
what  the  past  stood  for  or  attempted,  but  whose  view,  never- 
theless, is  the  prevailing  one ;  he  says :  "And  so  it  chanced 
that  in  striking  the  shackles  from  the  insane,  Pinel  and  his 
confreres  struck  a  blow  also,  unwittingly,  at  time-honored 
philosophical  traditions.  The  liberation  of  the  insane  from 
the  dungeons  was  an  augury  of  the  liberation  of  psychology 
from  the  musty  recesses  of  metaphysics.  Hitherto,  psychol- 
ogy, in  so  far  as  it  existed  at  all,  was  but  the  subjective 
study  of  individual  minds :  in  the  future  it  must  become  ob- 
jective as  well,  taking  into  account  also  the  relations  which 
the  mind  bears  to  the  body  and  in  particular  to  the  brain 


Psychological  Laboratories  37 

and  nervous  system."3 

If  the  laws  of  Genetics  mean  anything,  we  know  that  the 
offspring  of  one  or  both  parents  who  are  insane,  may  be 
and  usually  are  far  from  sane,  may  it  not  be  possible  to  ap- 
ply these  same  laws  here  and  suggest  that  if  insanity  was 
the  father  of  Modern  Psychology  that  that  accounts  for  so 
many  near-insane  applications  suggested  or  ideas  promul- 
gated by  insufficient  experimentation  and  almost  half-witted 
evidence?  But  we  must  not  forget  that  the  working  out  of 
the  same  laws  which  may  render  men  dead  to  one  sense  may 
also  increase  another  faculty  and  make  him  a  genius,  and  so, 
too,  from  this  experimentation  during  but  a  comparatively 
few  years  we  have  obtained  benefits  that  mean  more  to  us 
and  have  a  more  far-reaching  effect  than  many  of  the 
thoughts  we  have  been  quarreling  over  for  centuries. 

It  is  in  this  abnormal  field  that  we  have  found  so  much 
that  throws  light  on  the  normal,  so  that  for  any  one  desirous 
of  knowing  anything  about  alienism,  it  is  absolutely  essential 
that  a  knowledge  of  both  normal  and  abnormal  psychology 
be  thoroughly  mastered,  notwithstanding  that  there  are 
those  who  contend  that  the  mind  is  but  the  sum-total  of  the 
expression  of  the  individual's  entire  complex  life,  and  does 
not  exist  at  all  as  such;  and  that  the  mind  is  but  an  emana- 
tion of  the  brain  and  nervous  system  as  the  light  is  an  emana- 
tion of  the  match,  so  that  one  writer  has  said  that  the  mind 
can  no  more  affect  the  body  nor  the  body  the  mind,  than  a 
piece  of  "beefsteak  placed  in  a  sausage  machine"  could  be 
expected  >to  come  out  a  moonlight  sonata.  And  crass  as  this 
statement  appears,  it  is  the  conclusion  to  which  one  must 
come  if  he  accept  the  parallelist  doctrine  that  mind  and 
matter  are  totally  and  constantly  inseparable  functionally. 

8  The  Century's  Progress  in  Experimental  Psychology,  by  Henry 
Smith  Williams,  M.D.,  Harper's  Magazine,  September,  1899. 


38  The  Begimiings  of  Science 

To  this  the  interactionist  demurs.  He  acknowledges  that 
both  are  found  side  by  side,  but  does  not  believe  that  one 
can  thereby  argue  that  the  one  cannot  influence  the  other. 
The  proof  for  this  latter  viewpoint  seems  to  be  with  us  in 
our  daily  experience,  so  that  even  the  parallelists,  as  Profes- 
sor John  Watson  of  Johns  Hopkins  says,  use  language  that 
shows  they  think  in  terms  of  interaction,  though  speaking 
and  writing  in  terms  of  parallelism.4 

Now  what  was  it  that  the  abnormal  field  gave  us  that  is  of 
so  much  importance  as  not  only  to  lead  to  more  than  wonder- 
ful results  as  shortly  to  be  recounted,  but  which  again  led 
men  back  into  the  realm  of  the  mental  from  which  they  had 
departed,  seemingly  for  all  time? 

First,  it  was  through  observation,  especially  by  aid  of  the 
microscope,  that  it  was  found  that  the  two  pairs  of  nerves 
attached  to  the  spinal  cord  and  leaving  it  between  each  ver- 
tebra were  two  pairs  of  dissimilar  nerves  as  far  as  function 
was  concerned.  The  two  anterior  ones  being  motor  and  the 
two  posterior,  sensory.  That  is,  the  anterior  nerves  never 
carried  any  impulse  except  from  the  spinal  cord  to  some 
muscle  of  the  body  and  the  posterior  nerves  only  carried  a 
sensation  from  some  part  of  the  body  to  the  spinal  cord. 
Here  probably  was  born  the  idea  that  every  nerve  in  the  body 
had  a  definite  function  to  perform  and  could  perform  no 
other.  Up  to  this  time,  also,  the  brain  was  considered  more 
or  less  a  unity  of  tissue.  Now  it  was  found  that  there  were 
millions  of  cells  in  the  brain  and  still  later  that  each  cell 
of  a  nerve  in  any  part  of  the  body  had  several  processes,  but 
it  took  a  long  time  with  wonderfully  contrived  methods  to 
find  where  these  processes  ended  and  what  they  did.  One 
of  the  very  important  discoveries  along  this  line  was  that 

4  Behavior,    An    Introduction   to    Comparative    Psychology,   by   John 
B.  Watson. 


Psychological  Laboratories  39 

when  a  nerve  was  cut  in  any  way,  the  part  between  the  in- 
jured portion  and  the  outside  of  the  body  would  cease  to 
function  and  would  degenerate,  while  the  part  extending 
from  the  cell  itself  would  often  grow  again. 

It  was  only  by  this  process  of  degeneration — by  cutting 
various  nerves  on  the  smaller  animals — that  the  degenerated 
part  could  be  followed  completely  and  the  entire  course  of 
the  nerve  discovered. 

Next  came  the  finding  that  no  nerve  connected  directly 
with  another.  Usually  the  end  of  a  nerve  running  toward 
the  spinal  cord  had  a  tiny  arborization  that  surrounded  an- 
other nerve  cell,  but  did  not  come  in  actual  contact  with  it, 
and  then  came  Ramon  y  Cajal's  theory  of  how  the  nerves 
function,  namely,  very  like  a  telephone  system,  and  just  as 
each  cell  is  stimulated  and  acts,  it  extends  one  or  more  of 
these  little  processes  and  really  reaches  out  and  touches  the 
cell  or  processes  of  the  cell  to  which  it  is  to  carry  its  im- 
pulse. 

But  of  greater  value  than  these  discoveries  is  the  one  which 
has  meant  so  much  in  the  practical  field,  and  which  is  so 
well  and  succinctly  put  by  Dr.  Stephen  Smith,  himself  a  man 
who  has  done  more  to  effect  the  banishment  of  cruelties  from 
the  insane  in  this  country  than  probably  any  other  man. 
He  says :  "The  lessons  which  the  illustrations  of  the  anatomy 
and  physiology  of  the  nervous  system  teach  have  a  wide  ap- 
plication to  our  treatment  of  the  dependent  classes.  We  learn 
that  the  mental  attributes  of  every  person  depend  ultimately 
upon  the  physical  state  of  the  cell,  over  which  we  have  almost 
absolute  control  both  in  its  individual  and  collective  capac- 
ity. If  its  texture  is  feeble  from  heredity  or  disease,  we  may 
make  it  strong  by  nutrition,  exercise,  pure  air,  and  medica- 
tion ;  if  it  is  undeveloped,  we  can  develop  it  by  applying  ap- 
propriate stimulus  and  suitable  nourishment;  if  it  is  unduly 


40  The  Begwmmgs  of  Science 

developed  and  hence  overactive,  we  can  reduce  it  to  a  rudi- 
mentary and  inactive  state  by  removing  every  form  of  stim- 
ulant and  reducing  its  nutrition;  where  neither  the  regula- 
tion of  the  stimulant  nor  nutrition  accomplishes  our  pur- 
pose, we  can  rely  upon  specific  remedies. 

"The  logical  and  inevitable  conclusion  to  be  drawn  is  that, 
if  we  thoroughly  understood  the  exact  function  and  the 
functional  relations  of  all  the  cells  of  the  nervous  system,  we 
could,  beginning  with  the  child,  control  in  a  large  measure 
the  development  of  his  character,  and  in  the  adult  modify 
existing  attributes  by  stimulation  of  one  class  of  nerve-cells 
and  the  repression  of  another  to  any  extent  that  we  desired. 
Nothing  can  be  more  thoroughly  practical  than  the  appli- 
cation of  the  proper  remedial  measures  by  which  the  equilib- 
rium of  these  centers  is  secured."  5 

It  may  be  argued  that  what  we  have  discussed  is  Neurol- 
ogy and  not  Psychology,  and  this  is  perfectly  true;  but  as 
"mind,"  in  so  far  as  we  know  it,  does  not  work  in  the  human 
sphere  except  encased  in  the  body,  so,  having  by  common 
experience  since  the  beginning  of  time  found  that  the  dis- 
eases of  the  body  do  affect  the  mentality,  and  having  further 
found  that  the  highest  center  of  mentality,  the  brain,  is  es- 
pecially affected  by  nervous  diseases,  and  still  further  having 
found  that  the  brain  itself,  the  organ  of  intellection,  is  a 
mass  of  thousands  of  millions  of  tiny  cells,  each  with  its  own 
nerve-processes  that  may  and  do  connect  with  others,  we 
find  we  must  have  this  neurological  setting  for  any  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  mental  processes.  We  do  not  by  that  be- 
come neurologists,  but  we  do  wish  to  know  all  the  neurologist 
can  tell  us,  that  will  aid  in  the  better  understanding  of  WHY 
a  mental  reaction  is  what  it  is. 

And  so  the  psychologist  of  the  present  works  upon  this 

•Who  is  Insane?  by  Stephen  Smith,  A.M.,  MJD.,  LL.D. 


Psychological  Laboratories  41 

background  of  biology  and  neurology  by  tracing  from  the 
earliest  beginnings  the  marks  of  sense  perception  and  the 
peculiar  reactions  that  animals  give  when  various  stimuli 
are  applied,  under  the  heading  of  animal  or  comparative 
psychology,  both  for  its  own  sake,  which  is  the  mark  of  the 
true  scientist,  and  for  the  practical  effect  it  may  have  in 
throwing  light  on  the  processes  of  the  child  especially,  and 
this  is  what  we  call  genetic  psychology,  so  insistently  studied 
by  those  aiming  to  teach,  and  which  has  already  done  so 
much  for  the  growing  child.  No  longer  is  every  child  con- 
sidered the  equal  of  every  other  and  all  treated  alike.  We 
are  trying  to  get  away  from  the  machine-like  pattern  of 
similarity  and  getting  to  look  at  each  as  an  individual,  so 
that  many  of  the  larger  private  schools  have  their  consulting 
psychologist  who  measures  the  ability  and  intelligence  of 
each  child  and  classifies  him  accordingly. 

We  have  through  this  study  become  better  acquainted  with 
the  psychology  of  learning  so  that  we  know  much  more  now 
than  we  did  a  few  years  ago  as  to  the  better  method  of  learn- 
ing more  thoroughly  and  in  less  time  than  formerly.  We 
have  found  the  diurnal  movement,  for  example,  that  passes 
through  the  nervous  system  and  makes  it  easier  to  remember 
two  days  after  a  thing  is  learned  than  immediately  after  the 
task  is  completed.  And  in  line  with  this,  an  interesting  side- 
light was  thrown  on  the  differences  in  the  working  of  normal 
and  subnormal  children  in  London,  where  Mr.  Philip  B. 
Ballard  performed  a  great  number  of  experiments  on  school 
children  ranging  in  age  from  five  to  fifteen  years,  and  found 
that  the  subnormal  child  could  remember  very  much  more 
after  some  time  had  elapsed  than  he  could  at  the  moment  of 
finishing  the  memory  test,  while  the  normal  child  knew  more 
than  did  the  subnormal  at  the  time  of  learning,  and  not  so 


4£  The  Begwnmgs  of  Science 

much  later.6  This  might  be  interpreted  that  it  was  not  less 
ability  on  the  part  of  the  one  than  the  other,  but  that  there 
was  a  difference.  The  subnormal  being  slower  in  the  procuring 
of  his  memory  work  but  greater  in  his  retention  afterward. 
And  it  may  be  that  the  very  reason  for  the  child's  being  con- 
sidered subnormal  was  merely  due  to  the  longer  time  it  took 
him  to  memorize.  Should  this  be  the  case,  as  it  no  doubt  has 
been  time  and  again,  it  may  be  found  that  many  of  our  great- 
est men,  who  had  to  study  hard  and  long  before  they  were 
able  to  grasp  the  subject  at  which  they  were  working,  but 
who  then  never  forgot  it,  were  classified  by  their  teachers 
as  below  the  standard  and  not  of  much  value. 

Under  social  psychology  we  study  the  "herd  instinct"  as 
it  is  often  called.  The  desire  of  men  to  live  with  others  and 
form  a  community.  In  other  words  it  is  the  study  of  genetic 
psychology  taken  from  the  individual  and  applied  to  the 
nation  or  group,  while  under  racial  psychology  we  go  still 
farther  afield,  gather  the  myths,  the  superstitions,  the  beliefs 
and  the  forms  of  worship  of  all  peoples  and  try  to  co-ordi- 
nate them,  and  weave  them  into  a  meaningful  whole. 

We  have  a  psychology  of  history  and  a  psychology  of  re- 
ligion, both  of  which  are  more  or  less  self-explanatory,  while 
in  the  practical  field  the  best  known  is  probably  applied 
psychology,  which  usually  and  largely  means  advertising. 
That  is,  to  find  what  methods  are  best  to  attain  the  ends  one 
wishes,  through  newspaper,  magazine  and  salesman.  In  fact 
the  commencement  and  successful  operation  of  scientific- 
salesmanship  schools  and  the  great  number  of  industrial 
houses  which  now  have  departments  of  training  for  their 
men  is  a  direct  result  of  the  interest  in  applied  psychology. 

And  then  there  is  another  psychology,  which  has  not  yet 

"Obliviscence  and  Reminiscence,  by  Philip  B.  Ballard,  M.A.  Vol. 
I.  No.  2,  British  Journal  of  Psychological  Monograph  Supplements. 


Psychological  Laboratories  43 

been  given  a  name  except  that  it  has  been  called  "sex  psy- 
chology," though  this  does  not  label  it  exactly  as  it  should 
be  labeled.  We  refer  to  the  mental  differences  between  men 
and  women.  It  is  through  experimentation  that  we  are  seek- 
ing to  find  what  differences  actually  exist  mentally  between 
the  sexes,  and  whether  they  are  fundamental  or  whether 
they  are  due  only  to  different  methods  of  training. 

The  writer  has  taken  some  eleven  thousand  mental 
measurements  of  men  and  women  and  has  found  a  seeming 
similarity  among  women  of  their  dislikes,  but  they  do  not 
agree  so  well  on  what  they  like,  whereas  the  reverse  can  be 
said  of  men,  they  usually  agreeing  on  what  they  like  but  have 
very  varied  dislikes. 

But  throughout  these  experiments  it  was  found  that  al- 
ways the  great  mass  of  both  men  and  women  agree  some- 
where near  an  average,  that  is,  the  thing  nearest  like  to  the 
things  with  which  they  are  familiar  or  which  are  not  too 
original,  are  admired  most.  Great  originality  does  not  come 
in  for  many  enconiums. 

And  always  one  can  see  the  predilection  and  prejudice 
under  which  the  person  is  laboring,  for  it  almost  always 
shows  in  his  judgment;  very,  very  few  passing  an  opinion 
solely  on  the  merits  of  the  case. 

And  most  interesting  of  all  the  experiments  is  the  one  that 
compares  the  judgment  of  a  single  individual  given  many 
times  on  the  same  subject  with  the  same  number  of  judg- 
ments passed  once  by  a  number  of  people,  for  the  individual 
differs  more  from  his  own  judgments  than  do  the  many  from 
each  other.  In  other  words,  a  jury  of  fifty  people  would 
pass  a  more  correct  opinion  than  would  one  individual  pass- 
ing an  opinion  fifty  times  on  the  same  case,  provided,  always, 
of  course,  that  it  could  be  passed  on  such  matters  where 
memory  would  not  enter.  The  experiments  here  mentioned 


44  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

were  performed  only  with  the  sense  of  touch  and  sight. 

One  can  readily  see  that  here  we  have  a  very  vast  field  in 
which  to  work  and  many  interesting  and  valuable  findings 
may  be  made. 

Then  there  is  a  psychology  for  medical  students ;  for  legal 
students;  for  engineering  students,  and  in  fact  for  every 
walk  of  life.  But  of  all  the  branches  of  experimental  psy- 
chology, the  most  far-reaching  in  its  practical  results  is  in 
all  probability  that  of  abnormal  psychology.  Within  this 
field  may  be  found  actual  and  definite  results,  immediate  re- 
lief, and  often  cures  in  thousands  of  otherwise  hopeless*  cases. 
Heartaches  have  been  removed  and  many  subnormal  chil- 
dren have  been  trained  until  they  can  hardly  be  dis- 
tinguished from  many  persons  not  so  unfortunate.  Schools 
for  training  them  have  been  established  and  successfully 
carried  out.  It  has  taken  intelligence,  and  constant  fighting 
to  overcome  obstacles  and  opposition  to  the  suggestion  that 
the  feeble  minded  could  be  made  self-supporting.  But  suc- 
cess has  been  demonstrated.  Psychopathic  hospitals  and 
institutes  have  been  opened  where  those  who  are  com- 
mitted for  various  offenses  by  the  state  may  have  intelligent 
care  and  attention,  and  often  be  made  into  most  excellent 
men  and  women,  for,  often  the  original  reason  for  the  fall 
of  these  people  has  not  been  an  inherent  evil  disposition  and 
desire  to  commit  wrong,  but  an  entire  lack  of  training  which 
made  them  incapable  of  knowing  what  right  and  wrong 
meant. 

A  systematic  classification  of  the  idiot  and  feeble-minded 
has  led  to  excellent  results  and  better  care ;  and  a  knowledge 
of  the  ultimate  material  product  of  our  bodies,  the  cell,  as 
the  lines  before  quoted  of  Stephen  Smith  so  well  exemplify, 
has  led  to  an  attempt,  proven  more  successful  than  even  the 
promoters  had  dared  to  hope,  of  not  only  helping,  but  actu- 


Psychological  Laboratories  45 

ally  bringing  back  to  sanity  by  proper  training  of  the 
nervous  system  about  twenty-five  per  cent  of  all  commit- 
ments to  insane  asylums,  and  there  is  little  doubt  that  when 
all  the  states  realize,  as  some  of  them  do  now,  that  not  a 
physician  should  have  charge  of  these  homes,  but  an  alienist, 
thorough  in  his  work,  who  puts  into  practice  the  findings  of 
the  other  members  of  his  staff,  consisting  of  a  physiologist, 
a  pathologist  and  a  psychologist,  that  this  twenty-five  per 
cent  will  be  materially  increased.  The  last  three  members 
of  the  staff,  mentioned,  are  research  men  who  discover  the 
laws  and  the  reasons  for  these  laws,  while  the  alienist  puts 
them  into  practice. 

And  in  the  field  of  criminology  our  eyes  are  opened  when 
we  make  mental  tests  of  a  whole  series  of  so-called  criminals 
and  find  them  rated  by  our  tests  as  averaging  from  eight  to 
fifteen  or  sixteen  years  in  mental  age,  regardless  of  what 
their  years  on  earth  may  have  been. 

It  is  no  small  thing  for  one  science  to  be  able  to  point  out 
that  it  has  revolutionized  several  others  and  those  very 
ancient  and  important  studies ;  it  is  no  small  thing  to  be  able 
to  say  that  this  same  science  has  restored  many,  many  to 
their  reason  from  supposedly  hopeless  insanity;  has  made 
self-supporting  men  and  women  where  there  were  only  de- 
pendents before;  it  is  no  small  thing  to  have  taken  the 
shackles  from  the  insane  and  the  convict  and  to  have  helped 
remove  cruelty  in  the  world  in  those  places  where  it  was 
most  practiced  and  mostly  thought  necessary.  And  lastly, 
it  has,  through  its  acceptance  of  the  laboratory ;  through  its 
use  of  physical  evidence,  from  which  it  then  draws  its  con- 
clusions, brought  back  many,  yes  very  many,  to  a  realiza- 
tion of  the  fact  that  after  all,  life  is  not  all  material,  and 
the  spiritual  also  is  there.  It  has  been  and  is  a  sort  of  con- 
necting link  uniting  the  materialistic  biologist  of  the  present 


46  The  Begwnmgs  of  Science 

with  the  spiritual  philosopher  of  the  past,  drawing  them 
closer  and  closer  together,  exposing  the  crass  mechanism  of 
a  day  happily  past,  showing  a  prospect  of  hope  and  glory, 
that  in  so  far  as  it  has  already  had  so  glorious  a  history 
during  the  few  decades  of  its  existence,  may  yet  lead  to 
greater  things  and  make  the  name  of  psychology  shine  forth 
where  it  belongs,  as  a  necessary  star  in  the  constellation  of 
all  that  is  good  and  true  in  the  world  of  learning,  and  as  the 
one  connecting  link  which  unites  the  observer — the  gatherer 
of  facts — with  the  thinker — the  philosopher — the  interpreter 
thereof. 


CHAPTER  III 

GENETICS 

GENETICS  is  the  study  of  the  origin  and  development 
of  everything  and  anything  that  may  throw  light  upon 
the  child.  It  is  the  study  of  heredity  and  development  of  the 
infant.  It  aims  to  collect  every  fact,  whether  it  be  anecdotal, 
observational,  statistical  or  philosophical ;  then  to  take  these 
facts,  segregate  them,  study  them  in  turn,  and  finally  to  in- 
terpret them  for  the  same  reason  that  one  gathers  and  in- 
terprets facts  in  any  science,  namely  to  control  and 
prophesy. 

There  are  two  great  viewpoints  from  which  this  new 
science  may  be  considered,  namely,  the  Biological  and  the 
Psychological.  The  former  takes  into  consideration  pri- 
marily the  pre-birth  state.  It  amis  to  ascertain  reasons  why 
children  are  born  with  the  particular  equipment  they  possess, 
both  quantitatively  and  qualitatively. 

As  scientists  and  philosophers  have  always  known  that 
men  are  not  born  equal,  it  develops  upon  the  Biologist  to 
ascertain  WHY,  but  from  the  physical  side  only — the  as- 
sumption being  that  with  a  good  healthy  body  the  psychic 
part  will  care  for  itself. 

Little  progress  had  been  made  in  this  field,  because  men 
had  found  no  laws  of  heredity  which  could  be  applied  in  even 
a  majority  of  cases,  much  less  in  all.  The  methods  of  in- 
vestigation were  really  not  investigations  at  all,  but  simply 
collections  of  what  is  known  as  anecdotal  evidence;  that  is, 
some  one  observed  or  thought  he  observed  one  or  more  cases 

47 


48  Tltie  Beginnings  of  Science 

of  a  given  type  without  knowing  any  of  the  details  of  that 
case,  or  the  reasons  for  the  individual's  being  as  he  was,  and 
by  hasty  generalization  (the  bane  of  all  scientists)  formu- 
lated a  theory  which  gained  sway  among  friends  and  dis- 
ciples of  the  theorist.  It  never  seemed  to  dawn  upon  the 
pronouncer  of  the  theory,  or  any  of  his  disciples,  that  fifty 
per  cent  of  the  results  of  any  suggested  theory  is  more  than 
likely  to  be  true  if  there  are  only  two  alternatives,  or  if 
more,  the  same  proportional  truth  will  find  its  way,  even  in 
an  erroneous  theory.  So  that,  so  far  as  evidence  (sic)  is 
concerned,  there  is  no  theory  that  cannot  find  such  pro- 
portion of  substantiating  facts  as  we  have  mentioned,  and 
which  is  called  chance.  What  is  needed,  however,  is  much 
more  than  chance.  We  must  find,  let  us  say,  more  than 
seventy-five  per  cent  of  the  cases  under  consideration  show- 
ing the  thing  we  are  seeking,  or  our  theory  has  little  or  no 
value. 

Prior  to  the  nineteenth  century,  men  working  in  the 
natural  sciences,  especially  in  Biology,  were  more  interested 
in  trying  to  find  a  definition  for  each  separate  thing  which 
should  show  a  reason  for  keeping  it  apart  from  some  other 
group  or  individual  than  they  were  in  finding  a  relationship 
between  them.  Let  us  give  an  example.  The  interests  of 
scholars  of  that  day  lay  in  trying  to  define  species  so  that 
the  definition  would  be  exclusive.  That  is,  they  tried  to  lay 
down  a  rule  saying  that  everything  that  had  this  or  that 
feature,  belongs  to  this  or  that  species,  and  everything  that 
does  not  possess  the  peculiar  characteristic  in  question,  was 
simply  to  be  excluded;  so  that,  should  there  be  found  so 
strange  a  creature  that  might  possess  one-half  of  both  the 
necessary  features  of  two  separate  species,  that  particular 
creature  was  doomed  not  to  be  studied  and  classified  but 
mercilessly  to  "perish  beneath  the  boot-heel"  of  the  investi- 


Genetics  49 

gator  as  an  anomaly,  and  therefore  was  not  to  be  considered. 
He  was  a  disturber  and  should  be  cast  into  the  darkness. 

The  reason  we  now  begin  evolutionary  discussions  with 
Lamarck  and  Darwin  is  because  they  reversed  this  order. 
It  is  not  because  of  the  theories  of  these  men  particularly, 
for  the  theories  of  both  are  largely  discarded  now,  as  will 
be  shown  in  our  chapters  on  "The  Present  Status  of  Evolu- 
tionary Philosophy"  and  "Theories  of  Evolution,"  but  be- 
cause after  their  time,  there  was  a  change  in  the  old  order, 
men  then  insisting  that  the  important  subject  for  study 
was  not  differences  which  kept  species  apart,  but  similari- 
ties which  showed  a  relationship.  This  opened  up  an  entire 
new  world  of  thought,  and  no  doubt  some  of  us,  after  seeing 
some  of  the  things  it  brought  forth,  think  that  it  might  just 
as  well  have  remained  unopened,  but  be  that  as  it  may,  the 
fact  remains  that  we  are  now  no  longer  interested  in  the  lines 
of  exclusive  but  of  inclusive  demarcation.  Now  we  want 
to  know  why  it  is  that  nearly  every  bird  and  animal  is  a 
pentadactyl,  that  is,  why  they  have  five  fingers  and  five  toes ; 
in  birds  the  fingers  being  represented  by  the  divisions  into 
which  the  wings  fall.  These  are  clearly  discernable  in  such 
wings  as  those  of  the  bat  and  many  birds  as  well;  while  in 
some  types  of  birds  we  find  by  close  examination  the  several 
fingers  have  grown  together,  the  bones  however  showing  a 
sort  of  separation.  We  find  this  same  condition  in  the  vari- 
ous types  of  animals.  We  want  to  know  why  all  these  living 
things  are  so  much  alike,  and  not  what  differences  keep  them 
apart. 

Botanists  claim  certain  minute  organisms  as  plants  while 
Zoologists  claim  these  same  organisms  as  animals.1  If  it 
be  possible  to  have  a  living  thing  so  closely  resembling  both 

1  Hsematococcus,  for  example,  a  little  single-celled  organism,  con- 
taining chlorophyll  (which  is  the  usual  test  of  whether  the  individual  be 


50  The  Begmnmgs  of  Science 

plant  and  animal,  that  men  who  spend  their  lives  in  the 
study  of  just  such  matters  cannot  even  decide  on  whether 
to  call  it  a  plant  or  an  animal,  one  can  easily  see  what  a 
vista  is  opened  to  those  of  speculative  inclinations. 

And  from  this  gradual  seeming  rise  of  the  plant  and 
animal  in  the  scale  of  worth,  it  was  easy  to  assume,  because 
new  things  were  daily  being  found  by  the  aid  of  the  micro- 
scope, that  there  must  be  still  smaller  things  than  the  lowest 
forms  of  plant-life  which  would  unite  the  living  and  the  non- 


Haematococcus — Motile  Stages  (after  Parker). 

living.  This  is  one  of  the  assumed  purposes  of  the  bacteria. 
And  again  there  came  forth  the  theory  of  spontaneous 
generation — that  we  might  be  able  to  take  a  small  quantity 
of  hay,  for  example,  boil  it  until  it  was  completely  sterilized 
(and  therefore  could  contain  no  life  whatever),  then  per- 
mitting it  to  stand,  actually  see  it  produce  life.  This  was 
a  fascinating  doctrine  and  when  investigators  announced 
that  this  had  been  done  there  was  great  rejoicing  in  the 
materialistic  world.  However,  it  was  but  a  short  time  there- 
after that  other  investigators  taking  far  more  care  than 

a  plant  or  not)  and  possessing  flagella  (little  tails  by  which  they  move 
about).  These  are  often  included  under  the  Algae  or  lower  green 
plants.  (See  Parker  and  Haswell's  Text-book  of  Zoology,  Vol.  I, 
Page  72.) 


Genetics  51 

lad  the  first  to  prevent  the  intrusion  of  living  organisms 
after  the  sterilization,  found  that  no  life  was  so  produced, 
and  at  the  present  moment  there  is  no  investigator  or 
biologist  who  will  admit  that  spontaneous  generation  has 
been  demonstrated  in  the  laboratory  and  the  great  scien- 
tific formula  now  universally  accepted  is  that  there  is  "no 
life  except  from  a  previous  life"  and  "no  cell  except  from  a 
previous  cell." 

As  all  things  have  their  cycle  and  ultimately  come  to  a 
close,  the  origm  of  species  ceased  to  hold  men's  minds  in 
thrall  as  it  had  during  the  last  half  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, and  a  great  body  of  men  drifted  into  specialization  of 
one  or  another  of  the  many  branches  of  natural  science. 
There  were  in  a  short  time  investigators  of  the  nervous 
system — Neurologists ;  of  the  general  structure  of  the  body 
— Anatomists ;  of  the  development  of  the  individual  before 
birth — Embryologists  ;  of  the  plant  world — Botanists ;  of 
the  animal  world — Zoologists;  of  mental  phenomena — Psy- 
chologists, and  a  host  of  others.  This  will  but  serve  to 
show  the  possibilities  of  the  subject.  And  then  there  had 
to  be  a  co-ordinating  of  the  findings  of  all  these  individual 
workers.  Each  one  found  something  unknown  up  to  that 
time — each  interpreted  his  finding  in  the  light  of  his  own 
individual  knowledge  and  viewpoint,  only  to  find  that  in 
some  other  field  of  endeavor  the  opposite  conclusion  could 
be  reached  and  often  was  reached  from  just  as  thorough 
evidence. 

So  that  now,  with  a  vast  body  of  facts  in  our  possession, 
the  principal  matter  under  consideration  is  to  find  correct 
meanings  for  these  facts,  always  considered  in  the  light  of 
all  the  knowledge  in  all  related  subjects. 

We  find  then,  that  the  interest  is  no  longer  primarily,  in 
the  origin  of  species,  but  in.  the  origm  and  development  of 


52  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

the  individual.  This  subject,  too,  has  had  its  devotees  in 
all  ages,  but  we  of  the  present  insist  on  laboratory  proofs 
if  we  are  to  credit  the  many  theories  propounded.  We  are 
not  interested  in  what  Edison  thinks  about  heaven,  as  sev- 
eral newspaper  men  of  a  few  years  ago  thought,  but  we  are 
interested  in  any  definite  laws  he  may  have  discovered,  or 
proven,  that  may  be  used  by  all.  It  is  for  this  reason  that 
an  inventor  is  not  a  scientist.  He  does  not  discover  laws 
that  others  may  profit  by — he  applies  the  laws  of  men  who 
have  found  them,  and  these  latter, — the  ones  who  found 
them,  are  the  real  scientists. 

There  was  a  man,  some  years  since,  who  received  no  title 
of  "Wizard" ;  who  lived  in  a  little  village  in  Austria  during 
all  of  this  great  period  of  scientific  upheaval  which  we  have 
been  discussing  and  who  died  some  thirty  years  ago ;  who- 
was  not  even  known  outside  of  his  immediate  province  and 
hardly  known  there  until  some  years  after  his  death,  but 
who  has  profoundly  influenced  the  whole  scientific  world. 
It  is  safe  to  say  that  in  the  Biological  realm  there  is  no 
name  that  ranks  superior  to  that  of  Father  Johann  Gregor 
Mendel,  of  Briinn,  Austria,  of  whom  Castle  has  said: 
"Mendel  had  an  analytical  mind  of  the  first  order  which 
enabled  him  to  plan  and  carry  through  successfully  the  most 
original  and  instructive  series  of  studies  in  heredity  ever 
executed." 

Mendel  followed  out  the  principles  insisted  upon  by  every 
experimentalist,  namely,  that  he  perform  his  experiments 
under  similar  conditions  that  may  be  controlled,  and  then 
definitely  record  his  facts. 

His  great  work  consisted  in  the  scientific  breeding  of 
peas. 

The  theory  now  known  as  the  Mendelian  would  require 
entirely  too  much  space  for  a  book  of  this  nature,  were  it  to 


Genetics  53 

be  stated  in  all  its  fullness,  but  should  the  reader  become 
sufficiently  interested  to  wish  to  read  further,  he  will  find 
in  the  chapter  on  "Suggested  Reading"  the  names  of  the 
volumes  which  will  give  him  a  complete  and  comprehensive 
account  thereof.  We  shall  state  here  only  so  much  as  is 
essential  to  an  understanding  of  what  follows. 

Mendel  found  that  by  crossing  tall  and  dwarf  peas,  re- 
gardless of  sex,  all  of  the  offspring  were  tall.  Tall,  breeding 
in  this  way  he  called  DOMINANT,  while  the  dwarfness  was 
labeled  RECESSIVE.  Further,  he  found  that  when  any  of  the 
peas  were  crossed  with  each  other  or  were  self-fertilized, 
which  amounts  to  the  same  thing,  they  would  produce  in  the 
proportion  of  3  to  1.  That  is,  the  dominant  type  (tallness) 
would  have  three  plants  to  every  one  of  the  recessive 
(dwarf).  On  still  further  breeding,  the  dwarf  peas  would 
always  breed  true,  which  means  that  there  would  never 
again  appear  a  tall  one  among  them;  but  among  the  tall 
plants  there  were  two  kinds — one-third  of  them  always  pro- 
ducing tails,  and  the  other  two-thirds,  known  as  hybrids, 
giving  a  proportion  of  three  tall  to  one  dwarf,  like  their 
parents. 

For  our  purpose  it  is  necessary  that  we  remember  one 
thing  in  particular;  the  second  generation  where  all  were 
tall,  had  inherited  one-half  of  whatever  they  were  from  their 
mother  and  one-half  from  their  father.  Tallness  was  domi- 
nant, but  we  must  not  forget  that  dwarfness  was  also  there y 
but  covered  and  dominated  by  the  tallness.  There  was  no 
blending.  The  offspring  were  not  intermediate  between  the 
two  parents  as  to  height — they  were  either  tall  or  short. 
Another  point  to  observe  is  that  in  the  third  generation 
some  were  short  and  some  tall,  but,  that  notwithstanding 
this  fact  the  short  ones  always  bred  true  thereafter  and 
one-third  of  the  tall  ones  did  likewise.  The  supposition 


54  The  Begwnwgs  of  Science 

being  that  in  the  original  fertilized  germ-cell  the  tallness 
is  present  and  is  dominant ;  so,  if  the  germ-cell  of  its  mating 
partner  is  likewise  tall,  there  will  always  be  tall  offspring 
which  can  never  produce  a  dwarf,  while  if  tallness  meet  with 
the  germ-cell  of  dwarfness,  tallness  being  dominant,  tallness 
will  likewise  result,  but  with  this  difference,  that  the  dwarf 
character  is  also  there,  though  lying  dormant  for  the  time 
being.  As  each  plant  produces  a  great  quantity  of  germ- 
cells  and  an  egg-cell  is  only  fertilized  by  a  single  sperm-cell, 
if  the  sperm-cell  is  of  the  dwarf  type  and  mates  with  an 
egg-cell  of  the  same  type,  we  have  a  dwarf  as  the  result. 
In  other  words,  each  plant  produced — if  a  hybrid — both  tall 
and  dwarf  types  of  germ-cells,  and  if  any  egg-cell  becomes 
fertilized  with  any  sperm-cell  of  its  own  kind,  it  naturally 
produces  its  own  type,  and  if  not,  it  produces  tall; — but, 
the  tall  which  has  met  with  a  tall,  always  breeds  tall  and 
the  tall  or  dwarf  which  has  mated  with  its  opposite  type 
also  produces  tall,  but  the  offspring  of  the  next  generation 
may  be  either  tall  or  dwarf  depending  upon  whether  it  be  a 
pure  egg-cell  mating  with  its  own  or  its  opposite  type,  and 
so  on  ad  infinitum. 

This,  as  will  be  observed,  is  based  on  the  law  of  chance, 
for,  as  we  have  shown,  any  events  allowed  full  and  uncon- 
trolled sway  are  bound  to  result  in  appearing  one-half  the 
time  on  one  side  and  one-half  on  the  other,  if  there  be  but 
two  alternatives,  and  proportionately,  should  there  be  more. 
In  this  case  we  have  four  alternatives,  and  only  four: 

A  tall  may  meet  with  a  tall. 

A  dwarf  may  meet  with  a  dwarf. 

A  tall  may  meet  with  a  dwarf. 

A  dwarf  may  meet  with  a  tall. 

This  sketch  shows  the  possible  occurrences  in  the  mating 
of  dwarf  and  tall,  graphically.  Tall  meeting  tall  and  dwarf 


Genetics  55 

with  dwarf  are  what  is  known  as  "pure,"  while  dwarf  with 
tall,  and  tall  with  dwarf  produce  "hybrids,"  these  hybrids, 
however,  are  all  tall,  but  capable  of  producing  both  tall  and 
dwarf  offspring.  One-half  are  pure,  it  will  be  observed, 
and  one-half  mixed — showing  this  law  of  chance  of  which  we 
have  spoken. 

And  now  we  may  suggest  the  great  usefulness  to  which 
the  Mcndelian  theory  may  be  put.  We  can,  in  advance,  if  we 
know  one  or  two  generations  of  ancestors,  be  able  to  foretell 


Ta»  ^ Dwarf 

TaU-(Dxuarfs) 
Tall  2  TaU-COiuarfs) 

/  I 

Tall  Tall       £  Tall- (Dwarfs) 


TaU  Tall  Tall        2  Tatt-(Duia.Tf s)  Dwarf  Dwarf  Du»a.rf 


the  ratio  of  the  appearance  of  what  is  called  a  "unit  of  in- 
heritance." 

We  have  been  speaking  primarily  of  one  characteristic — 
tallness,  or  the  lack  of  it.  This  tallness  we  shall  call  one 
unit.  It  is,  of  course,  possible  to  complicate  matters  by 
taking  two  units.  We  may  take  a  green  wrinkled  pea  and 
a  yellow  smooth  one  and  from  this  combination  produce  a 
yellow  wrinkled  one  and  a  green  smooth  one.  Having  four 
factors  we  should  not,  however,  have  four  possibilities,  for 
we  found  four  possibilities  where  only  two  factors  were 
present,  so  in  this  case  we  have  four  times  four  possibilities 


56  The  Begiimmgs  of  Science 

appearing  and  so  on,  with  each  increase  in  the  number  of 
factors. 

The  difficulties  and  the  immense  number  of  possible  com- 
binations which  may  occur  in  the  human  form  with  the 
hundreds  of  unit  characteristics  may  readily  be  inferred 
from  this.  But  to  show  what  has  been  done,  so  we  may  not 
be  discouraged  with  what  the  future  may  hold  for  the  science 
of  Genetics,  it  is  possible  even  now,  to  predict  the  ratio  of 
children  with  curly  hair;  whether  it  be  light  or  dark;  the 
color  of  the  eyes  and  whether  or  not  color-blindness  will 
appear.  These  are,  of  course,  but  minor  examples  to  show 
what  is  meant  by  the  prediction  of  the  appearance  or  non- 
appearance  of  unit  characteristics. 

Father  Mendel's  work  has  turned  all  eyes  to  this  great 
principle  of  chance  with  its  dominant  and  recessive  char- 
acters, so  that  now  we  have  untold  numbers  of  investigators 
in  the  various  fields  of  heredity,  experimenting,  searching, 
gathering  evidence  and  interpreting  it.  In  the  plant  world 
especially  has  much  been  done,  and  we  have  the  Botanists 
to  thank  for  the  greater  part  of  our  knowledge  on  the  sub- 
ject. Then  the  similarity  of  plant  and  animal  world  and 
the  impossibility  of  telling  where  the  one  ends  and  the  other 
commences,  causes  the  application  of  the  same  theories  to 
the  animal  field  and  to  the  human ;  for  after  all,  aside  from 
animal  and  plant-breeders,  the  greatest  interest  lies  in 
whether  or  not  we  can,  by  intelligent  forethought,  cause  the 
child  to  be  better  equipped  at  birth  than  he  now  is. 

We  mean  then,  by  Genetics,  the  study  of  the  Biological 
and  Psychological  inheritance  and  the  development  to 
maturity  of  the  offspring  in  all  the  world  of  life,  but  espe- 
cially as  applied  to  the  human  child.  And  every  fact  that 
can  be  brought  to  bear  upon  a  subject  so  vital — of  such 
concern  to  every  teacher — every  parent — and  every  indi- 


Genetics  57 

idual  who  has,  or  ever  expects  to  have  anything  to  do  with 
ihildren — needs  to  be  considered.  It  is  the  study  of  Indi- 
/iduality  as  contradistinguished  from  the  study  of  Species. 

From  the  biological  standpoint  then,  the  great  outstand- 
ing factor  is  this,  that  "Structure  determines  Function." 
We  cannot  perform  any  act  whatsoever,  unless  we  have  an 
organ  with  which  to  perform  it ;  but  we  must  not  forget  that 
Function  in  turn  modifies  the  Structure,  as  we  can  readily 
see  in  the  massive  muscular  development  of  an  athlete. 

From  the  psychological  point  of  view  so  simple  a  thing 
as  looking  at  a  printed  word  and  reading  it,  is  a  very  com- 
plex process,  requiring  not  only  the  image  thrown  upon  the 
retina  of  the  eye,  but  from  there  through  the  optic  nerve 
the  image  must  be  carried  to  that  particular  portion  of  the 
brain  which  functions  with  the  eye,  and  still  further,  through 
the  psyche  or  mind  must  then  be  translated  into  meaning. 
And  when  it  is  remembered  how  long  it  took  the  child  to 
learn  the  alphabet — how  long  it  took  then  to  learn  to  write 
it — actually  to  form  words — and  lastly  to  get  a  meaning 
out  of  these  words  and  make  them  stand  for  actual  sounds 
and  thoughts,  one  may  with  little  imagination  realize  how 
complex  even  simple  acts  are,  and  how  extremely  complex 
the  higher  mental  processes  must  be. 

Everything  we  are,  think  and  do,  is  determined  to  a  very 
large  extent  by  what  we  are  born  with.  This  is  what  the 
Psychologist  means  by  a  "biological  setting."  In  other 
words,  if  we  did  not  have  a  good  nervous  system — for  every 
act,  no  matter  how  simple  or  complex  it  may  be,  is  perform- 
able  only  through  the  nervous  system  at  large,  and  the 
co-ordinating  organ,  the  brain,  in  particular — it  would  be 
impossible  to  learn  anything  well  or  do  anything  well,  for 
practically  every  seeming  simple  act  is  complex  and  it  is 
necessary  for  our  central  nervous  system  to  co-ordinate  all 


58  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

the  many  nerve  arcs  that  enter  in  the  action  to  be  per- 
formed. 

Another  way  of  putting  the  matter  would  be  to  say  that 
all  we  are  and  can  be  is  determined  by  our  instincts  and  our 
habits,  if  we  define  instincts  as  being  the  sum  total  of  every 
tendency  of  the  nervous  system  to  function  with  which  we 
are  born,  and  every  habit,  the  acquirement  of  everything  we 
do  after  birth,  never  forgetting  that  a  habit  can  only  be 
formed  upon  a  tendency  that  is  already  present  and  capable 
of  performing. 

We  are  born  with  certain  nerve-arcs  ready  to  function 
in  certain  ways,  which  we  have  designated  as  "tendencies  to 
act,"  and  that  these  tendencies  be  all  normal?  we  must  have  a 
normal  nervous  system,  which  means  in  turn  that  we  must 
have  a  normal  biological  inheritance. 

One  of  the  findings  of  recent  years  is  that  different 
people  do  not  react  to  the  same  stimulus  in  the  same  way; 
that  each  nervous  system  has  a  particular  tendency  to  react 
in  certain  ways  to  certain  stimuli,  and  this  divergence,  or 
variation  of  tendencies  to  react  in  certain  ways,  is  the  re- 
sultant of  Mendelian  unit  characteristics;  that  is,  that  just 
in  so  far  as  a  certain  unit  tendency  was  present  in  the 
dominant  parent,  will  it  appear,  not  blending,  but  singly 
and  definitely,  or  be  absent  altogether. 

The  Psychologist  is  trying  to  build  upon  this  biological 
background,  by  finding  out  definitely  what  tendencies  are 
present  in  the  child  and  developing  these;  or  taking  a  rival 
tendency  and  developing  it,  so  that  this  latter  may  become 
the  stronger;  for  development  or  learning  simply  means  the 
bringing  about  of  a  habit  founded  upon  an  instinct  that  is 
already  there.  It  means  that  the  strongest  tendency  will 
always  be  the  one  chosen  and  that  true  learning,  using  the 
word  now  as  synonymous  with  education,  means  the  choos- 


Genetics  59 

ing,  and  by  active  usage,  the  developing  of  those  mental 
and  moral  tendencies  which  we  wish  to  foster,  so  that  these 
will  become  the  stronger  and  come  naturally  to  the  fore- 
front at  any  given  moment ;  to  force  these  desired  tendencies 
into  active  acting  so  often  and  so  constantly  that  the  whole 
physical  makeup  responds  even  subconsciously  in  the  man- 
ner that  we  would  have.     As  an  example  we  may  cite  the 
instance  of  a  child  just  beginning  practice  on  the  violin. 
The  fingers  on  the  left  hand  are  pointed  downward  in  readi- 
ness to  press  upon  the  particular  string  in  the  particular 
position  required,  but,   very   often  the   little  finger  points 
almost    directly   toward   the    zenith   instead   of   downward. 
This  is  a  natural  tendency,  for  nature  apparently  did  not 
have  the  violin   in  mind  when   our  hands   were   fashioned. 
But   notwithstanding   instinct    as   here   displayed,   there  is 
also   a  tendency   to  bend  the  finger,  though  in   this   case 
not  so  strong  as  is  the  tendency  to  lift  it.    Were  there  no 
tendency  to  bend,  we  could  not  acquire  the  ability  of  which 
we  are   speaking.      So   the  teacher  insists   on  bending  the 
finger  into  the  desired  position  and  though  the  student  often 
forgets  and  the  finger  will  again  assume  an  erect  position, 
still,   by    constantly   insisting    and   forcing   the   finger,   we 
can  bring  about   the   condition  in   time   that  we  wish,   so 
that  after  years  of  practice,  the  older  tendency  which  was 
really  the  stronger  at  first — the  one  lifting  the  finger  sky- 
ward— has  been  entirely  superseded  by  the  downward  posi- 
tion, and  it  is  very  difficult  to  make  the  finger  follow  out 
the   original   tendency   without   considerable   effort.      This 
is  what  the  Germans   call  "einiibung" — to  drill  into — and 
can  only  come  by  actual  DOING  and  not  reading  about  it. 
It  is  from  this  principle  that  our  laboratories  have  sprung, 
so  that  students  may  themselves  perform  the  experiments, 
the  tests  mentioned,  and  feel  the  convincing  power  of  actual 


60  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

DOING. 

It  has  been  well  said,  that  an  education  is  of  no  value 
unless  it  makes  one  -feel  differently  in  regard  to  the  things 
one  sees,  hears,  and  does,  from  what  one  did  before  having 
such  training.  This  means  that  any  training  must  first, 
through  direct  conscious  effort,  become  so  part  and  parcel 
of  the  individual  that  it  will  in  time  become  subconscious. 

As  an  example  of  a  training  of  this  nature  by  actual 
doing,  though  not  directly  applicable  to  school  and  class 
work,  an  amusing  occurrence  came  to  light  the  other  night 
in  one  of  the  dormitories  of  the  University.  One  of  the 
boys,  formerly  employed  by  an  express  company,  sprang 
from  his  bed  as  the  passing  train  whistled,  grasped  a  chair 
and,  using  it  as  a  truck,  threw  his  neighbor's  clothes  thereon 
and  pushed  his  supposed  truck  around  the  bed  several 
times.  Here  the  association  of  pushing  a  truck  with  the 
whistle  of  the  incoming  train,  having  been  so  often  con- 
nected, started  his  muscles  going  through  the  entire  process 
of  the  work  to  which  he  had  been  accustomed. 

When  we  make  our  training  not  a  matter  of  memory,  but 
an  association  of  this  nature;  when  we  are  able  to  make 
the  individual  adapt  himself  to  his  surroundings,  or  shape 
his  surroundings  to  himself,  then  we  have  performed  our 
task  of  training  thoroughly. 

It  may  be  said  that  all  the  foregoing  is  self-evident,  and 
having  been  written  in  non-technical  language  it  seems  so. 
Yet  we  are  prone  to  forget  that  the  simplest  and  most  self- 
evident  things  are  just  the  ones  that  receive  least  attention 
as  a  rule. 

We  are  entirely  too  much  inclined  to  accept  a  prominent 
characteristic  as  the  significant  one.  Just  an  example: 
take  Dementia  Precox,  a  type  of  insanity  to  which  youth 
is  prone.  The  child  may  be  deeply  interested  in  geography 


Genetics  61 

and  nothing  but  geography.  He  seems  unable  to  become 
satiated  with  his  subject.  He  has  no  other  interests.  The 
proud  parents,  not  knowing  otherwise,  assume  they  have  a 
veritable  prodigy.  Suddenly  he  changes  to  some  other 
form  of  study  or  amusement  just  as  whole-heartedly.  He 
must  be  a  genius,  they  think,  if  he  can  become  so  terribly 
engrossed  in  two  different  subjects,  but — just  the  reverse 
is  true.  It  is  not  astonishing  that  he  knows  so  much  about 
one  subject  as  it  is  astonishing  that  he  cares  so  little  for 
anything  else.  In  a  short  time  the  child  knows  practically 
nothing  and  stops  growing  mentally,  remaining  at  the  men- 
tal  age  of  seven,  nine,  ten  or  whatever  it  may  be,  for  the 
rest  of  his  days. 

It  is  to  be  remembered  that  we  have  already  laid  stress 
on  the  fact  that  an  education  is  for  the  purpose  of  making 
one  feel  differently  toward  things.  Here  then  is  the  crux 
of  the  entire  subject.  Our  lives  with  few  exceptions  are  made 
up  of  emotions,  not  reasons.  We  like  or  dislike  an  in- 
dividual, and  should  he  whom  we  dislike  do  anything  of 
value,  we  assume  he  must  have  had  some  ulterior  motive, 
while  he  whom  we  love  must  have  been  sorely  tempted  to 
do  anything  of  which  we  disprove.  We  wish  to  demon- 
strate this  by  calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  parent 
or  teacher  who  loves  the  child  most  is  the  one  least  likely 
to  be  of  service  to  him.  We  all  know  that  the  physician  does 
not  treat  his  own  family  in  anything  of  a  serious  nature. 
He  calls  in  one  to  whom  the  patient  is  only  a  "case."  There 
must  be  no  emotion  in  serious  matters. 

All  of  us  have  heard  the  statement  "that  if  I  hadn't  seen 
this  with  my  own  eyes,  I  should  not  have  believed  it,"  when 
the  speaker  should  have  said,  "I  have  seen  this,  but  until 
some  one  who  is  trained  in  this  matter  has  passed  judgment 
I  will  not  believe  it."  For  one  is  very  often  deceived  by 


68  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

confusing  feelings  with  facts.  Often  people  say  they  see 
when  in  reality  they  do  not,  but  only  feel,  or  even  only  as- 
sume the  object  to  be  as  it  seems  to  be.  This  is  well 
illustrated  when  we  attend  a  picture  show,  where,  though 
we  gaze  at  the  screen  for  an  hour  and  a  half,  the  picture  is 
only  actually  before  us  about  twenty  per  cent  of  that  time, 
but  we  really  see  something  ah1  the  rest  of  the  time  we  are 
looking  at  the  hero  who  has  enraptured  us.  This  seems  more 
or  less  absurd  and  yet  it  is  true,  for  there  is  a  tiny  shutter 
that  keeps  on  closing  the  lens  constantly  and  for  much 
more  time  than  it  remains  open.  For  it  takes  a  certain 
length  of  time  for  an  image  to  be  seen  after  it  is  looked 
at,  and  also,  after  the  object  has  been  removed  it  takes 
some  time  before  the  image  that  was  thrown  upon  the  retina 
fades  away.  In  other  words,  one  never  knows  the  precise 
moment  when  one  begins  to  see  anything,  nor  do  we  stop 
seeing  it  when  we  stop  looking.  All  these  things  are  easily 
demonstrable  in  the  laboratory,  but  the  point  we  are  making 
is  this,  that  it  requires  a  training,  if  one  wishes  to  be  sure 
of  his  ground,  even  in  the  simplest  matters,  and  this  training 
is  what  we  mean  by  education,  which,  together  with  environ- 
ment and  heredity,  form  the  triangle  that  constitutes  the 
basis  of  genetics  in  all  its  fullness. 

Heredity,  by  some  considered  the  greatest  factor,  is  the 
fulfillment  of  Dr.  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes'  dictum  that  the 
proper  time  to  begin  right  living  is  two  hundred  years 
before  one  is  born,  while  environment  and  training,  closely 
related  as  they  are,  if  used  in  their  broadest  sense,  fulfill 
the  thought  expressed  by  the  proverb,  "tell  me  with  whom 
you  go,  and  I'll  tell  you  what  you  are." 

Education  is  not  a  natural  process,  but  an  artificial  one, 
based  on  natural  tendencies.  The  natural  way  would  be 
to  follow  one's  instincts  regardless  of  what  they  were.  And 


Genetics  63 

we  must  not  forget  that  we  have  both  right  and  wrong 
instincts  and  either  can  be  made  stronger  than  they  are  at 
birth.  In  some,  the  right  ones  are  already  strong  while 
in  others  the  reverse  is  true,  and  the  important  point  to 
be  emphasized  is  that  we  can,  through  inheritance,  see  to 
it  that  one  or  the  other  is  already  given  the  child  at  birth, 
so  that  the  terrible  effort  of  changing  them  will  be  ma- 
terially lessened  or  entirely  overcome. 

The  next  point  is  that  the  emotions  are  not  the  same  in 
every  individual  when  the  same  thing  is  seen,  heard  or 
touched.  We  must  not  judge  others  by  how  we  feel,  or  think 
we  should  feel  under  the  same  circumstances.  It  does  not 
follow  that  because  a  full  grown  individual  reads  something 
evil  into  a  picture  play,  that  a  child  does  likewise.  And 
from  this  we  may  infer  that  it  may  not  be  correct  to  judge 
a  child  by  our  standards,  but  realize  that  he  is  in  a  process 
of  development,  and  the  judging  standard  is  relative.  "Does 
he  do  as  well  or  better  than  the  average  of  that  particular 
age?"  is  the  criterion,  and  not  "Does  he  do  as  well  as  I?" 

And.  lastly  we  must  remember  that  it  is  in  MEANINGS 
— in  interpretations — that  we  find  our  difficulties.  We  can 
only  interpret  in  terms  of  our  own  knowledge  and  experi- 
ence, and  so  when  we  see  men  at  a  great  distance,  we  know 
they  are  of  average  size  just  the  same,  but  in  reality  we 
do  not  see  men  of  average  size,  but  very  small  men.  The 
child  has  not  had  this  experience,  and  so  he  says  actually 
what  is  true,  that  he  sees  very  tiny  men,  when  viewed  from 
a  distance.  We  older  people  usually  tell  him  he  is  wrong 
and  insist  upon  his  telling  what  he  saw  in  terms  of  what 
we  know  to  be  there.  The  child  is  often  thought  untruthful 
by  his  elders,  whereas  it  is  they  who  are  in  error  in  their 
statement  that  they  can  see  men  of  average  size  at  a  dis- 
tance. 


64  The  Begmnmgs  of  Science 

We  have  attempted  to  show  some  of  the  angles  from 
which  Genetics  can  be  viewed.  We  have  not  attempted  to 
answer  any  questions,  but  to  state  in  as  simple  a  language 
as  possible  what  is  now  held  in  this  field.  Some  say  that 
the  answers  to  the  many  questions  that  can  be  raised  in  this 
study  lie  with  Biology;  others  believe  that  Psychology  can 
do  more,  and  yet  others  think  that  the  Statistician  holds 
the  key,  in  that  he  gathers  all  the  facts  with  their  relative 
frequency  and  passes  judgment  upon  them.  Of  the  Psy- 
chologists there  are  various  factions,  represented  primarily 
by  the  introspectionists  on  the  one  hand  and  the  behaviorists 
on  the  other ;  the  former  believing  that  self -introspection  may 
throw  light  on  our  mental  processes,  while  the  behaviorists 
believe  that  introspection  is  worthless,  and  that  the  child 
must  be  studied  as  objectively  as  the  animal  of  lower  type 
would  be.  That  is,  consciousness  must  be  left  out  of  the 
question  altogether,  and  a  definite  problem,  fitted  to  the 
child's  organism,  must  be  presented,  and  then  an  exact  rec- 
ord of  the  reaction  resulting  taken,  and  when  every  possible 
act  has  been  studied  in  this  manner  we  shall  have  a  quantity 
of  statistical  matter  from  which  we  may  be  able  to  draw 
up  a  theory  that  will  give  us  what  we  seek. 

As  the  matter  now  stands,  the  word  "soul"  no  longer 
appears  in  the  psychological  literature;  "mind"  was  sub- 
stituted for  it  some  years  back,  but  that,  too,  has  been 
relegated  to  the  refuse  heap  of  obsolete  terms,  to  be  replaced 
by  "psycho-physical  reaction,"  words  of  "learned  length 
and  thundering  sound"  that  mean  little. 

The  definition  of  Psychology  itself  has  changed  from 
the  "science  of  the  soul"  to  that  of  the  "science  of  con- 
sciousness" and  when  it  was  later  discovered  that  maybe 
there  was  really  more  in  the  subconscious  than  in  con- 
sciousness itself,  we  have  it  defined  as  the  "study  of  mental 


Genetics  65 

phenomena,"  where  it  now  stands. 

Man,  too,  was  supposed  to  have  arisen  in  several  ways, 
one  being  from  a  hairy  ape,  from  whom  by  a  step-brother 
removed,  he  parted  company.  But  since  Professor  Hugo  de 
Vries,  the  great  Dutch  naturalist,  brought  forth  his  theory 
of  "sports  in  nature,"  and  that  these  are  often  of  the 
dominant  type  and  breed  true,  it  has  led  the  modern  psy- 
chologist and  behaviorist,  Professor  John  Watson,  at  least 
to  say  that  no  one  any  longer  looks  for  a  missing  link,2 
for  we  know  that  somewhere  in  the  scale  of  evolution,  Man, 
by  an  immeasurable  distance,  separated  himself  from  the  rest 
of  the  animal  world. 

Can  we  not  see  in  this  but  another  way  of  coming  back 
to  our  older  and  supposedly  disproven  doctrines? 

But  "stay,"  says  the  Alchemist  to  his  weeping  wife,  in 
Balzac's  powerful  novel,  "stay,  I  have  decomposed  tears. 
Tears  contain  a  little  phosphate  of  lime,  some  chloride  of 
soda,  some  mucus  and  some  water." 

Is  that  all  that  constitutes  a  tear?  Is  a  mere  reaction 
to  a  stimulus,  what  we  mean  by  life? 

a  Behavior,  An  Introduction  to  Comparative  Psychology,  by  John 
B.  Watson. 


CHAPTER  IV 

METAPHYSICS  AND  EPISTEMOLOGY 

THERE  are  three  factors  with  which  we  constantly  have 
to  deal  in  finding  our  starting  point  in  any  science :  ( 1 ) 
The  "Fact"  or  observation  itself;  (2)  The  ability  of  the 
scientist  who  announces  an  observation,  or  states  a  theory, 
and  (3)  The  honesty  of  such  person  in  giving  his  views 
to  the  world,  for,  it  is  perfectly  conceivable  that  one  who 
knows  more  than  any  other  man  on  a  given  subject  may 
still  not  be  honest  in  his  pronouncements,  due  to  a  desire 
to  bolster  up  some  favorite  theory,  or  to  a  so-decided  idea 
of  his  own  correctness  at  all  times,  that  but  a  single  side 
of  what  the  observations  may  mean  can  be  grasped. 

In  our  chapter  on  "Authorities,"  we  shall  examine  into 
the  method  of  ascertaining  who  is  and  who  is  not  capable 
of  passing  judgment  in  the  fields  of  science  that  we  are 
here  discussing.  In  this  chapter  we  wish  to  show  why  it  is 
that  we  lay  so  much  stress  on  the  two  branches  of  philoso- 
phy, Metaphysics  and  Epistemology,  which  are  absolutely 
essential  to  any  thorough  understanding  of  any  science. 

Taking  the  first  mentioned  philosophical  branch,  we  quote 
the  following  from  Professor  William  James'  Briefer  Course 
in  Psychology  published  in  1913,  page  460. 

What  the  word  Metaphysic  means.  In  the  last  chapter 
we  handed  the  question  of  free-will  over  to  "metaphysics." 
It  would  indeed  have  been  hasty  to  settle  the  question  abso- 
lutely, inside  the  limits  of  psychology.  Let  psychology 
frankly  admit  that  for  her  scientific  purposes  determinism 

66 


Metaphysics  and  Epistemology  67 

may  be  claimed,  and  no  one  can  find  fault.  If,  then,  it  turn 
out  later  that  the  claim  has  only  a  relative  purpose,  and 
may  be  crossed  by  counter-claims,  the  readjustment  can  be 
made.  Now  ethics  makes  such  a  counter-claim;  and  the 
present  writer,  for  one,  has  no  hesitation  in  regarding  her 
claim  as  the  stronger,  and  in  assuming  that  our  wills  are 
"free."  For  him,  then,  the  deterministic  assumption  of  psy- 
chology is  merely  provisional  and  methodological.  This  is 
no  place  to  argue  the  ethical  point ;  and  I  only  mention  the 
conflict  to  show  that  all  these  special  sciences,  marked  off 
for  convenience  from  the  remaining  body  of  truth,  must 
hold  their  assumptions  and  results  subject  to  revision  in  the 
light  of  each  others  needs.  The  forum  where  they  hold  dis- 
cussions is  called  metaphysics.  Metaphysics  means  only  an 
unusually  obstinate  attempt  to  think  clearly  and  consist- 
ently. The  special  sciences  all  deal  with  data  that  are  full 
of  obscurity  and  contradiction:  but  from  the  point  of  view 
of  their  limited  purposes  these  defects  may  be  overlooked. 
Hence,  the  disparaging  use  of  the  same  metaphysics  which  is 
so  common.  To  a  man  with  a  limited  purpose,  any  discus- 
sion that  is  over-subtle  for  that  purpose  is  branded  as 
"Metaphysical."  A  geologist's  purposes  fall  short  of  under- 
standing Time  itself.  A  mechanist  need  not  know  how 
action  and  reaction  are  possible  at  all.  A  psychologist  has 
enough  to  do  without  asking  how  both  he  and  the  mind 
which  he  studies  are  able  to  have  cognizance  of  the  same 
outer  world.  But  it  is  obvious  that  problems  irrelevant 
from  one  standpoint  may  be  essential  from  another.  And 
as  soon  as  one's  purpose  is  the  attainment  of  the  maximum 
of  possible  insight  into  the  world  as  a  whole,  the  meta- 
physical puzzles  become  the  most  urgent  ones  of  all. 
Psychology  contributes  to  general  philosophy  her  full  share 
of  these. 

It  has  been  deemed  best  to  quote  this  entire  paragraph, 
as  Professor  James  is  without  doubt  one  of  the  most  quoted 
of  men  and  one  deemed  by  his  compeers  as  being  as  worthy 
of  being  quoted  in  his  field  as  any  other  American  writer. 


68  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

What  he  says  is  simply  another  way  of  saying  that  if  a 
man  does  not  want  to  become  a  "specialist"  in  the  sense 
that  the  late  Elbert  Hubbard  defined,  as  being  "A  man  who 
only  knew  enough  to  know  one  thing,"  it  is  more  than  nec- 
essary to  go  a  little  beyond  the  physical  world,  which  is 
all  that  Metaphysics  means  (meta  meaning  beyond,  or  after 
physics,  that  is,  it  is  the  discussion  that  follows  the  physical 
sciences  and  gives  the  grounds  on  which  they  rest,  and  with- 
out which  they  could  not  be  possible),  i.  e.,  going  further 
back — deeper  down  than  the  merely  sensible  (those  things 
that  come  under  the  senses)  and  finding  a  starting  point 
that  is  more  than  a  mere  supposition.  In  other  words,  he 
should,  if  he  really  deserves  the  title  of  a  thoroughly  edu- 
cated man  and  scientist,  know  that,  while  it  is  interesting 
for  the  painter  to  examine  very  closely  the  grain  of  the 
wood  going  into  a  building  and  for  the  mason  to  examine 
the  stone-work,  still  we  have  the  entire  building  to  con- 
sider, and  only  in  so  far  as  these  details  of  stone-work  and 
lumber  and  grain  contribute  toward  the  fullness  and  beauty 
and  value  of  the  entire  structure  is  it  Vorth  anything  in 
the  final  analysis.  And  so  any  science  is  but  a  special  branch 
of  life,  and  its  work,  no  matter  how  interesting  in  and  of 
itself,  must  be  looked  at  from  the  world-viewpoint  to  find 
its  exact  place  and  fitting  value.  Each  one  of  the  sciences 
is  sorely  needed,  and  every  detail  of  that  science  may  result 
in  any  quantity  of  value,  but  it  must  be  balanced  with  all 
the  other  sciences,  and  this  balancing  is  always  the  work 
of  philosophy  and  not  that  of  the  laboratory  man.  For 
philosophy  means  to  find  ultimate  causes.  Whenever  a  man 
thinks,  he  philosophizes,  and  whenever  he  observes,  that  is, 
whenever  he  only  sees  a  thing  and  finds  that  he  can  always 
see  the  same  thing  under  the  same  circumstances  he  is  what 
is  at  least  popularly  known  as  a  scientist.  The  moment  he 


Metaphysics  and  Epistemology  69 

puts  his  observations  together  and  tells  what  they  mean, 
he  enters  the  field  of  philosophy. 

We  do  not  accept  the  definition  that  we  are  here  stating, 
for  we  contend  and  hold  that  the  only  true  science  is  philos- 
ophy, and  it  is  no  very  difficult  matter  to  look  at  any  ency- 
clopedia or  other  work  of  similar  nature  and  note  that 
every  man  who  stands  at  all  well  in  any  scientific  specialty, 
obtained  that  standing  by  his  philosophizing  and  not  by  his 
science,  using  the  term  "science"  in  the  sense  which  men 
at  large  use  it,  that  is  as  a  worker  with  laboratory  objects 
that  come  under  the  senses.  We  wish  likewise  to  show  that 
every  objective  discovery  that  means  anything,  has  to  be 
thought  about,  for  meanings  can  only  be  given  through 
thought-processes,  and  thought-processes  by  no  means  come 
under  the  senses. 

Further,  every  fact,  whether  physical  or  otherwise,  must 
rest  in  the  final  analysis  on  what  we  call  "First  Prin- 
ciples.," and  "First  Principles"  are  what  we  find  as  self- 
evident;  they  cannot  be  proved.  These  principles  must  be 
accepted  and  are,  by  every  educated  man  in  every  walk  of 
life,  for  without  them  the  entire  world  of  intellect  and 
thought  would  be  hopeless  chaos  and  could  not  exist  at  all. 
These  principles,  we  say,  illumine  the  intellect,  that  is,  with- 
out their  acceptance  there  could  not  be  anything  at  all 
that  would  mean  anything  to  the  human  mind.  There 
could  be  no  science,  no  connected  speech,  no  thought,  no 
telling  another  what  one  meant  or  felt  or  thought.  It  is 
the  light  that  makes  all  that  we  have  possible  and  under- 
standable. But  -to  say  that  First  Principles  can  be  ex- 
perimented on  in  the  laboratory  is  absurd.  First  Prin- 
ciples are  not  sensible  things  and  what  is  not  sensible 
cannot  come  under  the  senses,  and  what  cannot  come  under 
the  senses  surely  cannot  be  tested  in  the  laboratory,  for  all 


70  The  Begwnwgs  of  Science 

that  physical  science  means  is  the  testing  of,  and  finding 
laws  in  the  world  of  things  that  do  come  tinder  the  senses, 
so  that  even  in  Psychology  as  used  by  Professor  James  in 
the  passage  quoted,  he  has  separated  that  science  into  two 
parts  without  any  connecting  link.  He  is  speaking  of 
Physiological  Psychology  only,  that  is,  the  effects  of  the 
physical  states  of  the  body  on  the  mind  and  vice  versa; 
not  the  study  of  the  mind  in  itself,  this  latter  is  called 
Rational  Psychology. 

To  show  what  a  few  of  these  necessarily  accepted  Prin- 
ciples are,  we  may  mention  the  necessity  of  assuming  that 
what  we  see,  actually  corresponds  to  what  is  actually  be- 
fore us:  i.  e.,  that  the  senses  do  not  lie.  We  must  accept 
that  when  we  hear  anything,  there  is  a  sound  that  we  hear 
and  that  it  must  be  akin  to  what  we  actually  do  hear; 
we  must  accept  that  we  are  capable  of  thinking,  and  that 
speech  is  capable  of  telling  our  thoughts  to  another,  and 
that  those  to  whom  we  tell  them  are  constituted  as  is  the 
speaker,  so  that  the  telling  means  the  same  to  one  as  to 
the  other. 

The  very  fact  that  we  think,  shows  a  thinking  individ- 
ual and  a  thing  thought  about.  This  brings  about  the 
idea  of  relationship,  for,  if  we  are  conscious  of  thinking  and 
of  something  thought  about,  we  immediately  understand  that 
here  are  two  totally  separate  things,  which  bear  more  or  less 
relationship  to  each  other.  And  there  are  many  things 
in  every-day  science  that  we  accept  only  on  a  showing  of 
this  relationship,  without  ever  being  able  to  find,  or  bring 
under  any  of  the  senses  the  things  themselves  of  which  we 
are  absolutely  positive.  For  example,  this  is  true  of  atoms 
and  molecules  and  electrons,  which  no  one  has  ever  seen 
and  yet  all  accept.  It  is  true  of  gases,  which  can  be 
known  only  through  their  relationships,  for  our  senses  ca.n- 


Metaphysics  and  Epistemology  71 

not  distinguish  them,  except  through  such  relationship; 
and  so  also,  electricity  is  known  only  by  its  effects,  which 
is  another  way  of  saying,  by  its  relationships. 

Now,  if  we  accept  Rene  Descartes'  philosophy,  and  it 
is  this  philosophy  which  most  men  of  science  seem  to  hold, 
we  must  begin  as  he  began,  with  the  statement,  "I  think, 
therefore,  I  am."  But  here  again  we  find  what  we  have  just 
been  insisting  must  be  done,  namely,  to  accept  something  as 
a  foundation  that  cannot  be  proven,  and  this  little  state- 
ment of  Descartes  is  his  First  Principle.  It  is  on  this 
First  Principle  that  he  and  his  followers  build  their  theory 
of  knowledge  (a  theory  of  knowledge  is  all  that  Epistemol- 
ogy means)  which  may  be  summed  up  like  this:  that  if 
one  has  a  clear  and  distinct  perception  of  a  thing,  then  it 
must  be  true.  De  Lamennais  in  his  "Defense"  of  an  essay 
he  had  written,  gives  an  amusing  account  of  a  supposed 
dialogue  between  a  lunatic  and  a  Cartesian  ( as  the  followers 
of  Descartes  came  to  be  called).  The  lunatic  claimed  to  be 
Descartes  himself,  and  the  Cartesian  insisted  that  this  was 
impossible  because  Descartes  had  then  been  dead  some 
hundred  and  fifty  or  two  hundred  years,  to  which  the  lunatic 
responded,  by  asking  how  the  Cartesian  knew  that  he  him- 
self existed.  Receiving  the  answer,  of  course,  that  he 
"thought"  and  therefore  knew  that  "he  existed,"  as  well  as 
having  a  "clear  and  distinct  perception"  of  that  fact,  the 
lunatic  called  to  the  Cartesian's  attention  that  he  (th.e  lu- 
natic) also  ,  "knew"  himself  to  be  Descartes  himself,  be- 
cause, he,  too,  "thought  and  had  a  clear  and  distinct" 
idea  that  he  was  what  he  claimed  to  be.  The  Cartesian 
walked  away  slowly  murmuring,  "I  was  right,  the  poor  fel- 
low is  mad — what  a  pity!  Still  he  is  none  the  worse  Car- 
tesian for  that." 

To  the  philosopher  then  the  statement  that  a  man  ac- 


72  The  Begwrwngs  of  Science 

cepts  nothing  but  facts  that  can  be  proven  in  the  laboratory, 
this  whole  procedure  savors  hugely  of  a  joke,  and  yet  daily 
we  hear  these  same  empty  remarks  passed  about. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  two  friends,  unable  to  agree  on 
politics,  may  yet  discuss  all  other  subjects  with  perfect 
equanimity,  and  that,  knowing  their  shortcomings  in  the 
realm  of  political  discussion,  agree  among  themselves  not 
to  mention  the  forbidden  subject.  This  is  exactly  the 
situation  with  laboratory  men.  They  cannot  agree  on  any- 
thing whose  evidence  does  not  come  from  and  through  the 
laboratory,  so  they  have  simply  agreed  not  to  discuss  any- 
thing outside  of  the  evidence  so  obtained.  This  does  not 
imply  that  there  is  nothing  beyond  the  laboratory,  or  that 
that  which  is  beyond  is  not  of  more  value  than  is  that 
which  comes  from  the  laboratory,  any  more  than  the  case 
cited  of  the  friends  and  their  non-discussion  of  politics  ar- 
gues for  their  being  no  such  thing  as  politics  or  that  that 
subject  may  not  be  of  vastly  more  importance  than  the 
trifles  they  may  discuss  constantly.  It  is  svmply  an  agree- 
ment',  and  has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  lightness  or 
wrongness,  or  with  better  or  worse,  and  it  is  only  those 
who,  through  ignorance,  or  a  desire  to  make  capital  out 
of  the  ignorance  of  others,  use  this  as  an  argument  that 
scientists  are  opposed  to  the  things  they  do  not  discuss, 
such  as  religion,  for  example.  One  can  easily  see  that 
to  come  to  such  a  conclusion,  the  facts  are  neither  known  nor 
used. 

It  is  no  wonder,  then,  that  many  have  come  to  a  sim- 
ilar conclusion,  i.  e.,  that  Metaphysics  is  worthless  because 
it  is  not  discussed  in  the  laboratory,  and  have  assumed 
that  there  must  therefore  be  something  in  laboratory  evi- 
dence which  has  disproven  it,  that  there  is  nothing  beyond 
what  the  sensible  evidence  can  present — but  we  think  Pro- 


Metaphysics  and  Epistemology  73 

fessor  James'  paragraph  makes  this  viewpoint  untenable. 

Further,  we  must  not  forget  that  Faith  means  only  the 
acceptance  of  evidence  on  the  authority  of  another,  and 
without  Faith,  no  science  would  be  possible,  for  no  single 
individual  can  possibly  work  out  the  details  of  every  prob- 
lem that  confronts  humanity.  One  must  take  a  thousand 
things  on  Faith  and  Faith  alone,  for  every  detail  of  life 
for  which  one  finds  the  evidence  for  oneself ;  and  if  we  carry 
this  idea,  here  slightly  developed,  to  its  logical  conclusion, 
we  should  have  to  say  that  in  as  much  as  many  people 
accept  such  statements  as  we  have  just  condemned  on  pure 
faith,  and  if  superstition  means  anything  it  means  just 
that — accepting  a  lot  pf  untruths,  simply  because  one 
wishes  to  believe — surely  these  people  who  say  they  accept 
nothing  on  faith  are  the  most  hopelessly  superstitious  of 
any  people  known,  in  that  they  do  not  even  have  the  justi- 
fication of  the  men  in  ages  past,  who  believed  that  an  all- 
powerful  God  could  and  did  perform  miracles,  whereas  these 
latter  assume  that  the  magic  wand  of  "so-called  science" 
can  do  the  very  things  they  condemned  simple  people  for 
believing  an  Infinite  Agency  could  perform. 

Note  that  we  say  "so-called  science,"  for  it  is  not  science 
that  tells  us  any  such  foolish  things,  but  those  men  who, 
having  a  smattering  of  scientific  terms,  and  a  superficial 
knowledge  of  one  branch  of  that  immense  subject,  or  who, 
having  some  pet  doctrine  to  bolster  up,  constantly  write 
and  publish  their  writings,  until  the  poor  layman,  unable  to 
pass  judgment,  and  seeing  the  vast  flood  of  literature  on 
the  subject  staring  him  in  the  face  from  every  newspaper 
and  magazine,  concludes  that  because  this  man  knows  how 
to  advertise  himself  and  keep  himself  before  the  public, 
therefore  he  must  be  a  very  great  man  in  his  field,  and 
consequently  accepts  his  doctrines  as  the  truth.  Most! 


74  The  Begmnmgs  of  Science 

often,  however,   the  man   of  science  is   hardly  known  out- 
side the  immediate  circle  of  workers  in  his  chosen  realm. 

This  is  well  exemplified  in  the  naming  of  America.  All 
of  us  are  familiar  from  our  school  histories  that  there  was 
a  man  called  Americus  Vespucius,  who  wrote  on  the  sub- 
ject of  our  land,  then  newly  discovered,  and  that  another 
man,  also  a  writer,  not  knowing  of  Columbus,  and  only 
having  read  the  works  of  Americus,  assumed  that  he  must 
be  the  truly  great  man,  and  therefore  in  his  volume,  the 
name  of  America  was  given  to  the  New  World.  If  our  very 
land  was  christened  in  this  erroneous  manner,  we  ought  to 
have  a  good  example  constantly  before  us,  of  how  not  to 
get  our  scientific  dicta. 

Most  people  forget  that  it  was  not  so  many  centuries 
ago  (five  or  six)  that  all  the  English  speaking  people  in 
the  world  were  not  many  more  than  the  inhabitants  of  Chi- 
cago number  at  present.  They  forget  that  in  the  four- 
teenth century  a  great  reign  of  disease  called  "the  black 
plague"  overran  the  land  and  killed  over  half  of  these,  and 
that  from  these  few  people,  inhabiting  a  very  small  island 
away  from  the  continent  of  Europe,  isolated  from  the 
great  world  at  large,  we  draw  most  of  our  ideas  of  history, 
of  religion,  of  law  and  of  science. 

That  is,  this  land  of  England,  had  a  more  circumscribed 
view  of  the  world  at  large  than  other  lands  had,  yet, 
because  we  in  this  land  of  ours  speak  English,  we  feel, 
through  the  bonds  of  Language,  the  false  idea  that  whatever 
is  written  in  our  own  tongue  must  be  best.  We  forget,  for 
example,  that  immediately  after  Henry  VIII's  time  it  was 
only  possible  to  write  things  praiseworthy  regarding  the 
state  church,  because  this  was  the  acknowledged  religion, 
and  that  for  over  three  hundred  years,  Englishmen  could 
discuss  anything  and  everything  but  religion  in  a  historic 


Metaphysics  and  Epistemology  75 

spirit. 

It  requires  no  great  intellect  to  understand  that  if  through 
three  hundred  years  the  generations  of  children  born  and 
bred  in  England  were  forced  to  listen  to  fulsome  praise  of 
their  own  sect,  and  never  a  good  word  regarding  an  insti- 
tution that  gave  them  the  very  civilization  and  strength  by 
which  they  upheld  that  civilization,  that  these  children  would 
form  an  intense  hatred  for  a  Church  thus  condemned,  and 
that  for  no  other  reason  than  because  they  accepted  on  faith 
that  which  was  in  turn  taught  them.  Bear  in  mind  these 
people  were  not  dishonest.  They  were  the  result  of  dishon- 
esty, but  the  point  to  be  insisted  on  here  is  that  in  matters  of 
history  (because  the  Church  was  the  maker  of  history  dur- 
ing the  Middle  Ages),  any  one  not  being  able  to  read  any  lan- 
guage other  than  English — any  one  in  England,  during  these 
three  hundred  years,  unless  he  was  able  to  smuggle  in  vol- 
umes from  other  lands,  could  not  get  a  correct  account 
of  history-  or  religion  for  many,  many  centuries,  and  this 
is  why  we,  who  speak  English,  are  at  a  greater  disadvan- 
tage, unless  we  go  to  other  nations,  than  possibly  any  other 
race  under  heaven,  to  get  at  a  just  valuation  of  the  past. 

This  is  mentioned  in  the  interest  of  philosophy  and  not 
of  religion,  for  we  cannot  get  a  broad  world-view  unless 
we  have  a  proper  perspective,  and  that  we  can  get  only 
if  we  realize  that  to  us,  who  speak  English,  has  been  lost 
for  three  hundred  years  an  intellectual  ancestor  with  whom 
we  must  again  become  acquainted,  and  that  from  reliable 
sources. 

The  average  laboratory  worker  as  well  as  the  average  col- 
lege student  assumes  that  if  he  start  on  the  subject  of  Meta- 
physics or  any  other  branch  of  philosophy,  he  will  get  noth- 
ing tangible — nothing  that  he  can  grasp.  He  assumes  it 
will  all  be  vague  and  not  like  the  experiments  he  has  been  ac- 


76  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

customed  to  perform,  and  because  he  has  seen  the  many 
conclusions  that  can  be  drawn  from  the  same  premises,  the 
very  bewilderment  of  it  all,  the  immensity  of  the  subject, 
the  vast  quantities  of  literature  on  philosophy,  all  frighten 
him  into  the  easier  path,  of  total  neglect.  And  some  who 
wish  to  go  on,  fear  for  themselves,  knowing,  for  example, 
that  the  Scholastics  used  their  philosophy  to  prove  the  va- 
lidity of  the  Catholic  position,  and  not  wanting  to  have 
anything  to  do  with  Catholicity,  they  will  not  even  inves- 
tigate the  only  system  of  philosophy  that  has  held  mil- 
lions in  sway  for  over  seven  hundred  years  and  which 
to-day  is  coming  back  into  its  own,  as  witness,  Professor 
De  Wulf  of  Louvain,  now  at  Harvard;  and  Johns  Hopkins 
University  offering  a  Professorship  in  Scholastic  Philosophy 
to  the  Jesuits,  which  latter,  however,  was  declined.1  Wit- 
ness also  the  statement  of  Professor  William  James,  written 
shortly  before  his  death,  that  he  would  have  to  accept  the 
Scholastic  viewpoint  or  throw  all  logic  to  the  winds.2 

It  is,  of  course,  permissible  to  start  anywhere,  provided 
all  parties  to  the  discussion  are  agreed.  It  is  perfectly 
legitimate  for  the  Mormon  elder  to  start  with  "you  all 
agree  that  Joseph  Smith  was  the  chosen  leader  of  God," 
provided  all  his  hearers  already  accept  that  view,  but  it 
would  likewise  be  very  unreasonable  to  begin  in  that  way 

1(rhe  Catholic  Educational  Association  Bulletin,  Vol.  IX,  No.  2, 
February,  1913.  Page  21. 

2"I  saw  that  I  must  either  forswear  that  'psychology  without  a 
soul'  to  which  my  whole  psychological  and  Kantian  education  had  com- 
mitted me, — I  must  in  short  bring  back  distinct  spiritual  agents  to  know 
the  mental  states,  now  singly,  now  in  combination,  in  a  word  bring  back 
scholasticism  and  common-sense — or  else  I  must  squarely  confess  the 
solution  of  the  problem  impossible,  and  then  either  give  up  my  intel- 
lectualist  logic,  the  logic  of  identity,  and  adopt  some  higher  (or  lower) 
form  of  rationality,  or  finally,  face  the  fact  that  life  is  logically  irra- 
tional. .  .  .  Those  of  us  who  are  scholastic-minded,  will  smile  at  the 
elaborate  groans  of  my  parturient  mountain  resulting  in  nothing  but  this 
mouse."  Page  208,  of  the  "Pluralistic  Universe,"  by  Wm.  James. 


Metaphysics  and  Epistemology  77 

to  a  crowd  of  people  who  ridiculed  Joseph  Smith  and  con- 
sidered him  an  impostor.  So  there  is  no  fault  to  be  found 
when  men  agree  to  limit  the  work  under  discussion,  but 
where  fault  is  to  be  found,  and  that  most  strenuously,  is 
where,  because  after  a  few  generations  of  such  training, 
the  new  student  is  taught  to  accept  the  doctrine  that  because 
men  of  the  physical  sciences  start  at  a  given  point,  there 
can  be  nothing  beyond  that  point.  Men  who  permit  students 
to  accept  this  viewpoint  are  neither  scientists  nor  philoso- 
phers and  would  deserve  scant  treatment  were  it  not  for  the 
fact  that  some  of  them  occupy  high  places,  and  by  virtue 
of  their  positions,  can,  and  do,  mislead  many,  for  it  seems 
to  be  a  characteristic  of  human  nature,  to  follow  men 
who  know  much  in  one  line,  assuming  that  because  of  this 
they  must  know  much  in  every  line. 

Enough,  then,  has  been  said  to  show  that  the  very  basis 
of  science  rests  on  a  necessary  assumption,  pure  and  simple. 
In  other  words,  we  start  somewhere,  and  that  on  unproved 
truths  in  every  science  and  in  every  piece  of  work  that  man- 
kind does.  In  both  philosophy  and  in  science  we  begin 
with  what  are  called  First  Principles,  or  self-evident  truths. 
It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  this  be  clearly  under- 
stood— that  every  science  and  every  philosophy  must  begin 
with  some  accepted  Principles,  that  is,  with  certain  definite 
truths  that  cannot  be  physically  proved.  Every  suggestion 
that  a  materialist  makes,  every  "fact"  he  mentions,  can  be 
proved  only  on  the  basis  of  these  First  Principles,  which 
are  not  "facts"  at  all  in  accordance  with  his  definition. 
They  are  only  the  starting  point,  and  as  they  cannot  be 
proved,  he  must  admit  that  in  the  final  analysis  he  must 
depend  on  totally  unproved  points  to  give  any  validity  to 
his  further  philosophizing. 

Now,  if  every  starting  point  must  be  a  series  of  accepted 


78  The  Begwwimgs  of  Science 

truths — that  is,  First  Principles — we  can  and  must  have 
a  branch  of  study,  call  it  philosophy  or  science,  whatever 
you  will,  that  aims  to  formulate  a  "theory  of  knowledge," 
i.  e.,  a  study,  that  gives  us  a  validity  for  our  reasoning, 
that  tells  us  what  we  can  know,  and  how  we  can  know  it, 
and  weighs  the  continuity  and  universality  of  the  First 
Principles  thus  found.  This  is  called  Epistemology,  and 
means  only  that  we  try  to  sift  to  the  ultimate  all  that  we 
can  know;  for  surely,  if  we  admit  that  we  can  know  any- 
thing, we  ought  to  be  able  to  tell  what  we  can  know,  and 
just  how  we  can  be  sure  that  we  know  it.  It  aims  to  give  us 
criteria.  In  other  words,  Epistemology  attempts  to  answer 
x  the  question,  "What  can  I  know,  and  how  can  I  be  sure 
that  my  answers  are  correct  after  I  get  them?" 

One  often  feels  one  knows  a  thing,  but  from  a  scientific 
standpoint  this  is  worthless ;  one  must  know,  and  be  able 
to  give  an  intelligent  reason  for  that  knowledge,  and  that 
can  be  given  only  on  the  proof  of  First  Principles. 

Truth  is  absolute  in  the  Scholastic  Philosophy.  It  is 
not  in  the  Pragmatic,  but  the  meanings  of  the  same  word 
are  changed  in  the  two  schools.  Because  some  "so-called 
truths"  are  not  absolute,  it  does  not  follow  that  no  truth 
is  absolute.  But  surely  it  is  much  wiser  to  continue  the 
older  method  of  defining  truth  as  "the  correspondence  be- 
\:  tween  the  idea  one  has  of  a  thing,  and  the  thing  itself." 
This  does  not  mean  that  it  is  necessary  to  see  life  from 
two  sides  only — that  things  must  be  on  one  side  or  the 
other — that  is,  that  there  are  only  two  alternatives.  Life 
is  entirely  too  complex  for  any  such  viewpoint,  and  any 
mind  that  only  sees  two  points  of  view  is  entirely  incapable 
of  passing  judgment  on  any  subject  that  requires  a  wide 
range  of  vision. 

Professor  James  says  that  "Metaphysics  means  only  an 


Metaphysics  and  Epistemology  79 

unusually  obstinate  attempt  to  think  clearly  and  consistent- 
ly." The  Scholastic  would  say  that  as  Metaphysics  means 
the  study  of  that  on  which  all  physical  science  depends, 
it  obstinately  -forces  one  to  think  correctly  and  consist- 
ently. 

It  is  the  almost  hopeless  confusion  caused  by  not  think- 
ing clearly  and  consistently,  as  well  as  the  lack  of  a  stand- 
ard use  of  words,  that  give  rise  to  most  of  our  difficulties 
in  the  realm  of  thought.  An  excellent  example  and  one 
bearing  directly  on  the  subject  so  frequently  met  with  is 
the  varying  meanings  given  by  different  writers  to  the  word 
"law."  By  some  it  means  a  custom  of  the  people  crystal- 
lized into  a  written  code,  the  breaking  of  which  is  the  oc- 
casion of  punishment  of  the  offender.  The  law  itself  having 
been  formulated  by  a  law-giver,  whether  a  single  individual, 
such  as  Moses  or  Lycurgus,  or  by  a  body  of  legislators. 
Then  there  is  the  other  law  which  we  are  constantly  using 
in  the  realm  of  science,  and  which,  because  it  is  the  same 
word,  is  so  constantly  confused,  and  the  meaning  of  the 
word,  as  explained  above,  given  to  it,  when  it  is  as  different 
as  day  is  from  night,  for  a  "law"  in  the  physical  universe 
means  only  that,  in  so  far  as  we  know,  a  particular  following 
of  one  thing  after  a  similar  antecedent  under  the  same  con- 
ditions, has  no  exceptions.  This  kind  of  a  "law"  has  abso- 
lutely nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  kind  of  a  law  men- 
tioned first.  The  first  "law"  is  a  moral  affair,  telling  what 
is  right  and  wrong  in  the  moral  order;  the  second  hasn't 
a  thing  in  the  world  to  do  with  right  and  wrong — it  is 
totally  disconnected  with  any  moral  bearing  of  any  kind. 
It  is  merely  an  order  of  happenings  to  which  we  as  yet 
know  no  exceptions.  It  means  the  arrangement  of  a  suc- 
cession of  events  or  phenomena,  and  is  found  by  observa- 
tion; and,  it  may  be  that  at  some  future  time  an  exception 


80  The  Begmnmgs  of  Science 

may  be  discovered,  and  then  it  will  cease  to  be  a  "law." 
Though  of  course  a  law  in  either  sense  used  above  implies  a 
reason  for  that  law  or,  as  often  said,  any  law  demands  a 
law-giver.  This  was  even  admitted  by  Professor  Plate,  a 
very  decided  Monist,  in  the  famous  biological  discussion 
which  took  place  in  Berlin  in  1907.3 

Now  all  science  is  based  not  only  on  First  Principles 
(remember  not  on  physical  facts),  but  also  on  the  further 
supposition  that  every  regular  succession  of  events  from 
antecedents  similarly  conditioned  .implies  a  law,  and  always 
follows  in  the  same  path,  under  the  same  conditions  that  it 
does  now.  In  fact,  there  could  be  no  laboratory  evidence 
at  all — no  physical  science — if  we  thought  that  the  same 
event  or  phenomena  would  not  always  take  place  in  the  same 
way  under  exactly  the  same  conditions;  in  other  words,  if 
we  thought  that  different  effects  could  come  from  exactly 
the  same  causes  under  the  same  conditions. 

It  must  be  admitted,  even  without  proof,  that  every  effect 
needs  a  cause,  and  there  could  be  no  science  at  all  without 
this  belief.  It  must  be  further  assumed  that  the  same  causes 
have  always  led  to  the  same  effects,  do  now  and  will  so 
continue;  always,  of  course,  the  same  conditions  being  like- 
wise assumed.  That  is,  we  have  observed  during  historic 
time  that  the  same  effects  have  always  flown  from  the  same 
causes  under  the  same  conditions,  and  on  this  continuity 
and  perpetual  law,  we  have  formulated  other  laws.  But  ev- 
ery scientist  admits  that  things  were  not  always  as  they  now 
are.  Life  was  not  always  upon  the  earth.  If  we  suppose 
the  earth  to  have  once  been  a  very  hot  mass  of  matter,  so 
hot  that  it  was  molten,  we  know  that  even  if  there  had  been 
living  matter  then  it  was  killed,  for  no  germ,  even  of  the 
most  persevering  type,  has  been  able  to  stand  much  more 

'The  Problem  of  Evolution,  by  Erich  Wasmann,  S.  J.  (Herder). 


Metaphysics  and  Epistemology  81 

than  a  temperature  of  165  degrees  Centigrade,  so  surely, 
when  the  heat  ran  into  thousands  of  degrees,  life  was  not 
there.  It  does  no  good  to  suggest  that  meteors  and  other 
falling  bodies,  or  dust  from  other  planets  may  have  brought 
life  to  this  globe  of  ours,  for  these  other  planets  were  once 
molten  also,  so  it  is  only  pushing  the  problem  back  farther 
but  not  giving  any  answer.  IT  MUST  HAVE  STARTED 
SOME  WHERE  AT  SOME  TIME.  But  we  know  from  all 
our  evidence  that  Life  comes  only  from  Life.  No  one 
has  yet  been  able  to  show  that  life  can  come  from  non-living 
matter,  and  yet  we  are  confronted  with  the  fact  that  as  we 
have  life  now  but  did  not  have,  at  some  remote  age  of  the 
past,  life  must  have  come  from  non-living  matter,  or  a 
creation  must  have  taken  place.  But  the  point  here  made 
is  that  we  have  a  break  in  the  very  law,  at  the  outset,  on 
which  all  our  science  is  based.  For  we  must  never  forget 
that  without  continuity  of  laws,  there  are  really  no  laws, 
and  if  there  are  no  laws  we  have  no  science.  We  want  to 
impress  most  firmly  these  very  first  things  necessary  to  a 
proper  understanding  of  science  and  its  limits. 

Again  calling  attention  to  Professor  James'  paragraph, 
and  to  what  we  have  said  above,  in  all  physical  science 
we  must  start  at  some  point  on  which  all  are  agreed,  regard- 
less of  whether  there  is  more  evidence  -for  some  other  pomt 
or  not.  For,  as  Professor  James  says,  he  accepts  deter- 
minism for  his  science,  though  believing  that  his  opponents 
are  more  correct  in  not  accepting  it.  But  there  are  two 
distinct  sciences  here  involved,  one  Ethics,  the  other  Phys- 
iological Psychology,  and  for  Physiological  Psychology  we 
can,  by  accepting  determinism  as  merely  relative,  and  capa- 
ble of  being  dropped  at  any  time,  deem  it  of  considerable 
value  in  working  out  our  problems  of  Psychology  on  a  purely 
physical  basis.  Yet  in  Ethics,  we  must  accept  the  opposite 


82  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

doctrine  or  we  soon  cease  to  have  any  Ethics,  for  this  sci- 
ence is  in  turn  a  branch  of  Rational  Psychology. 

To  the  lay  mind  this  may  seem  like  a  hopeless  muddle, 
and  it  is  just  this  that  puts  the  philosopher  in  a  world 
by  himself  and  makes  him  so  thoroughly  misunderstood  by 
those  who  are  unfamiliar  with  the  mass  of  detail  that  he 
tries  to  weave  into  a  meaningful  whole.  He  is  often  ridi- 
culed for  his  nice  distinctions,  and  yet,  through  all  this 
ridicule,  the  man  who  KNOWS,  has  through  all  the  ages 
been  respected  and  also  feared  and,  as  shown  by  our  quota- 
tion in  an  early  chapter,  from  President  Hibben,  his  ideas 
have  at  last  become  the  "maxims  of  the  crowd."  He  has 
been  ridiculed;  for  the  man  with  lesser  intellect,  being  un- 
able to  grasp  great  depths,  or  unwitting  to  put  forth  the 
years  of  effort  required  to  understand  a  subject  fully,  wishes 
always  to  justify  himself,  and  thinks  the  easiest  way  is  that 
of  condemning  and  ridiculing  what  he  can  not  understand; 
but  always  in  an  emergency  he  calls  on  the  man  who  knows. 
It  has  ever  been  so,  and  the  leading  weapon  of  objectors 
has  always  been  ridicule,  for  they  work  on  the  principle 
of  the  elder  attorney  giving  the  young  one  the  advice,  that 
when  the  law  was  on  his  side,  to  quote  the  law;  when  the 
facts  were  on  his  side,  to  quote  the  facts  and  forget  the 
law;  but,  when  neither  facts  nor  law  were  on  his  side,  to 
ridicule  his  opponent. 

When,  then,  there  is  an  incapacity  for  understanding, 
ridicule  is  resorted  to,  and  it  calms  the  qualms  of  him  who 
resorts  to  it,  by  making  him  feel  he  has  the  best  of  the 
argument. 

Summing  up,  we  may  say,  we  start  all  scientific  work  on 
First  Principles,  which  means  only  an  assumption  of  things 
that  are  self-evident.  Then  we  agree  to  start  on  some 
theory  and  work  it  out,  contrary  to  the  usual  belief  that 


Metaphysics  and  Epistemology  83 

the  evidence  is  first  sifted  and  then  the  theory  propounded. 
So,  having  our  First  Principles  and  our  Theory,  we  are 
ready  to  experiment,  or  to  observe.  Then  we  check  up,  and 
find,  metaphysically,  whether  our  First  Principles  are  ac- 
ceptable or  not ;  whether  there  is  or  was  any  possible  chance 
for  wrong  observation;  whether,  under  the  same  circum- 
stances the  experiment  varies ;  whether  a  thousand  and  one 
things  were  just  as  they  should  have  been,  including  our 
instruments,  the  atmosphere,  the  eye-sight  of  the  worker, 
etc.,  and  whether  the  observer's  theory  has  blinded  him  to 
anything  but  favorable  results ;  for,  knowing  the  answer  he 
seeks,  he  all  too  often  like  the  schoolboy,  who,  knowing 
in  advance  what  the  answer  to  his  problem  may  be,  obtains 
the  results  expected  but  by  a  most  marvelous  complexity 
of  invalid  work. 

*  Then,  and  then  only,  after  finding  that  other  observers' 
findings  agree  with  his  own,  has  he  the  material  with  which 
to  work.  But  now  he  must  produce  his  links  in  the  chain 
that  he  is  forging.  Only  the  crude  iron  has  so  far  been 
found,  now  it  needs  hammering,  and  changing,  to  be  welded 
into  links,  and  these  separate  links,  in  turn,  must  be  joined 
together  to  make  the  perfect  chain.  The  bare  -facts  are  only 
the  metal;  the  separate  sciences  (called  also  the  special  sci- 
ences) are  the  links,  and  the  chain  is  the  logical  whole, 
welded  together  with  a  proper  regard  for  every  separate  link, 
with  a  pounding  here  and  a  pressure  there,  discarding,  wait- 
Ing  for  further  material  to  make  a  link  still  stronger  and 
greater  so  it  may  truly  fit  with  the  remaining  ones,  some- 
times missing  a  link,  but  trying  to  make  each  as  symmetric 
as  possible,  so  that  the  whole  chain  forms  that  true  mark  of 
workmanship  that  every  man  hopes  -for,  when  he  works  to 
obtain  perfection,  and  this  Is  all  the  work  of  that  other 
great  branch  of  Philosophy  called  LOGIC. 


CHAPTER  V 

IX>GIC 

MR.  BALFOUR,  in  his  volume  on  philosophy,  pub- 
lished in  1896,  makes  the  very  definite  statement  that 
"A  sound  epistemology  is  at  the  basis  of  all  science.1  This 
we  have  tried  to  show  in  our  immediately  preceding  chapter, 
but  as  this  is  not  a  text-book  of  the  special  sciences,  nor 
of  philosophy,  but  a  statement  of  their  value,  we  shall  not 
enter  into  any  more  detailed  study  of  this  particular  branch, 
but  furnish  a  list  of  volumes  at  the  end  of  our  work,  so 
that  he  who  wishes  may  delve  as  deeply  as  he  likes  in  any 
of  the  special  sciences  mentioned.  He  will  thus  learn  that 
there  are  men  equally  intelligent,  who  hold  decidedly  con- 
trary doctrines  on  nearly  every  subject,  though  usually 
these  doctrines  are  formulated  from  the  same  facts.  This 
chapter  will  therefore  take  up  the  method  of  formulating 
theories  and  doctrines. 

We  wish  to  quote  another  line  from  Mr.  Balfour's  work. 
"The  argument  from  'an  authority'  or  'authorities'  is  al- 
most always  useless  as  a  foundation  for  a  system  of  belief." 
And  commenting  on  this,  Professor  St.  George  Mivart  says, 
"More  than  this :  it  is  and  must  always  be  not  only  useless 
but  absurd.  Every  system  of  belief  must  repose  (1)  upon 
self-evident  principles;  (£)  upon  our  conception  of  the  fact 
of  our  continuous  existence,  and  (3)  on  the  evident  validity 
of  our  logical  reasoning."  2 

irThe  Foundations  of  Belief,  by  Arthur  Balfour. 
3  "Balfour's  Philosophy,"   by   St.  George   Mivart,  American   Catholic 
Quarterly  Review,  January,  1896. 

84 


Logic  85 

This  bears  out  what  we  have  been  insisting  upon  in  our 
previous  chapters,  namely,  that  all  science  starts  with  self- 
evident  principles;  that  to  go  on  from  here  we  must  ac- 
cept the  doctrine  that  all  data  and  theories  would  be  worth- 
less were  we  not  positive  that  every  effect  must  and  always 
does  follow  the  same  cause  under  the  same  circumstances  and 
conditions — in  other  words,  we  must  accept  the  doctrine  of 
continuity,  and  lastly,  we  must  accept  the  third  part  of  the 
triad,  that  all  theories,  all  proofs,  all  arguments  must  be 
logical,  and  it  is  to  this  subject  we  shall  devote  this  chap- 
ter. 

For  the  mere  facts  gathered,  whether  in  the  schools  or 
from  the  experiences  of  life  are  but  the  crude  material 
from  which  to  construct  our  chain.  The  separate  sciences 
are  the  individual  links,  and  now,  having  these,  we  must 
try  to  stand  on  an  elevation  where  we  can  see  the  result 
of  all  the  special  sciences  woven  together — we  must  try  to 
be  philosophers,  and,  as  such,  weld  our  chain  from  the 
separate  links  at  our  disposal.  That  is  the  object  of  Logic, 
and  it  must  be  understood  before  any  one  in  any  science 
can  make  his  work  mean  anything.  For  surely  it  will  be 
conceded  that  if  one  has  spent  the  years  in  merely  accu- 
mulating brick,  it  is  a  reasonable  question  to  ask  what  is 
going  to  be  done  with  the  gathered  material;  and  just  so 
reasonable  is  it  to  ask  of  an  observer,  after  his  note-books 
are  filled  with  the  facts  he  has  accumulated,  what  he  is 
going  to  do  with  them  all. 

We  may  readily  admit  that  the  things  he  has  seen  are 
interesting,  just  as  the  wonderful  Chinese  figures  and  writ- 
ings are  interesting,  but  what  do  they  mean?  And  this  is 
where  all  the  wranglings  come  in.  We  all  agree  on  the 
"facts19;  we  do  not  agree  on  what  these  same  facts  mean. 
No  man  can  be  even  reasonably  sure,  intellectually,  of  any 


86  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

opinion  he  passes  on  any  subject  unless  he  knows  some- 
thing about  Logic.  He  may  be  able  to  reason  correctly  and 
may  do  so,  but  he  has  no  rides  by  which  he  may  KNOW 
that  he  is  reasoning  correctly,  without  such  knowledge.  So 
that,  in  lines  of  work  with  which  he  is  pre-eminently  familiar, 
his  opinions  may  be  worth  a  great  deal,  though  he  cannot 
tell  why  he  thinks  as  he  does,  but  the  moment  some  one  tells 
him  something  of  some  other  line  of  work,  or  he  reads  an 
article  on  a  subject  of  which  he  knows  little,  it  is  an  easy 
matter  to  state  fact  and  fancy  side  by  side,  and  he  will 
not  know  "which  is  which."  This  is  Logic's  great  value, 
for,  even  in  the  daily  walks  of  life,  it  enables  one,  though 
the  opinion  be  passed  in  totally  unfamiliar  fields,  to  stop  the 
speaker,  and  ask  wrhat  the  "facts" — the  observed  facts 
really  are — and  what  proof  there  may  be  for  them.  Then 
to  be  able  to  point  one's  finger  at  the  weak  place  in  the  argu- 
ment and  say,  "But  here  is  where  the  facts  end ;  now  you  are 
philosophizing,  and  I  want  to  follow  step  by  step.  I  do 
not  want  your  assumptions  or  opinions,  I  want  to  know 
HOW  YOU  GET  THAT  OPINION — by  what  process — and  that 
every  successive  step  taken  to  build  it  is  valid!"  Logic  is 
used  daily  in  the  market-place,  in  the  forum,  in  the  physi- 
cian's office ;  without  it  no  reasoning  could  be  done ;  no  busi- 
ness transacted;  no  thought  uttered  that  would  mean  any- 
thing; and  it  is  due  to  the  ignorance  of  the  laws  of  Logic 
that  so  many  people  are  misled  by  untruths;  by  erroneous 
reasoning,  into  paths  from  which  they  fain  would  extricate 
themselves. 

It  does  not  follow  from  this  that  each  and  every  one 
knows  Logic.  Few  do.  But  men  use  it,  just  as  the  child 
speaks  its  mother  tongue  long  before  it  learns  its  gram- 
mar, and  Logic  is  the  grammar  of  thought.  As  grammar 
is  the  method  of  permitting  the  child  to  check  himself  up 


Logic  87 

and  find  whether  or  not  he  is  correct  in  the  usage  of  his 
language,  so  also,  while  the  child  may  speak  a  perfect  Eng- 
lish because  he  is  always  with  those  who  do  speak  correctly, 
and  while  some  may  reason  correctly  because  they  are  con- 
stantly associated  with  those  who  use  good  reasoning  meth- 
ods, still,  even  then  such  a  one  could  not  be  considered  at 
all  educated,  for,  to  be  able  to  do  a  thing  without  being 
able  to  explain  why  and  how  one  does  it,  does  not  speak 
for  intellectuality;  and  so  any  one  wishing  to  be  able  to 
do  his  thinking  well  and  correctly,  must,  if  he  care  at  all 
to  know  that  he  is  correct,  study  his  Logic. 

The  reason  for  this  will  be  made  the  more  evident  when 
the  ending  of  the  preceding  chapter  and  the  beginning  of 
the  present  one  are  remembered.  For  to  weld  our  chain 
we  must  build  up  our  matter  step  by  step,  until  we  have 
made  it  into  a  complete  whole. 

That  is,  every  scientific  theory,  every  scientific  law,  every 
thing  that  amounts  to  anything,  whether  good  or  bad,  in 
science,  philosophy,  religion,  business,  law,  medicine  or  any 
other  walk  of  life — every  thought  that  is  formed  on  another 
thought,  every  series  of  ideas,  every  opinion  on  any  sub- 
ject, and  every  judgment  passed,  must  be  logical  to  be 
worth  anything. 

We  must  start  with  a  premise.  We  start  with  something 
on  which  both  sides  are  agreed.  This  premise  may  or  may 
not  be  correct  m  itself,  but  one  can  get  nowhere  without 
this  starting-point.  Logic  does  not  assure  us  that  our 
premise — our  starting  point — is  correct.  That  lies  with 
First  Principles  and  with  Epistemology — with  Certitude. 
Logic  only  shows  us  how  to  reason  correctly  after  we  have 
established  what  we  are  going  to  reason  about. 

This  is  all  in  the  "abstract,"  as  contradistinguished  from 
the  "concrete."  In  other  words,  we  have  nothing  tangible, 


88  The  Begwnmgs  of  Science 

nothing  that  comes  under  the  senses.  It  is  all  a  matter  of 
mental  processes,  and  therefore  these  studies  are  very  dif- 
ficult to  the  majority  of  men  and  women,  who  can  think 
only  in  terms  of  the  sense-world.  But  as  we  have  just  shown, 
that  while  we  must  use  the  sensible  things  on  which  to  build, 
yet  our  superstructure  must  come  from  the  mental  part  of 
ourselves.  One  must  either  admit  this  or  cease  thinking. 
There  is  no  alternative,  and  there  is  no  dispute  among  the 
learned  on  this  point.  No  one  insists  that  thought  itself 
is  material,  though  some  have  thought  it  was  a  direct  ema- 
nation from  the  material,  one  ardent  materialist  even  going 
so  far  as  to  think  it  a  secretion,  such  as  the  gastric  juice 
from  the  stomach  or  the  bile  from  the  liver,  but  gastric  juice 
and  bile  are  both  material  substances  while  thought  is  not. 

It  is  just  because  it  requires  sustained  mental  effort  that 
so  few  enter  philosophical  fields,  yet  we  shall  show  that 
every  man  considered  a  scientist  and  acknowledged  as  such 
by  his  fellow  workers,  is  acknowledged  as  such  on  account 
of  his  reasoning — that  is,  on  account  of  his  Logic,  which 
again  is  philosophy— that  there  has  never  been  a  man  in  any 
walk  of  life  who  has  won  any  regard  from  his  fellow-men, 
which  did  not  come  from  his  philosophy — from  his  manner  of 
thinking.  There  is  no  case  on  record,  so  far  as  the  author  has 
been  able  to  find,  where  any  scientific  work  has  ever  been  done 
by  man  that  was  not  the  result  of  thought  somewhere  ex- 
pressed, and  all  thought  is  under  the  dominion  of  philosophy. 

This  is  so  true  that  Professor  Huxley,  considered  by  any 
number  of  men  as  one  of  the  great  men  of  science,  has  gone 
,  on  record  as  saying  that  he  regrets  that  the  term  "applied 
science"  was  ever  invented.  That  the  men  who  invent, 
who  do  things,  are  not  scientists  at  all,  but  simply  work- 
men putting  scientific  ideas  into  practice.  Yet  the  aver- 
age man,  were  he  asked  who  the  greatest  scientists  were, 


Logic  89 

would,  in  all  probability,  point  to  such  men  as  Thomas  Edi- 
son and  Luther  Burbank,  as  well  as  others  who  by  their 
genius  and  patience  have  brought  a  few  more  material 
comforts  to  mankind.  But  no  scientist  would  even  suggest 
that  these  men  be  called  scientists.  The  true  scientist  is, 
what  the  man  of  the  street  would  think  of  as  a  philosopher 
— he  is  one  who  finds  underlying  "laws" — natural  laws — and 
formulates  methods  so  that  others  who  come  after  him  may 
profit  thereby.  Edison,  Burbank  and  others  working  in 
"applied  science"  could  not  have  done  the  things  they  did, 
without  the  work  of  many  men  who  have  gone  before,  and 
so  it  is  the  one  who  out  of  his  own  inner  consciousness  can 
put  together  the  ideas,  the  mental  abstractions  into  a  mean- 
ingful whole  who  is  the  real  scientist. 

Let  it  be  asked  at  any  of  our  universities  who  the  great 
scientists  of  the  past  century  were,  and  Darwin,  Wallace, 
Huxley,  Tyndall  will  come  to  mind.  Mendel  will  take  his 
place  first  in  the  list  now,  as  shown  by  our  chapter  on 
"Authorities,"  but  he  wrote  then  only  for  a  local  audience 
and  it  was  not  until  the  year  1900  that  his  great  work  was 
discovered,  which  has  been  mentioned  in  the  chapter  on 
"Genetics,"  and  whose  theory  is  now  one  of  the  predominat- 
ing ones  in  the  scientific  world. 

Yet  all  of  these  men,  though  they  did  much  observing, 
would  not  have  been  known  except  as  other  men  are  known, 
were  it  not  for  the  theories  which  they  advanced  and  fought 
•for.  It  was  an  idea  again,  and  not  a  "fact,"  for  which  they 
fought.  It  was  a  "theory,"  built  up  logically  from  their 
premises.  Many  there  are  who  do  not  accept  these  premises, 
but  Darwinism  remained  in  force  for  almost  two  genera- 
tions or  until  the  philosophers  showed  the  errors  in  its  logic 
as  well  as  the  groundlessness  of  the  premise  with  which  the 
theory  started. 


90  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

This  part  of  our  subject  will  be  discussed  in  our  chapter 
on  "The  Present  Status  of  Evolutionary  Philosophy,"  as 
well  as  in  the  chapter  on  "Evolutionary  Theories,"  but  we 
wish  here  to  point  out  that  every  one  of  these  men  con- 
ceded to  be  a  great  scientist  by  those  who  know,  was  a 
philosopher,  and  it  was  through  his  philosophy  and  not 
through  his  observations  that  he  is  so  acknowledged. 

Much  of  the  looseness  of  discussion  on  this  whole  matter 
is  again  merely  a  matter  of  definitions  of  words.  Men  of 
the  street  and  even  of  the  schools,  who  have  achieved  pop- 
ularity, tell  us  that  science  has  explained  everything,  that 
science  can  do  nearly  anything.  But  the  men  acknowledged 
as  the  great  scientists  condemn  all  such  statements  and  in- 
sist that  those  who  make  them  are  not  scientists  at  all  but 
mere  workmen  using  the  materials  some  one  else  has  formed, 
and  then  not  even  using  these  materials  justly.  There  is 
then  a  looseness  in  the  reasoning  process,  for  surely,  if  the 
men  who  themselves  are  greatest  in  this  field  do  not  ac- 
knowledge these  men  whom  most  people  consider  scientists, 
it  is  something  of  an  anomaly  for  those  who  are  not  scientists 
to  consider  them  such. 

Were  one  to  ask  most  men  what  science  has  done,  they 
would  unhesitatingly  say  it  made  the  telephone,  the  tele- 
graph, the  ocean  liners,  the  railroads,  and  a  host  of  other 
things,  from  rocking  chairs  to  chewing  gum,  but  ask  the 
scientist  himself  what  the  outstanding  achievements  of  the 
last  century  are.  Let  us  see  what  Professor  Huxley  says: 
"There  are  three  great  products  of  our  time.  One  of  these 
is  that  doctrine  concerning  the  constitution  of  matter  which, 
for  want  of  a  better  name,  I  will  call  'molecular' ;  the  second 
is  the  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  energy;  the  third  is 
the  doctrine  of  evolution." 

The  average  man  is  here  inclined  to  throw  up  his  hands 


Logic  91 

in  despair,  unable  to  get  anything  out  of  it  all.  Well,  the 
average  man  will  never  get  anything  out  of  it.  Only  a  man 
who  studies  will,  and  can,  and  ought,  to  get  anything  out 
of  it,  and  the  average  man  does  not  study.  He  is  interested 
in  "popular  science"  as  it  is  found  in  the  Sunday  news- 
papers, with  their  glowing  headlines  of  "Science  tells  why  a 
baby  sucks  its  toes,"  "Science  tells  why  men  play  baseball," 
and  other  equally  enlightening  accounts,  but  surely  not  sci- 
ence in  any  sense  of  the  word.  Some  man  who  calls  himself 
a  scientist  tells  us  something  which  may,  or  may  not,  be 
true,  but  that  doesn't  make  it  science.  It  may  be  interesting, 
as  it  no  doubt  is,  but  if  any  one  accepts  such  matter  as 
science,  it  shows  very  conclusively  that  that  man  has  sore 
need  of  Logic. 

And  it  is  just  because  the  average  man  has  never  been 
able  to  make  much  out  of  science  that  the  popular  writer 
appeals  to  him.  Unable,  or  unwilling,  to  spend  years  in 
the  study  of  scientific  subjects;  unwilling  or  unable  to 
think  in  terms  that  are  not  tangible;  unable  or  unwilling 
to  follow  a  consecutive  argument  through  its  logical  entan- 
glements, and  unable  to  hold  anything  in  his  mind  that  isn't 
sensible  for  long  periods,  and  think  back  on  his  own 
thoughts,  he  cannot  get  anything  out  of  science,  except  to 
feel  that  somewhere,  vaguely,  and  in  some  way,  it  is  ac- 
complishing something.  And  so  he  is  willing  to  contribute 
toward  the  support  of  its  professors,  whom  he  cannot 
understand,  yet,  because  he  hears  it  said  that  Science  is 
doing  such  wonderful  things,  he  assumes  that  it  must 
be  producing  something  of  value.  To  tell  a  man  anything 
in  his  own  department  that  is  manifestly  untrue  will  im- 
mediately get  him  to  distrust  you,  but  in  a  subject  where 
everything  and  anything  is  called  Science,  and  of  which  the 
average  man  knows  so  very  little,  it  is  by  no  means  difficult 


9£  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

to  "pull  the  wool  over  his  eyes."  Of  this  we  have  an  excel- 
lent example  in  one  of  the  most  flagrant  cases  in  recent 
years,  by  a  man  whom  thousands  of  people  swear  by,  and 
one  whom  they  consider  a  scientist  above  all  others.3  That 

"This  reference  is  to  Professor  Ernst  Haeckel  of  the  University  of 
Jena,  whose  falsification  of  various  illustrations  to  establish  his  own 
theories,  was  shown  by  Professor  Wilhelm  His,  in  1874.  "In  a  book 
entitled  Unserer  Korperform  und  das  physiologische  Problem  ihrer 
Enstehung,  His  shows  how  Haeckel  in  the  first  edition  of  naturliche 
Schdpfwngsgeschichte,  wishing  to  show  the  likeness  of  embryos  of  dif- 
ferent species,  gives  on  page  242  figures  of  the  egg,  one  hundred  times 
magnified,  of  man,  the  ape  and  dog;  and  on  page  248  also  three  figures 
of  the  embryo  of  the  dog,  of  the  chick  and  of  the  turtle.  He  points 
out  quite  amusingly  certain  features  of  the  resemblance  in  the  three 
figures  of  these  two  series.  Not  only  are  these  figures  identical  in  out- 
line but  in  nonessentials  also.  Thus  it  happens  that  the  granules  in  a 
certain  part  of  the  dog's  egg  are  coarser  than  in  the  other  parts,  and 
there  is  absolutely  identical  arrangement  in  the  eggs  of  the  man  and 
of  the  ape.  Very  remarkably  the  first  vertebra  in  the  embryos  of  the 
dog,  chick  and  turtle  is  a  little  more  rounded  on  the  right  side,  and  the 
ninth  a  trifle  narrower  than  the  others.  In  short  to  make  the  pretended 
similarity  as  striking  as  possible,  Haeckel  used  in  two  instances  the  same 
figure  and  gave  it  three  diiferent  names.  This  fraud  was  pointed  out  by 
Professor  Riitimeyer  in  Archw  fur  Anthropologie,  Bd.  Ill,  s.  301.  Pro- 
fessor His  remarks  that  one  would  expect  a  retraction  and  excuse  for 
the  mistake;  but  no.  'Instead  of  this  Haeckel  in  the  preface  of  his 
later  editions  heaped  heavy  insults  on  Professor  Riitimeyer,  equally 
untrue  in  their  substance  as  dishonorable  in  their  form'  (p.  169).  He 
however  saw  fit  to  omit  the  duplicates.  But  the  exposure  did  him  no 
good.  Professor  His  tells  us  that  in  the  fifth  edition  of  the  same  work 
of  Haeckel's  there  is  a  copy  from  Bischoff  of  the  figure  of  an  embryo 
of  a  dog  and  from  Ecker  of  one  of  a  human  embryo,  both  assumed 
to  be  of  four  weeks.  He  points  out  certain  peculiarities  of  these  'copies' 
well  worthy  of  notice  'or,'  he  asks,  'is  it  through  a  mistake  of  the  litho- 
grapher that  in  Haeckel's  dog  embryo,  precisely  the  frontal  part  of  the 
head  is  three  and  one-half  millimetres  longer  than  BischofTs,  but  in  the 
human  embryo  the  forehead  is  shortened  by  two  millimetres,  and  at  the 
same  time,  by  the  pushing  forward  of  the  eye,  made  narrower  by  fully 
five  millimetres?'  In  short,  what  purported  to  be  copies  of  figures  by 
leading  authorities  and  respectable  men  were  falsifications  made  to  show 
a  similarity  which  does  not  exist  between  the  embryos  of  man  and  dog. 
His  then  points  out  other  false  dealings  by  Haeckel  in  the  matter  of 
illustrations,  some  of  which  he  declares  to  have  been  invented 
(erfunden),  and  remarks  very  justly  that  this  play  with  facts  is  far 
more  dangerous  than  his  play  with  words,  inasmuch  as  it  requires  an 
expert  to  denounce  it.  He  charges  that  Haeckel  well  knew  the  influence 
that  he  exercised  on  a  large  circle.  'Let  then  others  honor  Haeckel  as 
an  efficient  and  reckless  party  leader;  according  to  my  judgment  he  has 
forfeited  through  his  methods  of  fighting  even  the  right  to  be  counted 
as  an  equal  in  the  company  of  serious  investigators'  (p.  171).  There  is 


Logic  93 

is  the  only  reason  why  he  is  mentioned  here,  and  our  foot- 
note shows  where  the  evidence  of  his  falsifications  is  to  be 
found. 

It  is  very  easy  to  assume  that  a  man  who  commits  a  mur- 
der must  be  a  very  evil  personage,  while  one  who  teaches  a 
false  doctrine  is  only  an  imbecile.  We  think  no  one  will  be- 
lieve such  a  teacher,  but  we  forget  that  the  murderer  is  no- 
where nearly  as  bad  as  he  who  teaches  erroneously, — for  the 
murderer  kills  but  one  or  two  individuals.  The  teacher  who 
falsely  instructs,  let  us  suppose  he  has  only  one  class  of 
ten  pupils  each  year  and  that  he  teaches  twenty  years  (mak- 
ing a  total  of  two  hundred  individuals,  who,  marrying,  will 
add  two  hundred  more  people  to  the  list,  and  as  families 
average  about  three  children  this  will  make  six  hundred  more, 

only  to  add  that  Haeckel,  in  spite  of  plenty  of  subsequent  exposures, 
has  not  reformed  his  ways,"  (pp.  22-23;  Thoughts  of  a  Catholic  Anatom- 
ist, by  Thomas  Dwight,  M.D.,  LL.D.  Longmans,  Green  &  Co.,  1912.) 
And  in  a  note  Dr.  Dwight  adds,  "If  any  one  would  know  what  the 
late  Alexander  Agassiz,  whom  we  all  honor  as  a  scholar  and  a  gentle- 
man thought  of  Haeckel,  let  him  consult  Agassiz'  report  on  the  expedi- 
tion of  the  'Albatross'  in  the  Bulletin  of  the  Museum  of  Comparative 
Zoology,  at  Harvard  College,  Vol.  XXIII,  1892,  p.  32  to  p.  40.  His  tone 
is  not  that  of  one  arguing  with  an  equal,  but  of  one  exposing  a  knave." 

See  also,  "Facts  and  Theories,"  by  Sir  Bertram  Windle,  M.A.,  M.D., 
Sc.D.,  LL.D.,  F.R.S.,  K.S.G.,  Published  by  Herder,  1916,  pages  18  to 
27,  on  'Bias',  who  quotes  Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  F.R.S.,  "Life  and  Matter." 
"He  (i.e.  Haeckel)  writes  in  so  forcible  and  positive  and  determined  a 
fashion  from  the  vantage-ground  of  scientific  knowledge,  that  he  exerts 
an  undue  influence  on  the  uncultured  amongst  his  readers,  and  causes 
them  to  fancy  that  only  benighted  fools  or  credulous  dupes  can  really 
disagree  with  the  historical  criticisms,  the  speculative  opinions,  and  phil- 
osophical; or  perhaps  unphilosophical,  conjectures  thus  powerfully  set 
forth."  (p.135.) 

Also  refer  for  an  account  of  Haeckel's  falsifications  to  "Brass  and 
Gemelli,  L'Origine  dell  'Uomo  e  le  Falsificazioni  di  E.  Haeckel;  also 
Wasmann,  Modern  Biology  and  the  Problem  of  Evolution  (inter  alia., 
pp.  511,  seq.).  See  also  Gerard,  The  Old  Riddle  and  the  Newest 
Answer." 

Our  object  in  giving  this  lengthy  note  is  this,  that  although  Haeckel's 
work  has  often  been  objected  to,  it  was  rather  difficult  for  the  average 
reader  to  point  directly  to  the  very  page  and  place  where  these  falsifica- 
tions could  be  found,  and  to  cite  his  authorities. 


94  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

or  one  thousand  people  who  will  be  affected  in  one  genera- 
tion alone  by  a  single  teacher),  will  through  the  years  af- 
fect a  great  number  of  people,  who,  in  their  turn,  will 
teach  others  what  is  false,  making  a  never  ending  chain ; 
and,  as  most  men  cannot  think  without  putting  their  thoughts 
into  practice,  it  can  easily  be  seen  that  many,  many  mur- 
ders as  well  as  other  crimes  can  be  traced  to  nothing  else 
but  erroneous  principles  inculcated  during  the  plastic  period 
of  life.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  so  much  argument  has 
been  spent  on  whether  man  descended  from  one  of  the  lower 
animals  or  not.  This  is  really  the  crux  of  the  whole  matter 
with  moralists,  for  if  the  only  evidence  that  man  had  for 
assuming  that  he  was  especially  created  was,  let  us  say, 
the  bible,  and  he  believes  that  the  bible  is  the  sole  rule  of 
faith,  there  is  only  one  outcome  for  such  a  man,  and  woe  be 
unto  him  and  his  children  if  they  attend  any  of  our  schools 
now,  for  such  a  child  brought  up  to  accept  such  a  theory 
gets  his  only  validity  for  his  morals  from  the  one  fact  alone, 
that  the  bible  teaches  him  his  code  of  action.  If  it  can  be 
demonstrated  that  man  was  not  created  in  exactly  the  way 
this  particular  individual  has  pictured  it  to  himself,  then 
all  the  ground  is  taken  from  under  his  feet,  and,  having 
no  further  evidence  for  his  original  belief,  because  the  bible 
and  the  bible  only  was  his  sole  rule  of  faith,  he  has  no 
moral  code  left  him,  and  so  it  must  follow  that,  in  accordance 
with  this  reasoning,  that  man  not  having  been  originally  cre- 
ated a  full-fledged  man,  there  is  no  evidence  that  any  of  the 
rest  of  the  matter  contained  in  the  scriptures  is  true,  and 
consequently  he  rejects  consistently  the  moral  precepts  as 
well.  Again,  if  he  is  at  all  reasonable,  he  can  also  see  that  if 
man  is  but  a  piece  of  protoplasm,  highly  developed, — only  a 
little  more  developed  than  other  animals, — there  can  be  no 
reason  whatever  for  his  not  accumulating  all  the  pleasure 
and  wealth  possible,  caring  nothing  at  all  about  what  it 


Logic  95 

;osts  his  fellow-man.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  those 
vho  opposed  one  of  the  evolutionary  theories,  namely,  that 
nan  descended  from  an  animal  ancestor,  became  so  violent 
a,t  times,  and  it  is  for  this  reason  that  we  still  hear  so 
much  of  its  echoes,  about  Science  and  Religion,  or  Science 
vs.  Religion,  or  Science  and  Faith,  etc.  The  upholders  of 
the  descent  doctrine  felt  no  different  morally,  as  a  rule, 
than  they  had  before  they  defended  it,  because  they  had 
the  inheritance  in  all  its  fullness  of  their  moral  code,  and 
had  trained  themselves  in  accord  therewith,  so  that  in  as 
much  as  they  had  passed  the  plastic  period  of  their  lives, 
they  could  not  understand  how  men  could  think  that  de- 
scending from  the  animal  world  could  destroy  morality ;  but 
their  children,  and  men  at  large — the  great  majority — 
being  untrained  in  what  it  all  meant,  could  only  know  this, 
that  the  bible  in  which  they  had  placed  infinite  confidence 
was  torn  away  from  them.  There  are  very  few  human  beings 
who  can  stand  alone  mentally  or  morally.  Nearly  all  seek 
assistance  and  desire  to  lean  upon  the  theories  of  some 
tangible  philosophy  of  life,  and  pinning  their  faith  without 
rhyme  or  reason  to  some  man  who  is  an  interesting  writer 
or  speaker  (though  by  no  means  necessarily  a  scientist)  they 
feel  that  as  they  have  lost  the  philosophy  of  life  they  for- 
merly held,  they  must  follow  him  who  was  instrumental  in 
bringing  about  that  loss.  Having,  then,  come  into  an  at- 
mosphere where  no  moral  training  at  all  is  given,  there  are 
no  distinct  ideas  of  what  morality  means  and,  as  it  is  per- 
fectly true  that  in  and  of  itself  no  act  is  either  good  or  bad 
if  no  law  can  be  apprehended  (for  only  a  law  can  possibly 
tell  good  and  bad  in  the  moral  order),  there  is  no  reason 
why  men  should  not  follow  every  impulse  that  tends  to  give 
pleasure,  regardless  of  what  it  might  cost  others. 

We  are  here  using  the  term  "law"  as  an  expressed  or 


96  The  Begwrwngs  of  Science 

implied  statute  given  by  one  who  has  authority  to  give 
and  enforce  that  law  in  conscience.  We  are  not  speaking 
of  a  physical  law  or  of  a  statute  made  by  a  community. 

The  French  Revolution  brings  home  an  example  of  what 
we  are  trying  to  make  clear.  The  writers  of  that  day  taught 
that  the  people  were  supreme — that  there  was  no  higher 
power.  Now  it  is  well  known  that  the  great  mass  of  man- 
kind will,  whenever  they  have  a  thought,  try  to  put  that 
.  thought  into  action — in  other  words,  men  cannot  only  think, 
*  they  must  act  out  their  thoughts  and  in  the  example  of  the 
French  Revolution  we  see  what  terrible  bloodshed  resulted 
from  carrying  out  the  thoughts  which  the  writers  of  that 
day  propounded.  This  is  the  direct  result  of  the  doctrine 
that  there  is  no  power  of  absolute  authority  above  the 
people,  which  means,  of  course,  that,  the  people  being  su- 
preme, everything  they  do  must  be  right.  Will  any  contend 
that  the  murder  of  thousands  as  accomplished  during  this 
reign  of  terror  was  right?  No  one  was  to  blame  for  it  but 
those  teachers  who  taught  these  false  doctrines  and  in- 
flamed men's  minds  to  fury.  This  is  but  one  of  many  ex- 
amples of  what  the  erroneous  teacher  does.  His  crime  lives 
on  to  poison  thousands,  while  the  individual  criminal  injures 
only  himself  and  the  few  on  whom  the  immediate  injury 
is  inflicted. 

If  what  is  taught  matters  so  much,  one  can  understand 
why  those  of  broader  vision  see  the  results  long  before 
their  occurrence  and  begin  fighting  them,  usually  only  to  be 
condemned  by  their  contemporaries.  We  now  condemn  the 
burning  of  witches,  but  do  not  think  that  there  weren't  men 
and  women  of  the  past  who  also  condemned  the  practice. 
But  others  had  power  for  the  time  being,  and  as  always,  the 
passing  years  have  shown  most  conclusively  that  those  who 
saw  farther  than  their  neighbors  were  right  but  unpopular, 


Logic  97 

while  the  most  popular  teaching  was  entirely  in  error. 

If,  then,  every  thought,  every  idea,  everything  that  has 
changed  the  history  of  the  world,  is  but  a  series  of  thoughts 
built  up  from  some  few  facts  into  a  meaningful  whole,  it 
behooves  man  to  study  that  most  important  of  all  subjects 
by  which  he  may  test  himself  and  try  out  his  reasoning, 
and  check  himself  up,  so  he  may  feel  reasonably  assured 
intellectually  that  he  is  correct  in  his  findings,  and,  not  only 
"feel"  he  is  right ;  and  to  do  this,  he  must  study  Logic. 

An  example  that  illustrates  this  chapter  comes  to  mind 
from  the  pages  of  history.  Cardinal  Richelieu,  the  great 
minister  of  France  under  Louis  XIII,  fought  the  Protestants 
in  his  country  with  extreme  vigor.  This  is  a  fact.  None 
will  deny  it.  Now  to  know  that  much  without  having  several 
additional  facts  would  lead  one  into  erroneous  conclusions, 
for,  it  could  be  said,  that  as  Richelieu  was  a  Catholic  he 
might  wish  to  exterminate  those  who  were  of  another  belief. 
But — and  here  we  show  that  additional  observations  make 
considerable  difference  (bear  in  mind,  not  on  the  first  fact, 
but)  on  the  conclusion.  We  also  learn  that  Gustavos  Adol- 
phus,  King  of  Sweden  and  a  Protestant,  was  assisted  by 
Cardinal  Richelieu  in  exterminating  the  Catholics  of  that 
country.  Now  we  may  draw  other  conclusions.  But  with 
only  these  facts  before  us,  we  are  still  at  a  loss.  So  we  need 
a  broader  view  of  the  whole  range  of  the  times.  This  is 
what  we  mean  when  we  say  that  the  isolated  facts  gathered 
by  the  special  sciences  must  be  woven  into  a  complete  whole 
before  they  give  that  true  insight  into  what  it  is  all  worth, 
and  what  it  all  means.  And  we  must  know  all  this  before  we 
can  pass  a  valid  judgment  on  Life,  and,  after  all,  that  is 
'what  our  studies  are  for,  and  just  in  so  far  as  we  fail  to 
do  that  which  we  are  attempting,  we  are  failures. 

To  read  further  in  history  then,  we  easily  see  that  the 


98  The  Begmnmgs  of  Science 

Church  and  the  State  had  been  most  intimately  interwoven; 
in  fact  so  much  so  that  it  was  almost  impossible  for  men 
of  that  day  to  concede  that  a  state  could  exist  without 
such  union.  We  have  grown  accustomed  to  the  separation — 
we  have  been  born  into  it  all,  and  so  it  seems  a  matter  of 
course  to  us,  but  it  was  all  so  different  to  these  men  who 
never  even  dreamed  such  things  possible.  Religion  and 
Politics  meant  almost  the  same  thing,  or,  we  may  say,  two 
sides  of  the  same  question,  and  so  Religion  had  nothing 
whatever  to  do  with  what  Cardinal  Richelieu  did.  It  was 
politics  pure  and  simple.  The  Catholics  were  the  political 
party  in  power  in  France.  The  Protestants  were  similarly 
the  political  power  in  Sweden  and  one  reigning  house  helped 
the  other.  This,  then,  changes  our  entire  conclusion,  though 
it  is  based  on  exactly  the  selfsame  facts  with  a  little  broader 
knowledge. 

And  the  argument  would  run  something  like  this,  among 
men  who  know  nothing  about  the  matter,  except  one  of  the 
facts  mentioned :  "Well,  isn't  it  a  fact  that  Cardinal  Riche- 
lieu killed  the  Protestants,  at  least  all  he  could?"  And  the 
one  to  whom  the  question  is  addressed  admits  it,  when 
the  answer  comes  quite  regularly  as  it  always  does  in  such 
cases,  "Well,  then,  where's  the  argument?  Doesn't  that 
prove  my  point  that  he  was  a  narrow-minded  bigot,  and 
would  even  resort  to  murder  to  get  rid  of  his  religious 
opponents?"  Let  the  reader  judge  whether  it  proves  the 
point  or  not,  and  see  for  himself  what  value  Logic  may  have 
for  him  in  one  of  the  many  like  predicaments  in  which  he 
so  often  finds  himself  and  in  which  without  it  he  cannot  meet 
his  opponent's  "facts." 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  PRESENT  STATUS  OF  EVOLUTIONARY  PHILOSOPHY 

ALL  that  we  are  and  all  that  we  can  be  is  summed  up 
in  what  Inheritance  plus  Environment  in  its  widest  ap- 
plication determines  what  each  shall  and  must  be.  And 
if  this  be  true,  and  none  will  deny  it,  Evolution  is  one  of 
the  most  insistent  and  important  factors  with  which  we 
have  to  deal,  for,  since  Evolution  has  come  into  our  schools, 
and  it  has  been  there  for  over  a  generation  now  it  has 
not  only  revolutionized  our  educational  system,  but  there 
is  no  department  of  human  study,  from  theology  to  stock- 
breeding,  that  has  not  been  materially  affected  by  it — in 
other  words,  Evolution  has  reversed  our  educational  view- 
point entirely. 

The  thing  that  Darwin  did  in  1859,  by  the  publication 
of  his  epoch-making  book,  The  Origin  of  Species,  was  the 
turning  over  of  our  educational  system.  This  is  the  all- 
important  fact  to  remember  and  the  one  on  which  all  the 
stress  is  to  be  laid. 

Up  to  that  time  men  were  interested  in  dividing  and 
separating  everything  and  anything  into  separate  camps — 
into  separate  species — into  separate  families  and  groups 
of  various  kinds.  After  that  time  just  exactly  the  reverse 
viewpoint  was  stressed,  namely,  that  in  all  learning,  the 
object  sought  for  was  the  connecting  link  which  should  ,/ 
bind  all  things  together.  And  if  there  be  anything  of  most 
importance  in  one's  study,  it  is  the  viewpoint  with  which  one 
starts  and  which  so  thoroughly  and  indelibly  colors  all 

99 


100  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

one's  findings. 

The  story  is  told  of  a  missionary  and  a  hunter  meeting 
at  a  mutual  friend's  home,  both  being  surprised  to  find 
that  each  had  been  in  the  same  region  of  Africa  during 
the  same  period.  The  hunter  expressed  his  amazement  at 
their  not  having  met  before,  but  the  missionary  immediately 
asked  whether  the  hunter  had  met  any  missionaries  dur- 
ing his  African  sojourn;  receiving  a  negative  answer,  he 
continued,  "Well,  I  presume  you  saw  any  number  of  lions 
and  tigers?"  The  hunter  admitted  that  he  had,  to  which 
t  the  clergyman  made  answer,  "Yes,  you  were  looking  for  lions 
and  tigers.  I,  however,  saw  none  of  these  during  my  fifteen 
years'  work  in  the  region,  but  I  did  see  any  quantity  of 
missionaries,  for  I  was  looking  for  them.  We  each  found 
exactly  what  we  were  looking  for." 

This  psychological  point  is  so  often  lost  sight  of  in  sci- 
entific investigations.  So  many  students  forget  that  facts, 
in  and  of  themselves,  are  of  no  value,  for  which  reason  Dr. 
Oliver  Wendell  Holmes  said  that  if  there  was  any  one  thing 

'  that  never  made  an  impression  upon  him,  it  was  a  "fact." 
It  is  the  meanings — the  interpretations  of  the  facts  that 
count — not  the  facts  themselves.  Facts  are  only  the  foun- 
dation stones  on  which  to  build. 

Walter  Bagehot  probably  also  had  this  beginning  view- 
point (we  may  term  it)  in  mind,  when  he  said  that  the 
moment  a  man  becomes  famous  he  also  becomes  a  nuisance, 
for  he  carries  so  many  of  his  earlier  prejudices  over  into 

'  the  maturer  life  with  him.  And,  of  course,  by  virtue  of  his 
position,  does  untold  damage,  for  most  men  assume  that  if 
an  individual  knows  much  of  one  thing,  even  though  that 
be  but  one  of  the  minor  details  of  life,  he  must  likewise 
be  an  authority  on  all  other  things,  even  though,  about 
these  other  things  he  may  not  only  be  ignorant,  but,  what 


The  Present  Status  of  Evolutionary  Philosophy    101 

is  worse,  hopelessly  prejudiced — a  condition  due  to  that 
ignorance. 

For  this  reason  also  we  find  nearly  every  volume  written 
on  such  a  subject  as  Evolution,  either  giving  only  the 
points  that  help  to  bolster  up  the  particular  theory  the 
writer  upholds,  or  the  particular  points  that  demolish  or 
attempt  to  demolish  an  opponent.  To  read  a  book  of  this 
kind,  and  even  to  follow  out  all  the  references  cited,  only 
strengthens  one's  prejudices,  for  it  is  self-evident  that  in  the 
writing  of  such  a  volume  the  author  has  only  given  the  ref- 
erences to  those  writers  who  hold  largely  with  himself,  in- 
/  stead  of  showing  the  various  viewpoints  of  opposing  workers 
in  his  particular  field. 

To  have  read  a  volume,  then,  no  matter  by  whom,  and 
no  matter  how  worthy  in  itself — to  have  followed  every 
reference  stated — to  have  read  every  volume  in  the  bibliog- 

*  rapy  cited,  may  very  easily  mean  a  narrowing  instead  of  a 
broadening  to  the  one  who  reads.     It  is  most  essential  that 
the  reading  be  done  on  both  sides,  not  so  much  to  realize 
that   there  are   opponents,   for  every  theory   can  produce 
these,  but  to  obtain  perspective — to  be  able  to  stand  far 
enough  away  so  that  the  battle  cries  of  each  opposing  force 
may  be  heard  and  weighed  and,  above  all,  to  realize  how 

*  the  very  same  facts  can  produce  such  totally  different  con- 
clusions.    It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  facts  are  not 
disputed — all  the  arguments  and  wranglings  come  from  what 
these  facts  mean,  and  meanings  are  and  must  always  remain 
in  the  realm  of  philosophy — that  is,  they  must  be  logically 
drawn.    On  this  point  also  there  is  no  dispute.    All  writers 
admit  the  necessity  of  logic,  though  by  no  means  all  use 
it. 

Let  us  observe,  then,  the  various  viewpoints  with  which 
men  begin  their  science:  the  theologian,  starting  with  the 


10,?,  The  Begmnmgs  of  Science 

idea  of  a  God  and  a  separate  creation,  insists  that  his  facts 
be  interpreted  in  the  light  of  such  a  premise,  while  the  op- 
posing force  may  be  well  illustrated  by  the  lines  of  Pro- 
fessor Vernon  Kellogg  in  discussing  a  theory  (and  that  by 
a  non- theologian),  when  he  says,  "Nageli's  automatic  per- 
fecting principle  is  an  impossibility  to  the  thorough-going 
evolutionist  seeking  for  a  causo-mechanical  explanation  of 
change." 

Of  course  it  is.  Starting  with  the  idea  or  premise  that  all 
things  must  be  explained  by  a  causo-mechanical  action,  is 
just  as  valid  and  just  as  invalid  as  starting  with  the  the- 
ologian's viewpoint.  If  that  is  the  idea  with  which  one 
wishes  to  start,  and  if,  as  here  implied,  everything  is  to 
j  be  thrown  out  that  does  not  fit  in  with  such  a  theory,  one 
can  readily  see  that  there  isn't  any  science  about  it  at  all. 
It  is  simply  reaching  up  in  the  air  and  picking  out  a  start- 
ing point  that  is  more  or  less  agreeable  to  the  one  doing 
the  reaching.  And  yet,  perfectly  obvious  as  all  this  ap- 
pears, the  writer  has  hardly  met  a  single  student  at  any 
of  the  schools  where  he  has  studied,  who  even  remotely 
thought  of  this. 

To  the  student  thoroughly  ingrained  with  the  idea  that 
the  bible  is  to  be  used  as  a  text  for  every  subject  under 
the  sun,  this  has  become  so  part  and  parcel  of  him,  that  he 
does  not  know  that  he  has  never  found  a  reason  or  justifica- 
tion for  his  viewpoint.  He  has  simply  been  among  people 
who  have  always  considered  this  viewpoint  true,  and  conse- 
quently he  has  accepted  it.  But  is  there  any  more  reason 
why  this  man,  so  unscientific,  is  to  be  condemned  than  he  who 
takes  the  causo-mechanical  viewpoint  simply  because  he  has 
been  thrown  in  an  atmosphere  of  those  who  hold  it  and,  find- 
ing these  men  in  whom  he  has  confidence,  upholding  that  doc- 
trine, he,  without  rhyme  or  reason,  accepts  it,  just  as  did  the 


The  Present  Status  of  Evolutionary  Philosophy    103 

biblical  acceptor?  It  is  just  this  point  that  must  be  im- 
pressed upon  the  student  and  it  is  here  he  must  be  shown 
the  value  of  Epistemology  and  Metaphysics.  It  is  this  lack 
of  valid  reasons  for  the  Beginnings  or  starting  point  of 
most  laboratory  men,  that  separates  people  at  large  into 
camps  of  thinkers  and  camps  of  observers,  both  with  a  mu- 
tual distrust  of  each  other — with  an  undercurrent  of  smil- 
ing indulgence  and  tolerance,  but  implied  contempt  of  one 
side  for  the  other,  and  which  to  the  writer's  mind  is  haz- 
ardous to  the  student's  true  conception  of  either  observa- 
tion or  philosophy. 

The  very  surfeit  of  examples  that  come  to  mind  must 
be  culled,  and  only  one  produced  to  bring  home  this  most 
vital  and  important  feature.  In  the  Unpopular  Review  of 
about  a  year  ago,  in  a  series  of  articles  on  Psychical  Re- 
search, the  author  quotes  Professor  Wm.  James'  discussion 
with  a  well-known  psychologist  who  insisted  that,  even  if  a 
psychic  force  could  be  found,  it  should  be  denied  by  all 
scientists,  as  it  would  throw  into  disrepute  so  many  theories 
that  are  now  held  necessary  for  scientific  explanations. 

When  it  is  thoroughly  realized  by  students  that  all  of 
our  science  rests  on  theories  which  in  turn  can  only  be  held 
by  acceptmg  certain  unprovable  first  principles,  a  different 
viewpoint  will  be  had.  This  fact  is  brought  home  in  the 
passage  from  Professor  Kellogg,  where  he  says,  in  speaking 
of  both  Darwinism  and  an  opposing  theorist,  that  "after 
all  the  Darwinian  interpretation  is  proved  only  in  so  far 
as  it  possesses  a  high  degree  of  plausibility  and  makes  a  X" 
convincing  appeal  to  our  reason.  Of  exact  proof,  in  the 
nature  of  observed  fact  or  result  of  experiment,  or  of  math- 
ematical demonstration,  there  is  little  in  the  case  either  of 
the  Darwinian  or  the  Korschinskian  interpretation."  1 

Darwinism  To-day,  by  Vernon  L.  Kellogg. 


104  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

Professor  Kellogg  is  a  very  thorough-going  evolutionist, 
and  his  book  Darwinism  To-day  from  which  we  shall  quote 
in  this  chapter  in  so  far  as  it  pertains  to  the  purpose  in 
hand,  is  a  masterful  summary  of  the  various  systems  and 
theories  of  evolution  so  far  propounded,  though  furnishing 
no  proof,  as  usual,  for  logical  beginnings,  while  yet  saying 
very  definitely  that  "the  evidence  for  descent  is  of  satisfying 
but  purely  logical  character."  The  italics  are  ours. 

And,  speaking  of  intemperate  anti-Darwinians  as  he  does, 
it  seems  hardly  just  that  such  an  intemperate  paragraph 
as  the  following  should  come  from  the  pen  of  one  who  so 
heartily  condemns  the  very  thing  of  which  he  himself  is 
guilty. 

Now  all  these  millions  of  kinds  of  animals  and  plants  can 
have  had  an  origin  in  some  one  of  but  three  ways ;  they 
have  come  into  existence  spontaneously,  they  have  been 
specially  created  by  some  supernatural  power,  or  they  have 
descended  one  from  the  other  in  many-branching  series  by 
gradual  transformation.  There  is  absolutely  no  scientific 
evidence  for  either  of  the  first  two  ways;  there  is  much 
scientific  evidence  for  the  last  way.  There  is  left  for  the 
scientific  man,  then,  solely  the  last;  that  is,  the  method  of 
descent.  The  theory  of  descent  (with  which  phrase  organic 
evolution  may  be  practically  held  as  a  synonym  is,  then, 
simply  the  declaration  that  the  various  living  as  well  as  the 
now  extinct  species  of  organisms  are  descended  from  one 
another  and  from  common  ancestors.  It  is  the  explanation 
of  the  origin  of  species  accepted  in  the  science  of  biology. 
(The  natural  question  about  first  species  or  the  first  several, 
if  they  appeared  simultaneously,  will  receive  attention  later ; 
the  theory  of  descent  explains  the  origin  of  kinds  of  life, 
not  the  origin  of  life.)  If  such  a  summary  disposal  of  the 
theories  of  spontaneous  generation  and  divine  creation  is 
too  repugnant  to  my  readers  to  meet  with  toleration,  then, 
as  Delage  has  pertinently  said  in  connection  with  a  similar 
statement  in  his  great  tome  on  "Heredity,"  my  book  and 


The  Present  Status  of  Evolutionary  Philosophy    105 

such  readers  had  better  immediately  part  company;  we  do 
not  speak  the  same  language.     (Page  11.) 

In  other  words,  he  might  just  as  well  have  made  it  much 
shorter  and  said,  "As  long  as  this  is  MY  starting  point 
that's  all  there  is  to  it.  It  must  be  right  because  it  is  mine. 
There  is  absolutely  no  proof  needed  to  establish  my  premise. 
I  have  said  it.  Take  it  or  leave  it,  but  I'm  right." 

It  can  very  readily  be  seen  that  any  other  kind  of  a  be- 
ginning would  be  just  as  valid  and  just  as  absurd,  if  no 
further  facts  than  these  were  brought  for  evidence.  It 
would  be  a  little  fairer  probably  to  put  it  in  still  another 
way,  and  this  is  really  the  accepted  viewpoint  in  some 
scientific  circles — that,  though  there  are  those  who  differ 
from  us,  we  are  going  to  accept  as  our  starting  point  a 
causo-mechanical  explanation,  and  everything  which  does 
not  fit  in  with  this  theory  is  to  be  discarded,  and  all  those 
who  do  not  accept  this  statement  are  unscientific,  super- 
stitious, and  incapable  of  being  scientists  anyway,  so  we 
might  as  well  come  to  an  understanding  now.  You  who  do 
not  accept  this  theory  are  wrong,  for  we  must  be  right. 

Again  let  us  notice  the  philosophical  regions  drawn  upon 
when  proof  is  needed,  but  rejected  when  proof  is  demanded 
by  those  outside  the  causo-mechanist's  fold  for  the  very 
causo-mechanical  theory  upon  which  all  the  later  building 
rests. 

What  may  for  the  moment  detain  us,  however,  is  a  refer- 
ence to  the  curiously  nearly  completely  subjective  character 
of  the  evidence  for  both  the  theory  of  descent  and  natural 
selection.  (Page  18.)  The  italics  are  ours. 

We  wish  the  reader  to  understand  fully  and  completely, 
as  most  of  our  college  students  do  not,  what  the  evidences 
for  the  various  theories  of  Evolution  are.  And  we  have  used 


106  The  Begwnwgs  of  Science 

s  Professor  Kellogg's  volume  because  it  is  a  sort  of  classic  in 
the  biological  world  and  is  read  and  recommended  in  prob- 
ably most,  if  not  all  of  our  schools  to-day.  We  are  not  using 
it  as  a  text,  but  as  a  worthy  reference  work,  so  that  the 
causo-mechanists  may  be  represented  by  one  of  their  ac- 
cepted writers.  And  we  are  trying  to  impress  upon  the  reader 
the  fact  that  all  the  evidence  is  logical;  this  being  so,  every 
theory  must  fall  flat  that  cannot  be  upheld  by  that  self- 
same logic  that  is  invoked  as  evidence. 

We  must  here  differentiate  between  "True"  and  "Logical." 
To  get  at  the  truth  of  anything,  ALL  THE  FACTS  must 
be  known,  and  we  must  be  able  to  PROVE  OUK  PREMISE.  But 
to  be  logical  means  only  to  argue  in  accordance  with  the 
rules  of  logic  from  a  premise  already  accepted,  regardless 
of  whether  that  premise  be  false  or  true. 

Further,  it  requires  no  biologist  to  show  the  fallacy  of  an 
argument,  but  a  logician,  though  conversely,  it  does  not 
require  a  logician  but  a  biologist,  with  a  very  considerable 
knowledge  of  his  own  and  related  sciences  to  formulate  a 
biological  theory  that  is  of  value,  though  he  must  of  course 
know  his  logic  also.  This  is  well  put  by  Herbert  Spencer 
when  he  says : 

Judging  whether  another  proves  his  position  is  a  widely 
different  thing  from  proving  your  own.  To  establish  a 
general  law  requires  an  extensive  knowledge  of  the  phe- 
nomena to  be  generalized ;  but  to  decide  whether  an  alleged 
general  law  is  established  by  the  evidence  assigned  merely 
requires  an  adequate  reasoning  faculty.  Especially  is  such 
the  case  when  the  premises  do  not  warrant  the  conclusion. 

With  all  these  facts  before  us,  we  may  say  that  if  we 
accept  the  facts  that  laboratory  men  have  found,  and 
use  our  logic  in  analyzing  and  deducing  therefrom,  any 
man  capable  of  reasoning  may  show  where  errors  creep  in. 


The  Present  Status  of  Evolutionary  Philosophy    107 

In  other  words,  the  recluse  in  his  cell  is  just  as  capable  of 
this  as  is  the  best  observer  that  ever  lived,  so  that  it  seems 
strange  that  Professor  Kellogg  should  permit  the  following 
statement  to  appear  on  the  pages  of  his  book: 

I  have  however,  assiduously  sought  out  (with  the  help  of 
librarians  and  my  indefatigable  Leipzig  book-dealer  friend 
Bernh.  Liebisch),  and  perused  the  original  pourings-forth  of 
criticism  and  villification  even  to  the  reading  of  some  matter 
written  by  certain  Roman  Catholic  priests  with  a  consider- 
able amateur  interest  in  natural  history  and  a  strong  pro- 
fessional interest  in  anti-Darwinism!  (p.  30). 

The  implication  here  being  that  if  any  one  happens  to 
have  a  decided  leaning  away  from  a  preferred  interpreta- 
tion, one's  writings  are  worthless,  for  no  other  reason  than 
that  one's  leanings  are  not  those  of  the  particular  author's ; 
and  most  heinous  of  all  offenses  is  the  fact  that  one 
does  not  make  his  living  by  the  matter  under  discussion — 
that  is,  is  not  a  professional — for  that  is  all  the  word 
amateur  means,  though  by  implication  it  means  much  more 
and  is  a  subtle  way  of  poisoning  especially  youthful  minds. 
Would  it  not  be  just  as  fair  to  ask  how  Professor  Kellogg 
who  has  a  very  decided  leaning  away  from  the  majority 
of  anti-Darwinians,  by  that  leaning,  could  pass  a  valid 
judgment  on  them? 

It  would  seem  that  the  whole  matter  rests  on  an  equal 
footing,  but  surely  if  a  fact  be  a  fact,  it  ought  stilLto  be 
a  fact  whether  found  by  a  Roman  Catholic  Priest,  or  by 
any  other  amateur,  or  by  Professor  Kellogg ;  and  by  way  of 
passing,  it  might  be  suggested  that  of  all  biologist's  names 
contained  in  the  eleventh  edition  of  the  Encyclopedia  Bri- 
tannica,  the  Abbot  Mendel,  a  Roman  Catholic  priest  and 
amateur  scientist,  occupies  the  greatest  quantity  of  space, 
and  when  one  realizes  that  Father  Mendel  was  an  Aus- 


108  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

trian — that  is,  was  German — and  the  British  national  pride 
is  considered,  if  with  all  this  in  mind  we  find  an  English 
book  compiled  by  the  leading  scientific  University  of  Eng- 
land, giving  him  more  space  for  a  description  of  himself 
and  work  than  any  other  biologist  that  ever  lived,  it  might 
even  imply  that  he  deserved  still  more  credit  than  was  given 
him.  And  in  the  realm  of  insect  life  and  evolutionary 
philosophy  Father  Erich  Wasmann,  another  German  Roman 
Catholic  priest  and  amateur  scientist,  is  one  of  the  best  known 
and  ablest  of  men.  This  is  practically  acknowledged  by  Pro- 
fessor Kellogg,  but  what  we  are  trying  to  drive  home  is 
that  even  where  an  acknowledgment  of  this  nature  is  made, 
implications  that  are  subtle  and  invidious,  poison  the  mind  of 
our  students,  making  them  neither  scientists  nor  philoso- 
phers. We  must  give  them  freely,  frankly  and  openly  the 
evidences  as  they  are.  We  must  have  them  obtain  perspective, 
and  have  sufficient  background ;  then,  and  then  only,  can  they 
understand  the  necessity  for  constant  watchfulness  to  pre- 
vent emotionalism  and  desire  from  overpowering  logical 
judgment. 

We  wish,  then,  with  this  foreword  to  give  a  sort  of  synop- 
sis of  the  various  theories  of  Evolution,  for  it  is  well  known 
that  the  average  college  man  and  woman  of  to-day  accepts 
Evolution,  but  does  not  know  why.  Ask  the  first  dozen 
you  meet  and  note  the  conflicting  answers.  So  we  shall 
attempt  to  define  what  we  mean  by  the  terms  we  are  using, 
especially  the  two  most  in  evidence,  namely,  "evolution"  and 
"species."  It  must  be  admitted  that  these  two  terms  carry 
such  different  significance  to  different  people  that  prob- 
ably no  two  students  from  two  different  colleges  would  get 
the  same  meaning  out  of  a  volume  containing  them.  This 
explains  why,  often,  the  argument  as  used  by  an  author  may 
be  true  while  in  reality  the  whole  theory  may  be  false,  for 


The  Present  Status  of  Evolutionary  Philosophy   109 

the  facts  do  actually  demonstrate  that  the  thing  one  man 
means  by  "species"  is  actually  produced  from  the  same  com- 
mon parent,  while  in  the  other  sense  of  the  word  it  is  not 
and  cannot  be  demonstrated,  for  the  very  definition  of  the 
word  forbids  such  possibility.  We  may  say,  then,  that  the 
same  fact  may  give  rise  to  any  number  of  theories  as  to 
how  that  fact  came  to  be  what  it  is ;  we  may  further  say 
that  until  we  have  all  the  facts  we  have  not  the  truth, 
and  any  fact  may  change  our  interpretation,  and  then  we 
may  even  go  further  and  say  that  by  meaning  a  different 
thing  by  the  same  word,  the  same  fact  may  not  be  the  same 
fact  at  all,  but  found  by  two  different  people,  each  one 
assuming  the  other  means  exactly  what  he  does  by  his  terms, 
each  has  called  two  different  facts  by  the  same  name. 

Professor  Kellogg  defines  Evolution  as  being  synonymous 
with  the  theory  of  descent  in  the  plant  and  animal  world — 
that  is, 

The  various  living  as  well  as  now  extinct  species  of  organ- 
isms are  descended  from  one  another  and  from  common 
ancestors,  (p.  11.) 

Bear  in  mind  that  this  says  nothing  about  FIRST  forms. 
Something  has  evolved,  but  we  are  not  told  WHAT  it  was 
that  evolved,  nor  is  there  any  agreement  among  biologists 
themselves  as  to  HOW  it  all  occurred.  All  the  theories  of  / 
Evolution  are  attempts  to  tell  us  HOW  things  came  to  be 
what  they  are.  But  what  we  are  prone  to  forget  is  that 
we  have  to  have  something  to  evolve  before  it  can  begin 
evolving.  That  is,  Evolution  attempts  to  explain  only  HOW 
the  many  species  of  plants  and  animals  we  now  have  came 
to  be  what  they  are. 

It  is  a  very  decided  dictum  in  science  now  that  no  life 
can  come  from  anything  non-living.  We  have  living  things 


110  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

on  the  earth  now.  We  all  know  it  was  not  always  so.  Life, 
then,  must  have  come  from  the  non-living  at  some  time. 
There  is,  of  course,  not  one  vestige  of  observational  or 
experimental  proof.  All  we  have  is  our  logic  to  fall  back 
on,  and  this  tells  us  that  no  science  or  knowledge  of  im- 
portance is  possible  unless  we  have  a  continuity  of  the  ac- 
tion of  what  are  termed  laws  of  nature,  but  we  have  just 
shown  that  the  laws  of  nature  are  not  now  what  they  have 
been,  so  we  have  nothing  left  but  the  two  remaining  theories 
Professor  Kellogg  cites — Creation  and  Evolution.  But  even 
accepting  Evolution,  as  we  do,  it  surely  is  not  an  alternative 
as  the  book  quoted  states,  but  both  are  pretty  nearly  the 
same  thing,  for  in  the  one  case  it  is  implied  that  Creation 
must  mean  every  given  thing  was  created  just  exactly  as  it  is 
to-day,  and  in  the  other  that  changes  have  come  about 
throughout  the  ages  which,  however,  still  leaves  us  in  the 
dark  in  regard  to  the  first  forms  that  evolved. 

This  latter  problem  is  just  as  unsettled  now  as  it  has 
ever  been.  All  the  whole  argument  does  is  to  drive  the 
matter  back  a  little  further — it  doesn't  change  anything  at 
all.  But  those  who  object  to  the  causo-mechanical  way  of 
thought,  suggest  that  as  all  the  evidence  its  defenders  have, 
is  logical,  they  must  be  logical  to  the  very  end,  and  adhere 
to  their  own  principles  and,  assuming  as  they  do,  that  noth- 
ing occurs  without  a  cause,  then  if  there  be  any  value  in 
their  arguments  they  must  admit  a  first  cause  and  define 
and  explain  that.  This  they  fail  to  do. 

But  this  is  what  they  must  do  to  live  up  to  the  very  prin- 
ciples they  themselves  have  laid  down,  and  if  they  do  come 
to  this  conclusion,  as  many  of  them  now  have,  it  means 
that  the  cause  which  conditions  what  we  are  and  what 
we  can  evolve  into,  is  an  inner  driving  force,  as  Nageli 
has  well  shown  and  as  the  growing  school  of  Neo-Vitalists 


The  Present  Status  of  Evolutionary  Philosophy   111 

are  constantly  insisting  upon.  We  must  come  to  this  con- 
clusion, and  even  the  causo-mechanists  who  are  still  stern 
in  their  faith  of  a  causo-mechanical  explanation  of  things 
are  running  dangerously  near  the  shoals  with  their  ortho- 
genetic  theories  that  most  of  them  have  now  included  among 
the  factors  of  organic  evolution.  These  theories  will  be 
explained  a  little  farther  on,  here  we  wish  to  stress  impor- 
tant points  that  mean  everything  in  the  study  of  any  sci- 
ence. 

By  Evolution  then  we  mean  this  and  this  only,  that  some 
present-day  forms  of  plants  and  animals  are  different  from 
their  parents,  and  sufficiently  different  to  consider  them 
thoroughly  unlike  their  parents,  or  at  least  unlike  some  more 
distant  ancestor.  In  other  words,  a  present-day  form  of 
plant  or  animal  need  not  necessarily  have  had  ancestors  that  y 
were  just  like  itself. 

That  is  all  Evolution  means.  We  must  not  confuse  this 
word  with  a  THEORY  of  Evolution.  This  latter  is  an 
explanation  of  HOW  this  change  mentioned  came  about, 
and  nearly  every  worker  has  one  or  more  pet  theories  of 
his  own.  Evolution  must  not  be  confused  with  Darwinism, 
for  the  latter  is  only  one  of  the  Theories  of  Evolution. 

Now  to  explain  what  is  meant  by  SPECIES.  It  is  safe 
to  say  that,  taken  by  and  large,  there  are  really  two  view- 
points in  this  matter,  one,  that  so  long  as  plants  or  animals 
can  interbreed  do  they  belong  to  the  same  species,  provided 
they  give  birth  in  turn  to  fertile  and  similar  possible-inter- 
breeding offspring.  That  no  matter  what  difference  there 
might  be  in  appearance,  such  as  having  one  more  or  less 
stripe;  or  a  different  shade  of  color,  the  general  form  and 
type  is  always  true,  and  these  are  true  species.  Any  de- 
cided change  in  make-up  or  appearance  among  such  inter- 
breeding types  these  men  would  call  "variations"  and  the 


The  Begwnmgs  of  Science 

plant  or  animal  possessing  these  variations  would  be  known 
as  "varieties."  Of  course,  one  can  readily  see  that  there 
would  be  and  could  be  no  possibility  of  new  species  arising 
under  such  a  definition,  for  every  parent  form  would  always 
be  the  "Species"  and  any  variation  from  such  parent  would 
not  be  a  Species  but  a  "Variety."  This  being  so,  it  is  most 
essential  that  one  ascertain  what  any  given  author  means 
by  the  term,  before  passing  judgment. 

Those  opposing,  define  Species  as  being  any  decided  dif- 
ference that  is  carried  down  from  parent  to  offspring  and 
displayed  in  the  physical  form  of  such  offspring.  And  in 
accordance  with  this  explanation  there  is  some  evidence  that 
new  Species  are  formed. 

The  evidences  for  Evolution  are  drawn  primarily  from 
the  fossil  remains  of  ancient  forms  now  extinct ;  from  the 
life  of  plants  and  animals  before  birth  (embryology)  ;  from 
comparative  anatomy,  physiology  and  the  related  sciences. 

Accepting  as  a  fact  that  we  have  some  evidence  for  the 
formation  of  new  species,  in  accordance  with  the  second 
definition  given  above,  the  question  arises  as  to  whether  ALL 
present  forms  are  different  from  their  parent  forms  and 
the  still  more  important  query  will  not  be  banished,  as  to 
whether  all  of  these  forms  came  from  ONE  SINGLE  parent 
form,  or  whether  the  animals  came  from  a  common  an- 
cestor, the  plants  from  a  common  ancestor,  or  both  from 
a  common  ancestor,  or  whether  each  had  a  particular  parent 
form  somewhere  in  the  dim,  distant  past,  and  last  but  of 
most  vital  importance  can  Mind  ever  come  from  Matter — 
can  man's  intellect  have  arisen  by  mere  physical  accretion? 

And  we  must  not  forget  that  St.  Augustine,  many  cen- 
turies ago,  suggested  the  possibility  of  Evolution 2  and 

aSee  Augustinism  in  History,  Catholic  Encyclopedia,  under  V.  St. 
Augustine  of  Hippo. 


The  Present  Status  of  Evolutionary  Philosophy   113 

Lamarck  and  Geoffrey  St.  Hilaire  did  likewise  about  a 
half  century  before  Darwin's  time,  but  they  obtained  no 
very  ardent  disciples  to  carry  forward  their  work  and  so 
the  world  had  to  wait  until  the  arrival  of  Charles  Darwin 
to  have  its  principles  accepted  by  the  schools  at  large.  And 
here  an  interesting  observation  may  be  made, '  that  Dar- 
winism is  a  Theory  of  How  Evolution  came  about,  and 
while  Evolution  is  stronger  in  its  entrenchments  now  than 
ever  before,  Darwinism  is  constantly  losing  ground,  as  we 
shall  presently  show.3 

Darwinism  means  that  principally  if  not  entirely,  Natural 
Selection  is  the  cause  of  the  origin  of  species,  but  as  will 
be  shown,  Natural  Selection  can  only  kill  off  plants  and  ^ 
animals  and  can  never  originate  anything,  so  that  even  the 
title  of  Darwin's  volume,  "The  Origin  of  Species,"  is  a 
misnomer. 

All  too  often  men  give  a  description  of  a  phenomenon, 
call  it  by  a  name,  and  assume  they  have  explained  it,  but 
there  is  a  world  of  difference  between  a  description  and  an 
explanation. 

And  lastly  an  important  factor  appears  in  that  we  may 
ask  whether  or  not,  as  many  now  hold,  most  forms  would 
not  have  evolved  just  as  they  have  regardless  of  all  ex- 
ternal factors.  If  that  is  true,  there  is  an  inner  something  ^ 

3It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Professor  Huxley  was  not  himself 
convinced  of  the  theory  he  constantly  and  most  valiently  defended, 
though  as  Professor  Poulton  says  he  believed  so  thoroughly  in  fairness 
that  he  would  take  up  a  defense  of  a  thing  just  to  oppose  unfairness. 
See  Huxley  Memorial  Lectures  to  the  University  of  Birmingham  (1904- 
1912).  (Cornish  Bros.  Ltd.,  1914)  as  reviewed  in  Vol.  XIII,  Page  924, 
The  Hibbert  Journal.  "Professor  E.  B.  Poulton  discussing  in  the  second 
lecture  of  Huxley's  relation  to  the  theory  of  Natural  Selection,  says 
one  or  two  things  which  will  be  new  to  the  ordinary  reader.  'Although 
no  one  fought  so  nobly,  and  against  such  odds,  in  its  favour,  although  no 
one  had  ever  fought  the  battle  of  science  with  such  success,  he  was  never 
a  convinced  believer  in  the  theory  (Natural  Selection)  he  defended  from  A/ 
unfair  attacks'  (p.  45)." 


114s  The  Begwnwgs  of  Science 

in  the  plant  and  animal,  that  determines  to  a  large  extent 
what  it  is  to  become.  This  is  the  growing  view  of  most 
biologists  and  this  theory  is  called  Orthogenesis.  The  fur- 
ther question  presents  itself,  is  there  any  purpose  in  what 
is  done,  or  is  it  all  merely  accidental  and  promiscuous  ?  And 
this,  Teleology  answers. 

Having  covered  the  field  swiftly  and  shortly,  we  may 
add,  that  the  remaining  point  to  be  covered  is  whether  or 
not  in  its  application  Evolution  must  cover  all  living  things 
or  is  limited?  Does  it  apply  to  the  human  family?  Is 
there  any  difference  between  the  lower  animals  and  the  hu- 
man being  sufficient  to  be  able  to  state  definitely  and  con- 
vincingly that  they  could  not  have  been  related  at  any 
time  past?  And  we  must  note  this  point,  that  the  whole 
argument  rests  on  the  similarity  in  the  physical  bodies  of 
man  and  the  lower  animals  among  those  who  uphold  this 
viewpoint,  and  on  the  great  difference  in  the  mental  portions 
of  the  two,  among  those  who  take  the  opposite  side  of  the 
question.  And  it  is  more  than  interesting  to  observe  that 
nearly  all  of  our  animal  psychologists  and  our  human  psy- 
chologists, by  constant  observation  and  thorough  experi- 
mentation, have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  an 
unfathomable  difference  between  the  two.  It  is  almost  uni- 
versally agreed  that  animals  work  entirely  by  instinct  and 
association,  and  human  beings,  though  working  largely  by 
instinct  also,  may,  however,  use  reason.  Somewhere  Pro- 
fessor Wm.  Wundt,  the  greatest  living  Experimental  Psy- 
chologist, has  said  Animals  never  reason,  Humans  but  sel- 
dom. This  immense  difference  in  the  mental  realm,  to- 
gether with  man's  speech,  separates  man  entirely  from  the 
brute  world.4 

*John  B.  Watson's  Behavior,  An  Introduction  to  Comparative  Psy- 
chology. 


The  Present  Status  of  Evolutionary  Philosophy   115 

Summing  up,  then,  we  may  say  that  Evolution  means  that 
some  present-day  forms  of  living  things  come  from  dis- 
similar ancestral  forms,  many  intervening  forms  having  dur- 
ing the  years  become  extinct  so  that  we  cannot  trace  con- 
nections between  those  of  the  present  day  and  these  extinct 
ancestors. 

That  the  evidence  for  this  belief  is  not  absolute,  but 
purely  logical. 

That  "It  is  necessary,  even  in  the  study  of  the  Natural 
Sciences  to  have  something  of  the  nature  of  a  creed,  an  abid- 
ing belief  in  some  fixed  principle,  which  may  regulate  and 
give  coherence  to  the  mass  of  information  and  ideas  which 
we  accumulate  in  the  course  of  our  studies.  Without  such 
a  belief  to  guide  us  we  embark  on  our  journey  of  investiga- 
tion without  rudder,  compass,  or  pilot. 

"In  those  sciences  which  occupy  themselves  with  the  ex- 
planation of  the  existing  order  of  things  on  the  earth,  the 
fundamental  beliefs  are,  firstly,  that  the  course  of  Nature 
has  been  uniform — that  is  to  say,  that  in  past  times  the  same 
forces  have  operated,  possibly  with  varying  intensities,  but 
always  in  the  same  manner  as  those  that  are  in  operation 
to-day.  Secondly,  that  which  is,  is  the  outcome  of  that 
which  has  been,  and  is  the  forerunner  of  that  which  will  be. 
The  history  of  the  world  and  its  inhabitants  presents  itself 
to  our  imaginations  as  an  unbroken  series  of  successive 
states,  each  differing  somewhat  from  its  predecessor  and 
successor,  but  as  truly  derived  from  its  predecessor  as  the 
child  is  derived  from  its  parent,, and  as  truly  the  antecedent 
of  its  successor  as  the  parent  is  the  antecedent  of  the  child. 
This  belief  is  what  we  express  by  the  word  Evolution." 

That  we  have  accepted  the  conclusion  even  though  the 
natural  selection  theory  on  which  our  conclusion  was  based 
has  been  thrown  aside,  and  are  now  seeking  new  evidences. 

'Comparative  Anatomy  of  Animals,  by  Gilbert  C.  Bourne,  M.A., 
D.Sc.,  F.R.S.,  F.L.S.,  F.Z.S.  Yol,  I,  Page  1. 


116  The  Begwwngs  of  Science 

That  the  evidence  we  so  far  have,  is  drawn  from  many 
related  sciences  which  up  to  the  present  has  not  been  suf- 
ficiently stressed,  for  it  is  not  generally  known  that  the 
paleantologists  favor  one  system  of  evolution,  the  patholo- 
gists  another,  the  embryologists  another,  and  so  on. 

That  Darwinism  is  only  the  name  of  one  theory  of  how 
evolution  came  about.  It  must  not  become  confused  with 
Evolution,  and  it  is  almost  entirely  discarded  now,  because 
it  is  absolutely  unable  to  explain  how  a  single  species  orig- 
inated. 

That  it  all  depends  on  the  Creed  mentioned  by  Dr.  Bourne, 
quoted  above,  as  to  what  viewpoint  one  is  to  make  use  of  to 
begin  with.  That  is,  whether  one  accepts  the  Theistic  or 
the  Causo-mechanical  Creed  and  then  insists  on  making  his 
facts  fit  such  preconceived  idea  of  what  he  thinks  ought  to  be. 

That  Evolution  takes  no  account  of  the  BEGINNINGS 
OF  LIFE,  but  attempts  only  to  explain  what  caused  our 
present  many  types  of  plants  and  animals. 

That  the  very  continuity  of  which  Dr.  Bourne  speaks 
is  broken  somewhere  in  that  we  have  no  life  coming  from 
lifeless  matter  now,  and  yet  we  know  there  was  a  time  when 
there  was  no  life  on  earth.  We  are  forced  to  one  of  two 
alternatives,  namely,  that  we  must  find  a  starting  point  for 
v  Life  or  we  must  acknowledge  that  we  are  starting  in  the 
middle  of  things  with  everything  important  unexplained  and 
unexplainable,  and,  not  knowing  whether  our  hypothesis 
are  then  true,  there  being  no  ultimate  starting  point,  we 
cannot  know  whether  our  conclusions  are  true. 

That  to  be  fair  and  honest  with  our  students  we  must 
bring  these  matters  home  to  them.  We  must  show  them  that 
these  beginnings  rest  with  philosophy  and  that  it  is  only 
as  practical  scientists  that  we  are  forced  to  do  our  work 
and  "necessarily  so,  upon  the  principle  that  for  all  practical 


The  Present  Status  of  Evolutionary  Philosophy   117 

purposes   one  is   justified  in   using   any   assumption   as   a        f 
working  hypothesis,  if  everything  happens  just  as  if  it  were 
true." 

That  while  Evolution  is  accepted,  it  must  not  be  confused 
with  the  various  theories  that  have  been  brought  forth  to 
establish  it,  nor  must  it  be  applied  further  than  the  evi- 
dence warrants. 

That  the  outstanding  difference  between  man  and  brute 
is  speech  and  rationality,  a  totally  different  kind  of  a  dif- 
ference than  that  existing  between  other  animals  or  be- 
tween plants  and  animals.  Therefore  no  application  of  any 
theory  of  Evolution  has  yet  been  found  that  is  accepted  by 
biologists  themselves,  and  as  a  consequence  it  is  extremely 
hazardous  and  very  unscientific  to  apply  a  theory  still  un- 
proven  to  a  condition  which  leaves  out  of  question  the  very 
differences  on  which  the  distinction  between  brute  and  ani- 
mal depend,  remembering  what  has  been  said,  that  the  the- 
ories of  Evolution  are  based  on  the  physical  and  not  on  the  / 
mental  differences,  .and  that  all  who  have  studied  the  mental 
in  addition  to  the  physical  are  inclined  to  accept  this  view- 
point. 

That  the  Teleological  argument  has  not  lost  its  force,  and 
that  when  such  men  as  Nageli,  Driesch,  and  many  others 
pre-eminent  in  their  fields  have  come  back  to  it,  though  start- 
ing from  an  opposite  viewpoint  and  being  convinced  by  the 
physical  evidence  alone,  we  can  understand  the  reason  why 
Orthogenesis  is  the  most  important  factor  now. 

That  nearly  all  biologists  admit  Orthogenesis  in  some 
form  though  they  apply  it  differently,  and  feel,  depending 
upon  their  prepossessions,  that  it  possesses  a  varying  worth. 
And  that,  lastly,  but  of  greatest  importance,  it  depends 
on  whether  the  premise  with  which  one  starts  is  true,  for, 
if  this  should  not  be,  there  is  little  likelihood  of  erecting 


118  The  Begwmings  of  Science 

a  logical  structure  of  worth  thereon.  In  other  words,  shall 
we  begin  with  just  what  is  before  us  and  insist  that  every- 
thing that  does  not  look  favorable  to  a  Causo-mechanical 
explanation  shall  be  cast  aside,  or  shall  we  weigh  and  meas- 
ure in  truly  scientific  manner  every  detail,  every  thought 
and  thing,  coming  from  whomsoever  it  may,  professional 
or  amateur,  so  long  as  it  be  pertinent  to  the  matter  in 
hand,  suspending  our  judgment  until  all  the  evidence  is  in? 


CHAPTER  VII 

THEORIES   OF    EVOLUTION 

REMEMBERING  what  was  said  in  our  chapter  on  the 
Present  Status  of  Evolutionary  Philosophy,  we  shall 
here  consider  very  briefly  the  various  theories  which  bi- 
ologists have  propounded  to  show  HOW  Evolution  has 
come  about,  and,  lest  our  interpretation  of  what  the  vari- 
ous theories  actually  mean  be  questioned,  we  have  quoted 
the  very  words  of  one  of  their  ablest  defenders  wherever 
possible. 

In  its  modern  aspect  Lamarck  and  Geoffrey  St.  Hilaire 
were  the  founders  of  a  theory,  which  was  much  more  philo- 
sophical than  was  Charles  Darwin's,  in  that  it  actually  at- 
tempted to  give  an  account  of  the  reasons  for  the  varia- 
tions that  we  see  all  about  us.  Darwin  merely  accepted 
them  and  built  his  theory  thereon.  He  made  no  attempt 
to  explain  WHY  there  are  variations  to  start  with. 

Lamarck's  theory  may  be  simply  stated  by  calling  it  the 
working  out  of  the  principle  of  "use  and  disuse."  In  other 
words,  should  an  organ  be  used  to  any  considerable  extent 
it  would  become  better  developed  than  any  other  part  of 
the  body,  or  should  it  be  used  but  little  or  not  at  all,  it 
would  atrophy,  and  this  extra  development,  or  this  wasting 
away  of  the  organ  would  be  carried  from  parent  to  off- 
spring, so  that  the  offspring,  again  using  the  over-devel- 
oped organ  a  little  more,  or  neglecting  the  under-devel- 
oped organ  a  little  more,  and  carrying  it  on  to  its  off- 
spring in  turn,  would  in  the  long  run  develop  a  race  of  in- 

119 


120  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

dividuals  that  would  be  distinguished  from  other  races  by 
this  particular  over-development  or  a  particular  under- 
development  or  entire  loss  of  the  organ  in  question. 

Darwin  accepted  the  transmission  of  acquired  character- 
istics, as  explained  in  the  above  paragraph,  but  attempted 
to  explain  HOW  new  species  came  into  existence  by  Natural 
Selection.      Probably   a   simple  way   of  showing  what  was 
meant  by  this  would  be  to  give  an  example.     Suppose  some 
of  us   should  journey  to  the  Tropics  to  make  our  home; 
many  would  succumb  to  the  fevers  and  other  tropical  dis- 
eases ;  however,  some  would  survive,  and  these  would  produce 
offspring  many   of  which  would  likewise  perish,  but,   still, 
some  of  these  would  again  survive,  and  so  on,  until  there 
was  left  only  the  offspring  of  those  who  had  been  able  to 
withstand  the  particular  conditions  there  existing.     After 
long  years   of  such  weeding  out   of   those   who   could  not 
withstand  the  ravages  of  tropical  diseases,  we  should  have 
a  race  that  could  live  without  any  degree  of  uncomfortable- 
ness.     And  this  principle  would  be  called  the  "survival  of 
the  fittest,"  but  as  Professor  Cope  has  well  said,  "Of  course 
the  fittest  survive";  we  all  know  that.     This  only  tells  us 
which  ones  do  not  die.     And  this  is  called  Nature's  way 
of  selecting,  but  we  can  easily  see  that  this  does  not  tell 
us  how  anything  came  mto  existence — that  is,  it  does  not 
tell  us  anything  at  all  about  the  Origin  of  Species.     And 
this  is  what  is  meant  by  Darwinism,  pure  and  simple — that 
the  Origin  of  Species  came  about  by  Natural  Selection.    We 
must  not  forget,  however,  that  while  this  is  Darwinism,  it 
is  not  Charles  Darwin's  doctrine;  it  was  his  disciples  who 
carried  it  to  the  extreme.    Darwin  himself  believed  that  while 
/  Natural  Selection  was  the  mam  cause  of  the  Origin  of  Spe- 
cies, it  was  not   the  ONLY   one.     But  we   can  readily  see 
that  in  selecting  from  what  is  already  in  existence  we  can 


Theories  of  Evolution 

only  show  which  survive,  but  can  never  show  how  any  new 
races  originated. 

And  it  is  just  this  failure  to  do  the  very  thing  the  name 
of  the  volume  which  sets  forth  these  ideas,  would  lead 
one  to  believe  was  done;  namely,  to  show  "The  Origin  of 
Species,"  that  has  led  to  such  widespread  objection  to  the 
Darwinian  idea  of  explaining  anything  except  survivals.  This 
is  readily  shown  when  such  a  lecture  as  "The  Decline  of 
Darwinism"  l  is  delivered  at  an  institution  like  the  Univer- 
sity of  Chicago,  and  such  a  book  appears  as  Professor 
Vernon  Kellogg's  Darwinism  To-day.  This  volume,  written 
by  a  man  who  is  more  than  willing  to  render  to  the  Dar- 
winian side  all  and  probably  more  than  most  men  would 
be  willing  to  render,  and  whose  work  is  one  of  the  rec- 
ognized books  of  reference  on  this  subject  in  the  great 
universities,  we  shall  use  from  which  to  quote  in  this  chap- 
ter. We  suggest  a  reading,  however,  of  the  entire  volume 
so  as  to  be  able  to  see  that  Darwinism — that  is,  Natural 
Selection — has  signally  failed  to  show  how  anything  orig- 
inated. 

Before  entering  into  a  detailed  description  of  the  many 
theories  that  have  arisen  to  explain  how  Evolution  comes 
about,  we  may  call  the  reader's  attention  to  the  fact  that, 
after  all,  they  can  be  classed  in  two  great  divisions.  First, 
the  Darwinian,  or  Natural  Selection  plan,  together  with 
the  many  auxiliary  ones  that  tend  to  support  it,  and  second, 
an  alternative  type,  which  is  intended  to  replace  more  or 
less  entirely  the  selection  theories. 

In  regard  to  the  first,  or  Natural  Selection  theories,  it 
must  be  remembered  that  in  addition  to  the  selection  part 

irThe  Decline  of  Darwinism,  by  Elliot  Rowland  Downing,  Ph.D.,  De- 
livered during  the  Summer  Session,  1914.  See  list  of  Public  Lectures, 
for  that  Summer,  published  by  the  University  of  Chicago. 


The  Begwmmgs  of  Science 

„  of  the  plan  itself,  there  grew  up  also  the  idea  that  there  was 
something  adaptive  about  everything  any  living  being  did; 
i.  e.,  any  a,ct  or  movement  any  plant  or  animal  performed, 
was  adapted  to  some  end,  and  was  useful  to  its  possessor 
as  a  help  in  surviving.  This  does  not  mean  that  every  ac- 
tion was  done  for  a  definite  purpose,  in  the  sense  of  "pur- 
pose" meaning  in  accordance  with  an  intelligence  situated 
outside  of  itself ;  but  that,  when  any  movement  of  any  kind 
whatsoever  was  performed,  the  plant  or  animal  performed 
it  because  it  had  a  survival  value,  for,  if  it  wasted  its  energy 
in  movements  that  were  not  of  actual  service  in  survival, 
the  one  that  did  not  waste  such  energy  would  quite  naturally 
develop  parts  that  the  other  one  did  not  and  thus  become 
stronger  and  more  able  to  survive. 

Now,  Lamarckism,  or  the  principle  of  "use  and  disuse," 
would  really  explain  most  of  these  things  better  than  Dar- 
winism, but  unfortunately  for  both  theories  Professor  Au- 
gust Weismann,  a  most  ardent  Darwinian  himself,  inves- 
tigated the  matter  and  found  that  there  was  not  a  particle 
of  experimental  evidence  to  show  that  any  acquired  char- 
acteristic was  ever  transmitted  from  parent  to  offspring. 
To  put  this  in  other  words,  any  change  produced  in  the 
parent  during  his  lifetime  by  his  own  efforts  would  not  be 
given  to  the  child ;  so,  one  might  come  from  a  race  of  black- 
smiths, but  the  children  of  such  over-developed  muscular 
parents  would  not  have  any  larger  or  better  developed  mus- 
cles than  would  a  child  from  the  same  type  and  size  of 
parents  who  had  not  developed  their  arms. 

And  as  Professor  Weismann  was  a  sort  of  spokesman 
for  the  Darwinian  school,  his  word  is  of  more  importance 
on  their  side  than  practically  any  other  man,  save  Charles 
Darwin  himself,  and  yet  he  had  to  admit  that  Natural  Se- 
lection could  not  explain  everything,  and  that  it  was  un- 


Theories  of  Evolution  123 

able  to  "initiate  new  lines  of  development  or  descent"  (p. 
189)  2  even  going  so  far  as  to  at  least  apparently  ap- 
prove of  the  orthogenetic  viewpoint — which  will  shortly  be 
explained — that  when  a  particular  development  once  started,  x  , 
it  often  kept  right  on  even  to  the  point  of  killing  the  or- 
ganism itself. 

Professor  Weismann's  other  contributions  are  the  idea  of 
"Panmixia"  which  he,  however,  himself  discarded,  so  we  shall 
not  enter  into  a  discussion  of  it,  and  Germinal  Selection,  the 
latter  being  explained  as  follows:  As  the  unit  in  the  study 
of  all  biology  is  the  CELL,  and  as  every  living  thing  from 
the  lowest  plant  to  the  highest  type  of  life  in  the  animal 
world  starts  growth  from  a  single  cell,  this  single  unit,  only 
visible  under  the  very  high  powers  of  the  microscope,  must 
have  within  its  tiny  self  all  the  possibilities  of  producing  the 
wonderful,  complex  structure  that  is  later  to  develop.  This 
being  so,  this  tiny  mass  of  protoplasm,  as  it  is  called,  though 
looking  so  much  alike  under  the  microscope,  must  be  made 
up  of  a  very  complex  substance.  To  explain,  then,  how 
this  little  cell  could  reproduce  such  a  wonderful  structure 

as  we  see  in  adult  forms  of  life  he  assumed  that  there  must 

j\ 

be  thousands  of  little  particles,  each  very  elemental,  and 
which  he  called  biophors,  and  that  these  biophors  unite  in 
different  kinds  of  groups  and  thus  cause  different  types  of 
later  development.  Professor  Kellogg,  commenting  on  this, 
says  that  each  biologist  seems  to  have  made  a  theory  for 
himself. 

This  is  not  all,  however;  there  must  be  a  further  as- 
sumption of  "determinants"  for  each  kmd  of  cell,  but 
not  for  each  cell.  (There  are  certain  definite  kinds  of  cells 

2Darwinism  To-day,  by  Vernon  L.  Kellogg,  Professor  in  Leland 
Stanford,  Jr.,  University.  Published  by  Henry  Holt  &  Co.,  1907.  All 
pages  mentioned  are  from  this  volume. 


, 


The  Beginnings  of  Science 

that  go  to  make  certain  definite  tissues  in  the  body,  and 
these  tissues  then  unite  to  form  organs,  bones,  skin,  nerves, 
muscles,  etc.)  Remembering  that  there  is  a  variation  all 
through  nature,  no  two  blades  of  grass  being  exactly  alike, 
so  also  no  two  atoms  or  molecules  are  exactly  alike,  and 
this  being  so,  no  two  would  get  exactly  the  same  quantity, 
or  exactly  the  same  quality  of  food,  and  the  one  waxing 
stronger  would  determine  the  greater  strength  of  cells  into 
which  it  would  later  develop.  This  food  supply  might  be 
entirely  fortuitous,  but  the  determinants  being  in  the  Germ 
Cell  will  go  from  one  generation  to  another.  That  is,  there 
is  here  a  something  that  is  not  an  acquired  characteristic, 
in  the  sense  used  above,  of  being  due  to  some  deliberate,  or 
external,  exercise  or  use,  that  over-developed  some  part  of 
the  individual  and  was  then  carried  on;  but,  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  we  are  what  we  are,  simply  on  account  of  what 
we  get  from  our  parents — and  as  we  know  we  do  resemble 
our  parents  somewhat — whatever  resemblance  we  may  pos- 
sess must  come  from  the  mere  egg  of  the  mother  and  sperm 
of  the  father,  which  of  course  forms  the  germ  cell  from 
which  each  individual  develops,  so  that  any  change  in  the 
growth  and  movement  and  environment  of  the  egg  and  sperm, 
will  affect  the  germ  cell  from  which  we  are  built,  and,  in 
that  way,  whatever  we  are  born  with  we  get  from  our 
parents,  and  in  this  way  we  may  account  for  the  cause  of 
any  variation  that  we  may  have  from  our  parents.  This 
variation,  however,  would  be  along  definitely  fixed  lines,  and 
would  have  nothing  to  do  with  personal  selection,  because 
we  cannot  control  the  environment  of  ova  and  sperm.  Nat- 
ural Selection  then  steps  m  and  kills  off  those  that  cannot 
survive  the  obstacles  in  a  given  locality  or  environment.  But 
this  very  principle  vitiates  one  of  the  principal  arguments 
for  Selection;  namely,  that  it  could  establish  new  species. 


Theories  of  Evolution  125 

To  quote  Professor  Kellogg,  this  theory  consists  of  two 
purely  speculative  basic  assumptions:  First,  Weismann's 
particular  theory  of  the  ultimate  structure  of  the  germ- 
plasm  ;  namely,  the  theory  of  biophors  and  determinants ;  and 
secondly,  the  assumption  that  there  is  a  struggle  for  food 
among  determinants.  There  is  no  proof  of  pure  observa- 
tion or  experiment  for  the  theory,  and  there  is  some  proof 
directly  against  it.  And  yet  the  great  need  of  a  working 
hypothesis  for  the  causo-mechanical  explanation  of  de- 
terminate variation  makes  us  give  such  a  pure  speculation 
more  attention  than  it  might  otherwise  get.  Unfortunately 
the  attention  thus  given  to  this  particular  theory  seems  to 
have  resulted  in  the  bringing  forward  of  some  rather  ser- 
ious objections  to  the  possibility  of  the  truth  of  the  theory 
(p.  199). 

Roux's  theory,  sometimes  called  the  "battle  of  the  parts," 
is  based  on  somewhat  similar  lines  to  Weismann's  theory  of 
biophors,  except  that  it  does  not  assume  tiny  particles 
such  as  the  biophors,  but  attempts  to  explain,  by  assuming 
a  difference  between  outer  and  inner  adaptiveness ;  the  theory 
being  primarily  applied  to  the  inner  portion  of  the  organ- 
ism, and  attempts  to  account  for  the  marvelous  adapta- 
tions there  found.  The  competing  parts  in  Roux's  the- 
ory 

are  the  chemical  molecules  composing  the  cells  them- 
selves, groups  of  tissues  or  cells,  and  even  whole  organs. 
The  spurs  to  the  competition  for  food  are  functional 
stimuli,  whose  result  is  to  set  up  a  special  demand  and 
necessity  for  more  food  (pp.  201-8). 

This  means  that  the  determining  factors  are  largely  due 
to  the  "hazard  of  position,"  a  part  being  more  advanta- 
geously located  receiving  a  greater  stimulus  to  do  more 
work,  thereby  gaining  an  advantage.  The  theory  is  in 
reality  based  on  functional  adaptiveness  which  Kellogg  says 


126  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

is  proved,  but  not  explained. 

This  idea  of  Roux's  is  like  all  the  other  theories  pro- 
pounded— held  by  some,  and  entirely  rejected  by  others,  and 
if  we  are  to  accept  his  theory  it  will  mean  we  must 
accept  the  idea  of  the  "inheritance  of  acquired  character- 
istics" which  is  not  held  at  present  by  practically  any  bi- 
ologist, as  all  the  evidence  is  against  it.  But  Professor 
Kellogg  considers  it  valuable  because  it  does  present  "a 
mechanical  explanation  of  the  possibility  of  initiating  cer- 
tain fine  and  delicate  inner  adaptations"  (p.  208).  "Or- 
ganic Selection"  is  the  name  of  another  theory,  and  means 
that  by  it  we  can  explain  why  there  are  some  acquired 
characteristics  apparently  transmitted  by  suggesting  that 
ontogenetic  selection  (individual  selection  as  contradistin- 
guished from  the  selection  principle  applied  to  an  entire 
race  of  plants  or  animals)  may  explain  how  each  individ- 
ual may  be  born  with  a  tendency  to  vary;  that  is,  there 
may  be  a  congenital  tendency  to  vary  from  the  parent. 
Another  way  of  putting  it  might  be  to  say  that  the  germ- 
plasm  or  egg  cell  from  which  the  individual  springs  already 
possesses  this  tendency,  and  so,  of  course,  the 'off  spring  re- 
ceives the  tendency,  it  being  part  of  the  germ-plasm  itself. 
This  would  not  be  acquired,  it  will  be  observed,  for  it  was 
in  the  germ-plasm  of  the  parents  and  always  descends,  the 
parent  himself  being  unable  to  change  it.  But  the  individ- 
ual having  such  tendency  may  build  thereon  and  thus  make 
it  show  forth  very  definitely,  and  sometimes  prominently,  dur- 
ing life. 

The  causo-mechanists,  however,  reject  this,  for  it  is  too 
much  like  assuming  that  there  is  some  vital  principle — 
some  inner  factor — that  causes  the  tendency  of  which  we 
have  spoken,  and  this  would  be  fatal  to  causo-mechanism. 
There  remains  in  our  first  division  of  Natural  Selection  and 


Theories  of  Evolution  127 

Auxiliary  theories  only  the  following  then,  which  we  have 
not  yet  discussed:  Geographical,  Sexual  and  Physiological 
theories,  which,  under  a  single  grouping,  are  classified  as 

ISOLATION    THEORIES. 

Professor  Kellogg  says  :  The  varying  importance  attrib- 
uted by  different  biologists  to  the  theories  explaining 
means  and  results  of  isolation  is  notable.  While  by  some 
the  species-forming  influence  of  isolation  is  held  to  be  as 
effective  as  selection  itself  —  some  deem  it  more  effective,  — 
others  attach  but  little  importance  to  it,  indeed  see  no 
effects  of  consequence.  These  latter  men  are  likely  to  be 
morphologists,  cytologists,  and  laboratory  men  generally; 
the  former  are  systematists,  students  of  distribution,  and 
so-called  field  naturalists  (p. 


While  he  himself  says  he  will  take  the  middle  path.  Now 
all  that  is  meant  by  isolation  is,  of  course,  that,  due  to 
various  reasons,  few  or  many,  as  the  case  may  be,  a  given 
species  of  plant  or  animal  being  cut  off  from  the  rest  of 
the  same  species  (for  example,  by  the  sinking  of  a  neck 
of  land  once  existing  between  two  continents,  leaving  part 
of  the  race  in  one  region,  part  in  another)  that  these,  by 
inbreeding,  will  produce  a  type  of  individual  that  will  prob- 
ably be  different  from  those  which  have  not  been  so  iso- 
lated, the  particular  environment  allowing  congenital  varia- 
tions to  come  forth  in  varying  degrees.  The  non-geo- 
graphical forms  of  isolation  mean 

some  sort  of  segregation  of  individuals  of  the  same  species 
into  groups  inside  of  each  of  which  mating  takes  place, 
and  among  which  little  or  no  cross-breeding  occurs,  because 
of  varying  habits,  or  unusual  sexual  aversion  or  attraction, 
or  physiological  or  morphological  variation  affecting  mat- 
ing. For  example  .  .  .  Plate  points  out  that  there  are 
twelve  species  of  albatrosses  in  the  southern  hemisphere,  of 
which  nine  or  ten  belong  to  the  Australian  zoo-geographical 


128  The  Begwnmgs  of  Science 

realm  and  intermingle  throughout  most  of  their  range.  At 
breeding  time,  however,  these  different  species  become  segre- 
gated in  restricted  and  separate  localities  so  that  mating  is 
always  accomplished  among  different  individuals  of  the  same 
species,  although  hybridisation  could  doubtless  obtain  suc- 
cessfully along  these  closely  related  albatross  forms.  Thus 
the  species  characters  are  kept  pure:  the  species  distinct 
(p. 


The  theories  now  to  be  taken  up  are  for  the  direct  pur- 
pose of  setting  aside  Darwinism;  there  are  three  general 
ones  proposed  by  various  biologists  as  substitutes  for  the 
Selection  theories  to  account  for  evolution. 

Lamarckism  has  already  been  touched  upon,  but  as  this 
theory  requires  the  assumption  of  the  inheritance  of  ac- 
quired characteristics  and  as  we  have  seen  that  this  is  not 
accepted  in  the  scientific  world  at  present  we  shall  not 
enter  into  any  further  explanation  thereof. 

The  other  two  theories  being  those  of  Orthogenesis  of 
Nageli,  Eimer,  Jaeckel,  and  others,  and 

Heterogenesis  suggested  by  von  Kolliker,  definitely  form- 
ulated by  Korschinsky,  and  most  recently  and  importantly 
by  de  Vries.  Few  biologists  would  hold  any  of  these  theories 
to  be  exclusively  alternative  with  natural  selection;  de  Vries 
himself  would  restrict  natural  selection  but  little  in  its 
large  and  effective  control  or  determination  of  the  general 
course  of  descent.  But  all  these  theories  offer  distinctly 
substitutional  methods  of  species-forming,  and  one  of  them 
includes  certainly  the  most  favored  explanation,  next  to 
selection,  of  adaptation,  while  the  authors  or  later  up- 
holders of  some  of  them  actually  deny  any  constructive, 
that  is,  adaptional,  species-forming  or  descent-controlling, 
influence  of  natural  selection  (p.  262). 

One  of  the  principal  criticisms  of  the  natural  selection 
theory  is  that  of  the  impossibility  of  explaining  the  be- 
ginnings of  advantageous  modification  and  the  beginnings  of 


Theories  of  Evolution  129 

new  organs,  by  the  selection  of  fluctuating  individual  varia- 
tion, and  of  explaining  the  apparent  cases  of  the  existence  of 
determinate  variation  and  the  admitted  cases  of  forthright 
development  along  fixed  lines  not  apparently  advantageous, 
and  finally  of  explaining  the  definite  cases  of  ultra-develop- 
ment of  parts  and  species  beyond  the  point  of  advantage 
even  to  such  unfavorable  degrees  as  lead  to  death  and 
extinction  (p.  274). 

We  have,  then,  Orthogenesis,  which  means  only  this,  that 
there  is  a  particular  something  that  causes  an  organism, 
once  it  has  started  to  follow  a  change  along  a  certain  path, 
to  continue  in  that  path,  and  that  path  only,  even  if  it 
kills  it  to  do  so.  Then  there  are  several  camps  among  the 
Orthogenetists  themselves,  Nageli  being  a  Vitalist,  and  as- 
suming a  vital  principle  that  cannot  be  accounted  for  by 
any  causo-mechanical  force,  and  Eimer,  who  "finds  ortho- 
genesis produced  and  controlled  by  the  directly  working  ex- 
ternal factors  of  climate,  food  supply  and  environment  gen- 
erally." 

In  fact,  probably  a  majority  of  biologists  entertain  a 
conviction, — often  not  clearly  defined  and  generally  unac- 
companied by  any  satisfactory  conception  of  a  mechanism 
for  achieving  what  they  believe  to  exist, — of  the  actuality 
of  an  influence  on  organic  modification  and  descent  directly 
exerted  by  those  various  external  factors  or  conditions  of 
organic  life  which  we  call,  collectively,  environment  (p. 
277). 

Nageli's  theory  of  orthogenesis  depends  upon  the  assump- 
tion of  his  so-called  principle  of  progressive  development 
(Vervollkomungsprinzip),  a  something  inherent  in  the  or- 
ganic world  which  makes  each  organism  in  itself  a  force 
or  factor  making  towards  specialization,  adaptation,  that 
is,  towards  progressive  evolution.  Other  authors  who  ac- 
cept such  a  theory  of  an  inherent  driving  force  in  organ- 


130  The  Begmnmgs  of  Science 

isms  speak  of  this  factor  variously  as  "an  inner  directive 
force,"  and  "inner  law  of  development,"  or  an  "intrinsic 
tendency  toward  progress,"  etc.  Nageli  believes  that  animals 
and  plants  would  have  developed  about  as  they  have  even 
had  no  struggle  for  existence  taken  place  and  the  climatic 
and  geologic  conditions  and  changes  been  quite  different 
from  what  they  actually  have  been.  Korschinsky  says :  "In 
order  to  explain  the  origin  of  higher  forms  out  of  lower  it 
is  necessary  to  assume  in  the  organism  a  special  tendency 
towards  progress."  That  is,  to  be  believers  in  this  kind 
of  theory  of  orthogenesis  organic  evolution  has  been  and 
is  now  ruled  by  unknown  inner  forces  inherent  in  organism, 
and  has  been  independent  of  the  influence  of  the  outer  world. 
The  lines  of  evolution  are  immanent,  unchangeable,  and  ever 
slowly  stretch  toward  some  ideal  goal.  It  is  needless  to  say 
that  but  few  biologists  confess  to  such  a  belief.  However 
much  in  the  dark  we  may  be  regarding  the  whole  great 
secret  of  bionomics,  however  partial  and  fragmentary  our 
knowledge  of  the  processes  and  mechanism  of  evolution,  such 
an  assumption  of  a  mystic,  essentially  teleologic  force  wholly 
independent  of  and  dominating  all  the  physico-chemical 
forces  and  influences  that  we  do  not  know  and  the  reactions 
and  behavior  of  living  matter  to  these  influences  which  we 
are  beginning  to  recognize  and  understand  with  some  clear- 
ness and  fulness — such  a  surrender  of  all  our  hardly  won 
actual  scientific  knowledge  in  favor  of  an  unknown,  un- 
proved, mystic,  vital  force,  we  are  not  prepared  to  make. 
As  Plate  well  says,  such  a  theory  of  orthogenesis  is  op- 
posed, in  sharpest  contrast,  to  the  very  spirit  of  science 
(p.  278). 

In  other  words,  the  latter  part  of  this  paragraph  means 
simply  that  any  assumption  that  does  not  uphold  this  view- 
point— the  causo-mechanical — is  unscientific  and  invalid — 
but  any  assumption  that  does  uphold  it  is  at  least  to  be 
given  the  benefit  of  the  doubt. 

Eimer's  theory  may  be  said  to  be  some  determining  law 
affected  by  environment  or 


Theories  of  Evolution  131 

evolution  by  natural  selection  would  occur  along  all  sorts 
of  heterogeneous  and  radiating  lines  which  is,  according  to 
Eimer,  actually  not  the  case.  A  few  definite  lines  obtain 
from  which  occasional  branches  are  given  off,  the  whole 
building  the  familiar  phyletic  or  genealogical  tree.  That 
these  main  lines  and  branches  are  not  themselves  the  result 
of  selection  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  much  evolution  and 
modification  of  organisms  is  not  directly  useful,  a  majority, 
indeed,  of  the  characters  distinguishing  different  species  not 
being  characters  of  utility.  Only  when  a  character  or  line 
of  evolution  becomes  of  a  life-and-death  determining  dis- 
advantage can  selection  interfere  with  evolution  by  ortho- 
genesis. And  this  interference  is  always  and  only  of  the 
nature  of  a  stamping  out,  never  of  the  character  of  the 
creation  of  new  characters  or  lines.  Eimer  believes  in  the 
inheritance  of  acquired  characters,  believes  in  a  consid- 
erable species-forming  influence  of  geographical  isolation, 
that  is,  finds  such  isolation  very  helpful  to  the  general  basic 
organic  growth  evolution  principle  and  finds  the  actual 
causes  of  orthogenesis,  "to  lie  in  the  effects  of  external  influ- 
ences, climate,  nutrition,  on  the  given  constitution  of  the 
organism." 

He  denies  positively  any  capacity  on  the  part  of  nat- 
ural selection  to  create  species,  finding  it  effective  in  break- 
ing the  continuous  organic  chain,  that  is,  separating  it  into 
species,  only  when  aided  by  geographical  isolation.  The 
actual  species-forming,  that  is,  the  breaking  up  into  spe- 
cific units  of  the  orthogenetic  lines  of  change  instituted  by 
his  dynamic  factors,  he  finds  to  depend  on  three  chief  mo- 
ments :  viz.,  a  standing  still  or  cessation  of  development 
(EntwicklungsstUlstand) ;  a  sudden  development  by  leaps, 
called  halmatogenesis  (which  is  almost  exactly  the  funda- 
mental idea  in  Korschinsky's  and  de  Vries's  later  hetero- 
genesis  theory)  ;  and,  third,  a  hindrance  or  difficulty  in 
reproduction  (which  is  the  essential  factor  in  Romanes's 
theory  of  physiological  selection  proposed  ten  years  later). 
It  is  of  interest  to  note  Eimer's  claim  to  the  original  con- 
ception of  species-forming  both  by  heterogenesis  and  through 
physiological  selection,  with  which  two  theories  the  names 


132  The  Begin/Flings  of  Science 

of  de  Vries  and  Romanes,  respectively,  are  commonly  asso- 
ciated as  those  of  the  original  proposers  (pp.  282-283). 

We  should  not  omit  mention,  in  connection  with  Eimer's 
theory  of  a  point  upon  which  he  lays  great  stress,  and  that 
is  that  his  theory  is  not  the  result  of  pure  speculation,  but 
is  the  unavoidable  conclusion  arrived  at  by  long  years  of 
specific  observations  and  study  of  the  facts  obtaining  in 
the  case  of  relations,  conditions,  and  of  course  evolution 
of  certain  groups  of  organisms.  Eimer  made  careful  and 
extended  studies  of  the  wing-patterns  of  two  large  groups 
of  butterflies,  and  of  certain  lizards  and  birds,  and  it  is 
on  the  basis  of  these  studies  in  particular  that  his  theory 
is  formulated.  It  is  certainly  to  be  admitted  that  his  ex- 
haustive and  most  suggestive  account  of  the  relations  of 
species  and  patterns  in  the  swallow-tailed  and  certain  other 
butterflies  makes  a  very  strong  argument  against  the  va- 
lidity of  natural  selection  as  an  explanation  of  these  con- 
ditions. And  the  example  of  Eimer's  prolonged  and  minute 
study  of  actual  facts  as  a  basis  for  his  theory  and  hypothe- 
sis building  is  one  which  has  not  always  been  followed  by 
biological  generalisers.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  polem- 
ical and  personal  character  of  much  of  Eimer's  writing 
has  tended  to  make  his  whole  work  less  regarded  than  it 
ought  to  be  by  biologists. 

That  Eimer's  theory  does  not  include  in  any  degree  the 
assumption  of  an  inner  directive  or  progressive  force  the 
following  quotation  from  Eimer  himself  shows:  "According 
to  my  investigations  the  chief  cause  of  transformation  (of 
species)  is  that  determined  definitive  organic  growth  (or- 
ganophysis)  whose  expression  is  a  definite  determined  de- 
velopment (orthogenesis),  which  is  imposed  on  the  plasma 
by  constant  outer  influences,  climate,  and  nourishment.  .  .  . 
Apart  from  the  fact  that  the  Nagelian  assumption  of  a 
definite  determined  development  is  a  hypothetical  one,  not 
proved  by  facts,  the  zoologist  can  hardly  accept  the  exist- 
ence of  such  a  dominant  inner  factor  ever  pushing  toward 
advance,  when  he  recalls  the  host  of  regressive  structures 
he  has  to  see.  This  tendency  to  progress  based  on  the  as- 
sumption of  'inner  growth  laws'  contradicts  flatly  the  as- 


Theories  of  Evolution  133 

sumption  of  outer  influences  as  causes  of  change.  .  .  .  And 
it  is  my  belief  that  it  is  precisely  these  outer  influences, 
and  the  physiological  phenomena  dependent  on  them,  which 
are  the  determining  factors  in  the  phyletic  development  just 
as  they  are  in  individual  development"  (pp.  284-285). 

Recently  Whitman,  the  Nestor  of  American  Zoologists, 
has  declared  himself  strongly  as  an  adherent  of  the  actuality 
of  orthogenetic  evolution.  For  many  years  Whitman  has 
been  studying  variations  and  inheritance  in  pigeons,  and 
through  his  work  in  particular  he  has  become  convinced  that 
species-forming  variation  does  advance  in  definite  direction 
as  well  as  in  various  directions.  He  says  "natural  selection, 
orthogenesis,  and  mutation  appear  to  present  fundamental 
contradictions ;  but  I  believe  that  each  stands  for  truth,  and 
reconciliation  is  not  distant.  The  so-called  mutations  of 
CEnothera  (Evening  primrose)  are  indubitable  facts;  but 
two  leading  questions  remain  to  be  answered.  First,  are 
these  mutations  now  appearing,  as  is  agreed,  independently 
of  variation,  nevertheless  a  production  of  variations  that 
took  place  at  an  earlier  period  in  the  history  of  these 
plants?  Secondly,  if  species  can  spring  into  existence  at  a 
single  leap,  without  the  assistance  of  cumulative  variations, 
may  they  not  also  originate  with  such  assistance?  That 
variation  does  issue  a  new  species,  ano^jbhat  natural  selection 
is  a  factor,  though  not  the  only  factor,  in  determining 
results,  is,  in  my  opinion,  as  certain  as  grass  grows,  al- 
though we  can  not  see  it  grow.  Furthermore,  I  believe 
I  have  found  indubitable  evidence  of  species-forming  varia- 
tion in  a  definite  direction  *  ( orthogenesis ) ,  and  likewise  of 
variations  in  various  directions  ( amphigenesis ) .  If  I  am 
not  mistaken  in  this,  the  reconciliation  for  natural  selection 
and  orthogenesis  is  at  hand"  (pp.  288-289). 

Jaeckel,  the  Berlin  paleontologist,  has  formulated  a  the- 
ory that  is  a  sort  of  transition  between  orthogenesis  and 
heterogenesis,  in  that  he  believes  that  there  is  a  definite  or- 
thogenetic progress  among  the  race  itself,  but  that  individual 
species  spring  forth  suddenly.  These  species  at  various 


134  The  Begiwimgs  of  Science 

times,  may  sexually  come  to  a  standstill,  and  thus  continue 
a  definite  race  from  thence  forward  (p.  289).  Pfeffer  fol- 
lows somewhat  along  Nageli's  lines,  in  that  he  insists  that 

life  consists  of  the  capacity  (more  exactly  exercise  of  this 
capacity)  of  consciously  permitting  and  consciously  influ- 
encing (that  is,  actually  producing)  through  physico-chem- 
ical phenomena  changes  in  the  matter  or  form  of  the  fundv 
mental  life-stuff  (p.  320). 

The  theory  of  "heterogenesis,"  also  called  the  "theory  of 
mutations"  or  "saltations,"  and  sometimes  "discontinuous 
variations,"  takes  its  very  latest  ground  largely  from 
Professor  Hugo  de  Vries,  the  Dutch  botanist.  Such  names 
as  von  Kolliker,  Gait  on,  Dall,  Bateson,  Emery,  Scott  and 
Korschinsky  deserve  mention  in  connection  with  it  also 
as  de  Vries  was  not  the  originator  of  theory.  The  Abbot 
Mendel  as  far  back  as  1865,  six  years  after  Darwin's  "Ori- 
gin of  Species"  was  given  to  the  world,  published  an  ac- 
count with  some  very  logical  conclusions  thereon,  in  a  little 
journal  which  was  given  out  by  the  Brunn  Natural  History 
Society. 

It  was  not  until  1900  that  three  separate  students  of  bi- 
ology found  this  work  of  Mendel's  and  gave  it  to  the  world. 
Had  those  words  of  his  been  known  a  half  century  earlier, 
there  is  no  doubt  it  would  have  changed  much  of  our  dis- 
cussions on  the  "Origin  of  Species."  And  it  is  well  to 
note  here  that  when  Professor  Plate  says  that  to  accept  a 
view  such  as  Nageli's  we  should  have  to  give  up  so  much 
that  had  been  gained  by  hard-fought  battles,  and  Profes- 
sor Kellogg  says  that  it  is  needless  to  say  that  not  many 
biologists  hold  to  Nageli's  views,  it  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  on  matters  of  TRUTH  it  doesn't  matter  in  the  least 


Theories  of  Evolution  135 

how  many  men  hold  it,  for,  if  it  be  true,  it  remains  such, 
regardless  of  a  majority. 

A  newspaper  clipping  comes  to  mind  of  some  years  ago, 
when  Dr.  Robert  Koch,  of  Vienna,  was  lecturing  in  this 
country.  The  reference  is  lost,  but  it  comes  to  mind  some- 
thing like  this:  A  convention  for  the  study  of  tubercu- 
losis had  the  famous  bacteriologist  lecture  to  it,  and  among 
other  things  he  said,  was  that  he  was  not  yet  positive,  but 
in  so  far  as  his  experiments  had  shown,  he  was  inclined  to 
believe  tuberculosis  from  an  infected  cow  would  not  be 
transmitted  through  milk.  Objections  were  raised,  and 
finally  a  vote  was  taken  as  to  whether  the  doctor  was 
right  or  not,  the  delegates  voting  him  wrong.  Of  course 
that  settled  the  matter!  Disease  was  so  carried,  because  it 
had  been  voted  thus !  It  is  just  as  reasonable  to  accept  a 
thing  because  many  men  hold  to  it.  The  evidence  is  what  we 
seek,  and  not  the  vote. 

"Heterogenesis"  is  the  theory  with  which  de  Vries's  name 
is  mostly  associated  and  means  that,  sometimes  (though  not 
often),  we  have  a  freak,  a  monster,  or  "sport,"  as  it  is 
called,  born  from  apparently  perfectly  normal  parents  and 
these  sports  then  breed  true  and  thus  produce  a  new  spe- 
cies. 

Korschinsky,  the  Russian  botanist,  goes  much  further 
than  does  de  Vries,  who  admits  selection  as  a  factor  in  evo- 
lution. Korschinsky 


says  plainly  that  the  struggle  for  existence  and  selection 
have  either  no  influence  in  species-forming  and  descent,  or, 
if  any,  a  hindering  and  antagonising  influence,  a  retarding 
nd  nullifying  influence  (p.  333). 


I 


He  has  set  down  in  parallel  columns  his  views  (pp.  334- 


136 


The  Begimwngs  of  Science 


According  to  the  transmu- 
tation theory: 

1.  To  all  organisms  there 
belongs  a  capacity  for  varia- 
tion which  is  called  into  play 
partly  through  inner,  partly 
through    outer    causes, 
through  use  and  disuse,  etc. 
This  capacity  for  variation 
regularly  finds  its  expression 
in  the  appearance  of  slight 
and    unnoticeable   individual 
differences. 

2.  As     a    result    of    this 
struggle  for  existence  and  se- 
lection, those  individual  vari- 
ations   which    prove    them- 
selves useful  become  fixed  and 
accumulated,  while  the  non- 
useful  ones  disappear.      All 
characteristics  and  peculiari- 
ties of  a  species  must,  as  a 
result  of  a  prolonged  selec- 
tion, stand  in  harmony  with 
the  outer  conditions,  and  be 
useful  to  the  organism. 

3.  Through  prolonged  se- 
lection and  accumulation  of 
characteristics     all     species 
undergo  a  persistent  change, 
whereby  they  are  gradually 
transformed  into  new  species 
without,  however,  sacrificing 
their    normal    physiological 
relations. 


According  to   the  theory 
of  heterogenesis : 

1.  To  all  organisms  there 
belongs  a  capacity  for  vari- 
ation, which  is  a  fundamental 
inner   peculiarity    independ- 
ent of  outer  conditions,  and* 
which  remains  usually  in  the 
latent     conditions,     retained 
by  heredity,  but  which  now 
and  then  finds  its  expressions 
in  sudden  changes. 

2.  These    sudden    changes 
can,  under  favorable  condi- 
tions, be  the   beginnings   of 
persistent  races.     These  new 
characteristics,    having    ap- 
peared independently  of  out- 
er conditions,  are  sometimes 
useful  to  the  organism,  but 
they   may   also  stand  in  no 
harmony   with   outer   condi- 
tions. 


3.  All  once-formed  species 
remain  unchanged,  although 
new  forms  occasionally  split 
off  from  them  by  heterogene- 
sis. Such  newly  arisen  forms 
have,  as  the  result  of  a  dis- 
turbed heredity,  a  deranged 
constitution,  which  reveals 
itself  in  a  lessened  fertility 
and  often  in  a  generally 
weakened  condition  of  the 


Theories  of  Evolution 


137 


4.  This  process  can  take 
place  everywhere  and  under 
all  circumstances.  The  hard- 
er the  outer  conditions  and 
the  sharper  the  struggle  for 
existence,  the  more  energet- 
ically selection  works,  and 
therewith  the  quicker  the_de- 
velopment  of  new  forms. 


5.  The  chief  requisite  for 
evolution  is,  therefore,  the 
struggle  for  existence,  and 
the  selection  which  results 
from  it. 


•  6.  If  there  were  no  strug- 
gle for  existence,  no  selec- 
tion, no  survival  of  the 
strongest,  there  would  be  no 
evolution  and  no  specialisa- 
tion, for  adapted  species 
would  have  no  advantage 
over  unadapted  ones,  and  as 
a  result  of  crossing  with  the 
latter,  they  would  sacrifice 


organism.  The  new  forms, 
becoming  constant  races, 
gradually  recover  their  con- 
stitution. 

4.  The  organ  of  new  forms 
can,  however,  occur  only  un- 
der  favorable   conditions   of 
existence  for  the  species,  and 
the  more  favorable  these  con- 
ditions, that  is,  the  less  se- 
vere the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence, the  more  energetically 
can  evolution  go   on.      New 
forms    do    not    arise    under 
hard  external  conditions,  or, 
if  any  do,  they  go  quickly  to 
ground. 

5.  The  struggle  for  exist- 
ence, and  the  selection  that 
goes  hand  in  hand  with  it, 
constitute    a    factor    which 
limits  new  forms  and  hinders 
further     variation     and     is, 
therefore,  in  no  way  favor- 
able   to    the    origin    of   new 
forms.     It  is  a  factor  inim- 
ical to  evolution. 

6.  If  there  were  no  strug- 
gle for  existence,  there  would 
be  no  killing  out  of  newly 
arising    or     already     arisen, 
forms.     The  world  of  organ- 
isms  could  then  grow  to   a 
mighty  tree,  whose  branches 
could  all  persist  in  blooming 
condition,     and     the     most 
aberrant,  now  isolated,  spe- 


138 


The  Begmnings  of  Science 


their  useful  characteristics. 


7.  The  so-called  advance 
in  nature  or  the  perfecting 
of  organisms,  is  nothing  else 
than  a  more  complex,  more 
complete  adaptation  to  out- 
er conditions,  and  it  is 
reached  in  a  purely  mechan- 
ical way  through  selection 
and  the  accumulation  of 
characteristics  useful  under 
the  existing  outer  conditions. 


cies  would  be  connected  with 
all  others  through  intermedi- 
ate forms. 

7.  The  adaptation  which 
comes  to  exist  through  the 
struggle  for  existence  is  not 
at  all  identical  with  an  ad- 
vance, for  higher,  more  spe- 
cialized  ( vollkommenere) 
forms  are  by  no  means  al- 
ways better  adapted  to  outer 
conditions  than  the  lower 
ones.  One  cannot  explain  the 
evolution  of  organisms  in  a 
purely  mechanical  way.  In 
order  to  explain  the  origin  of 
higher  forms  out  of  lower  it 
is  necessary  to  admit  a  spe- 
cial tendency,  in  organisms, 
for  advance,  which  is  nearly 
related  to,  or  identical  with 
the  tendency  to  vary,  and 
which  compels  organisms  to- 
ward perfectness  as  far  as 
external  conditions  allow. 


This  theory  of  Korschinsky  and  de  Vries  is  not  based  on 
any  belief  that  sports  or  large  variations  are  any  more 
numerous,  nor  of  any  more  worth  as  the  beginnings  of  new 
species,  than  now  generally  recognized,  but  it  assumes  sud- 
den radical  changes  in  the  organism  which,  if  not  visibly 
large  as  regards  obvious  quantitative  conditions,  are  large, 
or  at  least  comprehensive  as  regards  qualitative  conditions. 
T,he  mutation  or  variation  assumed  by  the  theory  of  hetero- 
genesis  affects  many  organs  and  parts,  structurally  and 
physiologically;  it  produces  a  radical  change  throughout 
the  organism.  And  this  change  is  the  result  of  an  influence 
wholly  intrinsic,  inherent,  and  has  no  reference  to  external 


Theories  of  Evolution  139 

conditions,  except  in  that  the  stimulus  for  it  may  come 
partly  or  chiefly  from  specially  favorable  conditions  of  nu- 
trition. This  change  is  at  once  definitive  and  fixed;  it  is 
transmitted  unimpaired  to  the  offspring  of  the  organism 
showing  the  mutation,  only  the  capacity  for  the  production 
of  offspring:  i.  e.,  the  reproductive  fertility,  is  often  weak- 
ened (p.  336). 

The  theory  does  not  call  for  "sudden  and  large  changes 
or  variations,"  although  it  does  for  "sudden  and  fixed  ones." 

De  Vries  insists  that  instead  of  "variations  which  are 
changes  in  a  linear  direction,  the  transf oration  to  be  called 
mutations  constitute  divergence  in  new  directions.  They 
take  place  as  far  as  experience  goes,  without  definite  direc- 
tion." And  even  if  transition  forms  exist  between  the  spe- 
cies produced  by  mutations,  they  are  no  evidence  against 
the  mutations  "for,"  says  de  Vries,  "the  transitions  do  not 
appear  before  new  species,  at  most  only  simultaneously  with 
this,  and  generally  only  after  this  is  already  in  existence. 
The  transitions  are  therefore  no  intermediates  or  prepara- 
tions for  the  appearance  of  the  new  forms.  The  origin 
takes  place,  not  through  them,  but  wholly  independent  of 
them"  (p.  338). 

While  de  Vries  admits  that  recorded  mutations  are  few: 
"mutations  under  observation  are  as  yet  very  rare;  enough 
to  indicate  the  possible  and  most  probable  ways  but  no 
more";  yet  he  strongly  maintains  that  there  is  no  scientific 
proof  of  the  origin  of  species  in  any  other  way  than  by 
mutation  and  that  there  is  such  proof  of  their  actual  mu- 
tational  origin.  He  says:  "I  intend  to  give  a  review  of 
the  facts  obtained  from  plants  which  go  to  prove  the  asser- 
tion that  species  and  varieties  have  originated  by  mutation 
and  are  at  present  not  known  to  originate  in  another  way" 
(p.  339). 

•  But  in  any  consideration  of  de  Vries'  work  and  theories, 
one  must  have  clearly  in  mind  the  distinctive  meaning  which 
de  Vries  attaches  to  the  word  species.  However  little  biolo- 
gists agree  on  any  absolute  definition  of  species,  the  term 


140  The  Begwnmgs  of  Science 

nevertheless  is  consistently  used  to  refer  to  differentiated 
organic  types  between  any  two  of  which  there  is  consid- 
erable obvious  describable  difference,  either  qualitative  or 
quantitative.  If  two  types  of  such  obvious  difference  in 
one  or  several  characteristics  (usually  external  or  at  least 
externally  noticeable  differences  are  the  ones  used)  are  con- 
nected by  a  series  of  connecting  gradatory  forms  existing 
either  in  the  same  territory  or  in  other  regions,  the  two 
forms  are  not  referred  to  as  distinct  species  but  as  varie- 
ties ;  at  least  the  form  at  one  end  of  the  series  is  called 
a  variety  from  the  other  end.  By  de  Vries  species  and 
varieties  are  of  different  stuff.  Specific  distinctions  with 
him  are  based  on  differences  in  aggregation  of  the  element- 
ary units,  the  Einheiten,  that  go  to  compose  the  specific 
types.  P 

With  de  Vries,  then,  species  mean  two  different  things; 
first,  the  systematic  species,  which  florists  and  systematists 
use,  and  which  should  be  retained  as  such,  lest  a  new  classi- 
fication hopelessly  confuse  students,  by  the  immense  addi- 
tions that  would  have  to  be  made  to  our  lists,  and  second,  for 
our  purpose  we  must  find  through  "pedigree  culture"  any 
form  which  "remains  constant  and  distinct  from  its  allies" 
and  this  form  is  then  to  be  considered  the  elementary  spe- 
cies (p.  340). 

A  statement  made  by  de  Vries  must  be  recorded  on  ac- 
count of  its  value  from  an  orthogenetic  viewpoint;  as  he 
shows  that  it  is  already  within  the  seed  that  the  muta- 
tions-possibilities must  be  sought.  Here  is  what  he  says : 
"Obviously  the  mutations  must  be  decided  withm  the  seed." 
The  italics  are  ours. 

As  Professor  Kellogg  says,  On  the  whole  the  theory  has 
been  warmly  welcomed  as  the  most  promising  way  yet  out 
of  the  difficulties  into  which  biologists  had  fallen  in  their 
attempts  to  explain  satisfactorily  the  phenomena  of  the 


Theories  of  Evolution  141 

origin  of  species  through  Darwinian  selection.  And  espe- 
cially has  been  welcomed  the  fruitful  idea  of  unit  species 
characters,  and  of  the  indivisibility  and  the  distinctness  of 
such  characters,  in  inheritance.  But  with  all  the  interest 
aroused  by  de  Vries'  presentation  of  his  theory,  and  with 
all  the  eager  scrutiny  of  species  and  records  of  species  ap- 
pearing an  output  of  new  evidence  amazingly  small  (when 
one  stops  to  consider  the  publicity  gained  for  the  theory 
itself  and  its  obvious  need  of  more  confirmatory  data  of 
observation  and  experiment)  has  resulted.  Even  though  the 
answer  may  be  that  experiment  takes  time,  the  lack  of  new 
observational  evidence  of  the  occurrence  of  mutations,  and 
of  the  origin  of  new  species  through  mutations  in  nature, 
is  significant.  It  is  my  belief  that  a  reaction  against  the 
curiously  swift  and  widespread  partial  to  complete  accept- 
ance of  the  mutation  theory  as  the  sufficient  'way  out'  of  our 
troubles  to  explain  the  origin  of  new  species  will  soon  occur 
(p.  348). 

Conklin  well  says,  "The  mutation  theory  is  a  theory  of  the 
evolution  of  organisms  through  the  evolution  of  their  germ 
cells." 

Bateson  has  suggested  that  mutations  may  be  Mendelian 
recessives  coming  forth,  and  to  understand  this  we  suggest 
the  reading  of  our  chapter  on  Genetics.  Simply  stated  it 
means  that  after  breeding,  a  certain  proportion  of  the  off- 
spring will  show  after  the  second  generation,  certain  unit 
characters,  let  us  say,  the  color  of  the  hair.  Three  out  of 
four  of  the  offspring  will  have  the  color  known  as  "dom- 
inant," the  other  one  the  "recessive"  and  if  these  reces- 
sives are  bred  together  the  color  of  the  non-dominant  will, 
of  course,  be  predominating. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  the  excerpts  from  the  addresses 
delivered  before  the  American  Society  of  Naturalists  at  Phil- 
adelphia, December  28,  1904,  when  distinguished  men  in 
various  fields  of  biological  work  spoke  in  regard  to  the 


The  Beginnings  of  Science 
mutation  theory.     Castle  said: 

On  the  whole,  it  appears  that  the  formation  of  new 
breeds  begins  with  the  discovery  of  an  exceptional  individ- 
ual, or  with  the  production  of  such  an  individual  by  means 
of  cross-breeding.  Such  exceptional  individuals  are  muta- 
tions (p.  362). 

Dwight  said: 

It  is  to  my  mind  impossible  to  find  any  support  for  a 
theory  of  evolution  by  minute  changes  from  the  study 
of  anatomical  variations.  I  should  not  venture  to  say, 
on  the  other  hand,  that  they  give  any  support  to  the 
theory  of  mutation;  but  at  least  they  are  not  in  disaccord 
with  it  (p.  363). 

And  Wheeler : 

It  seemed  necessary  to  discuss  ethological  characters  at 
some  length  for  the  purpose  of  vindicating  their  importance. 
Having  attempted  this,  I  may  say  that  these  characters 
seem  to  me  to  offer  even  fewer  difficulties  than  the  mor- 
phological characters  to  the  acceptance  of  the  mutation 
theory,  for  the  reason  that  the  ethological  and  psychological 
processes  are  conceived  primarily  as  qualities  and  not  quan- 
tities. Thus  the  psychical  elements,  i.  e.,  the  simple  feel- 
ings, cravings,  and  sensations,  are  disparate  qualitative 
processes  which  cannot  be  derived  from  one  another  or  from 
some  more  undifferentiated  process.  This  is  still  more 
evident  in  the  case  of  the  complex  psychical  phenomena. 
Similarly,  instincts,  with  which  ethology  is  most  concerned, 
when  resolved  into  their  simplest  components,  are  seen  to 
consist  of  discrete  reactions  which  can  not  be  shown  to 
rise  from  one  another.  Although,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
measurable  intensities  and  durations,  of  the  reactions  are 
analogous  to  the  fluctuating  structural  variations,  it  is 
even  more  difficult  for  the  psychologist  to  conceive  of  a  par- 
ticular feeling,  craving  or  sensation  of  some  other  psychic 


Theories  of  Evolution  143 

process,  than  it  is  for  the  morphologist  to  conceive  of  the 
origin  of  new  characters  from  the  fluctuating  variations  of 
structure. 

Mutation  is  even  more  urgently  demanded  for  the  ex- 
planation of  many  other  instincts,  especially  those  of  sym- 
biotic or  parasitic  species  and  of  species  with  profound 
and  sudden  metamorphosis.  In  these  cases,  a  particular 
activity,  on  which  most  often  depends  the  life  of  the  indi- 
vidual or  of  its  progeny,  has  to  be  performed  with  a  high 
degree  of  proficiency  at  its  very  phylogenetic  inception  or 
it  can  be  of  no  advantage  to  the  individual  or  the  race. 
Such  cases,  with  which  you  are  all  familiar,  have  ever  been 
the  insurmountable  obstacle  to  the  evolution  of  instincts  on 
the  theory  of  fluctuating  variations  and  natural  selection. 
The  theory  of  organic  selection  seems  to  be  merely  to 
conceal  but  not  to  overcome  the  difficulties.  The  mutation 
theory  frankly  avoids  the  difficulties  even  if  it  fails  to  throw 
any  light  on  the  origin  of  the  mutations  and  bundles  this 
into  the  germ-plasma.  It  is  of  course  no  objection  to  the 
theory  that  it  leaves  something  under  the  heavens  to  be 
accounted  for.  This  is  rather  to  be  regarded  as  one  of 
its  chief  virtues.  As  working  naturalists  we  have  reason 
to  be  most  suspicious  of  the  theories  that  explain  every- 
thing (pp.  363-364). 

And  lastly  we  have  the  neo-Vitalists  regarding  whom 
Kellogg,  who  differs  radically  from  them,  says : 

The  position  of  the  new  Vitalists  is  perhaps  best  to  be 
taken  from  that  of  Driesch,  an  extremely  able  present-day 
biologist,  whose  first  belief  was  in  a  radical  mechanical  ex- 
planation of  all  life  phenomena,  and  whose  brilliant  experi- 
mental work  has  furnished  many  of  the  examples  referred 
to  in  the  text-books  of  the  modern  study  of  the  mechanics 
of  development.  But  Driesch's  present  position  is  an  un- 
compromising belief  in  the  impossibility  of  explaining  life- 
forms  and  life-functions  on  the  basis  of  ever  so  complex 
a  combination  of  purely  physico-chemical  and  mechanical 
conditions  and  factors.  Put  positively,  neo-Vitalism  de- 


144  The  Begwnmgs  of  Science 

mands  the  assumption  of  an  extra-physico-chemical  factor 
(called  "psychoid,"  according  to  Driesch's  nomenclature), 
which  is  an  attribute  of,  or  essential  kind  of  potentiality  per- 
taining to,  organized  living  substance,  and  not  found  in  nor 
influencing  inorganic  bodies. 

Biitschli  has  well  pointed  out  that  neo-Vitalism  is  really 
only  a  return  to  the  old  "vital  principle"  belief,  and  that 
we  are  now  and  have  been  ever  since  our  practical  giving 
up  of  the  vital  principle  notion,  making  steady  progress 
in  the  explanation  of  life-forms  and  life-functions  on  strict- 
ly mechanical  and  physico-chemical  grounds.  While  we 
have  by  no  means  explained  all  life  attributes  in  this  way, 
Biitschli  holds  that  our  progress  has  been  such  as  to  make 
no  demand  for  the  introduction  as  yet  of  a  new  vital 
principle  under  a  pseudo-scientific  guise. 

Other  neo-Vitalists,  one  of  whom  G.  Wolff  is  a  type, 
lay  chief  stress  on  the  inexplicableness  of  the  Zweckmassig- 
keit  in  organisms  by  any  of  the  known  biological  facts  and 
factors,  and  see  in  the  determination  or  very  existence  of 
this  Zweckmassigkeit  the  chief  revelation  of  a  vital  factor, 
wholly  distinct  from  anything  found  in  the  inorganic  world. 
Wolff's  argument  is  clever  and  suggestive,  and  brings  home 
to  one  strongly  the  indissoluble  relationship  between  living 
matter  and  its  adaptivity.  In  its  fundamental  character  life 
is  adaptivity  ;  the  indispensable  relation  between  living  mat- 
ter and  the  rest  of  nature  is  the  pliability,  the  adaptiveness 
of  the  living  matter  (p. 


These  are  the  various  theories  as  Professor  Kellogg  sees 
them  and  it  will  be  agreed  by  the  majority  of  biologists 
that  he  has  done  his  work  well  and  that  there  is  a  great 
breadth  of  reading  and  an  almost  unbelievable  familiarity 
with  the  many  systems  or  theories  propounded  to  account 
for  evolution.  This  work  appeared  in  1907.  We  have  be- 
fore us  the  August  number  (1916)  of  The  American  Nat- 
uralist, in  which  Dr.  Chas.  B.  Davenport,  the  geneticist, 
gives  what  he  calls  "The  Form  of  Evolutionary  Theory  That 


Theories  of  Evolution  145 

Modern  Genetical  Research  Seems  to  Favor."  In  which  he 
shows  quite  conclusively  that  from  experimental  researches 
the  "Internal  changes  are  chiefly  independent  of  external 
conditions,"  and  that  this  theory  has  the  support  of  work- 
ers in  the  many  fields  that  can  and  do  throw  light  upon 
the  matter. 

Wasmann  has  well  summed  up  the  whole  matter  when 
he  says  that  in  discussing  evolution  it  is  necessary  to 

distinguish  (1)  between  the  theory  of  evolution  as  a  sci- 
entific hypothesis  and  as  a  philosophic  speculation;  (2) 
between  the  theory  of  evolution  as  based  on  theistic  prin- 
ciples or  as  based  on  a  materialistic  and  atheistic  founda- 
tion; (3)  between  the  theory  of  evolution  and  Darwinism; 
(4)  between  the  theory  of  evolution  as  applied  to  the  vege- 
table and  animal  kingdoms  and  applied  to  man. 

As  a  scientific  hypothesis,  the  theory  of  evolution  seeks 
to  determine  the  historical  succession  of  the  various  species 
of  plants  and  animals  on  our  earth;  and  with  the  aid  of 
paleontology  and  other  sciences  such  as  comparative  mor- 
phology, embryology,  and  bionomy,  to  show  how  in  the 
course  of  the  different  geological  epochs  they  gradually 
evolve  from  their  beginnings  by  purely  natural  causes  of 
specific  development.  The  theory  of  evolution,  then,  as  a 
scientific  hypothesis,  does  not  consider  the  present  species 
of  plants  and  animals  as  forms  directly  created  by  God, 
but  as  the  final  result  of  an  evolution  from  other  species 
existing  in  former  geological  periods.  Hence,  it  is  called 
"the  theory  of  evolution,"  or  "the  theory  of  descent,"  since 
it  implies  the  descent  of  the  present  from  extinct  species. 
This  theory  is  opposed  to  the  theory  of  constancy,  which 
assumes  the  immutability  of  organic  species.  The  scientific 
theory  therefore  does  not  concern  itself  with  the  origin  of 
life.  It  merely  inquires  into  the  genetic  relations  of  sys- 
tematic species,  genera,  and  families  and  endeavors  to  ar- 
range them  according  to  natural  series  of  descent  (genetic 
trees). 


146  The  Begmnmgs  of  Science 

How  far  is  the  theory  of  evolution  based  on  observed 
facts?  It  is  understood  to  be  still  only  an  hypothesis.  The 
formation  of  new  species  is  directly  observed  in  but  a  few 
cases,  and  only  with  reference  to  such  forms  as  are  closely 
related  to  each  other.  .  .  .  There  is,  in  fact,  no  evidence 
whatever  for  the  common  genetic  descent  of  all  plant  and 
animal  forms  from  a  single  primitive  organism.  Hence,  the 
greater  number  of  botanists  and  zoologists  regard  a  poly- 
genetic  (polyphyletic)  evolution  as  much  more  acceptable 
than  a  monogenetic  (monophyletic).  At  present,  however, 
it  is  impossible  to  decide  how  many  independent  genetic  series 
must  be  assumed  in  the  animal  and  vegetable  kingdoms. 
This  is  the  gist  of  the  theory  of  evolution  as  a  scientific 
hypothesis. 

As  to  the  theory  of  evolution  considered  philosophically: 

The  history  of  the  plant  and  animal  kingdoms  upon  our 
globe  is  but  a  small  part  of  the  history  of  the  entire  earth; 
similarly,  the  geological  development  of  our  earth  consti- 
tutes but  a  small  part  of  the  history  of  the  solar  system 
and  of  the  universe.  The  theory  of  evolution  as  a  philo- 
sophical conception  considers  the  entire  history  of  the 
cosmos  as  an  harmonious  development,  brought  about  by 
natural  laws.  This  conception  is  in  agreement  with  the 
Christian  view  of  the  universe.  God  is  the  creator  of 
heaven  and  earth.  If  God  produced  the  universe  by  a  single 
creative  act  of  His  will,  then  its  natural  development  by 
laws  implanted  in  it  by  the  Creator  is  to  the  greater  glory 
of  His  Divine  power  and  wisdom.  St.  Thomas  says :  "The 
potency  of  a  cause  is  the  greater,  the  more  remote  the  effects 
to  which  it  extends"  (Summa  c.  Gent.  Ill,  LXXVII)  ;  and 
Suarez:  "God  does  not  interfere  directly  with  the  natural 
order,  where  secondary  causes  suffice  to  produce  the  in- 
tended effect."  (De  opera  sex  sierum,  II,  c.x.n.  13.)  In 
the  light  of  this  principle  of  the  Christian  interpretation  of 
nature,  the  history  of  the  animal  and  vegetable  kingdoms 
on  our  planet  is,  as  it  were,  a  versicle  in  a  volume  of  a  million 
pages  in  which  the  natural  development  of  the  cosmos  is 


Theories  of  Evolution  147 

described,  and  upon  whose  title  page  is  written:   "In  the 
beginning  God  created  heaven  and  earth."  3 

We  have  already  shown  the  value  of  a  scientific  hypoth- 
esis, in  a  previous  chapter,  and  have  there  called  attention 
to  the  fact  that  such  hypothesis  is  essential  in  all  experi- 
mental work,  and  that  we  are  justified  in  accepting  it  as  a 
working  hypothesis  regardless  of  its  being  true  or  noty  if 
our  experiments  work  out  as  though  it  were  true. 

We  have  further  shown  that  it  is  then  necessary  philo- 
sophically, that  is,  from  the  rules  of  logic,  to  establish 
(after  we  have  found  our  first  principles)  the  hypothesis 
on  solid  grounds  before  it  can  be  accepted  as  truth. 

This  is  what  Wasmann  means  in  the  citation  given  above 
in  his  first  division.  Likewise,  we  have  taken  his  second  point 
and  shown  that  it  is  necessary  to  start  somewhere  and 
with  a  definite  viewpoint  or  a  "creed,"  as  Dr.  Bourne  puts 
it,  and  this  we  have  stated  in  his  own  words.  That  is, 
there  are  really  two  schools  of  thought  involved,  the  one 
like  Professor  Kellogg,  who  insists  on  starting  with  a  causo- 
mechanical  viewpoint,  or  creed,  and  throwing  out  of  court 
all  things  that  do  not  fit  in  therewith,  the  other  school  in- 
sisting on  an  original  creative  act,  and  as  the  causo-me- 
chanists  have  not  yet  been  able  to  formulate  a  single  valid 
reason  for  actual  BEGINNINGS  of  anything,  the  latter  really 
have  the  best  of  the  argument. 

The  difference  between  Darwinism  and  Evolution  we  have 
made  clear  in  this  very  chapter,  for,  after  all,  that  is  prac- 
tically what  this  whole  chapter  is  written  for. 

And  lastly,  the  difference  between  the  animal  world  at 
large  and  man  is  really  not  a  difference  of  the  physical  at 
all,  except  to  a  very  small  extent.  The  argument  should, 

"Article,  "Evolution"  Vol.  V.  Page  654,  Catholic  Encyclopedia. 


148  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

and  must,  he  carried  into  the  thought  world — mto  the  realm 
of  philosophy  and  psychology,  for  it  is  in  the  field  of 
thought  and  of  spirituality  that  the  difference  is  found,  so 
that  men,  such  as  Professor  Wm.  Wundt,  the  greatest  living 
experimental  psychologist;  Professor  Wheeler  and  Profes- 
sor Wasmann,  world-renowned  authorities  on  the  supposed- 
ly most  intelligent  of  animals,  the  Ant,  have  all  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  there  is  an  immeasurable  difference  between 
the  "reasons"  of  animals  for  performing  the  acts  they  do, 
and  the  reasons  men  perform  similar  ones. 

Here  is  the  battleground  of  the  future,  for  already  much 
of  our  interpreting  of  the  physical  facts  has  fallen  to  the 
ground  as  worthless,  as  witness,  for  example,  many  of  the 
supposedly  vestigial  or  rudimentary  organs,  among  which 
the  ductless  glands  were  originally  considered,  but  which 
we  now  know  have  a  most  valuable  use  in  forming  minute 
particles  which  in  turn  permit  other  glands  to  function 
properly. 

Professor  Haeckel's  theory  that  man  passes  through  the 
same  stage  as  did  the  race,  that  is,  first  becomes  a  fish,  then 
going  on  through  other  forms,  until  he  shows  in  his  em- 
bryonic development,  every  form  through  which  his  ances- 
tors have  passed,  is  a  theory  which  Professor  Kellogg  well 
says  is  now  only  a  skeleton  on  which  to  hang  exceptions, 
and  as  has  also  been  said  by  another  Biologist,  that  there 
is  a  big  difference  between  saying  that  because  a  human 
being  passes  through  a  similar  stage  as  does  the  fish,  that 
therefore  the  human  must  have  been  a  fish  once  upon  a 
time,  when  aJl  that  should  be  said  is  that  the  human  and 
the  fish  pass  through  the  same  stage. 

No  fossil  remains  have  disclosed  a  missing  link  of  any 
description.  A  jaw  has  been  found,  part  of  a  skull,  or  a 
tooth,  but  to  build  up  a  whole  theory  on  a  single  part  of 


Theories  of  Evolution  149 

the  body  is  extremely  hazardous. 

And  the  argument  that  because  men  and  animals  are  so 
similarly  built  physically,  the  former  must  therefore  have 
sprung  from  the  latter  has  always  seemed  to  the  writer 
most  specious  reasoning,  for  it  assumes  that  because  the 
Creator  did  not  build  a  totally  different  form  in  each  case 
and  show  how  many  things  He  could  make,  therefore  He 
didn't  have  anything  to  do  with  any  of  the  things  He  did 
make.  Continuing  with  the  article  quoted  above  by  Pro- 
fessor Wasmann : 

That  God  should  have  made  us  of  natural,  evolutionary, 
original  causes  in  the  production  of  man's  body,  is  per  se 
not  improbable  and  was  propounded  by  St.  Augustine.4 

The  actual  proofs  of  the  descent  of  man's  body  from 
animals  is,  however,  inadequate,  especially  in  respect  to 
paleontology.  And  the  human  soul  could  not  have  been 
derived  from  that  of  the  brute,  since  it  is  of  a  spiritual 
nature;  for  which  reason  we  must  refer  its  origin  to  a 
creative  act  on  the  part  of  God.5 

In  reading  such  a  volume,  then,  as  Professor  Kellogg's 
we  are  confronted  by  the  indisputable  fact  that  among  the 
men  who  have  the  facts  before  them  there  is  a  most  hopeless 
mass  of  irreconcilable  theories.  How  many  hold  to  either 
side  or  to  any  particular  theory  no  one  knows.  There  is 
Professor  Fleishmann,  of  the  University  of  Erlangen,  a 
most  noted  Biologist,  who  absolutely  denies  that  any  Evo- 
lution of  any  kind  has  been  demonstrated.6  It  is  true  that 
he  is  the  only  one  of  the  recognized  Biologists  who  take 
this  extreme  view,  but  it  throws  a  light  on  the  so-called 
"evidence"  at  least  that  is  furnished  for  proof.  Then  there 

4  See  Article  "Augustinism  in  History,"  under  V.  Saint  Augustine 
of  Hippo,  Catholic  Encyclopedia. 

5  Article,  "Evolution,"  Vol.  V.  Page  654-655.     Catholic  Encyclopedia, 
6See  Page  8,  Darwinism  To-day. 


150  The  Begwvnwgs  of  Science  \ 

are  the  ever-growing  numbers  of  workers  in  biological  fields 
who  have  accepted  Orthogenesis,  that  is,  an  inner  driving 
force  of  some  nature,  though  as  shown,  one  school  explains 
this  is  a  physico-chemical  manner,  the  other  in  a  vitalistic. 
But  all  admit  that  nothing  has  as  yet  been  explained  as  to 
origins  of  organic  matter;  a  growing  number  are  constantly 
coming  to  Nageli's  and  Driesch's  viewpoint  of  Vitalism, 
recognizing  the  immeasurable  distance  between  the  living  and 
the  non-living  and  between  the  highest  form  of  animal  and 
the  lowest  of  human-kind. 

But  it  must  ever  be  remembered  that  new  names  are  given 
to  old  doctrines,  and  often  a  description  answers  where  an 
explanation  should  be  found,  so,  that  as  Sir  Bertram  Windle 
has  well  said,  it  is  exactly  this  orthogenetic  and  vital- 
istic doctrine  that  the  most  intense  defender  of  the  "soul" 
theory  ever  contended  for,  yet  many,  if  not  most  of  these 
men  who  actually  hold  these  self-same  doctrines,  would 
rather  perish  than  give  this  "something,"  which  is  the  inner 
driving  force,  so  antiquated  a  name  as  "the  soul."  Here  we 
have  the  interesting  spectacle  of  a  great  number  of  scien- 
tists being  perfectly  agreed  on  a  subject  but  most  insistently 
fighting  over  its  name. 

So  that  we  may  say  with  the  last  writer  quoted  above, 
that  as  long  as  men  who  have  all  the  known  facts  before  them 
cannot  come  to  a  decision,  the  average  man  would  do  well  to 
ponder  long  before  he  jumps  at  conclusions  too  abruptly. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

VITALISM 

ROUGHLY  speaking,  we  may  divide  the  curriculum  of 
any  school  attempting  to  embrace  universal  knowledge, 
into  three  great  divisions :  ( 1 )  the  study  of  non-living  mat- 
ter, (2)  the  study  of  living  matter  and  (3)  the  study  of  the 
thought-world. 

Everything  we  know — everything  that  we  can  possibly 
study  or  think  about — must  come  under  one  of  these  great 
classifications. 

We  have  shown  in  our  chapter  on  Metaphysics  and 
Epistemology  that  nothing  can  be  known  at  all,  unless  we 
begin  with  self-evident  and  unprovable  First  Principles,  and 
in  our  chapter  on  Logic  we  have  shown  that  from  these 
principles  it  is  necessary  to  build  up,  step  by  step,  the  super- 
structure of  theories  or  truths  we  are  seeking  to  demon- 
strate. 

First,  we  wish  to  call  attention  to  the  Non-living  part  of 
our  universe,  or  as  it  is  usually  termed  in  technical  language, 
the  Inorganic.  Such  studies  as  Physics,  simple  Chemistry, 
Geology,  and  Astronomy  come  under  this  Inorganic  head- 
ing. "Physics"  attempts  to  find  the  physical  laws  of  the  uni- 
verse by  which  men  may  be  able  to  tell  in  advance  what  effect 
a  given  thing  will  have  when  set  in  motion,  for  in  the  last 
analysis,  Physics  deals  with  Motion,  and  Motion  only,  while 
"Chemistry"  attempts  to  find  the  laws  by  which  it  may  tell 
what  given  combinations  of  irreducible  substances,  called 
elements,  will  produce  a  given  result,  there  being  two  general 

151 


The  Begvrmmgs  of  Science 

ways  of  going  about  it ;  one,  takes  a  compound  apart  so  as 
to  find  what  simpler  compounds  or  elements  entered  into  the 
matter  analysed,  and  the  other  experiments  with  various 
simpler  compounds  to  ascertain  the  result  obtained  by  their 
mixing.  This  first  method  is  known  as  "analytic,"  while  the 
latter  is  called  "synthetic."  "Geology"  in  its  broadest  sense 
means  the  application  of  the  laws  found  in  Physics  and 
Chemistry  to  our  own  earth,  while  Astronomy  applies  the 
same  laws  to  other  worlds  than  ours. 

Under  the  study  of  the  Living,  we  have  one  science  that 
embraces  everything:  namely,  Biology,  but  this  is  divided 
again  into  the  Plant  world  and  the  Animal  world.  And 
Man  considering  himself  as  the  highest  form  of  living 
things  naturally  attempts  to  apply  all  laws  that  are  found 
in  any  of  the  other  fields  of  study  to  himself.  This  is  what, 
after  all,  makes  other  branches  of  learning  interesting.  In 
and  of  itself,  if  no  application  whatever  could  be  made  to 
man  from  the  findings,  it  is  doubtful  whether  many  would 
make  the  attempt  of  ascertaining  these  now-so-interesting 
laws.  And  decidedly  the  most  interesting  and  most  valuable 
discussion  in  all  scientific  fields  centers  around  the  applica- 
tion of  the  physical  and  chemical  laws  to  actual  LIFE. 
Can  Life  be  explained  on  the  basis  of  the  laws  of  Motion 
and  the  laws  of  Chemistry?  In  other  words,  what  evidence 
is  there  that  would  lead  us  to  answer  this  question  in  the 
affirmative  or  the  negative  ?  Is  there  any  need  of  postulating 
anything  beside  these  laws?  And  if  so,  what  can  be  postu- 
lated, and  is  there  any  evidence  for  the  postulate? 

It  is  true  that  it  is  very  difficult  for  most  men  and  women 
to  look  at  this  question  fairly  on  account  of  their  training 
and  their  prepossessions,  but,  if  one  is  to  pass  judgment 
well  and  worthily  on  any  subject,  it  is  more  than  necessary 
to  throw  out  all  manner  of  emotional  desire  and  face  the 


Vitalism  153 

facts  as  they  are  definitely  demonstrated  in  the  laboratory 
and  the  logical  conclusions  that  must  be  based  on  such  find- 
ings. 

First,  then,  we  may  say  that  those  who  hold  that  the 
physical  and  chemical  laws  can  alone  explain  living  mat- 
ter, are  called  Causo-mechanists,  while  those  who  oppose  this 
view  we  shah1  call  Vitalists. 

We  have  explained  what  the  Causo-mechanists  are  and 
now  shall  attempt  to  give  definition  to  what  Vitalists  hold, 
but  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  Vitalists,  just  as  well 
as  the  Causo-mechanists  accept  as  freely  and  as  fully,  all 
the  physical  and  chemical  laws  that  have  been  established. 
The  Vitalist  insists,  just  as  definitely  as  does  the  Causo- 
mechanist  that  these  same  physical  and  chemical  laws  are 
found  to  be  working  in  all  living  things.  He  even  accepts 
the  machine  theory  of  life  which  the  Causo-mechanists  con- 
stantly use  in  their  explanations,  but  he  does  not  stop  there. 
He  insists  on  driving  the  matter  still  further  home.  And 
in  doing  this,  the  great  outstanding  problem  is  that  known 
as  Teleology,  which  in  turn  means  that  there  is  a  definite  end 
toward  which  all  living  matter  tends  and  which  it  usually 
succeeds  in  attaining,  at  least  partially.  In  other  words,  the 
problem  hinges  on  whether  or  not  there  is  "purposiveness" 
in  life,  and  here  again  a  further  problem  arises  as  to  what 
is  meant  by  this  word  "purposiveness."  It  is  quite  probable 
that  many  fighting  each  other  have  come  to  grief  in  regard 
not  only  to  the  meaning  that  is  to  be  attached  to  the  word, 
but  also  how  it  is  to  be  applied  to  life.  That  there  is  some 
purposiveness  in  life  no  one  denies ;  for  example,  that  the 
eye  in  each  individual  develops  for  the  purpose  of  the  use  to 
which  it  is  put,  is  self-evident;  that  food  is  eaten  for  the 
purpose  of  nourishment  and  that  it  fulfills  its  purpose  in 
health  is  likewise  accepted,  but  this  kind  of  purposiveness, 


154  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

while  interesting  as  a  problem  in  itself  is  not  the  problem 
with  which  and  on  which  our  interest  centers  in  discussing 
whether  the  physical  and  chemical  laws  are  sufficient  to 
explain  life.  What  we  are  after  is  this:  to  show  the  dis- 
tinction between  two  different  kinds  of  purposiveness.  The 
one  materialists  accept  is  that  the  body  of  a  living  thing 
is  a  machine-like  structure  and  that  just  as  any  machine 
made  by  man,  is  made  for  a  definite  purpose,  and,  when 
properly  managed  and  run,  will  turn  out  the  kind  vf  work  for 
which  it  was  intended,  so  does  the  living  machine,  but  the 
other,  to  which  Vitalists  call  attention,  is  not  this  kind  of 
teleology  or  purposiveness,  but,  just  as  in  the  analogous 
case  of  the  man-made  machine,  so  in  the  living  machine,  the 
question  propounds  itself,  what  is  the  reason  that  the 
machine  has  become  a  machine?  And  with  this  important 
question  arises  another  one,  namely,  why  is  it  that  there 
is  no  machine  that  has  ever  been  made  that  will  turn  food 
into  nutrition  for  itself,  that  will  re-grow  a  lost  part,  that 
will  produce  other  machines  like  itself,  and  most  interesting 
of  all,  that  will,  if  three-fourths  of  it  be  cut  away,  no  matter 
what  parts  of  it  these  may  be,  produce  with  perfect  pre- 
cision, though  on  a  smaller  scale,  the  whole  machine;  and, 
lastly,  there  is  no  machine  that  has  yet  been  able  to  adjust 
itself  to  a  different  environment  than  the  one  in  which  it 
has  been  placed;  e.g.,  it  will  always  and  invariably,  so  long 
as  it  is  in  good  working  order,  do  only  the  same  thing  under 
the  same  conditions  ?  Why  also  is  it  that  a  machine  will  not 
grow  larger,  no  matter  what  nutritive  things  may  be  given 
it,  but  works,  rather,  on  exactly  the  reverse  methods,  by 
commencing  to  wear  away  from  the  very  moment  it  is  first 
put  into  use,  whereas  the  living  body  increases  through  its 
own  inherent  ways  of  building — of  growing  from  the  most 
minute  germ-plasm  to  a  full  and  complete  living  adult, 


Vitalism  155 

reproducing,  and  then  beginning  its  downward  path,  that 
leads  to  dissolution? 

We  see,  then,  two  types  of  teleology  must  be  kept  in 
mind  if  we  are  to  make  any  progress  in  our  discussion. 
First,  the  machine  type  of  teleology  and  secondly,  the  re- 
productive, growth,  and  regenerative  as  well  as  adaptive 
type.  In  other  words,  we  may  say,  the  first  attempts  to  ex- 
plain why  the  machine  turns  out  the  work  it  does  after  the 
machine  is  made,  the  latter,  how  the  machine  came  to  be 
made  and  what  the  purpose  was  in  making  it.  Or  as  Pro- 
fessor Hans  Driesch,  one  of  the  ablest  Biologists,  of  the 
present  day,  has  put  it : 

The  main  question  of  Vitalism  is  not  whether  the  processes 
of  life  can  properly  be  called  purposive;  it  is  rather  the 
question  if  the  purposiveness  in  those  processes  is  the  result 
of  a  special  constellation  of  factors  known  already  to  the 
sciences  of  the  inorganic,  or  if  it  is  the  result  of  an  autonomy 
peculiar  to  the  processes  themselves.1 

Vitalism  is  concerned  with  the  Organic  world,  because 
it  is  concerned  with  processes  that  are  especially  adapted 
toward  certain  ends,  or  processes  that  at  least  have  a  posi- 
tion among  objects  in  a  system  that  may  be  working  toward 
a  certain  end,  and  where  as  far  as  we  can  see,  the  driving 
force  that  keeps  the  adaptiveness  working  is  contained 
within  the  living  thing  itself  as  contradistinguished  from  the 
inorganic  where  the  only  force  that  causes  any  change  of  any 
kind  whatsoever  is  from  the  outside.  And  then  we  have  the 
further  important  thing  to  consider,  that  always  the  same 
process  is  performed  in  all  similar  organisms  under  the 
same  conditions,  when  no  injury  has  taken  place  to  the 

xThe  History  and  Theory  of  Vitalism,  by  Hans  Driesch  (Macmillan). 
All  explanations  and  quotations  in  this  chapter  up  to  Note  4,  are  from 
this  volume. 


156  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

organism. 

And  Professor  Driesch  also  makes  a  very  excellent  dis- 
tinction in  his  brilliant  discussion  of  the  subject  by  calling 
attention  to  the  fact  that  we  are  dealing  with  processes  and 
processes  only.  That  a  machine  as  a  thing  is  not  a  pro- 
cess. The  machine  made  by  human  hands  is  made  for 
processes  and  every  single  process  in  a  machine  is  pur- 
posive. 

It  is  the  result  of  purposive  action,  of  human  action, 
but  it  is  the  fact  that  it  is  made  for  processes  that  dis- 
tinguishes it  from  other  human  artefacts,  from  works  of  art 
for  instance. 

There  are,  then,  inorganic  things,  namely,  those  made  by 
men,  which  show  us  processes  deserving  the  predicate  pur- 
posive. It  is  clear  that  here  the  purposiveness  of  each 
single  process  rests  on  the  specific  order  of  the  specific 
parts  of  the  machine,  and  is  determined  by  this  order.  In 
other  words,  each  single  effect  in  a  machine  is  only  purpo- 
sive in  so  far  as  it  is  part  of  a  higher  specific  whole;  and 
this  is  in  virtue  of  the  constitution  or  structure  of  that 
whole. 

Our  reasoning  has  now  brought  us  to  a  point  at  which 
the  problem  which  we  have  described  as  the  fundamental 
problem  of  biology  presents  itself  for  consideration.  We 
are  confronted  by  the  all  important  question:  are  these 
processes  in  the  organism,  which  we  have  described  as  pur- 
posive, perhaps  only  purposive  in  virtue  of  a  given  structure 
or  tectonic,  of  a  "machine"  in  the  widest  sense,  on  the 
basis  of  which  they  play  their  part,  being  purposive  there- 
fore only  in  the  sense  in  which  processes  in  a  machine  are 
purposive;  or  is  there  another  special  kind  of  teleology  in 
the  realm  of  organic  life  (p.  4)  ? 

The  usual  use  of  the  word  "Teleology"  is  only  descriptive. 
It  does  not  really  mean  anything  explanatory,  biologically 
considered,  as  it  is  used ;  it 


Vitalism  157 

leaves  the  most  important  point  still  open,  for  life  in  par- 
ticular this  question:  are  the  processes  of  life  to  be  judged 
teleological  only  in  virtue  of  their  given  order,  only  because 
a  given  mechanical  form  lies  beneath  them,  while  every  single 
one  is  really  a  pure  physical  or  chemical  process — or  are 
the  processes  of  life  purposive  because  of  an  unanalysable 
autonomy  ? 

And  this  is  called  the  machine  type  or  "static  Teleology" 
while  the  deeper  processes  which  lead  to  the  making  of  the 
machine,  Professor  Driesch  calls  the  "dynamic  Teleology." 
He  insists  that  it  is  the  "static"  type  that  leads  to  the 
mechanistic  theory  of  the  organism:  that  is, 

the  process  of  life  and  its  order  is  only  a  special  case  of 
those  laws  which  are  valid  elsewhere  and  of  the  general 
order  of  the  world.  The  constellation  of  all  the  single 
cosmic  elements  just  happen^  to  be  of  such  nature  that 
we  also  get  amongst  them  those  processes  which  are  grouped 
together  as  "life."  According  to  this  view  life  is  only  dis- 
tinctive as  a  combination  and  not  because  of  its  own  laws. 
The  question  whence  comes  the  given  order  with  which  static 
teleology  operates  is  insoluble;  arid  it  is  precisely  owing  to 
this  circumstance  that  the  life-machine  does  appear  to  be 
something  different  from  technical  machines  whose  origin 
we  know,  even  if  the  kind  of  purposiveness  is  the  same  in 
both  cases. 

Dynamic  teleology  leads  us  to  what  is  generally  called 
Vitalism ;  it  leads  us  to  the  recognition  of  the  "Autonomy  of 
vital  processes." 

As  we  have  shown  in  our  chapter  on  Logic,  it  is  from  this 
subject  that  we  obtain  the  validity  for  all  our  reasoning ", 
and  if  the  laws  of  Logic  fall,  we  can  know  nothing  validly, 
for  it  is,  and  can  only  be  through  Logic  that  we  gather 
knowledge  and  arrange  it  in  an  orderly  manner  so  it  will 

>ssess  a  meaning. 


158  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

First,  then,  we  wish  to  summarily  put  together  the  main 
points  so  that  he  who  has  had  no  logical  training,  may  yet 
see  why  we  lay  such  stress  on  the  subject. 

It  will  readily  be  admitted  that  in  the  study  of  living 
things  there  are  the  two  great  divisions — the  physical  and 
the  psychic — the  difference  between  contending  parties  being 
entirely  as  to  the  connection  or  difference  between  these 
worlds,  never  that  we  know  them  as  separate  entities  now. 

So  then,  we  know,  that  all  proof, — all  ability  of  every 
kind  whatever,  to  prove  anything — must  rest  with  our 
thoughts,  for  one  who  can  not  think,  can  not  explain  any- 
thing, and  one  who  can  not  think  can  have  nothing  explained 
to  him.  We  must  have  thought ;  but  to  think,  means  to  have 
something  to  think  about.  As  soon  as  we  think  of  some- 
thing we  know  that  the  mere  fact  that  we  ourselves  are 
thinking  and  that  we  are  thinking  about  something,  proves 
to  us  there  are  two  totally  different  existences  in  the  world. 
One  is  the  thinker,  the  other  the  thing  thought  about.  But 
we  also  know  from  this  that  when  we  are  describing  the  thing 
thought  about,  let  us  say  an  orange,  we  pull  it  to  pieces 
mentally,  we  say,  we  see  "yellow,"  we  see  "roundness,"  etc. 
We  are  only  taking  parts  of  it  at  a  time  in  our  thought,  but 
still  the  orange  being  the  sum  total  of  all  these  attributes 
we  are  describing,  we  get  a  notion  of  a  WHOLE  and  its  Parts. 
Now  if  what  we  have  in  our  mind  is  an  image  and  if  this  is 
an  exact  representation  of  what  is  actually  before  us  in  the 
physical  world,  we  think  of  this  agreement  as  TRUTH.  And 
the  object  itself,  of  which  .we  have  the  image  is  what  we 
mean  when  we  speak  of  the  "physical"  or  of  "Nature" 

Further,  in  our  analysis  of  thought  we  find  that  we  have 
something  in  mind  that  is  now  before  us,  or  we  may  think 
of  something  that  has  just  now  happened.  But  we  may 
also  think  of  things  that  have  happened  in  the  past,  and 


Vitalism  159 

some  even  that  may  occur  in  the  future.  In  other  words,  we 
know  what  is  present  as  being  Now,  and  that  which  has 
occurred  in  the  past  as  before  Now,  or  even  "earlier  than'9 
some  thing  else.  This  gives  us  what  we  call  a  relationship. 
But  during  this  whole  process  of  Now,  and  what  happened 
in  the  past  and  what  may  happen  in  the  future  we  still 
always  use  the  pronoun  "7"  in  speaking.  "7"  am  seeing 
this ;  "/"  saw  this  yesterday ;  "7"  shall  see  this  to-morrow. 
There  is  then  the  underlying  knowledge  that  "7"  exist  as 
an  individual,  and  notwithstanding  the  past  or  the  future, 
it  is  always  "I"  that  am  the  same;  it  is  my  thought  that  is 
changing.  This  idea  of  change  is  often  called  "Becoming.9' 

And  if  we  are  positive  that  what  we  have  thought  in  the 
past  has  resulted  in  our  thinking  what  we  do  at  present, 
that  is,  if  we  know  that  we  could  not  feel  and  think  as  we 
do  now  if  we  had  never  had  the  experience  we  have  had  in 
the  past,  we  have  the  theory  of  "Causality"  in  its  simplest 
definition.  All  we  mean  by  this  is  that  every  thought  we 
have  has  come  to  us  because  we  have  had  other  thoughts 
before  that  have  caused  the  result. 

It  is  important  to  remember  that  if  these  things  are  not 
true  then  there  is  no  truth,  for  it  is  the  only  way  we  have 
of  arriving  at  a  truth,  and  if  by  truth  we  mean  an  agreement 
between  what  actually  exists  in  the  physical  world  and  the 
impress  of  it  in  its  fullest  signification  in  the  mind,  we  must 
always  seek  this  agreement  between  the  physical  and  the 
mental  to  arrive  at  the  truth.  That  is  we  can  find  this  prin- 
ciple of  causality  in  Nature  very  readily,  for,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  laws  of  mind  we  have  just  drawn,  everything 
that  we  have  in  the  physical  world,  or  what  we  call  Nature, 
is  the  direct  result  of  forces  of  some  kind  that  have  gone  on 
in  the  past  which  have  caused  the  present  things  to  be  what 
they  are. 


160  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

So  far,  we  shall  in  all  probability  have  no  objections 
offered.  All  this  is  self-evident,  but  essential,  in  order  that 
the  meaning  of  our  words  be  understood.  And  as  it  was  the 
"I"  that  endured  in  the  thought  world,  so  "Substance"  is 
what  we  say  "endures"  in  the  physical.  Now,  Nature  or  the 
physical  world  occupies  space.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to 
imagine  anything  in  the  physical  world  about  us  that  does 
not  occupy  some  space,  BUT,  about  earlier  changes,  we  can- 
not say  definitely  that  the  changes  themselves,  which  are  the 
cause  of  our  present  world-forms,  necessarily  occupied 
space.  They  may  have  done  so,  but  it  is  neither  necessary 
to  assume  that,  nor  could  it  probably  be  proven  one  way  or 
the  other. 

Let  us  take  a  physical  law  to  which  we  have  never  been 
able  to  find  any  exceptions;  namely  that  "Nothing  can  rise 
higher  than  its  source"  without  an  outside  agency  adding 
additional  power  of  some  kind.  Or  as  Professor  Driesch 
puts  it,  "that  which  forms  the  reason"  for  anything  "must 
always  be  richer  in  content;  i.e.,  richer  in  attributes  than 
the  other  which  is  its  consequence."  This  richness  or  mani- 
foldness  means  that  there  must  be  a  greater 

number  of  different  irreducible  (elementary)  characters 
than  in  the  result  that  the  cause  produces.  We  have  then 
the  law,  "The  degree  of  manifoldness  of  a  natural  system 
can  never  increase  of  itself,  i.  e.,  without  a  cause  as  its 
quasi-sufficient  reason"  (pp.  196-197). 

This  merely  means  that  if  any  given  cause  produces  a 
result  that  is  more  complex  than  itself,  that  complexity  or 
additional  matter  that  caused  it  must  have  come  from  the 
outside  and  not  from  itself. 

In  the  non-living  world  all  growth  is  by  accretion — by 
adding  to  the  outside  of  the  object;  in  the  living,  just  the 


Vitalism  161 

reverse  method  takes  place,  all  living1  things  growing  from 
the  inside  outward. 

It  is  of  course,  easily  conceivable  that  between  two  given 
moments  "the  number  of  elementary  material  constituents 
(atoms)  of  a  system  might  increase  without  there  having 
been  a  passage  of  atoms  into  the  system  from  'outside'  in 
the  spatial  sense,"  and  if  this  be  true,  either  our  thought 
means  nothing,  or  we  must  accept  "thing-creating  agents9' 
which  have  made  these  atoms. 

Then  another  possibility  presents  itself;  namely,  that  a 
thing  which  has  not  been  changing,  may  at  a  given  moment 
begin  to  change,  and  yet  we  can  find  no  moving  cause. 
"Change-creating  agents  must  have  been  at  work  in  such  a 
case."  But  we  may  admit  that  we  have  not  found  these  two 
types  actually  in  the  physical  world,  though  they  may  be 
there,  for  it  does  not  follow  that  what  has  not  yet  been 
found,  is  non-existent — and  if  they  should  be  there,  they  may 
some  day  actually  be  brought  to  light. 

Then  there  is  still  another  type  of  change  which  may 
take  place.  Let  us  suppose  we  have  four  rows  of  four  dots 
each,  such  as  in  the  drawing,  with  different  relations  between 
them. 


Now  it  is  very  easily  understood  that  there  may  be  a 
change  within  this  that  does  not  really  affect  space,  that  is, 
there  may  be  a  change  in  the  relationship  of  the  different 
dots.  Let  us  say  that  these  may  continue  to  remain  in  the 
position  and  relationship  they  are  in,  up  to  a  certain 
moment,  and  then,  no  matter  under  what  conditions  we  find 


168  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

them,  a  change  in  the  number  of  different  kinds  of  relations 
may  take  place.  In  such  a  case,  there  would  be  immaterial 
or  non-spatial  agents  at  work,  or  again  there  is  no  founda- 
tion for  the  becoming  or  change  at  all,  on  a  logical  basis. 
In  other  words,  there  has  been  a  sufficient  reason  in  space 
for  "becoming"  in  general,  i.e.,  there  has  been  a  supply  of 
spatial  energy  for  what  has  happened ;  but  it  is  with  regard 
to  the  peculiarities  of  becoming  that  there  is  a  lack  of  suffi- 
cient reason  in  spatial  change.  "There  must  have  been 
non-spatial  agents  of  a  controlling  type,  so  to  speak"  (p. 
200). 

The  most  important  form  of  this  type  of  change  would 
be  where  a  distribution  in  one  system  that  is  really  a  sum, 
is  transformed  into  a  distribution  that  would  be  in  some 
sense  a  unity  or  totality,  without  any  spatial  mechanical 
predetermination  of  this  totality. 

Using  this  figure  of  Professor  Dreisch's  of  sixteen  points, 
an  arrangement  that  may  be  defined  by  very  few  terms, 
because  it  is  of  a  very  low  degree  of  manifoldness,  may 
be  transformed  into  an  arrangement  such  as  this: 


without  spatial  preformation.  There  are  sixteen  things  in 
each  case,  but  the  first  arrangements  of  these  things  is 
clearly  a  sum,  whereas  the  second  resembles — a  "fish." 

We  shall  call  this  type  of  becoming,  unifying  or  individ- 
ualising causality. 

If  a  system  passes  through  several  phases  of  becoming 


Vitalism  163 

in  succession,  all  controlled  by  unifying  causality,  we  may 
speak  of  the  evolution  of  the  system, 


and  every  single  unity  of  becoming  that  leads  to  unity  as  the 
final  end  may  be  called  purposive  or  teleological. 

And  we  wish  to  impress  upon  the  reader  that  it  is  this 
"unifying  causality"  that  "is  the  prototype  of  biological, 
i.e.,  vitalistic  becoming"  (p.  201). 

Vitalism  proper,  then  means  that  there  is  an  autonomy  of 
the  processes  of  Life. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  assume,  nor  is  it  assumed,  that  this 
autonomy  creates  any  matter  or  energy  or  any  of  the  pre- 
requisites of  change  as  such,  just  because  we  say  there  is  a 
unifying  agency  at  work.  All  we  need  say  is  that  this  auton- 
omy or  unifying  causality,  for  that  is  all  it  is,  is  regulative, 
or  we  might  say  that  it  controls  the  particular  way  in  which 
the  energy  manifests  itself. 

There  is  here  no  breaking  of  the  law  of  the  conservation 
of  Energy,  nor  of  the  principle  that  all  change  is  due  to  a 
difference  in  intensity  of  energy,  such  as  heat,  cold,  etc. 

Now,  all  that  is  claimed  for  this  autonomous  principle 
which  is  called  the  "entelechy"  is  that,  due  to  it,  there  may 
be  a  suspension  of  any  particular  happening  as  is  possible 
on  the  basis  of  pre-existing  differences  of  intensity  and  as 
would  occur  without  such  suspension.  Suspending  possible 
change  and  relaxing  suspension  would  then  be  the  two 
modes  of  "action"  of  the  bearer  of  individualizing  causality 
and  this  is  what  is  called  "entelechy." 

In  regard  to  the  figure,  the  points  stand  for  sixteen  sys- 
tems equal  one  to  another  and  each  endowed  with  endless 
"possibilities"  (in  the  form  of  given  differences  of  energetic 
intensities),  we  can  understand  how  this  homogeneous  dis- 
tribution of  possibilities  may  be  transformed  into  a  hetero- 


164  The  Begwnwgs  of  Science 

geneous  distribution  of  realities,  as  in  figure  2.  In  order 
that  this  may  happen,  it  is  only  necessary  that  "entelechy," 
which  is  supposed  to  have  suspended  all  possibilities  so  far, 
relaxes  its  suspension  for  each  system  in  a  different  way. 
This  avoids  the  argument  advanced  against  Vitalism  that 
this  life-principle  should  be  omnipotent.  It  is  only  regulative, 
and  as  such  can  create  nothing.  It  merely  controls  that 
which  already  exists.  And  it  is  important  that  we  remember 
that  "entelechy"  or  "any  other  individualizing  agent,  if  such 
there  be,  is  itself  neither  an  'energy'  nor  a  'material  sub- 
stance' of  any  special  kind,  such  an  assumption  would  lead 
to  absurdities.  Entelechy  is  an  agent  sui  generis,  non- 
material  and  non-spatial,  but  acting  'into'  space,  so  to 
speak;  an  agent,  however,  that  belongs  to  nature  in  the 
purely  logical  sense  in  which  we  use  the  word"  (p.  204). 

And  here  we  wish  to  impress  the  point  that  this  has  noth- 
ing whatever  to  do  with  the  origm  of  life.  It  is  simply 
another  way  of  saying  what  Dr.  Ward  says  in  the  article 
on  Psychology  in  the  eleventh  edition  of  the  Encyclopedia 
Britannica,  that  "Life  must  be  regarded  as  either  inherent 
in  matter,  or  as  the  result  simply  of  a  particular  material 
configuration,  or  as  physically  inexplicable.  But,  for  the 
present  at  all  events,  it  cannot  be  explained  physically ;  nor 
are  we  even  within  measurable  distance  of  such  an  explana- 
tion: so  much  is  beyond  cavil"  (p.  601,  vol.  22). 

From  the  purely  materialistic  viewpoint,  only  that  is  per- 
mitted to  be  discussed  which  can  find  its  way  for  demon- 
stration purposes  in  the  laboratory.  Science  consists  in 
describing  phenomena;  it  cannot,  and  never  has  explained 
anyihmg.  It  cannot  answer  a  WHY,  it  can  only  tell  us  HOW 
some  results  can  be  obtained  by  doing  certain  things,  but 
WHY  these  particular  results  are  obtained  when  this  par- 
ticular thing  is  done  remains  unanswered.  And  as  Science 


Vitalism  165 

has  not  been  able  to  explain  Life,  many  biologists,  prominent 
among  whom  stands  Professor  Hans  Driesch,  who  like  many 
others  started  with  intense  materialistic  and  causo-mechan- 
istic  ideas,  have  reversed  their  position  and  come  to  the  con- 
clusion that  no  progress  toward  truth  can  be  made  unless 
some  "unifying  principle"  be  accepted.  This  is  a  necessary 
hypothesis,  for  without  it  we  cannot  explain  how  the  little 
fertilized  germ-cell,  by  constant  dividing  develops  always 
and  ever,  one  part  into  the  digestive  tract,  another  into  the 
heart,  another  into  a  particular  gland,  etc.,  until  the  whole 
adult  form  of  the  individual  is  reached.  To  apply  the 
machine  theory  here,  would  be  doing  so  with  a  vengeance, 
for  first,  we  have  a  complete  little  machine — the  fertilized 
cell — this  divides  into  many  parts,  each  becoming  exactly 
what  every  similar  part  in  every  similar  cell  becomes,  and 
goes  right  on  developing  into  its  adult  form,  and  when  each 
part  working  along  entirely  separate  paths  has  finished  its 
growth,  we  find  each  organ  fitting  in  most  harmoniously  into 
the  whole  completed  and  complex  adult  form. 

So  the  "entelechy"  is  not  an  explanation  of  the  origin  of 
Life ;  it  is  an  explanation  of  how  each  part  comes  to  "unify," 
to  make  a  complete  organism,  and  it  for  this  reason  and  this 
reason  only  that  we  have  to  postulate  a  unifying  causality. 

And  as  we  have  shown  in  another  chapter  we  must  have 
an  hypothesis  on  which  to  work.  There  has  been  no  other 
theory  that  has  proven  at  all  satisfactory,  so,  as  this  theory 
does  "explain"  and  as  all  of  our  experiments  do  work  out  as 
though  it  were  true,  we  are  justified  in  making  use  of  it. 

So  much  for  our  hypothesis.  Now  let  us  review  some  of 
the  facts  of  both  observation  and  experiment  as  they 
actually  exist  in  Nature. 

In  embryology  we  find  many  of  our  most  interesting 
examples.  We  may  take  and  deprive  a  very  tiny  organism 


166 


The  Beginnings  of  Science 


of  most  of  itself,  not  exceeding  three-fourths,  and  each  part 
will  develop  into  a  complete  whole,  though  in  miniature.  This 
means  that  every  quarter  of  the  organism  has  the  possibility 
of  becoming  a  complete  adult,  yet  under  normal  conditions 
it  only  becomes  one  instead  of  four  individuals.  On  the  sea- 
urchin,  on  which  the  experiment  was  performed,  the  growth 


Planaria.  A.  Planaria  entire.  B.  Head  growing  new  body  after  cutting 
off  body  proper.  C.  Body  growing  new  head.  D.  Central  part  of 
body  growing  new  head  and  tail.  E.  After  splitting  head  and  part 
of  body,  each  half  has  regrown.  (A.  after  Shipley  and  Mac- 
Bride.) 

of  the  organism  was  permitted  to  go  on  some  distance  before 
the  separation  into  parts  was  made,  and  still  the  above 
results  were  obtained. 

By  "regeneration"  or  "restitution"  we  mean  the  power  of 
restoring  some  part  of  itself  which  has  become  lost,  after  the 
animal  has  more  or  less  completed  its  growth,  and  as  an 
example  of  "unifying  causality"  at  work,  we  may  mention  the 


Vitalism  167 

common  Crayfish,  which  will  grow  another  eye  when  the 
original  one  has  been  removed,  sometimes  growing  several, 
and  then  developing  a  sort  of  "feeler"  in  its  place,  should  it 
be  destroyed  again.  The  little  flat-worm,  called  planaria, 
will,  if  its  head  be  removed,  grow  a  new  head  on  the  body 
and  a  new  body  on  the  head. 

The  branchial  apparatus  (gills)  of  the  Ascidian  Clavel- 
lina  is  able  to  arrange  itself  into  a  complete  little  organism 
without  any  formation  of  new  cells,  and  any  part  of  this 
apparatus  will  do  likewise,  "cut  it  how  you  will." 

From  these  examples  alone,  it  is  plain  what  is  meant  by 
the  teleology  of  which  we  are  speaking,  i.  e.,  that  there  is  an 
inner  cause  that  forces  some  part,  never  under  ordinary  cir- 
cumstances growing  into  more  than  one  particular  thing,  into 
whatever  is  needed  for  the  protection  of  the  individual  who 
has  lost  a  part  of  himself,  that  is,  that  these  things  are 
adapted  to  an  end. 

As  Professor  Driesch  says,  it  was  legitimate,  before  we 
had  any  of  these  experiments,  to  assume  with  Weismann 
that  there  was  a  machine  inside  of  the  harmonious  system 
that  caused  all  this.  But  experiments  have  shown  "that 
any  part  of  the  system  however  large  and  wherever  taken, 
may  be  cut  away  from  it  without  disturbing  proportionate 
development.  This  proves  that  a  'machine'  cannot  be  the 
basis"  of  this  harmonious  arrangement  of  which  we  have 
spoken,  for  every  part  seems  to  have  equal  possibilities  with 
every  other  part.  In  other  words,  were  it  a  "machine"  it 
would  have  to  possess  a  specific  arrangement  of  physico- 
chemical  things  and  agents,  and  it  could  not  "remain  itself, 
if  you  take  from  it  whatever  you  please,  and  the  organism, 
or  better,  the  non-developed  harmonious  system  does  remain 
'itself,'  with  regard  to"  the  form-producing  faculties,  "after 
any  operation  whatever." 


168  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

This  "harmonious  system  cannot"  then  "be  a  machine," 
but  is  in  fact  "a  something  that  is  governed  by  this"  unify- 
ing causality,  and  this  is  what  "entelechy"  as,  a  non-mechan- 
ical agent  does. 

The  best  argument  for  Vitalism,  is  of  course,  the  one  we 
have  given  of  the  harmonious  arrangement  of  separate 
parts,  growing  from  the  same  cell,  and  always  making  up 
any  lost  part,  so  as  to  insist,  as  it  were,  on  keeping  the 
completeness  with  which  it  was  instinctively  endowed. 

And  one  of  the  most  interesting  points  established  comes 
from  the  study  of  the  ovary.  This  organ  has  come  from  a 
single  cell  and  this  cell  has  divided  and  re-divided  "innum- 
erable times"  until  finally  we  have  the  many  eggs  we  find 
therein.  "How  could  a  machine  be  divided  innumerable 
times,  and  yet  remain  what  it  was?  No  machine  therefore 
can  be  the  test  of  embryology." 

For  those  who  lay  greatest  stress  on  the  mental  side,  one 
might  mention  that  the  phonograph  also  reacts  to  a  given 
stimuli,  but  only  specifically  gives  forth  what  has  been  given 
it,  while  in  the  thought-world,  man,  though  acting  also  on 
what  has  been  given  him,  never  reacts  exactly  alike  twice 
during  an  entire  lifetime.  Then  there  are  also  the  more 
scientific  but  also  more  difficult  to  be  understood  "indicia" 
such  as  the  forming  of  anti-bodies,  etc.,  but  these  require 
considerable  scientific  knowledge  before  they  can  be  ex- 
plained in  understandable  language. 

Summing  up  Professor  Driesch's  work  along  the  line  under 
discussion,  we  may  say,  "A  sum  (of  possibilities  of  happen- 
ing) is  transformed  into  a  unity  (of  real  results  of  hap- 
pening) without  any  spatial  or  material  preformation  of 
unity,"  and  this  means  in  ordinary  language  that  the  CAUSE 
of  living  things  growing  as  they  do  and  becoming  what  they 
become,  is  non-material — that  is,  does  not  take  up  any 


Vitalism  169 

space. 

Up  to  here  we  have  been  discussing  individual  unity.  But 
there  is  also  a  larger  unity.  We  must  conceive  of  the  entire 
universe  as  one  complete  whole,  logically.  "Nature  is  to  be 
conceived  as  the  one  order  of  natural  objects;  only  if  con- 
ceived of  in  this  way,  can  nature  be  said  to  be  "understood" ; 
for  to  understand  is  to  conceive  as  an  order."  But,  this 
destroys  all  difference  between  mechanism  and  Vitalism,  "for 
it  abolishes  mechanism."  For,  surely  there  can  be  no  "singu- 
larity" if  everything  is  one  order  in  nature.  It  also  destroys 
the  concept  of  the  law  of  nature. 

All  so-called  "laws,"  i.  e.,  all  connections  of  natural  prin- 
ciples with  regard  to  being  or  becoming  which  are  realized 
in  so  many  "cases"  appear,  at  any  rate,  as  nothing  but 
features  of  the  behaviour  of  that  agent  which  orders  "the 
nature,"  as  features  of  the  behaviour  of  the  natura  naturans. 
And  these  features  have  no  guarantee  in  themselves  of  being 
immutable,  as  certainly  as  nature  is  a  something  m  evolu- 
tion. All  natural  becoming  is  like  one  great  embryology; 
but  in  biological  embryology  we  know  that  the  "law"  of 
mere  cleavage,  for  instance,  holds  good  for,  say,  ten  cell- 
divisions  and  is  then  followed  by  the  "law"  of  organ  forma- 
tion. 

Every  singularity  of  being  and  becoming  has  its  own  par- 
ticular place  in  the  order  of  nature — so  runs  our  postulate 
in  another  form. 

Now,  this  does  not  entail  so  great  a  disadvantage  to 
science  as  would  be  supposed,  for  in  banishing  the  concep- 
tion of  "law"  it  also  banishes  the  worst  of  scientific  enemies, 
namely  chance  or  contingency 2  which  Professor  Driesch 
says  is  the  "greatest  enemy  of  thought,"  for  there  "is  no 
contingency  where  there  is  order." 

2  Professor  Driesch  uses  "chance"  and  "contingency"  as  synonymous 
terms. 


170  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

We  cannot,  of  course,  solve  in  a  final  way  whether  there 
is  complete  unity  in  Nature  or  not,  but  from  what  we  do 
know  we  can  always  reason  in  this  way: 

Certainly,  what  we  know  and  are  even  able  to  know  about 
nature  does  not  form  one  order  if  taken  altogether;  there 
is  chance,  contingency,  non-teleology  in  what  we  know. 
But  this  is  our  fault  and  not  the  fault  of  nature.  For  we 
have  imagined  we  had  the  whole  of  nature  where  we  had 
only  a  part;  and  only  that  part  which  is  such  as  to  be 
accessible  to  our  form  of  apprehending  reality.  We  can 
only  receive  the  one  part  of  reality  which  appears  to  us 
under  the  signs  of  spatiality.  But  only  what  we  call  inor- 
ganic becoming  is  completely  accessible  to  us  in  the  form 
of  spatial  signs ;  even  in  individual  organic  becoming  as 
studied  in  biology,  is  marked  to  us  only  by  some  spatial 
results  but  not  as  becoming;  for  it  is  not  spatial,  i.  e.,  in 
space,  as  becoming.  And  who  can  say  how  many  kinds  of 
being  or  becoming  there  may  be  in  reality  which  are  abso- 
lutely inaccessible  to  us,  because  they  are  not  marked  by 
spatial  signs  at  all?  And  might  it  not  be  that  nature  would 
appear  to  us  as  the  one  order  we  are  in  search  for,  if  only 
we  knew  all  those  parts  of  it  which,  by  our  mental  organisa- 
tion, we  are  absolutely  incapable  of  knowing? 

But  Nature  shows  that  there  is  some  chance,  and  yet  we 
can  get  nothing  out  of  either  Nature  or  Thinking  unless 
we  have  recourse  to  the  dictum  that  there  is  a  monism  of 
order,  though  there  may  be  some  chance  in  Nature.  And 
the  only  way  we  can  accept  this  which  must  be  accepted  if 
we  wish  to  retain  any  validity  to  thinking  at  all,  is,  by 
accepting  this  principle,  that  there  may  be  certain  areas  of 
reality  which  have  no  spatial  signs,  as  above  explained,  for 
without  this,  not  "even  the  biological  problem"  can  be  solved 
satisfactorily. 

So  much,  for  the  very  complex  but  highly  interesting  and 
valuable  contribution  to  Vitalistic  literature  made  by  Pro- 


Vitalism  171 

fessor  Driesch,  whose  classic  experiments  have  found  their 
way  into  most  of  our  standard  text-books,  and  whose  ability 
is  not  limited  to  but  one  side  of  the  question,  for  he  is  not 
only  a  Biologist  of  world-recognition  but  also  a  philosopher 
of  note,  being,  therefore,  able  to  speak  from  a  more  perfect 
understanding  and  a  greater  breadth  of  view  than  are  most 
writers  on  either  side  of  these  two  great  subjects. 

It  is  interesting  to  note,  that  if  the  causo-mechanical 
viewpoint,  is  correct  there  is  an  end  to  all  our  sciences 
except  Physics  and  Chemistry,  for,  if  everything  can  be 
resolved  into  a  few  chemical  elements,  and,  through  Physics 
we  may  find  the  laws  by  which  these  various  compounds 
then  work,  there  is  not  only  no  further  need  of  any  other 
science,  but  all  things  have  already  been  explained,  which, 
however,  we  know  is  not  the  case. 

Professor  Wilson,  probably  the  greatest  authority  on 
"The  Cell"  tells  us  "the  study  of  the  cell  has  on  the  whole 
seemed  to  widen  rather  than  narrow  the  enormous  gap  that 
separates  even  the  lowest  forms  of  life  from  the  inorganic 
world."  3 

Von  Bunge,  the  celebrated  German  organic  chemist,  in- 
sisted that  "the  mechanical  theories  of  the  present  are  urg- 
ing us  surely  onwards  to  the  vitalistic  theory  of  the  fu- 
ture." 

And  we  are  reminded  of  Professor  Kellogg's  remarks  in 
his  Darwinism  To-day,  that  the  workers  in  different  bio- 
logical fields  are  inclined  to  accept  different  evolutionary 
theories,  when  we  note  that  it  is  in  Germany  and  in  America 
the  thinkers  and  workers  are  doing  most  of  the  writing  on 
Vitalism,  in  some  form  or  another,  while  practically  none 
of  it  comes  from  England.  This  may  be  due,  as  Sir  Bertram 

8The  Cell  in  Development  and  Inheritance,  by  Edmund  B.  Wilson, 
Ph.D.,  Professor  of  Zoology,  Columbia  University.  (Macmillan.) 


The  Begmnmgs  of  Science 

Windle  4  thinks,  "to  the  fact  that  the  Germans  and  Ameri- 
cans are  doing  more  research  work  along  the  study  of  the 
individual,  while  the  English  have,  due  to  the  stimulus  of 
Darwin,  been  working  along  racial  lines." 

The  puzzling  thing  to  many  if  not  most  students,  is  found 
in  the  many  different  names  writers  use  for  practically  the 
same  thing,  for  example:  Driesch  uses  "entelechy"  which, 
of  course,  means  "a  vital  principle" ;  Williams,  however,  calls 
it  "genetic  energy,"  Henslow,  "the  property  of  self-adapta- 
tion," Cope  "growth"  or  "bathmic  force,"  Eimer  "direction" 
and  Professor  B.  Moore  "biotic  energy,"  but  if  one  will  weigh 
and  compare  the  definitions  given  to  these  names  by  their 
respective  god-fathers,  it  will  not  be  very  difficult  to  dis- 
cover the  same  things  traveling  under  many  aliases. 

And  as  we  have  given  the  more  difficult  theories  of  Pro- 
fessor Driesch,  in  as  non-technical  language  as  possible,  we 
shall  here  attempt  to  give  in  the  simplest  possible  form,  the 
very  interesting  details  of  experimental  and  observational 
FACTS  from  which  many  of  the  foregoing  and  all  of  the  con- 
cluding ideas  of  have  been  drawn. 

Frog's  and  sea-urchin's  eggs  always  behave  in  a  definite 
manner.  We  know  exactly  how  they  will  hatch,  as  well  as 
when,  and  it  is  easy  to  give  a  very  excellent  account  of  their 
life-histories.  After  the  fertilised  egg  commences  to  divide, 
it  forms  a  sphere,  consisting  of  a  single  layer  or  sheet  of 
cells.  Suppose  we  place  the  egg  between  two  pieces  of  glass 
so  as  to  squeeze  it  considerably.  Quite  naturally,  the  sphere 
that  develops  becomes  flattened.  This  cannot  be  continued 
too  long  or  the  animal  would  die  for  sheer  lack  of  space, 
but  when  it  is  released,  after  this  abnormal  arrangement, 

4  What  is  Life?  a  study  of  Vitalism  and  Neo-vitalism,  by  Sir  Bert- 
ram Windle,  M.A.,  M.D.,  Sc.D.,  LL.D.,  F.R.S.,  F.S.A.,  President  of 
Queen's  College,  Cork.  (Herder.)  All  quotations  from  here  on  are 
from  this  volume. 


Vitalism  173 

the  development  goes  on  exactly  as  though  nothing  out  of 
the  ordinary  had  occurred,  and  we  get  a  larva  of  frog  or 
sea-urchin,  and  finally  a  fully  and  completely  perfect  animal. 

That  is,  a  frog  or  sea-urchin  has  been  developed  by  means 
of  a  series  of  events  which  one  may  safely  say  had  never  oc- 
curred before,  a  tolerably  clear  proof  that  there  is  within  the 
egg  a  power  which  is  able  to  steer  it  even  through  seas  before 
unsailed  by  any  egg  (p.  66). 

Professor  Wilson  performed  an  experiment  on  the  eggs 
of  nereis  and  annelid. 

It  is  a  little  difficult  to  describe  this  experiment  without 
becoming  highly  technical,  so  that  those  who  are  familiar 
with  the  real  facts  of  the  case  must  deal  leniently  with  the 
writer  if  he  endeavors  to  make  the  circumstances  clear  by 
simplifying  things  to  the  utmost  extent.  In  the  normal 
development  of  nereis,  then,  it  is  known  that  certain  cells 
will  develop  into  certain  parts  of  the  later  organism  and 
others  into  different  and  distinct  parts. 

Now,  if  the  egg  be  allowed  to  develop  under  pressure  as 
in  the  experiments  above  detailed,  the  lines  of  division  are 
vertical  in  all  cases,  so  that  the  segmented  egg  finally  forms 
a  plate,  a  flat  plate  of  eight  cells.  Now  if  these  cells,  thus 
formed  into  a  plate,  are  released  from  the  pressure  under 
which  they  have  been  developing  they  at  once  again  divide 
in  an  approximately  horizontal  plane,  so  that  sixteen  cells 
now  make  up  the  congeries.  The  subsequent  course  of  the 
development  of  these  shows  that  some  of  the  cells  with,  of 
course,  their  included  nuclei,  which  would  under  normal  cir- 
cumstances have  been  worked  up  into  one  part  of  the  body, 
are,  under  the  altered  conditions,  actually  converted  into 
another.  The  significance  of  this  experiment  will  be  obvious 
to  any  one  who  considers  it,  but  that  significance  will  be 
increased  when  it  is  remembered  that  the  results  negative 
certain  views  that  were  held  as  to  the  specific  character  of 
the  nuclei.  It  was  held  by  some  that  the  nucleus  of  each 
cell  was  of  a  specific  character  and  could  produce  a  cell 


174  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

of  one  type  and  of  one  type  only.  Even  if  this  were  the 
case  it  would  not  have  helped  us  very  far  along  the  road 
towards  an  explanation  of  the  powers  of  the  cell,  for  we 
would  still  be  ignorant  of  how  the  nucleus  succeeded  in  so 
modifying  the  cell  as  to  make  it  lead  to  the  development  of 
a  liver  or  some  other  part  of  the  body.  But  this  experiment, 
and  many  others  of  a  similar  kind  might  be  cited,  seems 
to  show  that  the  nuclei  of  the  various  cells  during  develop- 
ment, at  any  rate,  have  no  specific  character,  but  are 
capable,  to  put  the  matter  colloquially,  of  turning  their 
hands  to  any  job  in  the  gradually  rising  edifice  of  the  body 
(pp.  66-68). 

Professor  Wilson  also  performed  the  following,  which  has 
since  been  corroborated  by  other  experimenters,  on  what  is 
called  "amphioxus,"  but  more  commonly  known  as  "lance- 
let": 

Let  us  suppose  that  at  the  eight-celled  stage  the  group 
is  put  into  a  test-tube  with  water  and  violently  shaken. 
The  result  is  that  eight  cells  are  shaken  apart  and  become 
completely  separated  from  one  another.  Then  a  very  re- 
markable thing  happens.  Most  people  would  imagine  that 
the  immature  creature  must  have  been  killed  by  such  rough 
treatment,  but  such  is  not  the  case.  Each  of  the  eight  cells, 
undaunted  by  what  it  has  been  through,  sets  itself  to  work, 
begins  to  divide  on  its  own  account  and  finally  builds  up  a 
complete  amphioxus.  Let  us  consider  what  this  means.  A 
single  cell,  from  the  eight-celled  groups,  would  under  nor- 
mal circumstances  have  constructed,  one  may  roughly  say, 
one-eighth  of  the  future  amphioxus.  It  might  have  been 
worked  up  into  its  tail,  into  one  of  its  internal  organs,  into 
a  variety  of  positions  of  the  body.  But  under  the  altered 
circumstances  it  is  able  to  construct  and  does  construct  an 
entire  and  complete  new  amphioxus.  It  was  the  considera- 
tion of  phenomena  of  this  kind  which  led  Driesch,  one  of 
the  greatest  workers  in  this  line,  to  declare  that  the  egg 
seemed  to  act  like  an  intelligent  being.  And  the  same  thing 


Vitalism  175 

is  admitted  by  Wilson  in  the  preface  to  his  great  work 
where  he  says :  "  'One  is  sometimes  tempted  to  conclude,' 
was  recently  remarked  by  a  well-known  embryologist,  'that 
every  egg  is  a  law  unto  itself !'  The  jest,  perhaps,  embodies," 
he  continues,  "more  of  the  truth  than  the  author  would 
seriously  have  maintained,  expressing,  as  it  does,  a  growing 
appreciation  of  the  intricacy  of  cell  phenomena,  the  diffi- 
culty of  formulating  their  general  aspects  in  simple  terms, 
the  inadequacy  of  some  of  the  working  hypotheses  that  have 
been  our  guides"  (pp.  65-69). 

Experiments  of  this  kind  are  what  lead  men  in  the  biol- 
ogical fields,  especially  in  embryology,  to  the  belief  that,  if 
a  cell  will  follow  out  a  certain  path  which  always  leads  to  a 
very  definite  destination  regardless  of  hindrances,  there 
must  be  something  besides  pure  chemistry  and  physics  work- 
ing within  its  tiny  body. 

Virchow,  the  father  of  modern  pathology,  said  as  long 
ago  as  1887,  "Never  has  a  living  being,  or  even  a  living 
element — let  us  say,  a  living  cell — been  found,  of  which 
it  could  be  predicated  that  it  was  the  first  of  its  species. 
Nor  have  any  fossil  remains  ever  been  found  of  which  it 
could  ever  be  likely  that  it  belonged  to  a  being  the  first 
of  its  kind,  or  produced  by  spontaneous  generation"  (p.  76). 

And  Hertwig,   the  eminent  biologist,  has   recently  said, 

In  the  existing  condition  of  science  there  is  little  hope 
that  any  worker  will  be  able  to  produce  the  simplest  man- 
ifestation of  life  in  any  artificial  way  from  non-living  mat- 
ter. He  has  certainly  no  more  chance  of  success  in  his 
endeavors  than  Wagner,  in  Goethe's  "Faust"  had  of  brew- 
ing Homonculus  in  his  retort  (p.  76). 

And  as  Sir  Bertram  Windle  then  adds,  that  though  all 
are  agreed  that  at  present  there  is  no  evidence  whatever  that 
life  comes  from  the  non-living,  still, 


176  The  Begmnmgs  of  Science 

Suppose  we  grant  that  living  matter  has  always  come 
from  living  matter,  where  did  the  first  living  matter  come 
from?  The  world  was  once  so  hot  that  no  living  thing 
could  exist  upon  it.  It  cooled  down  and  a  time  arrived  when 
life  could  exist.  Where  did  it  come  from?  It  has  been 
suggested  that  living  matter  might  have  been  brought  to 
this  world  from  some  other  by  means  of  a  meteorite,  but 
this  view,  even  if  likely,  which  is  not  the  case,  does  not 
help  us  one  bit  towards  the  origin  of  life,  since  the  living 
thing  which  travelled  on  the  meteorites  must  have  come 
from  somewhere  and  the  life  to  which  it  belonged  must  have 
had  its  commencement  somewhere,  somewhen. 

Faced  with  this  difficulty  many  men  of  science,  unwilling 
to  admit  the  possibility  of  a  Creator,  have  claimed  that, 
though  spontaneous  generation  does  not  take  place  or  can- 
not be  proved  to  take  place  nowadays,  yet  it  must  have 
taken  place  at  some  former  period,  when  conditions  on  the 
earth  were  far  different  from  what  they  now  are  (p.  81). 

And  Professor  August  Weismann,  one  of  the  most  dis- 
tinguished biologists  who  recently  passed  away  (1914),  said 
"that  spontaneous  generation  in  spite  of  all  vain  efforts  to 
demonstrate  it,  remains  for  me  a  logical  necessity"  (p.  82). 

This  is  extremely  interesting,  in  that  the  only  reason 
there  is  a  logical  necessity  in  this  instance,  is  of  course, 
because  the  only  alternative  possible  is  to  admit  of  a 
Creator.  In  the  words  of  Reinke: 

If  we  agree  that  living  matter  has  at  some  time  come 
from  inorganic  substances  then,  in  my  opinion,  the  Creation 
hypothesis  is  the  only  one  which  meets  the  necessities  of 
Logic  and  of  Causality  and  therewith  answers  to  the  needs 
of  a  prudent  seeker  after  nature  (p.  83). 

Now  let  us  look  to  the  meanings  of  several  words  that  are 
very  prominently  used  in  all  scientific  discussions.  The 
word  "adaptation"  is  so  often  used  as  an  explanation,  but 
this  is  doing  about  the  same  thing  as  making  a  personal 


Vitalism  177 

god  out  of  Evolution,  as,  for  example,  when  it  is  said  "that 
Evolution  explains  this" — "Evolution  explains  that." 
"Evolution"  isn't  anything  at  all.  It  is  the  name  of  a 
process  which  we  assume  is  the  method  by  which  certain 
changes  took  place.  It  doesn't  exist  by  itself.  It  is  simply 
the  name  of  a  PROCESS. 

To  make  this  distinction  rather  clear,  we  may  use  the 
story  of  a  one-legged  man  of  taciturn  disposition  sitting 
in  the  same  seat  with  one  of  opposite  temperament.  Riding 
together  for  some  time  the  talkative  one  asked  how  the  other 
lost  his  leg,  being  told  that  only  on  one  condition  would 
the  answer  be  given,  and  that  was  that  no  further  questions 
were  to  be  asked.  Agreeing  to  this,  the  one-legged-man  said 
"it  was  bit  off."  And  if  we  substitute  the  word  "Evolution" 
we  get  a  very  clear  idea  of  what  we  mean  by  a  process  not 
being  an  explanation. 

And  so,  when  Professor  Weismann,  in  trying  to  explain 
certain  behaviour  on  the  part  of  tubularia,  says: 

This  also  appears  to  us  to  be  adaptive,  and  does  not 
surprise  us,  since  we  have  long  been  accustomed  to  recognise 
that  what  is  adapted  to  an  end  will  realise  this  if  it  be 
possible  at  all, 

and  another  time  he  says,  "It  was  not  worth  Nature's  while 
to  make  such  adaptations"  (p.  88),  we  have  an  explanation 
like  the  story  cited  above.  It  gives  a  name  to  something 
that  happened  and  calls  it  an  explanation.  Any  machine 
made  for  a  certain  purpose  will,  of  course,  perform  that 
purpose,  but  WHY  was  the  machine  made  for  that  purpose 
and  what  caused  all  the  parts  to  be  made  as  they  were,  in 
order  that  they  would  unify  and  always  work  out  that  pur- 
pose? 

Remember  that  the  mechanically  constructed  thing  always 


178  The  Beginnmgs  of  Science 

performs  the  same  act  in  the  same  way,  while  the  living 
thing  never.  The  latter  has  considerable  discriminative 
power  even  in  the  lowest  forms,  as  witness,  what  Pauly  5 
says  regarding  tiny,  one-celled  animals  that  pick  always  a 
certain  kind  of  food  among  the  many  sea-plants  about,  and 
though  some  might  suggest  this  is  due  to  a  chemical  attrac- 


B 
Regeneration  and  grafting  in  Hydra. 

A.  Seven-headed  Hydra  made  by  splitting  distal  ends  lengthwise. 

B.  A  piece  of  Hydra  regenerating  an  entire  animal  showing  various 
stages  in  the  process. 

C.  Part  of  one  Hydra  grafted  on  another. 

(Hegner— A.  after  Trembley.     B.  after  Morgan.     C.  after  King.) 

tion  of  some  kind,  to  be  logical,  they  would  have  to  extend 
this  idea  to  its  ultimate  end  and  apply  it  to  the  human 
family,  but  surely  few  of  us  would  be  willing  to  concede 
that  our  food-likes  and  dislikes  are  to  be  explained  on  the 
basis  of  pure  chemical  attraction. 

In  "regeneration"  and  "repairing,"  sometimes  also  called 
"restitution,"  we  have  a  most  interesting  concourse  of  won- 

1  Darwinismus  und  Lamarckismus,  by  Pauly  (Munchen  1905). 


Vitalism  179 

derful  results  obtained  from  various  experiments. 

The  hydra  is  a  little  fresh-water  creature  described  in 
practically  all  elementary  zoological  texts.  If  this  animal 
is  cut  into  two  pieces,  each  becomes  a  complete  hydra  again. 

If  it  is  cut  in  many  pieces,  under  favorable  circumstances, 
each  piece  becomes  a  complete  individual.  If  the  head-end 
is  bisected,  we  have  a  two-headed  hydra,  and  the  Abbe 
Trembley  who  performed  these  experiments  found  that  he 
could  continue  this  until  he  had  an  eight-headed  hydra,  with 
a  single  stalk  or  lower  portion. 


Salamander. 

Later  on  Spallanzani  found  that  the  common  earthworm 
would  regenerate  a  new  head  or  tail  if  cut  transversely,  but 
that  it  will  die  if  it  is  divided  longitudinally.  While  with  the 
salamander,  the  same  experimenter  found 

if  the  tail  was  cut  off  a  new  one  would  grow  which  would  con- 
tain vertebrae — new  vertebrae,  of  course — just  like  those  which 
had  formed  the  skeleton  of  the  original  appendage.  Further, 
he  showed  that  if  a  leg,  or  even  all  four  legs,  were  cut  off,  it 
or  they  would  grow  again  and  that  this  process  might  be  re- 
peated time  after  time  (p.  101). 

He  actually  cut  off  the  legs  and  tail  of  one  salamander 
six  times  and  each  time  they  all  grew  during  three  summer 
months.  And  the  last  time  they  grew  with  just  as  great  a 
rapidity  as  the  first,  so  that 


180  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

Spallanzani  calculated  that  during  these  three  months  the 
animal  under  experiment  had  made  for  itself  no  less  than 
647  new  bones,  not  to  speak  of  all  the  muscles,  nerves,  and 
arteries  which  formed  with  the  bones  in  question  the  vari- 
ous parts  which  were  restored  (pp.  101-102). 

And  in  addition  to  this,  the  salamander  can  also  regen- 
erate his  upper  and  lower  jaws.  This  animal  is  a  vertebrate, 
that  is  a  back-boned  animal ;  the  hydra  is  an  invertebrate, 
that  is,  one  who  does  not  have  a  back-bone.  The  vertebrate 
cannot  be  cut  in  little  pieces,  though  in  a  more  limited  way, 
it  has  the  same  powers  that  force  the  animal  to  become  what 
it  was  intended  to  become,  regardless  of  its  injuries. 

Wolff's  experiment  on  the  water-newt  should  also  be  kept 
in  memory.  Here  only  the  lens  of  the  eye  was  removed,  and 
though  originally  the  lens  grows  from  a  totally  different 
layer  of  the  developing  organism,  now  it  actually  grew  a 
new  lens  from  the  outer  layer  of  the  iris,  that  is,  the  colored 
curtain,  which  in  our  eyes  is  blue,  or  grey  or  brown.  This 
means  that  here  is  a  case  in  which  a  lens  came  from  a  layer 
of  cells  from  which  no  lens  had  ever  come  before,  so  far  as 
any  one  knows. 

The  planarians  or  flat-worms,  have  a  most  wonderful 
power  of  regeneration,  for  in  these  one  may  cut  off  tail  and 
head,  and  from  the  mid-piece  thus  left,  there  will  emerge  a 
new  head  and  a  new  tail,  while  the  head  grows  a  new  body 
and  tail,  the  tail  a  new  body  and  head. 

Comparing  this  with  a  machine,  we  should  have  to  pro- 
duce a  mechanical  arrangement  that 

had  a  bad  breakdown,  setting  to  work  to  grow  for  itself 
a  new  wheel  or  to  construct  a  new  connecting-rod.  Or  we 
may  picture  a  lathe  which  has  had  a  wound  inflicted  in  its 
side  setting  to  and  producing  a  new  chuck  from  the  in- 
cision (p.  106). 


Vitalism  181 

This  would  be  wonderful  enough  and  is  hard  enough  to 
imagine,  but  still  more  difficult  of  mental  imagery  would 
be  the  state  of  affairs  in  which  the  wounded  locomotive 
would  resolve  itself  into  its  constituent  steel  and  brass, 
and  having  done  so  should  then,  by  the  force  of  its  own 
intrinsic  powers,  reconstruct  a  full,  complete  and  working 
railway  engine.  Yet  this  is  what  is  done  in  another  form 
and  the  whole  chain  of  occurrences  is  so  remarkable  and 
so  forcible  an  example  of  the  powers  of  living  matter,  as 
well  as  of  their  differences  from  those  of  non-living  objects, 
that  it  may  be  given  here  at  length. 

Professor  Driesch  has  made  this  experiment-  on  clavellina 
lepadiformis,  a 

tolerably  highly  organised  creature  belonging  to  the  class 
of  ascidians  placed  by  zoologists  very  near  the  lower  ver- 
tebrates in  the  scale  of  animal  life.  It  is  about  an  inch  in 
length  and  divided  into  three  portions ;  the  uppermost  of 
which  forms  an  extraordinarily  large,  basket-like  gill,  pro- 
vided with  an  entrance  and  an  exit  for  the  water. 

To  this  succeeds  a  small  connecting  body  portion  which 
contains  part  of  the  intestines  and  finally  there  is  the  so- 
called  intestine-sac  with  stomach,  intestine,  heart,  repro- 
ductive organs,  etc.  If  we  divide  the  body  of  a  clavellina 
at  the  level  of  the  connecting  portion,  so  that  the  gill- 
basket  and  the  intestinal-sac  are  separated  from  one  an- 
other, either  or  both  of  these  portions  can  in  three  or  four 
days  complete  itself  into  an  entire  organism,  since  by  means 
of  true  regeneration  proceeding  from  the  incision,  the  gill- 
basket  makes  itself  an  intestinal-sac  and  the  intestinal-sac 
a  gill-basket. 

But  the  interest  here  lies  in  the  manner  in  which  this  is 
brought  about,  which  is  totally  different  from  the  way  any 
of  the  preceding  examples  have  re-built  themselves. 

The  organisation  of  the  gill-basket,  its  ciliated  clefts,  its 
openings,  etc.,  all  gradually  dwindle  away.  At  the  end  of 


182  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

five  or  six  days  no  more  organization  is  to  be  seen  in  these 
parts,  which  appear  like  white  spheres,  in  fact,  the  describer 
states  that  when  he  first  saw  this  condition  he  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  clavellina  was  either  (Read  or  on  the 
way  to  death.  It  was  not  so,  however,  for  though  the  crea- 
ture remains  or  may  remain  in  this  condition  for  two  or 
three  weeks,  at  last  the  day  comes  when  it  begins  to  clear 
and  to  stretch  and  then,  after  the  end  of  two  or  three 
days,  it  is  found  that  amorphous  mass  has  once  more  be- 
come a  complete  ascidian  with  gill-basket  and  intestinal-sac. 
It  has  become  a  perfectly  new  organism  which  has  no  con- 
tinuity with  the  parts  of  the  earlier  organisation,  though 
it  has  with  its  material.  "Its  gill-basket  is  not  a  derivative 
of  the  old  one ;  it  is  very  much  smaller  and  fewer  and  smaller 
openings.  What  has  happened  is  that  the  old  organised  gill- 
basket  has  returned  to  an ( indifferent  substance  and  then, 
from  this  indifferent  substance  on  embryological  lines,  a 
new  smaller  individual  has  been  constituted.  But  this  is  not 
the  whole  story,  for  it  is  not  merely  the  isolated  gill-basket 
which  can  restore  itself  by  means  of  this  roundabout  process, 
but,  after  having  isolated  the  basket,  it  can  be  itself  divided 
either  into  an  upper  and  lower  portion  or  into  an  anterior 
and  a  posterior  bit  and  each  of  these  portions  will  then  go 
through  the  same  process,  that  is,  each  of  them  will  fir^t 
of  all  return  to  the  indifferent  condition  and  then  from 
that  re-constitute  itself  into  a  new  small  ascidian  (pp.  106- 
108). 

The  example  of  a  locomotive  falling  apart  into  its  con- 
stituent elements  and  then  rebuilding  itself  as  suggested 
is  a  fair  comparison. 

Surely  there  is  something  that  makes  all  this  happen  in 
this  way,  and  whatever  that  SOMETHING  is  we  call  the  "Vital 
Principle."  Is  there  any  wonder  that  nearly  all  biologists 
now  accept,  as  Professor  Kellogg  says,  some  parts  of  an 
Orthogenetic  doctrine,  that  is,  that  there  is  an  inner  driving 
force?  which  if  logically  followed  out,  becomes  this  "Vital 


Vitalism  183 

Principle." 

We  wish  to  call  attention  to  two  words  not  yet  men- 
tioned, which  are  likewise  often  used  as  explanations  but 
which  are  in  reality  only  names  for  something  we  know 
nothing  about,  namely  "immanent"  and  "inherent."  To  say 
that  certain  forces  or  what-not,  may  be  inherent  or  im- 
manent within  some  other  object,  tells  us  nothing  whatever 
about  what  the  forces  are,  nor  where  they  came  from. 

But  in  objecting  to  "verbal  explanations"  the  objection 
may  be  raised  that  a  "Vital  Force"  is  also  only  a  verbal 
explanation.  However,  we  may  suggest  that  there  is  such 
a  thing  as  "gravity,"  which  is  a  "force,"  and  there  is  such 
a  thing  as  "ether"  though  we  cannot  see  it.  We  can,  however, 
know  it  by  its  manifestations — by  what  it  does.  As  Pro- 
fessor Duncan  says  "ether  is  not  visible  to  the  eye  of  sense ; 
it  is  visible  to  the  eye  of  the  mind  which  is  much  less  liable 
to  err"  (p.  123).  So  that  we  might  also  say,  that  if  the 
"vitalistic  explanation  is  verbal  only,  so  also  is  the  theory 
of  gravitation  and  so  the  existence  of  ether,"  or  as  Dr. 
Haldane,  the  distinguished  physiologist  has  said: 

It  is  frequently  urged  that  Vitalism  amounts  to  nothing 
more  than  the  mere  assertion  that  a  physico-chemical  ex- 
planation of  vital  phenomena  has  not  been  found ;  and  that 
even  though  this  assertion  be  correct,  the  only  possible  way 
to  advance  in  physiology  is  by  the  further  application  of 
the  principles  of  physics  and  chemistry,  since  there  are  and 
can  be  no  other  kinds  of  explanation  but  the  causal  ones 
which  these  sciences  afford.  This  argument  m  its  widest 
form  is  undoubtedly  based  on  the  metaphysical  assumption 
that  the  universe,  interpreted  as  it  is  m  the  physical  sciences 
as  a  universe  of  matter  and  energy,  corresponds  to  absolute 
reality,  and  is  for  this  reason  incapable  of  any  further  in- 
terpretation. The  work  of  modern  philosophy  since  Berke- 
ley and  Hume  has  shown  that  tha,  assumption  in  question 
is  without  foundation.  The  italics  are  ours  (pp.  123-124). 


184  The  Begmnmgs  of  Science 

Regarding  Energy,  we  may  define  it  by  saying  it  is  the 
capacity  for  doing  work,  and  is  of  two  kinds,  "Kinetic"  or 
actual  motion,  as  a  running  train,  for  example,  and  "Poten- 
tial" energy  meaning,  the  power  to  do  work  due  to  position, 
such  as  the  weights  in  an  old-fashioned  clock,  when  the 
clock  is  "wound  up" ;  and  we  have  found  through  our  physi- 
cal experiments  two  so-called  energy  laws." 

(1).  That  the  sum  of  the  kinetic  and  potential  energies 
of  any  system  of  bodies  remains  constant;  and 

(£).  That  the  sum-total  of  the  energy  in  the  universe 
remains  the  same.  6 

6  Scholasticism  and  Modern  Thought,  by  Rev.  P.  Coffey,  Ph.D.,  Irish 
Theological  Quarterly,  October,  1909.  Footnote,  Page  459. 

"Cf.  Rickaby,  Scholasticism,  p.  100:  The  hope  of  Scholasticism  as  a 
philosophy  for  the  future  seems  to  rest  on  its  alliance  with  Physical 
Science.  Let  scholastic  metaphysicians  be  physicists,  or  with  the  physi- 
cists, and  they  may  yet  win  back  the  sceptre  from  Hegel.  Nor  are  the 
two  families  unconnected.  The  true  ancestors  of  the  physicists  of  to- 
day are  not  the  Humanists  of  the  Renaissance,  but  the  Schoolmen  of  the 
thirteenth  century.  For  scholasticism  did  make  its  endeavor  by  its  own 
method  and  according  to  its  own  notions  and  opportunities  to  inquire 
into  nature.  Moreover,  our  physical  science  sadly  needs  the  co-operation 
of  some  sound  metaphysics;  for  though  the  two  provinces  be  distinct,  yet 
they  are  adjoining,  and  professors  of  physical  science  are  continually 
making  incursions  into  metaphysics,  not  always  with  the  happiest  re- 
sults." As  an  interesting  illustration  of  such  incursion  we  may  quote  the 
following  sentences  from  Professor  R.  K.  Duncan's  fascinating  volume, 
The  New  Knowledge  (London:  Hodder  &  Stoughton,  1907,  p.  263,  8vo. 
Price  6s  net) : — "If  the  universe  is  running  down  its  available  energy 
into  uselessness,  there  must  have  been  a  precise  moment  of  time,  how- 
ever far  back  we  may  place  it,  when  the  energy  was  all  available,  and 
when  it  was  initiated  in  a  sudden  beginning  by  a  single  creative  act. 
Consequently,  there  must  have  been  a  time  behind  which  our  present 
laws  did  not  operate.  Also  there  must  be  a  time  in  future  when  the  uni- 
verse will  have  grown  to  a  definite  exhaustion  and  death.  The  death 
will  come  gradually,  but  the  beginning  must  have  been  sudden  and  due 
to  a  creative  act.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  waste  of  energy  is  replaced 
by  growth,  the  universe  is  immortal  and  eternal,  both  in  the  future  and 
in  the  past.  If  the  old  conception  is  true,  it  is  necessary  to  say,  'God 
made  it,  and  started  it  at  a  definite  time  to  run  its  course.'  If  fhe 
second  conception  is  true,  we  may  say,  'The  Universe  i*  God  in  one 
phase  of  Him,  and  it  possesses  His  attribute  of  eternal  duration.'" 
(p.  245).  May  we?  About  such  a  world  the  most  we  could  infer  (from 
the  premises)  would  be  its  co-eternity  as  a  creature  with  God,  and 
dependently  on  Him  as  Creator:  and  such  participated  eternity  of  a 


Vitalism  185 

It  is  essential  that  we  again  call  attention  to  the  word 
"law"  as  here  used.  This  does  not  mean  a  "law"  at  all,  in  the 
usual  sense  pertaining  to  matters  of  "right  and  wrong" ;  it 
merely  means  that,  in  as  much  as  we  see  certain  occurrences 
follow  each  other  constantly,  we  have  given  this  series  of 
"following-occurrences"  the  name  "law."  It  means  only,  that 
as  yet  we  have  found  no  physical  experiment  that  has 
proven  an  exception  to  this  series  of  occurrences. 

And  it  is  here  that  the  opponents  of  Vitalism  probably 
base  their  most  insistent  claim.  We  have  shown  how  Pro- 
fessor Driesch  overcomes  it,  but  here  is  still  another  way. 
Sir  Oliver  Lodge  says : 

The  term  "energy"  itself,  as  used  in  a  definite  sense  by 
the  physicist,  rather  involves  a  modern  idea,  and  is  itself 
a  generalisation.  Things  as  distinct  from  each  other  as 
light,  heat,  sound,  rotation,  vibration,  elastic  strain,  gravi- 
tative  separation,  electric  currents,  and  chemical  affinity, 
have  all  to  be  generalised  under  the  same  heading  (of  the 
Conservation  of  Energy)  in  order  to  make  the  law  true. 
Until  "heat"  was  included  in  the  list  of  energies,  the  state- 
ment could  not  be  made;  and  a  short  time  ago  it  was  some- 
times discussed  whether  "life"  should  or  should  not  be  in- 
cluded in  the  category  of  energy.  I  should  give  the  answer 
decidedly  No,  but  some  might  be  inclined  to  say  Yes;  and 
this  is  sufficient  as  an  example  to  show  that  the  categories 

creature  is  very  different  from  the  essential  eternity  of  the  Necessarily 
Existing  Deity.  "This  (pantheistic  conception),  to  most  people  of 
scientific  training,  is  (the  author  continues)  the  more  acceptable  con- 
clusion." If  so,  it  is  because  their  "scientific  training"  is  so  narrow  and 
so  specialised  as  to  make  them  oblivious  to  the  evidences  for  Theism 
and  Creation  to  be  found  in  the  phenomena  of  the  religious,  moral  and 
social  sciences,  apart  altogether  from  Physics;  and  possibly  because  it 
has  been  the  fashion  in  recent  times  to  assume  (without  proof)  that 
physical  hypotheses  point  ultimately  to  Pantheism.  The  author  himself 
seems,  nevertheless,  to  recognise  the  existence  of  a  Transcendent  Deity 
as  Creator  of  the  Universe.  "Meanwhile"  (he  writes,  p.  257),  "we  feel 
that  we  know  this— 'In  the  beginning  God  created'  and  in  the  midst  of 
His  creation  He  set  down  man  with  a  little  spark  of  the  God-head  in 
him  to  make  him  strive  to  know  .  .  ." 


186  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

of  energy  are  not  necessarily  exhausted;  that  new  forms 
may  be  discovered;  and  that  if  new  forms  exist,  until  they 
are  discovered,  the  Law  of  the  Conservation  of  Energy,  as 
now  stated,  may  in  some  cases  be  strictly  untrue,  though 
partially  and  usefully  true;  just  as  it  would  be  untrue, 
though  partially  and  usefully  true,  in  the  theory  of  ma- 
chines, if  heat  were  unknown  or  ignored  (p.  131). 

This  may  all  be  summed  up,  by  repeating  what  we  have 
already  said  elsewhere,  that  a  truth  can  only  be  arrived  at 
after  ALL  THE  FACTS  have  been  gathered.  A  fact  must  not 
be  confused  with  TRUTH.  It  is  only  part  of  Truth,  and  ariy 
fact  may  thoroughly  upset  any  quantity  of  our  specula- 
tions, though  every  one  of  these  same  speculations  may  have 
been  just  as  true  as  possible  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  facts 
we  then  had  at  our  disposal,  but,  they  were  not  the  Truth. 
And  our  conclusions?  The  last  word  has  not  yet  been 
said.  In  other  words,  all  the  facts  are  not  yet  in,  so  we  had 
best  hold  our  affirmations  of  pet  theories  in  abeyance  until 
they  are. 

Summing  up  both  Professor  Driesch's  complex  but  very 
scholarly  arguments,  and  Sir  Bertram  Windle's  far  more 
simple  ones,  we  must  and  can  only  come  to  the  conclusion 
from  the  facts  we  now  possess  that  from  the  Scientific 
investigations  so  far  made,  after  we  have  dissected  and 
observed  and  analyzed,  after  we  have  applied  every  physical 
and  chemical  law  we  know,  we  find  there  is  a  "something 
over"  which  we  have  not  explained,  and  from  all  appearances 
cannot  be  explained  from,  through,  nor  by  purely  physical 
laws. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  IDEAL 

AS  we  have  shown  in  the  chapter  on  Logic  as  well  as  in 
the  Chapter  on  Vitalism,  all  ability  to  prove  anything 
must  come  from  the  world  of  THOUGHT;  further,  whenever 
we  do  any  thinking  at  all,  we  must  have  Something  to  think 
about,  which  immediately  presents  to  our  consciousness  the 
fact  of  a  Thinking  Subject  and  an  Object  thought  about. 
We  also  called  attention  to  still  another  fact,  namely,  that 
whenever  we  describe  anything,  for  example,  an  orange,  we 
speak  of  Attributes  only,  and  that  when  we  analyse  this,  we 
find  that  Attributes  are  only  certain  characteristics  that  the 
orange  possesses — that  is,  there  is  a  REAL  something  that 
possesses  these  characteristics — and  this  gives  us  the  idea 
of  Relationship,  for,  we  always  think  of  the  orange  as  a 
Whole  and  its  Parts. 

Having  got  this  idea  of  a  Relationship  from  our  analysis 
of  our  description  of  any  object,  we  may  call  attention  to 
another  Relationship — that  of  time — which  we  obtain,  not 
by  thinking  of  a  sensible  object,  but  by  thinking  back  on 
our  own  thoughts,  for  we  may  think  of  an  event  that  is  now 
taking  place  and  one  that  has  taken  place,  or  even  that 
may  take  place,  which  upon  analysis,  gives  us  a  Relation- 
ship of  time. 

The  distinction  between  thinking  of  objects  that  come 
under  the  senses  and  thinking  back  on  our  own  thoughts, 
must  always  be  held  in  mind  in  all  philosophical  discussions. 

By  Truth  we  mean  the  correspondence  between  our  idea 

187 


188  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

of  an  object  and  the  object  itself,  and  all  of  these  things 
together  we  call  the  common-sense  viewpoint  in  philosophy, 
as  contradistinguished  from  the  doctrine  of  Empiricism^ 
which  insists  that  only  those  things  can  be  known  which  one 
has  already  materially  experienced,  and  the  doctrine  of 
Idealism,  which  simply  casts  aside  the  material  world  en- 
tirely. 

We  do  accept,  however,  with  the  empiricist,  that  all 
our  Intellectual  ideas  must  have  first  come  through  the 
senses,  but  we  believe  that  our  idea  of  an  object  actually 
corresponds  to  what  the  object  is — that  is,  that  we  can 
actually  know  the  thing  before  us. 

Further,  we  can  see,  from  what  has  been  said  of  attri- 
butes, that,  they  being  characteristics  of  an  object,  we  must 
necessarily  have  an  object  to  which  they  belong,  whenever 
we  have  any  attributes. 

Another  way  of  saying  this  more  philosophically,  would 
be  to  suggest  that  as  we  find  everything  we  know  any- 
thing about,  dependent  on  something  else — we  have  the  idea 
of  "contingency" — which  means  that  coming  into  our  mind 
at  the  same  time  with  every  thought  we  may  have,  if  we 
analyse  that  thought,  we  find  a  division  into  the  two  "cate- 
gories" as  they  are  called,  of  dependency  on  something  else, 
which  we  call  "contingency"  and  an  "independent"  something 
which  is  dependent  on  nothing  else;  for  it  is  unthinkable  to 
assume  that  there  could  be  something  dependent  on  some- 
thing else  that  was  in  turn  dependent,  and  so  on  indefinitely. 
Somewhere  we  should  have  to  draw  the  line  and  find  some- 
thing that  was  not  dependent,  and  then  of  course,  we  should 
have  something  "Independent"  or  what  is  often  called 
"Necessary,"  for  this  Independent  something  must  be  abso- 
lutely Necessary  or  our  very  thoughts  are  worthless,  and  if 
this  should  be  so,  then  we  must  accept  the  only  conclusion 


The  Ideal  189 

possible,  namely,  that  we  can  never  know  anything. 

From  Professor  Driesch's  argument  we  have  already 
shown  that  scientifically  considered,  nothing  can  possibly  be 
greater  than  the  thing  from  which  it  sprang — in  other 
words,  the  egg-cell  that  is  to  develop  into  a  complete  human 
being,  must  already  have  the  possibility  of  that  development 
within  its  tiny  body. 

But  this  little  egg-cell  came  from  an  adult  body,  that  is, 
from  a  much  more  highly  organised  individual  than  it  is 
itself,  and  driving  this  argument  home,  we  must  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  very  first  living  cell  that  ever  existed, 
must  have  had  within  itself  all  the  possibilities  to  which  it 
ever  has  arrived  or  ever  can  arrive ;  and  if  this  be  true,  then 
this  first  living  cell,  due  to  these  possibilities,  must  have  been 
at  least  as  complex,  if  not  more  so,  than  any  cell  of  the 
present  time. 

May  this  not  be  the  reason  why  "protoplasm"  which  scien- 
tists originally  considered  one  of  the  simplest,  elemental 
compounds,  has  now  come  to  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  most 
complex  substances  we  know? 

No  one  has  yet  been  able  to  tell  us  what  protoplasm  is 
and  it  may  be  of  interest  to  know  that  so  simple  a  thing  as 
water  is  not  yet  thoroughly  known,  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  the  most  elementary  classes  in  chemistry  assume  such 
knowledge. 1 

1See  Chapter  on  "The  Physical  Chemistry  of  Protoplasm,"  in 
Mathew's  Phyysiological  Chemistry.  (Published  by  Wm.  Wood  &  Co., 
New  York,  1915.) 

"What  is  water?  It  is  a  singular  fact  that  the  exact  composition  of 
this  abundant  substance,  a  sine  qua  non  of  life,  is  not  yet  known.  That 
water  decomposes  into  hydrogen  and  oxygen  and  that  there  are  nearly, 
if  not  exactly,  two  volumes  of  hydrogen  liberated  to  one  of  oxygen  is 
common  knowledge.  Also,  it  is  certain  that  water  is  formed  by  the 
union  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen.  The  simplest  formula  which  can  be 
written  for  water  is  H2O,  H-O-H,  and  this  generally  given  as  its 
formula,  but  there  are  many  facts  which  show  that  water  as  it  exists 
in  the  liquid  and  solid  form  and  probably  in  the  form  of  its  vapor  even 


190  The  Begmnmgs  of  Science  x 

Again,  we  have  been  taught  that  higher  forms  come  from 
lower  ones  in  the  biological  world,  but  it  would  seem,  from 
the  reasoning  above,  that  the  reverse  viewpoint  would  be 
the  more  logical,  as  this  so-called  "higher  form"  is  only 
apparent  and  not  "real." 

We  have  shown  also  that  the  machine-theory  cannot  hold 
in  any  way  whatever,  and  that  there  is  a  purpose  displayed 
as  shown  by  the  study  of  the  mere  physical  facts  of  re- 
generation to  which  we  called  attention. 

But  we  know,  also,  that  to  take  the  simplest  forms  of  raw 
material  and  produce  a  machine  that  will  in  turn  produce 
anything,  requires  a  very  high  type  of  intelligence,  and  if 
re-generation  shows  so  conclusively  that  the  object  for 
which  the  thing  in  question  was  apparently  designed,  will 
again  and  again  grow  to  fulfillment  when  injury  has  come 
to  the  organism,  we  certainly  shall  have  to  admit  some  in- 
telligence somewhere  or  procure  a  new  definition  for  the 
word. 

So,  if  the  first  germ-cells  had  all  the  possibilities  within 
them  to  which  any  of  their  descendents  attained,  there  must 
have  been  an  Intelligence  behind  it  all,  for,  we  must  not 
forget  that  no  thing  can  come  from  anything  that  is  less 
than  itself,  so  that  this  Intelligence  must  therefore  be 
greater  than  all  the  Intelligence  combined  that  now  exists 
in  the  forms  we  know,  for  it  follows,  that  all  human  intelli- 
gence must  have  been  present  in  the  first  Human  germ-cell 
as  a  possibility. 

at  365°,  which  is  its  critical  temperature,  has  a  more  complex  formula. 
Its  high  critical  temperature,  cohesion,  refractive,  index  and  boiling 
point  all  show  that  the  formula  is  more  complex  than  H2O.  The  mole- 
cule of  water  would  be  very  light  were  the  above  formula  true;  it  should 
boil  at  a  low  temperature,  and  have  a  low  surface  tension.  Instead  it 
has  a  very  high  surface  tension,  much  higher  than  any  of  the  hydro- 
carbons. Hence  it  is  certain  that  the  formula  is  more  complex,  at  least 
at  temperatures  lower  than  400° C."  p.  190. 


The  Ideal  191 

The  arguments  here  used  have  been  built  up  logically, 
just  as  all  scientific  discussions  must  be,  from  evidence  pre- 
sented in  the  laboratory,  and  in  order  that  they  may  the 
more  easily  be  kept  in  mind  we  shall  group  them  in  con- 
venient form. 

There  has  been  no  scientific  advance  toward  an  explana- 
tion of  the  origins  of  life. 

No  fact  is  of  value,  except  in  so  far  as  it  can  be  defined 
in  terms  of  meanings. 

Logic  means  correct  reasoning. 

Reasoning  makes  use  of  thoughts. 

Analysing  our  thoughts  we  find: 

A  thinking  Subject  and  an  Object  thought. 

To  describe,  we  must  tear  our  object  to  pieces  mentally, 
thus  giving  us  the  idea  of  the  Relationship  of  the  whole  to 
its  parts. 

The  descriptive  parts  are  always  attributes,  never  the 
thing  itself. 

Attributes  cannot  exist  unless  something  exists  which  has 
them. 

We  have  never  been  able  to  find  anything  that  is  not 
dependent  on  something  else,  in  so  far  as  this  world  of  ours 
is  concerned. 

We,  ourselves,  are  dependent  on  thousands  of  things. 

But,  driven  far  enough,  we  must  come  to  some  place  in 
our  thought,  where  something  is  found  that  is  not  dependent, 
for  there  can  be  nothing  dependent  unless  there  is  something 
on  which  to  depend,  as  we  have  just  shown. 

The  abstract  idea  of  this  dependency  on  something  else 
is  called  "Contingency." 

But  it  is  impossible  to  think  of  anything  "contingent" 
without  something  "Necessary"  on  which  the  thing  under 
discussion  is  contingent. 

But,  if  this  Necessary  something  were  dependent  on  any- 
thing else,  in  any  way,  shape  or  manner,  it,  too,  would  be 
contingent,  which  would  be  a  contradiction  of  terms  and 
absolutely  unthinkable. 


The  Beginnings  of  Science  , 

Therefore,  there  must  be  something  that  is  Necessary  and 
alone  necessary,  for,  were  there  two  or  more  necessary 
things,  one  would  be  limited  by  the  existence  of  the  other, 
and  consequently,  being  limited,  would  again  be  contingent, 
and  therefore  not  necessary. 

Now,  if  there  is  anything  necessary  in  this  sense,  it  must 
always  have  been  necessary,  for  surely,  if  everything,  every- 
where, depends  on  something  independent — something  neces- 
sary— then  there  could  have  been  no  beginning  to  this 
necessary  something,  nor,  so  long  as  anything  whatever  ex- 
ists, can  there  be  an  end.  And  this  is  what  we  mean  by 
"eternal." 

The  Laboratory  has  given  us  our  scientific  law,  that 
no  thing  can  come  from  anything  that  is  less  than  itself. 

We  have  found  a  Unifying  Causality  which  insists  on 
making  any  part  of  the  body  become  what  it  apparently 
was  intended  for,  regardless  of  environmpnt;  that  is,  we 
have  found  an  Inner  Driving  Force,  which  brings  into  ac- 
tuality whatever  was  purposed. 

We  know  that  we  ourselves  are  very  complex  adult  forms 
and  that  we  are  intelligent,  so  that  in  accordance  wjth 
what  has  gone  before  we  must  come  to  this  final  conclu- 
sion: 

The  First  Cause  must  possess  in  an  eminent  manner,  all 
the  intelligence,  all  the  complexity,  all  the  purpose,  there 
is  in  existence. 

We  find  then,  that  though  we  may  not  be  able  to  give 
any  complete  description  of  this  First  Cause,  we  must  accept 
it  as  a  logical  necessity  for  all  scientific  reasoning,  for  with- 
out it,  there  is  no  science  possible,  because  the  only  way  we 
know  anything  at  all  is  by  taking  the  various  attributes 
we  find  and  then  going  back  far  enough  to  find  what  pos- 
sesses them.  So  having  established  by  laboratory  proof  and 
pure  logic  that  there  is  a  Necessary,  Intelligent,  Eternal, 
First  Cause,  let  us  see  what  more  can  be  said  from  the 
purely  experimental  side. 


The  Ideal  193 

We  must  not  forget  that  all  we  are  and  can  be  comes  to 
us  only  through  that  with  which  we  are  born  (inheritance), 
plus  what  we  obtain  after  birth  (environment  and  training)  ; 
consequently  all  the  subject-matter  of  thought  possible 
comes  from  our  environment,  though  colored  by  our  training, 
and  reaches  us  only  through  the  senses,  for,  not  being  born 
with  thoughts,  we  must  get  our  subject-matter  for  them 
after  birth,  and  as  we  have  shown,  this  can  only  come  from 
environment  and  training,  consequently  through  the  senses. 

Now,  suppose  we  look  at  an  object,  be  it  picture,  book, 
statuary,  building,  or  what-not,  immediately,  we  know  that 
this  object  at  which  we  are  gazing  is  not  the  most  perfect 
thing  of  its  kind  possible.  We  have,  however,  not  been  born 
with  Perfection  in  us ;  we  have  not  experienced  Perfection  in 
any  form,  nor  have  we  been  trained  to  know  Perfection — yet, 
notwithstanding  all  this,  we  do  know  that  there  can  be  a 
more  perfect  thing  than  the  one  we  are  then  perceiving,  and 
this  we  call  the  "idea  of  the  Ideal."  But,  we  must  get  this 
idea  from  somewhere,  and  the  only  thinkable  way  of  having 
obtained  it,  is  that  it  is  an  attribute  of  whatever  it  is  that 
has  made  each  of  us  possible;  and,  knowing  that  we  have 
this  idea,  it  must  follow  that  the  cause  of  this  Perfection 
of  which  we  have  but  a  hazy  notion,  though  our  conviction 
of  having  it  is  clear  enough, — no  existence  being  greater 
than  its  cause — must  be  absolute  Perfection  itself. 

As  will  be  observed,  we  have  made  use  of  Laboratory 
Science  and  Pure  Logic  only — that  is,  Pure  Science,  and 
this  has  led  to  the  conclusions  just  mentioned,  namely,  that 
while  we  cannot  know  all  about  the  First  Cause,  yet  we  are 
far  from  not  knowing  anything  about  it,  for  we  can,  by 
observation  and  experimentation  and  analysis,  learn  much 
about  the  attributes  that  this  First  Cause  must  possess,  and 
from  this,  if  thoughts  and  logic  mean  anything,  draw  con- 


194  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

elusions  for  a  valid  and  legitimate  Philosophy  of  Life. 

It  will  not  be  difficult  for  the  student  of  the  Sciences  to 
follow  our  reasoning,  but  he  will  find  his  troubles  in  having 
schooled  himself  to  think  only  in  terms  of  the  seeable  and 
hearable,  and,  consequently,  trying  to  translate  this  Ideal 
First  Cause  into  some  Physical  Form.  But  this  he  cannot 
do  any  more  than  he  can  bring  down  a  thousand  and  one 
things  to  physical  forms.  He  must  not  make  Professor 
Haeckel's  mistake  of  thinking  it  necessary  to  assume  a 
"gaseous  vertebrate."  All  he  must  do  is  to  know  a  logical 
and  necessary  CONCLUSION,  without  attempting  to  formulate 
this  conclusion  into  some  form  that  is  seeable  or  hearable. 

We  need  not  say  a  God  is  impossible  because  we  cannot 
imagine  such  a  being,  for  the  very  simple  reason  that  noth- 
ing that  cannot  be  seen  or  heard  or  come  under  the  senses 
in  some  way  is  imaginable;  the  very  word  means  to  be  able 
to  have  an  image,  and  an  image  is  a  copy  of  something  that 
has  come  under  the  senses,  and  is  then  thrown  on  the  screen 
of  the  mind.  An  electron,  an  atom  and  a  molecule  are  un- 
imaginable, though  by  no  means  unthinkable.  In  fact  we 
have  to  think  them  or  much  of  our  science  ceases. 

Let  us  not  forget  either  that  to  think  along  one  pathway 
only  soon  brings  about  a  state  that  makes  it  practically 
impossible  to  think  along  any  other.  This  is  well  exempli- 
fied by  Charles  Darwin  himself,  who  regretted  that  in  his 
later  years  he  lost  all  appreciation  of  music  and  the  finer 
things  of  life,  because  he  had  permitted  his  mind  to  dwell 
so  long  on  only  one  line  of  thought.  We  call  particular 
attention  to  this  fact  because  many  are  wont  to  draw  the 
conclusion  in  other  fields  that  because  one  can  no  longer 
appreciate  certain  forms  of  thought  they  are  non-existent; 
but  surely,  none  would  say  that  because  Darwin  could  not 
appreciate  music,  there  was  no  such  thing  as  music  appre- 


The  Ideal  195 

elation  in  existence,  and  so  we  must  not  forget  that  the 
more  difficult  things  to  hold  in  mind,  such  as  attributes  and 
relationships,  because  they  are  difficult,  and  with  some  per- 
sons, seemingly  impossible,  are  not  on  that  account,  however, 
non-existent. 

Ether,  now  considered  by  many,  the  ultimate  "substance" 
can  be  known  only  through  its  attributes  and  relationships, 
and  the  ultra-violet  rays  as  well  as  the  infra-red  rays,  which 
every  scientist  knows  from  laboratory  evidence  exists,  can- 
not be  seen  by  the  eye,  though  they  are  colors. 

Our  very  word  Evolution  means  something  immaterial —  */ 
that  is  it  means  "Becoming."  It  does  not  exist  as  a  potato 
or  a  carrot  exists;  it  exists  as  the  process  by  which  the 
potato  or  carrot  comes  to  be  what  it  is,  exists.  It  would 
be  well  for  the  student  to  use  the  word  "Becoming"  instead 
of  "Evolution"  for  a  time,  so  as  to  bring  this  important 
distinction  home  to  him. 

And  lastly,  it  is  just  as  absurd  to  imagine  that  a  single 
brain-cell  of  ourselves  could  have  a  complete  understanding 
of  our  entire  organism  of  which  it  is  such  an  insignificant 
part,  as  it  would  be  for  any  one  of  us,  who  probably  do  not 
even  occupy  so  important  a  place  in  the  universal  scheme 
of  things,  as  does  the  single  brain-cell  in  the  scheme  of  our 
body,  to  assume  that  he  could  understand  or  know  all  about 
the  First  Cause. 

And  thus  far,  and  thus  far  only,  it  seems  to  the  writer, 
can  Science  plus  Logic  go,  and  to  this  conclusion  must  it 
come.  From  here  on  the  province  belongs  to  Revealed 
Religion,  and  Science  has  no  more  to  offer, 


CHAPTER  X 

AUTHORITIES 

IT  is  a  common  belief  and  one  that  is  expressed  all  too 
often,  that  men  have  ceased  to  rely  on  Authority  in  our 
day  and  age  and  now  insist  on  procuring  all  the  evidence 
for  themselves.  But  like  so  many  popular  ideas,  this  is  very 
far  from  the  truth.  All  that  is  meant  by  those  who  are 
capable  of  intelligently  discussing  this  phase  of  philosophi- 
cal argument  is  that  the  PAST  simply  because  it  is  past, 
is  not  sufficient  authority  for  anything,  and  further,  that 
this  is  only  in  the  Natural  Science  Realm,  and  only  on  such 
things  as  can  be  definitely  proven  in  the  laboratory.  It  has 
nothing  to  do  with  another  order  of  things,  such  as  Morals 
and  Theology.  This  must  always  be  remembered,  and  we 
have  here  an  actual  application  of  what  our  entire  volume 
has  been  attempting  to  make  clear,  i.  e.,  that  simply  because 
a  certain  individual  is  an  authority  in  one  field  of  work 
does  not  imply  that  he  is  at  all  proficient  in  another. 

So,  when  we  read  of  men  who  set  aside  "Authority  in 
Science"  all  that  is  meant  is  that  they  refused  to  accept 
what  had  always  been  taught  as  true,  unless  there  could  be 
proof  brought  to  substantiate  it;  in  other  words,  that  they 
refused  to  believe  that  because  men  had  always  done  a  thing 
in  a  certain  way,  or  believed  a  certain  thing  from  time  im- 
memorial, it  has  on  that  account  been  true.  And  all  of  us 
are  indeed  glad  that  this  kmd  of  authority  was  broken  up. 
But  as  to  Real  Authority,  we  must  make  use  of  it  daily, 
for  no  man,  no  matter  what  his  span  of  life  might  be,  is 

196 


Authorities  197 

capable  of  proving  every  detail  of  life  for  himself,  and  so 
he  must,  by  the  very  exigencies  of  life,  accept  thousands  of 
things  on  the  Authority  of  others.  And  in  view  of  this  fact 
it  behooves  us  to  find  who  is  an  authority  so  we  may  feel 
positive  that  we  are  not  following  false  teachers.  And  it 
is  just  this  interesting  problem  in  the  Biological  field,  that 
this  chapter  attempts  to  answer  as  objectively  as  possible. 

The  usual  plan  of  writers  is  to  quote  only  those  who  agree 
with  them.  This  book  has  tried  to  quote  both  sides,  letting 
the  student  come  to  his  own  conclusions.  And  so  we  have 
taken  every  name  that  is  entitled  to  recognition  for  dis- 
tinctive work  in  Biology  and  compiled  a  list  for  comparative 
purposes. 

First,  we  have  chosen  for  our  guide  the  Eleventh  Edition 
of  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica,,  for  this  work  has  been 
edited  and  arranged  under  the  supervision  of  the  University 
of  Cambridge,  England,  which  institution  is  without  doubt 
the  most  famous,  and  deservedly  so,  of  all  scientific  schools 
in  the  English-speaking  world.  We  have  thus  the  advantage 
of  having  our  Authorities  in  Biology  chosen  by  the  most 
eminent  living  scientists  themselves,  and  observing  what 
space  they  felt  should  be  accorded  to  each. 

Second,  we  have  taken  Professor  Wm.  Locy's  book, 
Biology  and  Its  Makers,  the  most  complete  standard  work 
of  its  kind  in  the  English  language,  and  have  procured  from 
this  a  list  of  all  names  there  mentioned,  so  we  could  be 
certain  that  none  was  neglected. 

Third,  we  have  taken  the  amount  of  space  accorded  each 
in  the  Britannica  and  placed  all  names  in  the  relative  order 
of  importance,  taking"space  accorded" as  an  objective  guide. 

Fourth,  we  found,  definitely  stating  the  finding  place, 
whether  or  not  each  of  these  men  was  a  "believer"  or  not, 
as  we  wished  to  make  this  list  of  ALL  biologists  as  valuable 


198  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

to  each  reader  as  possible. 

There  have  been  articles  and  books  written,  picking  out 
a  certain  number  of  scientists  for  or  against  some  indi- 
vidual creed  or  belief,  but  as  any  side  of  any  argument  can 
produce  several  important  names  in  its  support,  these  writ- 
ings have  always  seemed  quite  valueless.  So,  to  overcome 
this  narrower  viewpoint,  we  have  quoted  them  all,  thus 
making  valid  comparisons  possible. 

As  we  have  already  stated  in  a  previous  chapter,  the 
number  of  individuals  for  or  against  a  thing  has  absolutely 
nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  truthfulness  of  it,  for,  to 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  because  all  men  of  science  are 
"believers"  or  "non-believers"  therefore  the  "believer"  is 
right  or  the  "non-believer,"  as  the  case  may  be,  is  just 
about  as  valid  as  having  the  ice-man  lay  out  the  diet  for  the 
family  table  and  calling  him  in  to  prescribe  when  any  mem- 
ber becomes  ill.  Religion  and  the  Laboratory  have  nothing 
whatever  to  do  with  each  other,  and  a  Laboratory  man  has 
no  more  right  to  speak  on  Religion  than  has  the  ice-man 
on  diet,  and  the  reverse  is  also  true,  that  Religion  has  no 
right  to  speak  on  whether  a  fact  has  or  has  not  been  found 
in  the  laboratory.  That  requires  a  laboratory  man,  BUT, 
after  the  fact  is  found,  and  we  begin  to  discuss  what  the 
fact  MEANS,  then  the  Laboratory  man  is  finished  with  his 
task,  unless  he  also  be  a  Philosopher,  for  this  is  the  work 
of  the  Philosopher  and  the  Philosopher  alone. 

And  as  very  few  of  us  are  even  remotely  capable  of  unit- 
ing even  two  fields  of  learning,  much  less  the  three  immense 
ones  that  we  have  just  mentioned,  Authorities  loom  up  very 
large  on  our  horizon,  for,  on  every  belief  we  have,  we  must 
know  whom  to  look  to  as  an  Authority,  first,  as  to  whether 
our  facts  are  correct,  second,  as  to  whether  our  meanings 
are  valid,  and  third,  as  to  whether  the  Creed  we  have  laid 


Authorities  199 

out  for  ourselves  is  properly  supported  by  legitimate  First 
Principles  and  a  sound  Metaphysics.  Which  means  that 
there  isn't  a  thing  we  can  accept  as  true  unless  we  have 
three  Authorities  in  three  totally  different  fields  pass  judg- 
ment. We  are,  of  course,  here  speaking  of  any  belief  we 
hold  that  is  founded  on  fact,  and  not  fanciful,  imaginary 
visions.  We  must  have  an  Authority  for  every  Fact  found ; 
we  must  have  an  Authority  for  the  Logic  of  our  Meaning; 
we  must  have  an  Authority  for  our  Metaphysics,  or  First 
Principles. 

And  as  all  of  us  are  doing  our  very  best  to  obliterate  su- 
perstition we  are  very  anxious  that  none  should  adopt  that 
most  absurd  of  all  superstitions  of  accepting  as  an  Au- 
thority in  one  field  a  man  who  is  only  an  Authority  in  an- 
other, for,  after  all,  that  is  about  all  superstition  means, 
namely,  accepting  something  that  isn't  true  on  the  Author-  f 
ity  of  some  one  who  isn't  an  Authority. 

Professor  Joseph  Jastrow  has  well  said  that  people  often 
wonder  why  experts  disagree,  when  in  reality  they  seldom 
do,  but  many  and  many  a  man  calls  himself  an  "expert" 
who  is  not,  and  disagreement  is  to  be  expected  in  that  case. 

So  these  tables  will  show  who  the  HEAL  EXPERTS  are, 
and  a  letter  written  by  Professor  Helmholtz,  one  of  the 
greatest  scientists  of  the  just  past  generation,  will  make 
still  clearer  what  we  have  here  been  attempting  to  bring 
home  to  the  reader,  that  those  who  advertise  themselves  as 
great  experts  and  able  scientists  and  who  obtain  many  fol- 
lowers, are  not  considered  worthy  at  all  by  those  who  ac- 
tually are  capable  of  passing  judgment. 

This  letter  was  written  to  Professor  Helmholtz's  father 
from  the  University  of  Berlin,  on  just  such  a  subject. 

"From  your  letter  it  appears  to  me  that  you  entertain 
some  suspicion  that  I  endorse  the  trivial  tirades  of  Vogt 


200  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

and  Moleschott.  Not  in  the  least.  I  must  also  earnestly 
protest  against  your  ranking  these  two  among  the  repre- 
sentative scientists.  Neither  has  as  yet  proved  by  any  sci- 
entific special  research  that  he  has  acquired  that  regard 
for  facts  and  that  calmness  in  his  conclusions  which  were  ob- 
tained in  the  school  of  natural  science.  A  cautious  scientist 
knows  full  well  that,  because  he  has  gained  a  somewhat  deeper 
insight  into  the  complicate  working  of  the  natural  forces, 
he  is  for  this  reason  not  a  bit  more  justified  than  any  other 
man  to  give  a  verdict  against  the  nature  of  the  soul." 

Croat  Mam     in  RinUrrr  Columns  of  Space  Accorded  in  the  Eleventh 

areat  Names  in  Biology  Edition  Q{  |£  Encyclopedia  Britannica 

Mendelism,  (Mendel  was  an  Augustinian  Monk) ....  9% 

Harvey,  ( Vitalist) 9% 

Huxley,   (Brought   up  his   children   in   the  Anglican 

Faith) 71/2 

Darwin,  (Was  in  doubt  as  to  a  God  or  not.    See  state- 
ment below.)    7 

Spencer,  (The  beginnings  of  things  were  all  accounted 

for  by  his  "unknown") 5 

Lister, 4% 

Oken,  (Vitalist) 4 

Servetus,  (Christian.     See  Catholic  Encyclopedia)  .  .  3% 

Pasteur,   (Catholic.     See  Catholic  Encyclopedia)...  3% 

Agassiz,  (Believer.     See  Encyclopedia  Americana)..  3 

Wallace,  (Spiritualist.     See  his  own  writings) 2% 

Linnaeus,    (Christian.     See   Heroes    of   Science,   Lon- 
don)      21/2 

Ray,  John,  (Christian.     See  Heroes  of  Science,  Lon- 
don)      21/2 

Koelliker,    2% 

Owen,    2% 

Tyndall,   8% 

Virchow,  (Believer.     See  sketch  in  Encyclopedia  Brit- 
annica)     214 

Bell,  Charles,  (Believer.     See  sketch  in  Encyclopedia 

Britannica)    2 


Authorities  201 

Columns  of  Space  Accorded  in  the  Eleventh 
Edition  of  the  Encyclopedia  Britannica 

Berengarius,  (Catholic.     See  sketch  in  Encyclopedia 

Britannica)    2 

Haeckel,  Ernst   2 

Lamarck,  (Catholic.     See  Heroes  of  Science) 2 

Bois-Reymond  (Catholic.    See  Catholic  Encyclopedia) 
Bonnet,  (Vitalist.     See  Article  "Life"  in  Catholic  En- 
cyclopedia)      

Buckland,  (Christian.  See  Bridgewater  Treatises  or 
article  under  this  heading  in  Encyclopedia  Britan- 
nica)   

Cuvier,  (Christian.     See  Heroes  of  Science) 

Haller,  (Christian.  See  Kneller's  Das  Christenthum 
u.d.  Vertreter  d.  Neueren  Natur  Wissemchaft, 

Herder.) 

Lyell,  (Christian.    See  Heroes  of  Science) 1% 

Buff  on,  (Christian.     See  Heroes  of  Science) 

Cohn,  (Non-conforming  Jew.  See  Jewish  Encyclo- 
pedia)   

Gray,  Asa,  (Christian.  See  Encyclopedia  Britannica) 

Galen,  (Ancient  Roman.)   

Malpighi,  (Catholic.  See  Catholic  Encyclopedia)  .  .  . 
Smith,  Wm.  (Christian.  See  Heroes  of  Science)  .... 
Baer,  von.  (Believer.  See  Kneller's  Volume,  quoted 

above)     1 

Bichat,  (Vitalist.     See  Table  of  Vitalists,  following)     1 

Brown,   Robt 1 

Darwin,  Erasmus, 1 

Gesner,  ( Christian.     See  Heroes  of  Science) 1 

Goodsir,    1 

Hooke,  Robt.  (Christian.  See  Encyclopedia  Britan- 
nica)    1 

Leeuwenhoek,  (Vitalist)    1 

Ludwig,    1 

Mohl,  von 1 

Suarez,   ( Catholic  Priest.     See  any  encyclopedia. )  .  .      1 
Bernard,  Claude  (Became  an  infidel  but  later  became 
a  Catholic.     See  Catholic  Encyclopedia) 


The  Beginnings  of  Science 

r-.of  WoTvoa  ;n  •R;/>inm  Columns  of  Space  Accorded  in  the  Eleventh 

Great  Names  in  Biology  Edition  Q£  J£  Encydopedia  Britannica 

Quatrefages,  (Christian.) % 

Galton,    34 

Romanes,  (Looked  at  the  Christian  side  far  more  fav- 
orably as  he  grew  older.     See  Tables  further  on.)  % 
Schwann,  (Catholic.     See  Catholic  Encyclopedia)...  % 
Spallanzani,  (Catholic  Priest.     See  Catholic  Encyclo- 
pedia.)      % 

Balfour,    (Christian.      See  any   of  his   Philosophical 

Writings.)    % 

Boerhaave,    % 

Koch,  Robt % 

Gegenbauer,   % 

Caesalpinus,  (Christian.    See  Catholic  Encyclopedia)  % 
Cope,    (Believed    in    a    Creator.     See    Encyclopedia 

Americana) % 

Schleiden, 1/3 

Schultze,  Max   1/3 

Swammerdam,  (Christian.     See  Heroes  of  Science).  .  % 

Whitney, 1/3 

Aldrovandi,  (Christian.     See  Catholic  Encyclopedia)  % 

Carpenter,  (Christian.    See  Encyclopedia  Britannica)  % 
Ehrenberg,  (Christian.    See  Kneller's  Volume,  already 

cited)    y2 

Grew,    1/2 

Marsh,   O.    C 1/2 

Milne-Edwards,    % 

Mivart,    St.    George,    (Catholic.     See    Encyclopedia 

Britannica)    % 

Miiller,  Johannes,  (Catholic.     See  Catholic  Encyclo- 
pedia)      1/2 

Weismann,    % 

Zittel,    1/2 

Fabricus,   (Catholic.     See  Catholic  Encyclopedia)..  % 

Fallopius,  (Catholic.     See  Catholic  Encyclopedia)..  % 

Siebold,  von,    % 

Steno,  (Catholic  Bishop.     See  Catholic  Encyclopedia)  % 

Wolff,  (Vitalist.     See  List  of  Vitalists) % 


Authorities  £03 

Table  of  Biologists  who  have  done  valuable  work,  but, 
up  to  1910  have  not  been  deemed  worthy  of  a  separate 
article  in  the  Eleventh  Edition  of  the  Encyclopedia  Bri- 
tannica. 

de  Bary,  H.  A. 

Ramon  y  Cajal 
Calkins 

Carpi  (see  Catholic  Encyclopedia) 
Castle 

Columbus   (see  Catholic  Encyclopedia) 
Davenport 
Dufour,  Leon 
Dujardin 

Dwight  (Catholic.     See  his  "Thoughts  of  a  Catholic  Anato- 
mist") 
Geer,  de, 
Eimer 

Hertwig,  Oskar.     (Opponent  of  Weismann) 
His,  Wm. 
Johnston 

Klein  (see  Jewish  Encyclopedia) 
Kowalevsky 
Lacaze-Duthiers 
Leidy 
Lesser 
Leuckart 
Ley  dig 
Loeb 
Lyonet 

Mecket,  J.  Fr. 
Miiller,  Fritz 
Nageli  (Vitalist) 
Needham  (Catholic  Priest) 
Newport 
Osborn 
Pander 
Pearson,  Karl 
Pouchet 


£04  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

Purkin  j  e 

Rathke 

Reaumur  (Christian.    See  Heroes  of  Science) 

Redi   (Christian.      See   Catholic  Encyclopedia) 

Remak  (Jew.     See  Jewish  Encyclopedia) 

Roesel 

Saint  Hilaire  (Christian) 

Schaudinn 

Schultze,  Franz 

Severinus  (Pope) 

Strauss-Diirckheim 

Vesalius  (Catholic.    See  Catholic  Encyclopedia) 

Vicq  d'Azyr 

Vinci,  Leonardo  (Catholic.     See  Catholic  Encyclopedia) 

Vries,  de,  Hugo 

Willoughby  (Christian.     See  Heroes  of  Science) 

Wyman,  Jeffries 

Wasmann,  Erich  (Catholic  Priest) 

Wheeler  (Vitalist.     See  his  writings) 

Table  of  Vitalists  as  per  Professor  Han  Driesch's  History 
and  Theory  of  Vitalism. 

The  names  that  follow  are  the  most  representative  Vital- 
ists, that  is,  are  the  names  of  those  who  are  convinced  that 
Life  cannot  be  explained  by  a  causo-mechanical  process. 
They  insist  on  a  "Vital  Principle,"  which,  however,  many  of 
them  call  by  different  names,  such  as  "Entelechy,"  "Genetic 
energy,"  "Property  of  self-adaptation,"  "Growth,"  "Bath- 
mic  force,"  "Direction,"  "Biotic  Energy,"  or,  as  the  older 
writers  called  it,  a  "Soul,"  though  it  must  be  observed  that 
most  of  these  writers,  as  Sir  Bertram  Windle  hag  well  said, 
would  rather  perish  than  give  it  that  antiquated  name. 

Aristotle 

Helmont,  van  J.  B.  (1577-1644) 

Harvey,  Wm.  (1578-1657) 

Stahl,  George  Ernest  (1660-1734) 

Buff  on,  George,  Louis,  Leclerc  (1707-1788) 


Authorities  205 

Maupertius  (1698-1759) 

Needham,  Tuberville  (1713-1781) 

Wolff,  Caspar,  Friedrich  (1733-1794) 

Blumenbach,  J.  F.  (1752-1840) 

Bichat  (1771-1802) 

Keyserling 

Hegel   (1770-1831) 

Schelling  (1775-1854) 

Cuvier  (1769-1832) 

Goethe  (1749-1832) 

Humboldt,  von  Alexander  (1769-1859) 

Oken,  Lorenz  (1779-1813) 

Reil,  J.  Ch.  (1759-1813) 

Treviranus,  G.  R.  (1776-1837) 

Autenrieth,  M.  F.   (1836-  ) 

Tiedemann,  F.   (1830-   ) 

Burdach,  K.  F.  (1835-  ) 

Baer,  von  Karl  E.  (1792-1876) 

Wagner,  R.  (1805-1864) 

Magendie,  F.  (1816-  ) 

Miiller,  Johannes  (1801-1858) 

Liebig  (1846-  ) 

Schopenhauer,  Arthur  (1788-1860) 

Hanstein,  von   J.    (1880-    ) 

Wigand,  Albert 

Hartmann  von  Eduard  (1842-1906) 

Liebemann,  Otto  (Regards  Vitalism  as  a  Possibility) 

Pfliiger  (Partly  a  Vitalist)   (1877-  ) 

Goetz  (Partly  a  Vitalist)  (1869-  ) 

Busse 

Montgomery,  Edward 

Roux,  W. 

Ehrhardt,  F.  (1890-  ) 

Wolf,  Gustav 

Cossmann,  P.  Nikolaus 

Reinke,  Eugen 

Noll,  Fritz 

Pauly  (absurd  theory,  but  Vitalistic) 

Schneider 


206  The  Beginnings  of  Science  x 

Ostwald 

Gurwith 

Bergson 

Lotze 

Bunge,  von  G.  (Problematic  Vitalist) 

Bernard,  Claude  (Vitalist,  but  is  seemingly  inconsistent) 

Descartes 

Leibnitz 

Bonnet 

Haller,  Albert 

Spallanzani 

These  last  five,  however,  do  not  believe  there  is  any  mu- 
tual interaction  between  soul  and  body. 

Special  Tables  of  the  Most  Important  Biologists 
Professor  Wm.  Locy's  summaries  of  great  names. 

Aristotle  Lamarck 

Galen  von  Baer 

Vesalius  Miiller,  Johannes 

Harvey  Schwann 

Malpighi  Schultze,  Max 

Linnaeus  Darwin 

Wolff  Pasteur 

Cuvier  Zittel 
Bichat 

From  our  Table  compiled  from  the  Encyclopedia,  it 
will  be  seen  that  all  of  these  except  Schultze  and  Zittel, 
regarding  whom  we  could  find  nothing  as  to  their  beliefs, 
were  "believers"  and  Darwin  is  doubtful. 

And  here  is  another  list  of  FOUNDERS  of  the  various 
branches  of  Biology.  For  to  these  men  all  that  has  come 
after  their  time  is  due,  for,  as  Professor  Locy  well  says,  of 
those  that  came  after  Vesalius,  they  "had  the  advantage  of 
the  sketches  made  under  the  direction  of  Vesalius.  Pioneers 
and  Pathbreakers  are  under  special  limitations  of  being  in 


Authorities  207 

new  territory,  and  make  more  errors  than  they  would  in 
following  another's  survey  of  the  same  territory;  it  takes 
much  less  creative  force  to  correct  the  errors  of  a  first  sur- 
vey than  it  does  to  make  original  discoveries." 

Founders  of  Biological  Divisions 

Malpighi,  founder  of  Pathology. 

Virchow,  founder  of  Modern  Cellular  Pathology. 

von  Baer,  founder  of  Embryology. 

Miiller,  Johannes,  founder  of  Modern  Physiology. 

Schwann,  founder  of  the  Cell  Theory. 

Pasteur,  founder  of  Bacteriology. 

Bichat,  founder  of  Histology. 

Lamarck,  founder  of  Modern  Evolution. 

Darwin  applied  this  to  man. 

Cuvier,  founder  of  Modern  Comparative  Anatomy. 

Linnasus,  founder  of  Modern  Botany 

Again,  it  will  be  observed  that  every  one  was  a  "believer," 
with  Darwin  alone  doubtful. 

Tables  of  Modern  Scientists  in  Various  Fields  of  Research 

Physicists  (from  Kneller's  volume  and  Schwickerath's  Article) 

Benjamin  Thompson,  American,  afterward  Count  Rumford 

of  Bavaria 
Sir  Humphrey  Davy 
Robert  Mayer 
Joule 
Him 
Clausius 
Thompson  (Lord  Kelvin) 

The  first  five  established  the  "mechanical  theory  of  heat 
and  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy"  while  the  last 
two  drew  the  "conclusions  from  these  laws  which  bear  on 
the  whole  universe." 

In  regard  to  their  views  on  religion,  Every  One  of  them 


£08  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

has  in  his  writings  shown  not  only  unmistakable  evidence 
of  a  firm  faith  in  Christianity,  but  from  their  writings  one 
can  in  all  truth  say,  went  out  of  their  way  to  let  people 
know  it. 

Not  one  of  the  establishers  of  this  great  law  was  a 
defender  of  materialism,  though  Ernst  Haeckel  considers 
this  same  law  "paragraph  I  of  the  monistic  religion,"  so 
we  must  with  Father  Schwickerath,  from  whom  we  quote, 
say,  "we  must  suppose,  and  Haeckel  should  suppose  as  well, 
that  these  men  knew  a  little  more,  and  certainly  not  less, 
about  the  bearing  of  this  law  than  Haeckel  himself." 

Mathematicians 

Cantor  (died  1783) 

Gauss  (died  1855) 

Cauchy 

Vicaire 

Binet  (died  1856) 

Puiseux  (1883) 

Hermite  (1901) 

Buoncompagni 

Professor  Weierstrass  of  the  University  of  Berlin  (1897) 

All  illustrious  mathematicians  and  every  one  a  believer; 
several  of  them  extreme  defenders  of  the  Faith  and  most 
of  them  Catholics.  Cauchy  wrote  a  pamphlet  in  which  he 
said:  "I  am  a  Christian,  i.  e.,  I  believe  in  the  Divinity  of 
Christ  with  Tycho  Brahe,  Copernicus,  Descartes,  Newton, 
Fermat,  Leibnitz.  Pascal,  Grimaldi,  Euler,  Guldin,  Bos- 
covich,  Gerdil;  with  all  the  great  astronomers,  with  all  the 
great  physicists,  with  all  the  great  mathematicians  of  the 
past  centuries.  I  am  a  Catholic,  a  sincere  Catholic,  as 
were  Corneille,  Racine,  La  Bruyere,  Bossuet,  Bourdaloue, 
Fenelon." 

Among  Astronomers  we  have: 

Father  Piazza,  who  discovered  Ceres,  the  first  of  the  plane- 
toids, which  discovery  is  really  a  very  important  one  in 
astronomy. 


Authorities  209 

Father  Oriani. 

Inghiraini,  a  member  of  the  religious  order  of  the  Piarists. 

Cecchi,  also  a  member  of  the  same  order. 

Denza,  a  member  of  the  Barnabites. 

Roller,  a  Benedictine. 

Reslhuber,  a  Benedictine. 

de  Vico. 

Perry. 

Secchi,  all  three  being  Jesuits. 

Gibers. 

Bessel,  both  of  whom  speak  in  their  letters  of  God  so  that 

all  idea  of  materialism  must  be  excluded. 
John  Frederick  William  Herschel  was  a  believer  and  thor- 

oughly pious.     (See  article  in  the  Dictionary  of  National 


Leverrier  (1877)  Discoverer  of  Neptune. 

Faye,  the  distinguished  French  astronomer  (1902).      (See 

his  work,  Sur  VOrigme  du  Monde,  where  he  speaks  of 

biblical  creation.) 
Lament. 

Kreil,  both  devout  Catholics. 
Professor  Heis  of  Minister  (1877)  ardent  Catholic  and  de- 

fender of  the  faith. 

In  Electricity 

Galvini  Ohm 

Volta  Siemens 

Ampere  Oersted 

Faraday  Maxwell 

Coulomb  de  la  Rive 

Nearly  all  the  great  men  in  electricity  were  Christians 
and  most  of  them  Catholics.  (See  Catholic  Encyclopedia, 
and  Dr.  James  Walsh's  Makers  of  Modern  Electricity.) 

Father  Kneller,  in  his  volume,  from  which  we  have  been 
quoting,  says  most  eloquently:  "The  half-educated  man 
who  is  smoothly  borne  along  the  street  in  an  electrical  car, 
who  from  his  room  converses  with  his  friend  miles  distant 
and  recognizes  his  voice,  who  sends  a  message  to  America 


The  Begwwwngs  of  Science 

from  Australia,  far  in  advance  of  the  fastest  train  or  steam- 
er, this  man  often  smiles  with  a  superior  and  sneering  look 
when  he  sees  an  old  woman  telling  her  beads,  or  when  the 
conversation  turns  on  priests  and  the  church,  and  he  thinks 
that  the  great  discoveries  of  this  age  of  electricity  have 
given  the  death  blow  to  the  old  religious  prejudices.  But 
by  so  thinking  he  betrays  his  own  ignorance ;  he  forgets  that 
the  great  intellects  to  whom,  in  the  first  place,  these  great 
modern  achievements  are  due,  have  humbly  meditated  on, 
and  bowed  before,  the  truths  of  Christianity.  And  in  the 
clever  hands  under  whose  touch  the  hidden  forces  of  elec- 
tricity first  manifested  themselves  have  often  closed  in  hum- 
ble prayer,  and  in  the  instance  of  Volta  and  Ampere,  have 
even  not  disdained  to  hold  the  beads." 

Maxwell,  who  died  in  1879,  said  to  Mr.  Colin  Mackenzie, 
"Old  chap,  I  have  read  up  many  queer  religions :  there  'is 
nothing  like  the  old  thing  after  all,"  and  "I  have  looked  into 
most  philosophical  systems  and  I  have  found  that  none  of 
them  will  work  without  God." 

In  Optics 

Fresnel 

Fraunhofer 

Foucault 

Ketteler  of  Minister  (died  1900).    All  believers. 

In  Natural  Science 

Biot 

Regnault 

Desains 

Becquerel 

Plateau 

Tait 

Jolly. 

All  of  whom  were  Christians. 

Chemistry 

D  alt  on 
Berzelius 


Authorities 

Chevreul 

Dumas 

Liebig 

Chaptal 

Schonbrin  of  Basle 

Wurtz 

Klaproth 

Friedel 

Henry 

Deville 

All  but  one  Christians  and  not  even  he  was  a  materialist. 
Liebig  "mercilessly  condemned  the  attempts  at  utilizing  the 
natural  sciences  as  props  to  materialism.  He  says  that  such 
attempts  are  not  made  by  the  real  scientists,  but  by  'dilet- 
tanti who  from  their  promenades  on  the  borderlines  of  sci- 
ence think  themselves  justified  to  expound  to  the  ignorant 
and  credulous  public  how  the  world  and  life  in  it  have  orig- 
inated, and  how  wonderfully  man  has  progressed  in  the  ex- 
ploration of  the  sublimest  things.  And  the  ignorant  and 
credulous  public  believes  these  people  and  not  the  real  sci- 
entists.' " 

Geographers 

Ritter 

Daniel 

Maury 

Freycinet 

d'Abbadie 

Hauy   (called  the  father  of  scientific   crystalography) 

Fuchs  of  Munich 

Beudant 

Hausmann 

All  believers  and  Hauy  was  a  priest. 
Geology  and  Paleontology 

de  Luc 
Cuvier 
Fuchs 


The  Beginnings  of  Science 

Buckland 

de  Derrer 

Miller 

Hitchcock 

MacCulloch 

Pfaff 

Dana 

Waagen 

Every  one  of  whom  tried  to  show  a  harmony  between  reve- 
lation and  geology.  Some  even  went  entirely  too  far  in  their 
attempts. 

Conybeare  (an  Anglican  Clergyman) 

Sedgwick  (an  Anglican  Clergyman) 

Beaumont 

Bischof 

Fraas 

Studer 

Quenstedt 

Daubree 

Dumont 

Barrande 

d'Omalius 

Lessen 

L  apparent 

All  of  whom  were  believers. 

In  Physiology 

Johannes  Muller  (the  greatest  Physiologist  of  all  times) 

Schwann  (founder  of  the  Cell  Th/eory) 

Wagner 

Volkmann 

Vierordt 

Claude  Bernard  (became  a  Catholic  before  his  death) 

Flourens   (also  a  free-thinker  for  a  time,  but  returned  to 

his  faith,  Protestant,  before  his  death) 
Pasteur  (father  of  Bacteriology) 
Carnoy  (the  Begian  biologist,  was  a  priest) 


Authorities 

Ehrenberg  (pioneer  in  microscopic  zoology,  thought  that 
materialism  was  a  "humbug  and  a  fantastic,  sickly  tend- 
ency of  our  time,  which  parades  under  the  name  of  sci- 
ence") 

von  Baer  (one  of  the  most  versatile  of  great  scientists, 
father  of  Embryology,  noted  in  zoology,  geography,  eth- 
nography and  anthropology,  always  a  firm  believer  in 
teleology,  for  a  time  a  pantheist,  but  later  coming  back 
into  the  fold) 

Agassiz 

Van  Beneden 

Altum   (Zoologist  and  priest) 

David  (Zoologist  and  priest) 

Heude  (Zoologist  and  priest) 

Latreille  (Entomologist  and  a  priest) 

von  Martius  (Botanist  who  ordered  a  green  cross  to  be 
placed  on  his  shroud  because,  as  he  said,  "A  cross,  be- 
cause I  am  a  Christian;  green,  in  honor  of  botany") 

Kielmeyer  (Botanist) 

von  Schrank  (Botanist  and  priest) 

Leunis  (Botanist  and  priest) 

Castracane  (Botanist  and  priest) 

In  Evolutionary  Science  Particularly 

Lamarck 

Saint  Hilaire,  both  of  whom  founded  the  theory  of  Evolu- 
tion in  its  modern  form,  and  the  latter  of  whom  saw 
in  it  a  "further  step  towards  a  deeper  knowledge  of  God." 

Ampere 

d'Omalius 

Waagen 

Lessen,  all  of  whom  were  Catholics,  defended  it  strenuously. 
(They  did  not,  however  defend  Darwinism,  and  as  we 
have  shown  in  our  chapters  dealing  with  this  problem, 
Darwinism  is  not  held  in  very  high  esteem  in  the  scientific 
world,  so  these  men  were  more  nearly  correct  than  were 
the  more  rabid  defenders  of  the  theory  that  swept  so 
many  off  their  feet.) 


The  Begmnmgs  of  Science 

Darwin,  "vacillated  between  atheism  and  theism,"  as  shown 
by  what  the  Duke  of  Argyle  says  regarding  him:  "In 
the  course  of  that  conversation,  I  said  to  Mr.  Darwin, 
with  references  to  some  of  his  own  remarkable  works  on 
the  'Fertilisation  of  Orchids,'  and  upon  'The  Earth- 
worms,' and  various  other  observations  he  made  of  the 
wonderful  contrivances  for  certain  purposes  in  nature — 
I  said  it  was  impossible  to  look  at  these  without  seeing 
that  they  were  the  effect  and  expression  of  mind.  I  shall 
never  forget  Mr.  Darwin's  answer.  He  looked  at  me 
very  hard  and  said,  'Well,  that  often  comes  over  me 
with  overwhelming  force;  but  at  other  times,'  and  he 
shook  his  head  vaguely,  adding,  'it  seems  to  go  away.' ' 

Asa  Gray,  a  firm  believer  and  he  actually  wrote  a  book  to 
show  that  Natural  Selection  did  not  oppose  Natural  The- 
ology. 

We  had  intended  giving  only  a  complete  list  of  all  Biol- 
ogists, so  that  the  percentage  of  believers  and  non-believers 
could  be  observed  at  a  glance.  We  have  done  this,  but 
found  so  many  interesting  names  in  other  fields,  and  some- 
times the  same  name,  appearing  in  several  of  the  sciences, 
that  we  thought  these  added  pages  would  serve  some  pur- 
pose in  at  least  acquainting  those  who  are  unfamiliar  with 
either  the  names  or  the  sciences  with  an  excellent  list  that 
could  be  used  as  a  sort  of  foundation  for  a  "reading  course." 

We  wish  to  call  particular  attention  to  the  list  of  Bi- 
ologists. It  is  especially  among  workers  in  this  field  that 
men  who  do  not  know  are  always  telling  us,  all  the  recruits 
for  materialism,  atheism,  and  causo-mechanism  are  found. 
We  have  made  as  thorough  an  investigation  as  was  within 
our  means,  and  have  not  found  over  four  instances  in  which 
any  of  the  entire  list  there  cited  actually  stated  that  the 
causo-mechanistic  explanation  was  sufficient  to  account  for 
Life.  We  have  not  been  able  to  find  anything  whatever 
regarding  many  of  the  names  as  to  their  religious  belief 


Authorities 

and  conviction,  but  if  among  those  accorded  a  separate 
account  under  their  own  name,  we  find  so  vast  a  majority 
believers,  we  can  apply  the  same  percentage  to  those  for 
whom  we  could  find  no  biographical  sketch,  and  surely  the 
result  is  astonishing  to  us  all. 

There  is,  of  course,  an  objection  that  can  be  raised,  and 
that  is  that  there  were  many  able  men  who  did  defend  ma- 
terialistic views,  such  as  Virchow,  Du  Bois-Reymond,  Ber- 
thelot  and  others,  but  it  is  again  astonishing  to  note  how 
many  of  the  scientists  who  in  the  beginning  defended  such 
views  came  to  change  them  as  they  grew  older  and  the  first 
excitement  of  youth  had  given  way  to  maturer  judgment. 
"Haeckel  has  recently  lamented  such  a  change  in  the  case 
of  prominent  naturalists  of  the  materialistic  camp.  As 
instances  of  such  'psychological  metamorphosis,'  he  quotes, 
besides  Kant,  such  naturalists  as  Virchow,  Du  Bois-Rey- 
mond, and  Wundt.  He  states  with  regret  that  Virchow, 
originally  a  materialist,  who  in  1856  expressed  his  convic- 
tion that  he  would  never  change  his  opinions  in  this  re- 
spect, by  his  subsequent  actions  showed  that  his  'former 
conviction  was  a  grave  error;  for  twenty-eight  years  after- 
ward he  defended  radically  different  opinions.'  Wundt 
styled  the  first  edition  of  his  Lectures  on  the  Soul  of  Man 
and  Animals,  thirty  years  later  'the  sin  of  his  youth,' 
and  in  the  second  edition  he  advanced  entirely  different 
views.  The  first  edition  was  purely  monistic  and  material- 
istic, the  second  purely  dualistic  and  spiritualistic.  It  is 
possible  that  Haeckel's  expressions  are  exaggerated,  but 
they  prove  this  much,  that  these  eminent  scientists  became 
the  more  cautious  in  condemning  the  'spiritualistic'  views, 
the  more  they  advanced  in  the  knowledge  of  psychological 
phenomena." 

Here  is  still  another  list  of  Scientists  who  were  also  de- 


216  The  Begwnwgs  of  Science 

voted   churchmen,   compiled  by  Professor  J.   A.   Zahm,   of 
Notre  Dame  University. 

Catholics 
Astronomers 

Leverrier 
Faye 

Father  Secchi 
Father  Denza 
Father  Ferrari 
Father  Perry 
Father  Searle 
Father  Hagen 

Botanists 

Tulasne  Greene 
Edward  L.  Greene 

Geologists 

Barrande 

Gaudry 

Dumont 

d'Homalius  d'Halloy 

Collet 

de  L  apparent 

de  la  Valles,  Poussin 

Charles  Sainte-Claire  Deville 

Chemists 

Barf 

Renard 

Dumas 

Berthelot 

Chevreul 

Henri  Sainte-Claire  Deville 


Authorities  217 


Mathematicians 

Chasles 

Puiseux 

Cauchy 

Gilbert 

Hermite 

Prehistoric  Archeologists 

Abbe  Hamard 
Abbe  Delaunay 
Abbe  Beroud 
Abbe  Bourgeois 
Abbe  Ducrost 
Abbe  Arcelin 
Abbe  Cau  Durban 
Marquis  de  Nadaillac 

Protestants 

James  Clerk  Maxwell 

Gabriel  Stokes 

P.  G.  Tait 

Sir  William  Thompson 

Asa  Gray 

J.  D.  Dana 

Quatrefages 

Dawson 

Joseph  Henry 

Fresnel 

Liebig 

Mayer 

Sir  David  Brewster 

Dr.  Whewell 

Adam  Sedgwick 

Sir  Roderick  Murchison 

E.  Hitchcock 

Sir  John  Herschel 

Michael  Faraday 


218  The  Begwvnmgs  of  Science 

Taken  from  Catholic  Science  and  Catholic  Scientists,  by 
Rev.  J.  A.  Zahm,  C.S.C.,  Professor  of  Physics  in  the  Univer- 
sity of  Notre  Dame,  pub.  by  H.  L.  Kilner  &  Co.,  1894,  Phila- 
delphia. 

In  comparing  the  "believers"  with  the  "non-believers,"  we 
have  found  six  who  can  without  hesitancy  be  classified  as 
believing  that  the  Causo-mechanistic  idea  is  alone  suffi- 
cient to  explain  life,  and  these  are:  Spencer,  Huxley, 
Haeckel,  Ludwig  and  Loeb  and  Weismann.  That  there  are 
others  is  to  be  conceded,  but  we  have  not  found  them.  We 
have,  however,  been  able  to  find  that  among  those  whose  biog- 
raphies were  contained  in  separate  articles,  that  is,  among 
the  GREATEST  of  all  biologists,  the  overwhelming  majority 
were  and  are  believers. 

Many  of  the  biographies  have  touched  but  little  on  bi- 
ology, for  often  the  same  man  did  most  exceptional  work 
in  one  field  that  is  stressed  on  that  account,  and  is  barely 
mentioned  in  the  field  we  are  considering,  which  makes  the 
list  arbitrary,  as  all  such  lists  are  bound  to  be,  but,  neverthe- 
less, the  method  we  have  used  in  compiling  our  names  is 
the  only  objective  one  we  know. 

John  Hunter  has  10%  columns  assigned  him,  but  Men- 
del's account  is  entirely  on  biology  and  Hunter's  is  not, 
so  that  Mendel  has  a  greater  space  accorded  him  than 
Hunter  in  Biology,  or  for  that  matter  than  any  biologist 
who  ever  lived. 

This  list  will  prove  interesting  when  one  contemplates 
what  is  usually  written  by  those  who  do  not  know,  regard- 
ing the  non-belief  of  scientists,  especially  in  the  biological 
world. 

We  believe  with  Professor  Swift  of  Washington  Uni- 
versity that  styles  in  thought  like  other  decrees  of  fashion 
are  set  by  the  leaders  of  the  groups  of  men  with  whom 


Authorities  £19 

one  is  accustomed  to  associate.  When  erroneous  scientific 
statements  are  made,  it  is  therefore  easy  to  grade  the  kind 
of  intellectual  associates  with  which  the  speaker  is  fa- 
miliar, for  he  has  obtained  his  information  and  his  thoughts 
from  the  popular  magazines  and  Sunday  papers,  or  sim- 
ilar "non-authorities"  in  regard  to  science.  The  reader  of 
such  articles  assumes  that,  because  the  article  and  the 
journal  or  paper  is  well  advertised,  that  therefore  the  ar- 
ticles must  be  authoritative,  is  working  entirely  in  the  prin- 
ciple expounded  in  The  Hunting  of  the  Snark  where  some- 
one says,  "What  I  tell  you  three  times  is  so." 

Repetition  and  constant  seeing  or  hearing  a  name  in  con- 
nection with  a  science  carries  with  it  the  conviction  to  most 
men  that  such  an  individual  must  be  very  important  in 
that  particular  field. 

We  do  not  believe  that  these  lists  prove  anything  what- 
ever as  to  the  validity  or  its  opposite  of  any  religious  views, 
and,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  it  is  only  of  interest  as  a  guide 
showing  whom  to  accept  as  an  Authority,  and  to  refute 
the  popular  but  nonsensical  ideas  that  scientific  men  are 
opposed  to  religion  or  are  even  non-religious. 


CHAPTER  XI 

SUMMARY 

SUMMING  up  the  chapters  that  have  gone  before,  we 
may  point  to  the  following  important  facts  that  we  have 
attempted  to  impress   upon  any   student  of  the   Sciences: 

Why  the  Philosopher,  who  was  the  acknowledged  great 
man  of  the  past  is  no  longer  so  considered  by  men  at  large. 

Why  we  now  accept  laboratory  evidence  alone  for  our 
Facts. 

Why  Facts  must  never  be  confused  with  Meanings — 
that  is,  there  must  be  no  confusion  between  the  Fact  itself, 
and  what  the  Fact  stands  for. 

That  Meanings  are  all  Mental,  and  therefore  do  not 
come  under  the  Natural  Sciences  at  all,  but  can  come 
only  under  that  branch  of  Philosophy  called  Psychology. 

That  Psychology  is  divided  into  two  parts,  the  Rational 
or  Philosophical,  and  the  Experimental,  sometimes  also 
called  Physiological. 

That  no  one,  therefore,  who  does  not  know  both  the 
Factual  evidence  and  the  Philosophical  interpretations,  or 
at  least  the  Philosophical  method  of  checking  up  interpreta- 
tions, has  any  moral  right  to  an  opinion  on  the  subject  in 
question. 

That  a  laboratory  man,  such  as  a  Biologist,  Chemist, 
Physicist,  etc.,  may  and  should  speak  with  authority  on  his 
findings,  but  that  after  he  has  developed  a  theory,  he  must, 
because  every  theory  to  be  worth  anything  must  be  logical, 
we  repeat,  he  must  go  to  the  Logician  to  find  whether  his 
theory  is  sound  and  whether  it  has  been  validly  drawn  from 
the  facts  at  his  disposal. 

That  even  after  doing  this,  he  must  go  to  the  General 

220 


Summary 

Philosopher  to  find  whether  he  has  started  with  correct 
First  Principles,  for,  even  though  his  facts  and  his  theory 
be  correct  and  logical,  he  may  find  that  there  were  no 
grounds  for  his  original  premises. 

That  a  theory  is  first  originated,  and  then  experiments 
are  performed  to  find  whether  there  are  any  exceptions  to 
it,  and  not  as  is  usually  supposed,  the  facts  found  first  and 
then  the  theory  propounded,  for  every  deliberate  experi- 
ment ever  performed,  has  been  performed  with  the  idea 
of  proving  something,  or  trying  to  find  out  whether  some- 
thing is  true — in  other  words — to  demonstrate  a  the- 
ory. 

That,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Psychology  has  come  down 
to  the  laboratory,  and  attempted  to  test  the  reactions  of 
the  nervous  system  under  particular  circumstances,  we  have 
found  a  sort  of  middle  ground  by  which  we  have  a  con- 
necting link  between  the  Observer  and  Experimenter  and 
the  Philosopher. 

That  through  Genetics  we  have  been  able  to  find  and 
have  been  able  to  prove  by  laboratory  evidence,  that  all 
men  do  not  respond  to  the  same  stimuli  in  the  same  way, 
and  that  just  because  there  is  a  difference  between  them, 
it  does  not  mean  that  one  is  any  better  or  worse  than  the 
other. 

That  we  must  therefore  never  make  the  error  of  assuming 
that  just  because  two  things  are  different,  one  must  on 
that  account  be  superior  to  the  other.  They  are  simply 
different. 

But,  that  this  being  true,  we  must  go  about  presenting 
even  our  facts  differently  to  different  types  of  people,  if 
we  wish  them  to  see  the  same  thing,  and  consequently 

That  it  is  absurd  to  condemn  another  manner  than  one's 
own  in  presenting  facts,  provided  always  they  be  facts,  as 
is  so  often  done  by  both  sides,  especially  in  biological  and 
theological  treatises. 

That  simply  because  one's  teachers  have  all  agreed  on  a 
certain  point  does  not  make  that  point  of  view  true  or  un- 
true, for  one  is  more  than  likely  to  find  at  one  school  only 
those  men  who  think  very  much  alike,  because  the  head  of 


The  Begwnmgs  of  Science 

the  department  usually,  if  not  invariably,  sees  fit  to  employ 
or  recommend  only  those  who  agree  with  him.  In  fact  often, 
it  would  probably  be  found  that  those  in  the  same  depart- 
ment come  from  the  same  schools  or  were  pupils  of  the  very 
man  in  charge. 

That  to  find  references  in  a  volume,  on  no  matter  what 
subject,  usually  means  only  references  to  other  writers  who 
agree  with  the  author  who  quotes  them,  and  therefore  to 
read  a  hundred  such  volumes  may  be  narrowing,  rather  than 
broadening. 

That  there  is  no  viewpoint  that  does  not  have  its  oppo- 
nents, and  that  just  because  a  thing  is  popular  does  not 
make  it  true. 

That  Truth  means  the  agreement  between  our  idea  of  a 
given  thing  with  the  object  itself. 

That  a  Fact  is  only  one  very  small  portion  of  a  truth 
and  must  never  be  confused  with  it. 

That  until  all  the  facts  are  in,  we  cannot  have  the  proper 
correlation  of  truth. 

That  it  does  not  follow  that  because  we  cannot  know 
all  about  anything  we  can  know  nothing  about  it. 

That  the  gathering  of  facts  is  of  value  only  in  so  far  as 
we  can  find  meanings  for  them,  and  then  apply  them  to 
humanity  at  large. 

That  as  Professor  James  says,  as  soon  as  we  get  away 
from  the  very  narrow  work  of  just  hunting  for  a  few  facts 
along  one  line,  we  must  try  to  obtain  a  world-viewpoint, 
and  as  soon  as  we  do  this,  the  biggest  thing  that  looms 
up  before  us,  is  the  problem  of  Metaphysics. 

But,  this  does  not  imply  that  we  must  cast  our  hypotheses 
to  the  winds. 

Nor  does  it  imply  that  our  hypotheses  are  true. 

We  must  accept  a  working  hypothesis  to  be  able  to  ac- 
complish anything  in  laboratory  work,  regardless  of  wheth- 
er it  be  true  or  not,  just  so  long  as  our  experiments  work 
as  though  it  were  true. 

That  the  student  must  be  shown,  that  it  is  only  on  ac- 
count of  the  immense  amount  of  disagreement  between  men 
at  large  on  all  problems,  we  have  come  to  an  agreement  as 


Summary  228 

to  where  we  shall  start  our  sciences,  But  this  agreement 
has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  whether  there  is  anything 
beyond  that  starting  point.  It  means  only,  that  we  shall 
not  discuss  it  m  the  laboratory,  because  it  is  beyond  the 
laboratory.  In  other  words,  because  we  have  agreed  as  lab- 
oratory men  only  to  discuss  what  we  can  find  presented  to 
our  senses  in  the  laboratory  does  not  show,  nor  has  it 
anything  whatever  to  do  with  WHY  our  senses  perceive 
things  as  they  do,  nor  on  what  grounds  we  accept  the  evi- 
dence of  our  senses.  All  of  these  things  are  left  for  the  realm 
of  Philosophy,  where  they  rightfully  belong;  for  these 
things  are  Psychological  and  not  sensible,  and  the  labora- 
tory cannot  deal  with  things  which  do  not  come  under  the 
senses. 

That,  after  all,  Facts  make  little  difference  to  any  of  us 
in  and  of  themselves.  The  MEANINGS  are  what  count 
and  these  lead  to  the  propounding  of  our  many  theories. 

Theories,  then,  are  what  actually  count,  because  every  fact 
we  try  to  find  or  have  found  every  thought  we  think  or 
have  thought,  has  been  for  some  theoretical  purpose. 

But,  Theories  must  be  LOGICAL  if  they  are  worth  any- 
thing, and  Logic  must  be  rigorously  adhered  to  if  we  ex- 
pect to  be  reasonable  in  our  interpretations  of  facts. 

So  that  to  demolish  any  theory,  all  that  is  required  is 
that  it  be  shown  to  be  illogical,  and  no  laboratory  man  is 
needed  for  this  purpose,  but  a  Logician. 

We  all  agree  that  each  man  must  and  can  pass  judgment 
validly  on  subjects  propounded  in  his  own  field.  We  right- 
fully resent  a  theologian  telling  us  about  a  biological  fact, 
unless  he  be  a  biologist  also,  and  so  we  must  as  justly  resent 
a  biologist  telling  us  anything  about  philosophy  and  theolo- 
gy unless  he  be  trained  in  these  sciences  as  well. 

That  this  is  best  exemplified  in  Evolutionary  Science 
where  so  much  is  written  on  both  sides  without  much  foun- 
dation in  fact,  and  where  theories  are  so  often  illogically 
drawn. 

That  we  can  readily  understand  why,  this  being  an  age 
of  "specialization,"  the  average  laboratory  worker  has  had 
practically  no  training  at  all  in  philosophy  and  so  cannot 


The  Beginnings  of  Science 

draw  up  a  theory  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  that  sci- 
ence, though  we  must  not  forget  that  all  writers  insist 
that  every  particle  of  evidence  must  be  Logical,  that  is— 
Philosophical. 

That  most  biologists,  with  the  exception  of  Professor 
Fleishmann,  agree  that  there  is  Evolution. 

That,  notwithstanding  this  agreement,  very  few  agree  on 
HOW  it  all  has  come  about. 

That  Evolution  must  never  be  confused  with  a  THEORY  OF 
EVOLUTION,  for  "Theory"  here  means  only  one  way  of  HOW  IT 
CAME  ABOUT,  and  does  not  mean  the  same  thing  as  Evolution. 

That  Evolution  is  a  PROCESS  and  not  an  Object,  in  other 
words  that  it  means  BECOMING. 

That  Darwinism  must  not  be  confused  with  Evolution; 
for  Darwinism  is  only  one  Theory  of  How  Evolution  came 
about. 

That  Charles  Darwin  was  not  a  Darwinian. 

That  Darwinism  is  not  held  by  very  many  biologists  now. 

That  Huxley,  the  greatest  defender  of  the  Darwinian 
Theory  was  himself  not  a  believer  in  it,  but  defended  it 
against  unfair  attacks.1 

That  de  Vries'  theory  of  Mutation  is  probably  accepted 
to  a  greater  extent  than  any  other  single  evolutionary  the- 
ory. This  holds  that  any  changes  which  have  taken  place 
have  usually  come  by  sudden  leaps  or  bounds  rather  than  by 
slow  continuous  growths. 

That  this  being  so,  it  is  and  always  has  been  absurd  to 
look  for  a  missing  link,  seeing  there  could  be  no  missing 
link  when  there  were  no  links  in  the  process. 

That  there  is  not  one  particle  of  evidence  that  Man  came 
from  an  animal  ancestor. 

That  all  evidence  on  this  score  has  been  one-sided  in  that 
it  took  only  physical  comparisons,  leaving  out  the  psychical. 

That  practically  all  Animal  Psychologists  have  come  to 
the  conclusion  that  there  is  a  decided  difference  between 
animals  and  men  on  the  psychical  side  and  that  by  no  process 
yet  come  to  light  can  this  difference  be  bridged. 

That  animals  never  think,  but  work  by  instinct  and  asso- 

1  See  Footnote  3,  Chapter  VI. 


Summary 

ciation,  and  always  react  in  very  nearly  the  same  way  to  the 
same  stimuli,  and  that  all  animals  of  one  species  always  do 
everything  in  practically  the  self-same  way,  and  have  ever 
done  so. 

That  man  responds  in  various  ways,  and  that  there  has 
never  been  one  particle  of  evidence  that  an  animal  ever 
formed  a  concept  of  a  thing  as  a  whole. 

That  Professor  Haeckel  himself  has  noted  the  tendency 
amongst  biological  workers  who  have  also  studied  the  psychi- 
cal side  of  life,  to  reverse  their  viewpoint  from  that  which 
they  originally  held  regarding  a  purely  mechanistic  ex- 
planation of  life. 

That  Orthogenesis  is  now  accepted  in  some  form  or  an- 
other by  nearly  all  biologists,  and  means  that  there  is  an 
inner  driving  force  that  makes  the  living  organism  do  what 
it  does. 

That  more  and  more  the  Vitalistic  doctrines  of  a  separate 
Life-Principle  comes  to  the  fore  and  is  being  accepted  by 
an  evergrowing  number  of  scientific  men. 

That  we  are  as  far  away  from  explaining  life  as  we  have 
ever  been,  as  shown  by  Dr.  Ward's  statement. 

That  to  account  for  the  wonderful  regenerative  processes 
mentioned,  there  must  be  an  Autonomous  Life-Principle 
assumed. 

That  this  same  Vital-Principle  has  been  given  many  dif- 
ferent names  by  different  writers,  but  in  the  last  analysis 
it  means  the  SOTJL. 

That  if  we  analyse  our  every  thought,  we  readily  see  that 
we  have  a  thinking  self  and  an  object  thought  about. 

That  we  also  find  a  relationship  between  the  Whole  and  its 
Parts. 

That  from  what  we  have  shown,  it  is  seen  that  no  attri- 
butes can  exist  unless  they  be  attached  to  something  on 
which  they  are  dependent,  thereby  illustrating  what  is 
meant  by  the  two  words  "dependent"  and  "independent." 

That  what  is  not  independent  must  be  dependent  on  some- 
thing else. 

That  we  know  ourselves  to  be  dependent  on  thousands  of 
things,  and  must  therefore  be  dependent  on  something 


The  Beginnings  of  Science 

greater  than  ourselves, 

For,  nothing  can  come  from  anything  else  that  is  less 
than  itself. 

Showing,  that  a  Cause  must  virtually  contain  all  that  it 
ever  can  produce;  in  other  words,  that  that  into  which  a 
thing  ultimately  develops  must  have  been  present  in  the 
very  first  Germ  as  a  possibility,  so  that  the  first  Germ  was 
in  reality  more  complex  than  the  last  development,  though 
seemingly  the  reverse  is  true. 

That  as  nothing  can  possess  anything  within  itself  that 
was  not  already  present  in  its  Cause  as  a  possibility,  there- 
fore, as  we  have  intelligence,  the  Cause  which  produced  us, 
must  be  intelligent. 

That  as  we  KNOW  perfection  though  never  having  ex- 
perienced it,  we  must  also  have  obtained  this  from  the 
Cause  which  must  have  possessed  it  in  order  that  it  could 
be  given.  This  Cause  for  want  of  a  better  name,  we  call 
the  First  Cause. 

That  thus  far  and  thus  far  only  can  Logic  and  Labora- 
tory science  go. 

From  here  on  Natural  Theology  and  Revealed  Religion 
take  up  the  thread  and  continue  in  logical  order  to  develop 
their  theses,  while  the  biologist's  and  psychologist's  work  is 
done. 

Here  are  several  things  that  it  is  very  important  to  bear 
in  mind  in  any  study: 

We  must  obtain  all  the  facts  from  all  the  different 
branches  of  science  so  as  to  check  up  our  findings  and  com- 
pare them,  lest  the  facts  found  in  one  deny  those  of  an- 
other; witness,  for  instance,  what  Professor  Kellogg  says — 
that  Paleontologists  accept  one  theory  of  evolution,  Path- 
ologists  another,  Embryologists  still  another,  and  so  on. 

That  probably  no  one  man  can  co-ordinate  all  the 
sciences,  for  there  are  so  very  many  branches  now,  and  that 
just  for  this  reason,  we  cannot  now  and  probably  never  can 
(for  there  will  in  all  probability  be  still  more  divisions  of 
our  present  branches  in  the  future)  be  able  to  arrive  at  any- 
where near  a  consistent  co-ordination  of  truths  in  a  purely 
scientific  way,  for,  to  know  the  Truth  one  must  know  all 


Summary 

the  facts,  and  as  we  have  just  shown,  this  is  practically 
impossible.  We  can  know  these  things  tentatively  but  every 
new  finding  may  change  our  views,  so  that,  as  Professor 
Kellogg  well  says,  biology  (and  he  might  have  named  other 
branches  as  well)  is  not  in  such  a  state  that  any  theories 
can  yet  be  built  upon  it.  He  believes  that  only  one  truth 
has  been  brought  out  of  biology  so  far,  about  which  there 
can  be  no  disputation,  and  that  is  "Evolution,"  but  as  we 
have  shown,  Professor  Fleishmann — an  equally  eminent 
biologist — denies  even  this. 

That  as  it  is  acknowledged  by  all  biologists  that  there 
are  very  few  biological  facts  that  can  be  made  use  of  as 
truths  on  which  to  build  theories  for  the  training  of  children, 
for  Social  Psychology,  etc.,  it  will  be  seen  that  practically  all 
volumes  on  these  subjects  which  began  their  theorizing  on 
biological  grounds  that  have  not  yet  been  established,  and 
as  Kellogg  mentions,  were  even  more  shakily  established 
than  many  others  that  have  not  been  used,  are  almost 
worthless. 

That  most  people  work  on  an  emotional  and  not  a  reason- 
able basis,  and  desiring  a  thing  to  be  true,  they  read  into 
various  facts  all  manner  of  meanings  that  are  not  true, 
well  illustrating  the  proverb,  "The  wish  is  father  to  the 
thought." 

That  any  number  of  writers  use  different  names  for  the 
same  thing,  while  others  call  different  things  by  the  same 
name,  so  that  one  must  be  positive  of  the  word's  meaning 
before  attempting  an  interpretation,  and  that  on  this 
account,  many  men  who  are  fighting  each  other  in  print, 
are  probably  agreed  on  what  they  actually  believe,  but  due 
to  a  different  training  and  a  different  nomenclature,  they 
themselves  believe  they  differ  from  each  other. 

That  if  we  do  not  give  the  student  a  training  in  Logic 
he  cannot  know  that  his  reasoning  is  correct  even  though 
he  may  be  fairly  accurate  in  its  use,  and  that  he  must  have 
Logic  though  he  wished  to  prove  that  he  doesn't  need  it, 
for  even  then,  there  would  have  to  be  the  assumption  that 
he  could  set  his  facts  opposing  this  idea  in  logical  order. 

That  what  the  man  on  the  street  means  by  a  Scientist  is 


The  Begmnmgs  of  Science 

one  who  "applies  science,"  but  a  real  Scientist  never  thinks 
of  including  such  a  one  under  that  title.  The  true  Scien- 
tist is  he  whom  the  average  man  would  consider  a  Philoso- 
pher. 

That  no  Scientist  has  ever  won  acceptance  and  renown 
except  through  his  philosophising. 

That  in  Science  we  cannot  explain  a  single  WHY  of  any- 
thing. All  we  can  do  is  to  show  HOW  to  do  certain  things 
in  order  that  something  else  may  occur.  But  WHY  this  does 
occur,  we  do  not  know. 

That  there  are  two  kinds  of  Law.  The  one  referring  to 
the  Moral  Order  and  dealing  with  Right  and  Wrong,  the 
other  a  Physical  Law,  meaning  only  that  two  or  more 
occurrences  always  follow  in  the  same  order  in  so  far  as  we 
have  yet  been  able  to  prove.  This  Physical  Law  has,  of 
course,  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  Right  and  Wrong  in 
the  Moral  Order. 

That  in  Ethics,  unless  we  accept  Free- Will  and  a  Creator, 
we  cannot  have  any  Ethics,  for  each  individual  would  neces- 
sarily have  to  do  the  things  he  does,  and  it  would  be  perfectly 
absurd  to  deny  any  one  the  "right"  to  do  that  which  he 
couldn't  help  doing,  and  to  punish  him  therefor. 

That  there  can  be  no  valid  reason  why  man  should  live 
a  decent  life  if  there  be  no  absolute  Right  and  Wrong,  which 
means  that  a  Superior  Being  established  certain  laws  that 
must  be  obeyed,  for  if  man  be  but  a  piece  of  protoplasm  de- 
veloped from  the  primitive  nebulosity  until  he  has  become 
what  he  is  due  to  purely  Physico-chemical  laws,  Might  is 
Right,  and  there  is  no  valid  reason  why  he  should  not  pro- 
cure all  he  can  for  his  own  gratification  and  care  nothing  for 
the  injury  he  may  do  others. 

That  if  it  be  objected,  that  each  man  seeks  happiness,  and 
that  injuring  his  neighbor  would  cause  him  unhappiness,  it 
might  be  answered  that  that  is  exactly  the  point  we  are 
making,  namely,  that  there  has  been  impressed  upon  his 
conscience  by  an  outside  intelligence,  an  idea  of  Right  and 
Wrong  as  well  as  an  idea  of  Happiness,  for  if  we  remember 
that  nothing  can  be  greater  than  its  cause,  we  must  come  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  cause  of  having  a  Conscience  at  all 


Summary  , 

must  have  been  a  very  great  and  good  intelligence,  or  we 
could  not  have  our  notions  of  Intelligence  and  Good. 

That  by  far  the  overwhelming  majority  of  great  men  in 
biology  were  "believers"  in  a  Supreme  Being,  and  were  like- 
wise quite  religious. 

That  Alfred  Russell  Wallace,  co-founder  of  the  Theory 
of  Natural  Selection  with  Darwin,  said  in  his  last  book,  that 
there  had  been  absolutely  no  moral  progress  since  the 
history  of  man  began. 

That  Kohlmann,  the  German  Anthropologist,  says  that 
"Man  has  not  changed  his  racial  characteristics  since  the 
glacial  period." 

That  Kohlbrugge,  a  great  German  Biologist,  speaking  of 
our  knowledge  of  Evolution  says  "We  do  not  know  anything 
distinct  about  the  great  problem  of  evolution  as  yet.  We 
have  not  quite  even  seen  its  face.  All  must  be  done  over 
again." 

That  even  Huxley,  the  great  agnostic,  had  St.  Thomas 
Aquinas,  the  greatest  philosopher  of  the  Scholastic  school, 
as  one  of  his  favorite  authors. 

That  this  same  Professor  Huxley  had  his  children  brought 
up  in  the  Anglican  Church,  because,  as  Dr.  Walsh  says,  "he 
thought  that  Christian  principles  would  protect  them 
through  dangerous  periods  and  if  later  they  wanted  to 
choose  for  themselves,  they  might  do  so." 

And  it  is  well  to  remember  several  of  Dr.  Walsh's  "Scien- 
tific Don'ts."  2 

Don't  forget  that  Huxley's  "Romanes'  Lecture"  shows 
how  conservative  he  became  in  his  later  years,  and  remember 
that  Herbert  Spencer  in  his  last  book  retracts  many  of  his 
earlier  views  on  religion. 

Don't  forget  the  remarks  Dean  Stanley  made  as  he  lay 
on  a  sick  bed  from  which  it  was  thought  he  would  never 
rise :  "Life  looks  very  different  when  viewed  from  the  hori- 
zontal." Life  and  Philosophy  look  very  different  viewed 
from  the  gathering  shadows  of  the  end  of  life. 

Don't  forget  Francis  Bacon's  well-known  expression  "A 

J  Fifty  "Don'ts"  of  Science,  by  James  J.  Walsh,  M.D.  Ph.D.,  The  Cath- 
olic Mind,  Vol.  XIII.  No.  6,  March  22,  1915. 


230  The  Beglnnmgs  of  Science 

little  philosophy" — by  which  he  meant  natural  philosophy 
or,  as  we  call  it,  science — "inclineth  man's  mind  to  atheism, 
but  depth  in  philosophy  bringeth  men's  minds  about  to 
religion." 


CHAPTER  XII 

SUGGESTED     READING 

OUR  object  throughout  this  book  has  been  to  give  to 
the  reader  PERSPECTIVE,  in  order  that  he  may  thereby 
obtain  a  more  comprehensive  view  of  LIFE;  and  as  a  small 
volume  of  this  nature  cannot  enter  into  the  details  of 
the  many  subjects  discussed,  we  are  here  suggesting  a 
"course"  of  reading  that  we  believe  will  be  both  instructive 
and  profitable  to  all  who  will  follow  it  out  honestly  and 
thoroughly  but,  as  probably  very  few  will  have  had  the 
same  training,  we  shall  suggest  first  a  list  of  books  for  those 
whose  schooling  has  been  but  little,  and  who  on  that  ac- 
count cannot  immediately  delve  into  volumes  that  will  prove 
more  difficult  reading. 

This  first  list  must  be  purchased  so  that  the  student  can 
go  through  the  works  mentioned,  thoroughly  and  constantly, 
until  completely  mastered.  They  must  be  STUDIED,  not 
merely  read. 

Logic,  by  Wm.  Turner,  S.T.D.   (Catholic  Educa- 
tion Press,  Washington) $  1.25 

Dr.   Turner  is   Professor   of  Philosophy   in   the 
Catholic  University  at  Washington,  D.  C.,  and 
his  book  is  the  very  simplest  possible. 
Truth  and  Error,  by  Aloysius  J.  Rother,  S.J.     (B. 

Herder)    50 

Certitude,  by  Aloysius  J.  Rother,  S.J.  (B.  Herder)  .50 

Being,  by  Aloysius  J.  Rother,  S.J.  (B.  Herder).  .  .50 

The  author  of  these  little  books  is  professor  of 
philosophy  in  St.  Louis  University. 

231 


232  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

Psychology,  by  Michael  Maher,  S.J.,  D.Litt.,  M.A., 

(Longmans,  Green  &  Co.) 2.00 

Dr.  Maher  is  professor  of  Psychology  at  Stony- 
hurst  College,  England,  and  his  volume  is  a  vast 
store-house   of  all  things   psychological,   both 
from  the  Rational  and  the  Experimental  side. 
Problems    of  Philosophy,   by   John   Grier   Hibben 

(Scribners)    1.00 

Dr.  Hibben  is  president  of  Princeton  University. 

Backgrounds   for  Social   Workers,   by   Edward   J. 

Menge,  M.A.,  Ph.D.,  M.Sc.  (Richard  G.  Badger 

1918) 1.50 

General  Biology,    Sedgewick   and   Wilson    (Henry 

Holt  &  Co.) 1.75 

Dr.  Sedgewick  is  professor  of  biology  in  the 
Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology  and  Dr. 
Wilson  is  professor  of  zoology  in  Columbia 
College,  New  York. 

These  volumes,  if  thoroughly  mastered,  will  lay  a  solid 
foundation  for  all  future  reading. 

Should  one,  however,  have  had  some  philosophical  train- 
ing and  be  able  to  read  more  difficult  work  with  under- 
standing, we  would  suggest  that  the  list  of  volumes  im- 
mediately following  be  made  a  part  of  one's  library,  as 
well  as  all  of  the  books  in  the  outlined  course,  which  follows 
this  list,  that  the  student  can  afford. 

A  Manual  of  Scholastic  Philosophy,  by  Cardinal 

Mercier,  2  volumes,  (B.  Herder) $  7.00 

This  is  a  very  complete  philosophy  covering  prac- 
tically   all    problems    that   may    arise   in    the 
student's  mind. 
Problems   of  Philosophy,   by   John   Grier  Hibben, 

(Scribners)    1.00 

General  Biology,  by  Sedgewick  and  Wilson,  (Holt 

&  Co.)    1.75 


Suggested  Reading  233 

A  Text-Book  of  Zoology,  by  Parker  and  Haswell, 

(Macmillan),  2  volumes 9.00 

This  is  the  most  complete  work  on  the  subject  in 

the  English  Language. 

Stonyhurst  Series  of  Philosophy,  (Longmans, 
Green  &  Co.).  There  are  eight  volumes  in  this 
series  not  all  of  equal  value.  They  are  written 
by  the  professors  of  Stonyhurst  College,  Eng- 
land, and  treat  Scholastic  Philosophy  from  a 
modern  viewpoint  as  does  also  the  work  of  Car- 
dinal Mercier,  quoted  above.  It  is  not  neces- 
sary to  have  both  Mercier's  Manual  and  these 
eight  volumes,  but  Maher's  Psychology  should 
be  had,  on  account  of  the  vast  field  it  covers. 

Natural  Theology,  by  Bernard  Boedder,  S. J 2.00 

Logic,  by  Richard  F.  Clarke,  S.  J 1.50 

Political  Economy,  by  Charles  S.  Devas,  M.A 2.25 

Psychology,    by    Michael    Maher,    S.  J.,    Litt.  D., 

M.A 2.00 

The  First  Principles  of  Knowledge,  by  John  Rick- 
aby, S.J 1.50 

Moral  Philosophy,  by  Joseph  Rickaby,   S.J 1.50 

General  Metaphysics,  by  John  Rickaby,  S.J 1.50 

Theories  of  Knowledge,  by  Leslie  J.  Walker,  S.J. .  .         2.75 

The  outline  we  are  here  suggesting  has  been  formed  with 
the  idea  of  presenting  both  sides  of  the  question,  so  a 
rather  varied  list  of  articles  and  books  are  cited,  but  we 
would  have  the  student  remember  that  as  these  articles  and 
books  were  not  especially  written  to  form  a  course  of 
connected  reading,  there  will  be  some  repetition  and  often 
a  running  off  into  by-paths  that  have  little  to  do  with 
the  subject,  but  that  is  a  fault  one  must  always  find  in  the 
collateral  reading  one  may  follow. 

We  also  wish  to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  with  the 
Encyclopedia  Britannica  and  the  Catholic  Encyclopedia 
there  are  excellent  index  volumes,  which  should  always  be 


234  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

consulted  first  when  looking  up  any  subject  whatever,  for 
often  the  thing  sought  may  be  part  of  an  article  listed  under 
a  totally  different  name  and  in  a  totally  different  volume 
from  what  one  might  suppose. 

Further,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  until  the  three 
important  Encyclopedias  we  mention  have  been  consulted 
on  every  article  under  discussion,  the  student  must  not  con- 
sider himself  free  from  a  one-sided  viewpoint,  remembering 
that  a  fact  will  be  the  same  in  each  case  though  each  fact 
may  be  viewed  from  a  vastly  different  angle. 

Then  it  is  well  to  remember  that  the  Encyclopedia  Bri- 
tannica  is  written  largely  by  Protestants,  the  Catholic  En- 
cyclopedia by  Catholics  and  the  Jewish  Encyclopedia  by 
Jews,  thus  giving  one  an  authoritative  account  from  these 
three  angles. 

Outline  of  Study 

Philosophy  and  Common  Sense,  by  Dr.  Orestes 
Brownson,  Vol.  1,  Page  1,  of  Brownson's  Col- 
lected Works,  which  can  be  found  in  any  large 
library. 

Problems  of  Philosophy,  by  John  Grier  Hibben. 

Logic. 

Dante  and  Aquinas,  by  Philip  H.  Wicks  teed,  (Dut- 

ton  &  Co.) $  2.00 

This  little  volume  will  prove  an  interesting  and 
valuable  introduction  to  those  desiring  to  famil- 
iarize themselves  with  the  viewpoint  and  ter- 
minology of  Scholasticism. 
General  Biology,  by  Sedgewick  and  Wilson. 
Scholasticism,  Old  and  New,  by  M.  M.  C.  J.  de  Wulf 

(Benziger)    2.00 

Professor  de  Wulf  was  formerly  at  the  University 

of  Louvain  and  is  now  at  Harvard. 

Christian  Philosophy,  by  J.  T.  Driscoll  (Benziger)  1.25 
The  Revival  of  Scholastic  Philosophy  in  the  Nine- 


Suggested  Reading  235 

teenth  Century,  by  Joseph  Louis  Perrier,  Ph.D. 

(Columbia   University  Press) 1.75 

Mercier's  Manual  of  Scholastic  Philosophy  or 
The  Stonyhurst  Series  of  Philosophical  Studies. 
History  of  Philosophy,   by   Wm.    Turner,   S.T.D. 

(Ginn  &  Co.) 2.50 

Biology  and  Its  Makers,  by  Wm.  A  Locy,  (Henry 

Holt  &  Co.) 2.75 

Darwinism  To-Day,  by  Vernon  Kellogg,    (Henry 

Holt  &  Co.) .         2.00 

Essays   in   Unnatural   History,   by   John   Gerard, 

S.J.,  F.L.S.   (Herder) 1.25 

This  volume  having  been  written  in  1900  refutes 
much  that  needs  no  refutation  to-day,  but 
nevertheless  it  is  good  reading  on  the  history 
of  the  development  of  many  so-called  scientific 
ideas  that  are  no  longer  accepted. 
Studies  in  American  Philosophy,  The  Modern 

Schools:  Evolutionism,  by  the  Rev.  J.  B.  Ceule- 

mans,  Ecclesiastical  Review,  Sept.1912,  page  258. 

The  First  Principles  of  Evolution,  by  S.  Herbert, 
M.D.,  M.R.C.S.  (Eng.)  L.R.C.P.  (Lond.)  (Mac- 

millan)    1.60 

Easy   to   read   and   covers   both  inorganic   and 
organic   evolution,   BUT    one  must   not   forget 
one's  logic,  for  the  author  often  arrives  at  con- 
clusions that  are  not  exactly  sound,  logically. 
Facts  and  Theories,  by  Sir  Bertram  Windle,  M.A., 
M.D.,  Sc.D.,  LL.  D.,  F.R.S.,  K.S.G.,  President  of 

University  College,  Cork,   (Herder) .45 

The   Problem   of   Evolution,   by   Erich   Wasmann, 

S.J.  (Herder)    1.60 

This  is  an  account  of  a  most  interesting  public 
discussion  held  in  Berlin,  in  1907,  between  dis- 
ciples of  Professor  Haeckel  and  Professor 
Wasmann  himself,  who,  by  the  way,  is  one  of 
the  great  authorities,  if  not  the  greatest  on  Ant 
Life. 


236  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

What  is  Life?  by  Sir  Bertram  Windle,  (Herder) .  .  .75 

The  Conservation  of  Energy  and  Voluntary  Activ- 
ity, by  the  Rev.  Michael  O'Kane,  O.P.,  in  Amer- 
ican Catholic  Quarterly  Review,  July,  1903,  Page 
588. 

A  Recent  Argument  against  Vitalism,  by  the  Rev. 
A.  M.  Schwitalla,  S.J.  Ecclesiastical  Review, 
Feb.  1913,  Pages  136-149. 

The  Life  in  Separated  Human  Tissues,  by  Austin 
O'Malley,  M.D.,  Ecclesiastical  Review,  October, 
1914,  Page  464. 

Modern  Biology  and  the  Theory  of  Evolution,  by 

Erich  Wasmann,  (Herder) 4.50 

Genetics,  by  Herbert  Eugene  Walter,  (Macmillan)         1.50 

Instinct  and  Intelligence  in  the  Animal  Kingdom, 

by  Erich  Wasmann,  (Herder) 1.00 

Brain  and  Personality,  by  Wm.  Hanna  Thomson, 

(Dodd,  Mead  &  Co.) 1.20 

For  those  whose  interests  lie  in  the  biological  realm,  and 
who  wish  to  read  more  extensively  along  their  chosen  line, 
we  suggest: 

Origin  of  Species,  by  Charles  Darwin. 
Voyage  of  the  Beagle,  by  Charles  Darwin. 
Text-book  of  Zoogeography,  by  Frank  Evers  Bed- 

dard,  (Putnams)    $  1.50 

Behavior  of  the  Lower  Organisms,  by  H.  S.  Jen- 
nings, (Columbia  Univ.  Press) 3.00 

Heredity,  in  its  relation  to  Eugenics,  by  Chas.  B. 

Davenport,  (Henry  Holt  &  Co.) 2.00 

Ants,  by  Wm.  Morton  Wheeler,  Ph.D.   (Columbia 

Univ.  Press)    5.00 

Species  and   Varieties,  by  Hugo  de  Vries,   (Open 

Court   Pub.    Co.) 5.00 

Mendel's  Principles  of  Heredity,  by  W.  Bateson, 

(Putnams)    3.50 

Thoughts    of   a   Catholic   Anatomist,    by    Thomas 

Dwight,  M.D.,  LL.D.,  (Longmans,  Green  &  Co.)         1.00 


Suggested  Reading  237 

On  the  Psychological  side,  read : 

The  Century's  Progress  in  Experimental  Psychol- 
ogy^ by  Henry  Smith  Williams,  M.D.,  Harpers 
Magazine,  September,  1899,  Page  512. 

Fact  and  Fable  in  Psychology,  by  Joseph  Jastrow, 

Ph.D.,    (Houghton  Mifflin  Co.) 2.00 

Professor  Jastrow  is  head  of  the  department  of 
Psychology  in  the  University  of  Wisconsin. 

Genetic  Psychology,  by  Edwin  A.  Kirkpatrick,  B.S., 

M.Ph.,  (Macmillan)    1.25 

Psychology   for   Teachers,    by   Charles   H.   Judd, 

(Appleton  &  Co.) 1.20 

Education  of  the  Central  Nervous  System,  by  Reu- 
ben Post  Hallack,  (Macmillan) 1.00 

From  the  animal  side  of  psychology,  we  have  1;hese  excel- 
lent books : 

Behavior,  An  Introduction  to  Comparative  Psy- 
chology, by  John  B.  Watson,  Professor  of  Psy- 
chology in  the  Johns  Hopkins  University. 
(Henry  Holt  &  Co.) 1.75 

Lectures  on  Human  and  Animal  Psychology,  by 

Wilhelm  Wundt,  (Macmillan) 2.60 

The  Animal  Mmd,  by  Margaret  Floy  Washburn, 
Ph.D.,  Professor  of  Psychology  in  Vassar  Col- 
lege, (Macmillan)  1.60 

Instinct  and  Intelligence  in  the  Animal  Kingdom, 
by  Erich  Wasmann,  S.J.  (Herder)  Already 
quoted 1.00 

Comparative  Studies  m  Psychology  of  Ants  and  of 

Higher  Animals,  by  Erich  Wasmann,  (Herder)         1.00 

Founders  of  Modern  Psychology,  by  G.  Stanley 
Hall,  President  of  Clark  University.  (D.  Apple- 
ton  &  Co.) 2.50 

Rather  difficult  reading  unless  one  is  familiar  with 
philosophy. 

All  that  have  been  cited  so  far  are,  of  course,  a  part  of 
the  literature  that  makes  for  a  general  knowledge  on  the 


238  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

subjects  discussed,  but  the  following  books  are  especially 
interesting  as  they  deal  more  with  the  philosophy  of  biology 
direct. 

The  Freedom  of  Science,  by  Joseph  Donat,  S.J., 

D.D.,    (Joseph  F.   Wagner,   New  York) $2.50 

Dr.  Donat  is  a  professor  in  Innsbruck  University. 

The  Great  Enigma,  by  W.  S.  Lilly,  (D.  Appleton 

&  Co.)    3.60 

The  Science  and  Philosophy  of  the  Organism,  by 
Hans  Driesch,  Ph.D.,  Professor  in  the  University 
of  Heidelberg,  and  Gifford  Lecturer  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Aberdeen  for  1907-1908.  2  volumes, 
(Macmillan)  6.00 

The  Problem  of  Individuality,  by  Hans  Driesch 
(Macmillan). 

The  History   and   Theory   of    Vitalism,    by   Hans 

Driesch,  (Macmillan)    1.75 

Quite  difficult  reading  unless  one  is  familiar  with 
both  biology  and  philosophy. 

Mechanism,  Life  and  Personality,  by  J.  S.  Haldane, 
M.D.,  LL.D.,  F.R.S.,  (London). 

Continuity,  The  British  Association  Presidential 
Address,  1913,  by  Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  D.Sc.,  F.R.S. 
(London,  1913). 

Some  Intimations  of  Immortality,  by  the  Rt.  Hon. 
Sir  Edward  Fry,  G.C.S.,  (London,  1913). 
The    last    three    volumes    differ    with    Professor 
Driesch  to  a  very  considerable  extent  and  will 
therefore  prove  quite  interesting. 

See  The  Hibbert  Journal  "Reviews,"  Vol.  XII,  Page 
706,  for  a  review  of  these  three  and  Vol.  XIII, 
page  438  for  a  review  of  Professor  Driesch's  vol- 
umes, both  reviews  are  by  O.  W.  Griffith. 

Modern  Science  and  the  Illusions  of  Professor  Berg- 
son,  by  Hugh  S.  R.  Elliot,  with  preface  by  Sir 
Ray  Lankester,  K.C.B.,  F.R.S. ,  (Longman's, 

Green  &  Co.)    1.60 

This  book  challenges  the  "right  of  philosophy  to 


Suggested  Reading  239 

intrude  into  the  sphere  of  science,"  but  is  in 
turn  answered  by 
The  Limitations    of  Science,   by   Louis   T.   More, 

(Henry  Holt)    1.50 

The  following  articles  in  various  Journals,  easily  obtain- 
able at  any  Library  of  importance,  are  also  of  interest: 

Mind  and  Matter,  a  Hylozoistic  View,  by  Fleet-surgeon 
C.  Marsh  Beadnell,  R.N.,  Hibbert  Journal,  Vol.  XIII,  Page 
605. 

A  Physiologist's  View  of  Life  and  Mind,  by  D.  Noel  Paton, 
Professor  of  Physiology  in  the  University  of  Glasgow.  Hib- 
bert Journal,  Vol.  XIII,  Page  367. 

A  Recent  Work  on  Primitive  Revelation  and  Modern 
Science,  by  the  Rev.  John  D.  Folghera,  O.P.  Ecclesiasti- 
cal Review,  April,  1914. 

Science  in  "Bondage,"  by  Sir  Bertram  Windle,  The  Catho- 
lic World,  February,  1917. 

Religion  as  a  Credible  Faith,  by  W.  H.  Mallock.  This 
book  is  quite  interesting  on  account  of  the  attempt  the 
author  makes  to  harmonize  supposedly  conflicting  facts. 
Published  by  Macmillan  in  1903 ;  it  should  be  read  and  then, 
the  answer  to  that  part  dealing  with  Maher's  Psychology, 
will  be  found  in  the  1914  edition  of  Maher's  Psychology; 
also  read  these  criticisms  immediately  following  the  reading 
of  the  volume: 

Mr.  Mallock  on  Science  and  Religion,  by  Rev.  S.  Fitz 
Simons,  The  American  Catholic  Quarterly  Review,  January, 
1904.  Vol.  XXIX,  Page  74. 

Mr.  Mallock  as  a  Defender  of  Natural  Religion,  by  E.  R. 
Hull,  S.J.,  The  American  Catholic  Quarterly  Review,  July, 
1896.  Vol.  XXI,  No.  83. 

The  Problem  of  Evolution,  by  Erich  Wasmann,  S. J.  Al- 
ready quoted,  is  reviewed  and  objected  to  by  the  article: 

Father  Wasmann  on  Evolution,  by  Rev.  S.  Fitz  Simons, 
American  Catholic  Quarterly  Review,  January,  1910.  Page 
12.  Vol.  XXXV.  No.  137,  Page  12.  This  is  a  good  sum- 
mary by  one  who  absolutely  refuses  to  accept  any  evolution 


240  The  Begmnmgs  of  Science 

whatever. 

History  of  the  Warfare  of  Science  "with  Theology  in 
Christendom,  by  Andrew  Dickson  White,  (D.  Appleton  & 
Co.)  2  volumes,  $5.00.  A  work  whose  reading  is  suggested 
at  many  of  our  great  schools,  but  it  should  be  read  in 
conjunction  with  the  following: 

Critique  of  White's  "Warfare,"  Vol.  16,  Page  597.  Ecclesi- 
astical Review  and 

Christian  Faith  and  Modern  Science,  by  the  V.  Rev.  John 
B.  Hogan,  SS.  D.D.,  American  Catholic  Quarterly  Review, 
April,  1897,  Vol.  XXII,  Page  382. 

For  Draper's  works  though  thoroughly  discredited,  but 
often  referred  to,  see  article  "Science"  Catholic  Encyclope- 
dia. See  also  the  following  articles  in  the  three  Encyclope- 
dias mentioned. 

Biology,  Evolution,  Medicine,  Life,  Cell,  Vitalism,  An- 
atomy, Physiology,  Instinct,  Heredity,  Eugenics,  Psychol- 
ogy, Botany,  Zoology,  Biogenesis,  Abiogenesis,  Autogeny, 
Ethics,  Science. 

See  also  Reading  Lists  on  Biology  and  Philosophy,  in 
both  Encyclopedia  Britannic  a  and  the  Catholic  Encyclo- 
pedia, in  the  last  volume  of  each. 

Consult  the  "Periodical  Index"  found  in  any  library  for 
special  articles  appearing  in  the  various  journals;  but  re- 
member that  in  reading  these  articles  when  a  statement  is 
simply  made  without  evidence  adduced  to  support  it,  though 
it  be  quoted  until  it  is  known  by  nearly  every  one,  the  state- 
ment need  not  be  true;  for,  often  one  man,  wholly  irre- 
sponsible, has  said  something  which  others  have  copied  until 
the  very  fact  that  it  is  so  often  quoted  gives  it  a  semblance 
of  truth. 

Consult  the  annual  index  or  semi-annual  index  of  the  fol- 
lowing high  grade  journals,  for  many  interesting  articles: 

The  North  American  Review, 

The  Atlantic  Monthly, 

The  Hibbert  Journal, 

The  American  Catholic  Quarterly  Review, 

The  Catholic  World, 


Suggested  Readmg 

The  Dublin  Review, 
The  Unpopular  Review. 

This  list  is  by  no  means  exhaustive  and  its  aim  has 
been  to  open  up  a  world  of  broader  vision  for  the  student 
than  he  would  be  likely  to  obtain  by  the  usual  suggestions 
given  him. 

As  we  have  stated  in  our  chapter  on  "The  Ideal,"  it 
is  the  province  of  Religion  to  begin  where  we  have  left  off. 
So  we  would  suggest  the  following  two  volumes  for  reading 
in  this  region. 

Constructive  Natural  Theology,  by  Newman  Smyth, 

(Scribner)    $  1.00 

From  the  Protestant  viewpoint,  and 
Natural  Religion,  by  Franz  Hettinger,  D.D.   (Fr. 

Pustet  &  Co.) 2.00 

From  the  Catholic  side.  Dr.  Hettinger  was  pro- 
fessor of  Theology  in  the  University  of  Wurz- 
burg. 

We  have  given  only  those  articles  and  volumes  which 
are  written  in  the  English  language.  There  are  of  course, 
many  more  than  we  have  cited,  and  in  German  and  French 
even  a  great  many  more  than  there  are  in  English,  but  for 
those  who  can  read  either  of  these  languages  in  the  original 
the  references  and  notes  in  the  volumes  cited  will  furnish  suf- 
ficient material  for  a  most  extended  effort. 

There  is  one  more  point  that  we  must  not  fail  to  men- 
tion, and  it  is  that  of  Vestigial  or  Rudimentary  Organs  and 
those  similarities  of  structure  known  as  Homologies  be- 
tween Men  and  Animals.  We  cannot  treat  so  vast  a  sub- 
ject very  fully  here,  but  we  can  show  the  student  where 
he  may  find  the  references  he  wishes: 

Evolution  of  Man,  by  Jas.  Walsh,  M.D.,  Ph.D.,  Litt.D., 
etc.  Article  in  The  Catholic  World,  May,  1916,  pp.  207- 


242  The  Beginnings  of  Science 

218. 

Regarding  Haeckel's  Biogenetic  Law,  that  is,  that  each 
individual  passes  through  the  same  stages  that  the  race 
has  passed  through.  See, 

Wasmann's  Biology,  page  456  and  445  and  446. 

Wasmann's  Biology,  (English  Translation)  in  the  Ap- 
pendix, I.e.  page  503  and  487. 

Kellogg's  Darwinism  To-day,  Page  21,  where  he  says 
the  "Recapitulation  theory  is  mostly  wrong."  (This  is  Haeck- 
el's  Biogenetic  Law)  and  in  another  place  he  adds  that  this 
theory  now  forms  only  a  skeleton  on  which  to  hang  excep- 
tions. See  also  page  130,  where  Professor  Kellogg  says 
that  Haeckel  still  continues  to  cling  to  discredited  theories. 

Ranke's  Der  Mensch,  (Third  Edition)  I.  page  311-314, 
and  the  whole  of  section  306  to  314.  Ranke  is  an  authority 
so  no  one  need  fear  quoting  him. 

T.  Thesing's  Experiment elle  Biologie,  II.  (Volume  337  of 
the  collection  Aus  Natur  wnd  Geistes  Welt. 

Biologwche  Zentralblatt,  XXXVI,  1906,  No.  21,  pages 
754-768.  Article,  "Neuerere  und  Neueste  Schilddruesen- 
forschung"  by  O.  Schulz.  Consult  any  Medical  Library  for 
this.  Wasmann  cites  it,  I.  page  446. 

Stimmen  aus  Maria  Laach,  1911,  No.  4.  This  covers 
Evolution  as  it  applies  to  man,  by  Karl  Frank,  S.J.  See 
page  16  for  the  mention  of  Rudimentary  Organs. 

Neueres  zur  Abstummungslehre,  in  Revue  Luxembour- 
geoise,  1910,  No.  2,  by  E.  Wasmann. 

In  regard  to  rudimentary  organs,  we  are  daily  finding 
reasons  for  their  existence.  A  few  years  ago  the  ductless 
glands  were  so  considered,  but  now  we  know  they  produce 
some  substance  that  other  glands  must  -have  to  continue 
their  work,  and  similarity  of  structure  does  not  denote 
similarity  of  ancestry  any  more  than  dissimilarity  denotes 
that  the  organisms  possessing  it  sprang  from  different  par- 
entage. 

At  any  of  the  larger  universities  a  great  number  of  tech- 


Suggested  Reading 

nical  journals  may  be  found,  usually  in  the  departmental 
libraries,  on  all  Biological,  Psychological,  Philosophical  and 
other  branches  of  Science,  and  we  suggest  consulting  these 
also. 


INDEX 


Abnormal  psychology,  37,  44 

Acquired    characteristics,   120,    122 

Adaptiveness,    functional,    125 

Adaptation,  122 

Adaptation,  definition  of,   176 

Adaptation,  Weismann  on,   177 

Advertising,  42 

Agassiz,  200,  213 

Aldrovandi,  202 

Altum,  213 

America,  naming  of,  74 

Americus  Vespucius,  74 

Ampere,  209,  213 

Amphigenesis,  133 

Anatomy,  21 

Animal  Life,  21 

Animal      as       contradistinguished 

from  man,  65 
Animal  psychology,  41 
Anti-Darwinians,  104,  107 
Apparent  chance,  170 
Applied  psychology,  42 
Applied  science,  88 
Aquinas,   Thomas,   146,  229 
Arcelin,  Abbe,  217 
Archeologists,  table  of,  217 
Argyle,  Duke  of,  214 
Aristotle,  204,  206 
Ascidians,  167,  181 
Assumptions,  70 
Astronomers,  208,  216 
Augustine,  Saint,  112,  149 
Autenrieth,  M.  F.,  205 
Authority,  real,  196 
Authority  in  science,  196 


Authority-seeking    type    of    mind, 

25 
Autonomy  of  vital  processes,  157 

Bacon,  Francis,  229 
Bacteriology,  22 
Baer,  von,  201,  206 
Bagehot,  Walter,  100 
Balfour,  84,  202 
Ballard,  Philip  B.,  41 
Balzac,  65 
Barf,  216 
Barrande,  212,  216 
Bateson,  134,  141 
Bathmic  force,  172 
Battle  of  the  parts,  125 
Beaumont,   212 
Becquerel,  210 
Becoming,  158 
Bell,  Charles,  200 
Behaviorists,   64 
Belief,  system  of,  84,  199 
Berengarius,  201 
Bergson,  206 
Berkeley,  183 
Beroud,  217 

Bernard,  Claude,  201,  206,  212 
Berthelot,  215,  216 
Berzelius,  210 
Bessel,  209 
Beudant,  211 
Bichat,  201,  205,  206,  207 
Binet,  208 

Biological    science,     founders    of, 
207 


245 


246 


Index 


Biologists,  200 

Biologists,  most  important,  206 

Biology,  21 

Biology  and  its  makers,  197 

Biology,  far-reaching,  28 

Biophors,  123 

Biot,  210 

Biotic  energy,  172 

Birth  of  psychology,  35 

Bischof,  212 

Blumenbach,  J.  F.,  205 

Boerhaave,  202 

Botany,  21 

Botanists,  table  of,  216 

Bois-Reymond,  201 

Bonnet,  201,  206 

Boscovich,  208 

Bossuet,  208 

Bourdeloue,  208 

Bourgeois,  Abbe,  217 

Bourne,  Dr.  G.  C.,  115,  116,  147 

Brahe,  Tycho,  208 

Brewster,  Sir  David,  217 

Britannica,      Encyclopedia,       107, 

164,  197 

Brown,  Robt.,  201 
Briinn    Natural    History    Society, 

134 

Bruyere,  La,  208 
Buckland,  201,  212 
Buffon,  201,  204 
Bunge,  von,  171,  206 
Burbank,  Luther,  89 
Burdach,  K.  F.,  205 
Busse,  205 
Butschli,  144 

Caesalpinus,  202 
Calkins,  203 
Cantor,  208 
Career,  222 
Carpenter,  202 
Carnoy,  212 


Carpi,  203 

Castle,  52,   142,  203 

Castracane,  213 

Catholicity,  76 

Catholic,   Roman   priests,   107 

Catholic   scientists,   216 

Cauchy,  208,  217 

Causality,  159 

Causality,    unifying    is    regulative, 

163 
Cause    always    richer    in    content 

than  product,   160 
Cause,  first,  192 
Cause    of   change    not    necessarily 

spatial,   160 
Causo-mechanism,    brings    an    end 

to  all  sciences  save  physics  and 

chemistry,   171 
Causo-Mechanists,     definition     of, 

153 

Causo-mechanists,  list  of,  218 
Ceechi,   209 

Cell,  effect  of  study  of,  171 
Cell,  develops  toward  an  end,  175 
Certitude,   87 
Chance,  48 

Chance,    abolished,    169 
Chance,  apparent,  our  fault,  170 
Change  from  philosophy  to  labora- 
tory sciences,  30 

Change  in  methods  in  schools,  48 
Chaptal,  211 
Chasles,    217 

Chemists,  table  of,  210,  216 
Chevreul,  211,  216 
Clausius,   207 
Cleavage,  law  holds  good  up  to  a 

certain    point      only      and    then 

changes,   169 
Coffey,  Rev.   P.,  184 
Cohn,   201 
Collet,  216 
Columbus,  203 


Index 


247 


Commandments,  Ten,  28 

Comparative  psychology,  41 

Conklin,  141 

Conservation  of  energy,  90,  163, 
185 

Constancy,  theory  of,   145 

Contingency  and  necessity,  188 

Conybeare,   212 

Cope,   120,   172,  202 

Copernicus,  208 

Corneille,  208 

Cossmann,  P.  N.,  205 

Coulomb,  209 

Crayfish,   167 

Creed,  need  of  in  science,  115 

Criminology,  45 

Culture,  16 

Curriculum  of  universal  knowl- 
edge, 151 

Cuvier,  201,  205,  206,  207,  211 

d'Abbadie,  211 

Dall,  134 

Dalton,  210 

Dana,  212,  217 

Daniel,  211 

Darwin,   Charles,   49,   89,   99,    113, 

119,  172,  194,  200,  206,  207 
Darwin,  Erasmus,  201 
Darwinism,  103,  111,  116 
Darwinism,  decline  of,  121 
Darwinism  losing  ground,  113 
Darwinism  to-day,  103 
Daubree,  212 

Davenport,  Charles,  144,  203 
David,   213 

Davy,  Sir  Humphrey,  207 
Dawson,  217 
de  Bary,  H.  A.,  203 
de  Derrer,  212 
Delage,  104 
de  Lamennais,  71 
de   Lapparent,    210 


de  la  Rive,  209 

Delaunay,    Abbe,    217 

de   la   Valles,   Poussin,   216 

de  Luc,  211 

Dementia  precox,   60 

de   Nadaillac,  Marquis,  217 

Denza,   209,   216 

Desanis,  210 

Descartes,   71,  206,  208 

Description  not  an  explanation,  30, 
177 

Determinants,   123 

Determinism,    66 

Development  and  origin  of  the  in- 
dividual, 52 

Deville,  211,  216 

de  Vries,  65,  128,  131,  134 

de  Vico,  209 

de   Wulf,   76 

d'Homalilus  d'Halloy,  212,  213,  216 

Direction,  172 

Discontinuous  variations,  134 

Did  human  beings  spring  from 
animal  ancestors?  114 

Difference  between  humans  and 
animals  psychic  and  not  physi- 
cal, 114 

Differences  between  man  and 
brute,  117 

Difference  between  proving  one's 
own  point  and  showing  the  lack 
of  proof  in  another,  106 

Doctrine  of  the  schools  at  last  be- 
come the  maxims  of  the  crowd, 
31 

Dominant,  53 

Downing,  E.  D.,  121 

Driesch,  117,  143,  150,  189 

Driesch,  see  entire  chapter  on  vi- 
talism, 151 

Driesch's  experiment  on  clavellina 
lepadiformis,  181 

Du  Bois-Reymond,  215 


248 


Index 


Ducrost,   217 
Dufour,  Leon,  203 
Dujardin,   203 
Dumas,  211,  216 
Dumont,  212,  216 
Duncan,   Professor,   183,   184 
Durban,  Abbe  Cau,  217 
Dwight,  142,  203 
Dynamic    teleology,    157 

Edison,  Thomas,  52,  89 

Education  not  natural,  62 

Educational  literature  largely 
worthless,  227 

Egg  cell  more  complicated  than 
adult  form,  189 

Ehrenberg,  202,  213 

Ehrhardt,   F.,  205 

Eimer,  128,  130,  172,  203 

Electricity,  209 

Embryology,  21 

Emery,  134 

Emotional  types  of  mind,  25 

Empiricism,    188 

Energy  defined,  184 

Energy,  laws  of,  184 

Energy,  as  used  by  Lodge,  185 

Energy,  store  of  being  run  down 
constantly,  184 

English  language,  74 

Environment,  99 

Entelechy,  definition  of,  163 

Entelechy,  vital  principle,   172 

Epistemology  and  metaphysics,  103 

Ethics,   67,   81,   228 

Euler,  208 

Evidence,  anecdotal,  46 

Evidence,  for  evolution  purely  log- 
ical, 104 

Evidence,  laboratory,  18 

Evolution,  90,  99 

Evolution,  evidence  subjective,  105 

Evolution,  evidence  for,  112 


Evolution  defined,  109 

Evolution,  a  process,  177 

Evolution  as  a  personal  god,  176 

Evolution  as  a  scientific  hypothe- 
sis, 145 

Evolution   means   becoming,   195 

Evolution  due  to  environment,  131 

Evolution  not  due  to  environment, 
130 

Evolution,  causo-mechanical  start- 
ing point,  102 

Evolution,  exact  proof  wanting, 
103,  104 

Evolution,  external  factors  effect 
on,  113 

Evolution,  limitation  of,  114 

Evolution,  monogenetic,  146 

Evolution,  monophyletic,  146 

Evolution  not  to  be  confused  with 
a  theory  of,  111 

Evolution;  only  one  thing  proven 
in,  227 

Evolution  philosophically  consid- 
ered, 146 

Evolution;  points  to  be  remem- 
bered in  a  summary  of,  145 

Evolution,  polygenetic,  146 

Evolution,  polyphyletic,  146 

Evolution,  theological  starting 
point,  101 

Evolution,  thought  of  by  St.  Au- 
gustine, 112 

Evolution,  theories  of,  different  for 
various  sciences,  116 

Evolution,  theory  of,  111 

Evolution  turned  over  educational 
methods,  99 

Evolutionary  theory  favored  by 
genetical  research,  144 

Evolutionary  scientists,  table  of, 
213 

Evolutionary  work  must  largely 
be  done  over  again,  229 


Index 


249 


Experimental  psychology,  36 
Experimental  psychology,  birth  of, 

36 
Experts  disagreeing,  199 


Facts  agreed  upon  by  all,  85 
Facts,  interpretation  of,  98 
Facts  vs.  interpretations,  100 
Facts,   all   necessary  before   truth 

can  be  ascertained,  226 
Facts,  same  ones  produce  different 

conclusions  in  different  persons, 

101 

Facts  vs.  truth,  109 
Faith,  definition  of,  73 
Fabricus,   202 
Fallopius,  202 
False  teaching,  96 
Faraday,  209,  217 
Faust,  Goethe's,  175 
Faye,  209,  216 
Fenelon,  208 
Fermat,  208 
Ferrari,  216 
First  cause,  192 
First  principles,  27 
Fleischmann,  Professor,  149,  227 
Flourens,  212 
Fossils,  none  ever  found  that  were 

first  of  its  kind,  175 
Foucoult,  210 
Fraas,   212 
Frauenhofer,  210 
Freaks  in  nature,  135 
Free  will,  66 

Free  will  necessary  to  ethics,  228 
French  revolution,  31,  96 
Fresnel,  210,  217 
Freycinet,  211 
Friedel,  211 
Frog's  eggs,  172 
Fuchs,  211 


Galen,  201,  206 

Galton,  201 

Galvini,  209 

Gaudry,  216 

Gauss,  208 

Geer,  de,  203 

Gegenbauer,   202 

Genetic  energy,   172 

Genetic  psychology,  41 

Geographers,  table  of,  211 

Geographical    selection,    127 

Geologists,  table  of,  211,  216 

Germinal  selection,  123 

Gerdil,  208  £ 

Gesner,  201 

Gilbert,  217 

Goethe,  175,  205 

Goetz,   205 

Goodsir,  201 

Gray,  Asa,  201,  214,  217 

Greene,  Edward  L.,  216 

Greene,  Tulasne,  216 

Grew,  202 

Grimaldi,  208 

Growth,  122 

Growth  adapted  to  an  end,  167 

Guldin,  208 

Gurwith,  206 

Gustavos  Adolphus,  97 

Habit,  58 

Haeckel,  Ernst,  148,  201,  218 
Haeckel's  biogenetic  law,  242 
Haeckel,  falsifications  of,  92 
Haeckel,  gaseous  vertebrate,  194 
Haeckel,  lament  on  change  of  atti- 
tude   by   prominent    naturalists, 
215 
Haeckel,  paragraph  I  of  the  Mo- 

nist  religion,  208 

Haematococcus,  50  ; 

Hagen,  216 
Haldane,  Dr.,   183 


250 


Index 


Haller,  201,  206 

Halmatogenesis,  131 

Hamard,  Abbe,  217 

Hanstein,  J.   von,  205 

Hartman,  Edward  von,  205 

Harvard,  76 

Harvey,  200,  204,  206 

Hausmann,  211 

Hauy,  211 

Hazard  of  posii'on,   125 

Hegel,  184,  205 

Heis,  Professor,  209 

Helmholtz,    199 

Helmont,  J.  R.  von,  204 

Henry,  211,  217 

Henslow,  172 

Herd  instinct,  42 

Hermite,  208,  217 

Herschel,  209,  217 

Hertwig,   175,  203 

Heterogenesis,  128,  133,  134 

Heterogenesis  vs.  transmutation, 
136 

Heude,  213 

Hibben,  20,  31,  82 

Hirm,  207 

His,  Wm.,  203 

Histology,  22 

Hitchcock,  212,  217 

Holmes,  Oliver  Wendell,  62,  100 

Hooke,  Robt.,  201 

Hubbard,  Elbert,  68 

Human  being  and  fish  pass 
through  same  stage,  148 

Humanists  not  ancestors  of  physi- 
cists, 184 

Humboldt,  Alexander  von,  205 

Hume,  183 

Hunter,  John,  218 

Hunting  of  the  snark,  219 

Huxley,  89,  90,  200,  218,  229 

Huxley's  children  brought  up  in 
Anglican  faith,  229 


Huxley,  conservative  in  later  years, 
229 

Huxley,  not  convinced  of  Darwin- 
ism, 113 

Hydra,  178 

Hypothesis  justified  if  it  works, 
116 

Idealism,  188 

Idealism  cannot  be  given  physical 
form,  194 

Idea  of  the  ideal,  193 

Immanent,  183 

Inclusive  demarcation,  49 

Independent   and   dependent,   188 

Inghirami,  209 

Inherent,   183 

Inheritance,  99 

Inner  directive  force,  130 

Inner  law  of  development,  130 

Interactionist  doctrine,  38 

Instinct,  58 

Interpretations,  63 

Intrinsic  tendency  toward  pro- 
gress, 130 

Introspectionists,  64 

Inventors  not  scientists,  52 

Isolation  theories,  127 

Jaekel,  128,  133 

James,  Wm.,  66,  70,  76,  78,  81,  103 

Jastrow,  Joseph,   199 

Jesuits,  76 

Johns   Hopkins,  76 

Johnston,  203 

Jolly,  210 

Joule,  207 

Kant,  215 

Kellogg,  Vernon,  Ch.  VI,  VII. 

Kellogg,  biology  has  proven   only 

one  thing,  227 
Ketteler,  210 


Index 


251 


Keyserling,  205 

Kielmeyer,  213 

Klaproth,   211 

Klein,  203 

Kneller,  207,  209 

Know  thyself,  22 

Knowledge  vs.  wisdom,  31 

Koch,  Robt.,  135,  202 

Kohlbrugge,  229 

Kohlmann,  229 

Koller,  209 

Kolliker,  von,  128,  134,  200 

Korschinsky,  103,  128,  130,  131 

Kowalevsky,  203 

Kreil,  209 

Laboratory's  justification,  18 
La  Bruyere,  208 
Lacaze-Duthiers,  203 
Lamarck,    49,    113,    119,    122,   201, 

206,  207,  213 
Lament,  209 
Lapparent,  212 
Larger  unity,  169 
Latreille,  213 
Law,  79,  95,  185 
Laws  of  energy,  184 
Laws,  moral  and  physical,  228 
Laws  of  nature,  concept  destroyed, 

169 

Learning,  58 
Leeuwenhoek,  201 
Legal  type  of  mind,  25 
Leibnitz,  206,  208 
Leidy,  203 
Lesser,  203 
Leuckart,  203 
Leunis,  213 
Leverrier,  209,  216 
Leydig,  203 
Libraries,  16 
Liebemann,  205 
Liebig,  205,  211,  217 


Life,  cannot  be  explained  physi- 
cally, 164 

Life  from  another  planet,  176 

Life,  origin  of,  164 

Life,  philosophy  of,  194 

Life,  plant,  21 

Life-principle  not  omnipotent,  164 

Life,  science  of,  21 

Living  machine,  154 

Living  matter,  151 

Living  things,  study  of,  physical 
and  psychic,  158 

Linnaeus,  200,  206,  207 

Lister,  200 

Locy,  Professor  Win.,  197,  206 

Lodge,  Sir  Oliver,  185 

Loeb,  203,  218 

Logic  vs.  truth,  106 

Logical  summary,  191 

Lessen,  212,  213 

Lotze,  206 

Louis  XIII.,  97 

Louvain,   76 

Ludwig,  201,  218 

Lycurgus,  79 

Lyell,  201 

Lyonet,  203 

MacCulloch,  212 

Mackenzie,  Colin,  210 

Magendie,    F.,    205 

Malpighi,  201,  206,  207 

Man  has  not  changed  his  racial 
characteristics,  229 

Man  as  contradistinguished  from 
animals,  65 

Man,  synoptic,  20 

Many  passing  judgment  more  cor- 
rect than  a  single  person  pass- 
ing it,  43 

Marsh,  O.  C.,  202 

Mathew,    Professor,    189 

Martineaux,  28 


252 


Index 


Martins,  von,  213 

Mathematicians,  table  of,  217 

Matter,  constitution  of,  90 

Maupertius,   205 

Maury,  211 

Maxwell,  209,  210,  217 

Mayer,  207,  217 

Meanings,  63 

Mechanism  abolished  by  order  in 
nature,  169 

Mecket,  203 

Men    and    women,    mental    differ- 
ences, 43 

Mendel,  52,  89,  107,  134,  200,  218 

Mendelism,   200 

Mendel's  experiment  on  peas,  53 

Mendelian  theory,  52 

Metaphysics,   usual  type  accepted 
by  scientists,  183 

Mental  effort,  sustained,  31 

Mental  phenomena,  science  of,  35 

Microscope,  invention  of,  32 

Middle  ages,  75 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  20 

Miller,  212 

Milne-Edwards,  202 

Mind,  35,  37,  40,  64 

Mind,  types  of,  25 

Mivart,  St.  George,  84,  202 

Modern  psychology,  36 

Mohl,  von,  201 

Molecular  theory,  90 

Moleschott,  200 

Monism  of  order,  170 

Monist,  80 

Montgomery,  Edward,  205 

Moore,  Professor  B.,  172 

Moral  order,  79,   196 

Moral  order  and  law,  95,  228 

Moral  progress,  none  since  man's 

history  began,   229 
Mormons,  76 
Moses,  79 


Miiller,  Fritz,  203 

Miiller,    Johannes,    202,    205,    206, 

207,  212 

Murchison,  Sir  Frederick,  217 
Mutation  theory,  134 
Mutations   may  be   Mendelian   re- 

cessives,  141 

Nageli,  102,  110,  117,  128,  130, 
150,  203 

Natural  science  realm,  196 

Natural  scientists,  table  of,  210 

Natural  selection,  Huxley  not  con- 
vinced of,  113 

Nature,  definition  of,  158 

Nature  conceived  as  one  order, 
169 

Necessary  being,  188 

Needham,  203,  205 

Neo-vitalists,  110,  143 

Nerves,  38 

Neurology,   40 

Newport,  203 

Newton,  208 

Noll,  Fritz,  205 

Non-living  matter,   151 

Observer,  30,  103 

Oersted,  209 

Ohm,   209 

Oken,  200,  205 

Olbers,  209 

Optics,  table  of  workers  in,  210 

Organic   selection,  126 

Oriani,  209 

Origin  and  development  of  the  in- 
dividual, 52 

Origins  of  life,  possible,  104,  164 

Origin  of  species,  51,  99,  104 

Originality  not  admired,  43 

Orthogenesis,  114,  117,  128,  133, 
150 

Orthogenetic  theory,  111 


Index 


253 


Osborn,  203 
Ostwald,   206 
Ovary,  168 
Owen,  200 

Paleontologists,    table    of,    211 

Pander,  203 

Panmixia,  123 

Pantheism,   184,   185 

Parallelists,   37 

Pascal,  208 

Past  as  past  not  sufficient  author- 
ity, 196 

Pasteur,  200,  206,  207,  212 

Pathology,  22 

Pauly,  178,  205 

Pearson,  Karl,  203 

Perfection,  how  obtained,  193 

Perfection  never   experienced,   193 

Perry,  209,  216 

Pfaff,  212 

Pfeffer,   134 

Pfliiger,  205 

Philosophy  and  common  sense,  188 

Philosophy,   definition   of,  34 

Philosophy  differs  from  science,  20 

Philosophy,  through  it  all  great 
scientists  have  become  great,  88 

Philosophy,  problems   of,  34 

Philosophical  summary,  191 

Physicists,  table  of,  207 

Physiological  psychology,  70,  81 

Physiological  theories,   127 

Physiologists,  table  of,  212 

Physiology,  21 

Piazza,  208 

Picture  show,  62 

Pinel,  Dr.,  36 

Planaria,  166,  180 

Plant  life,  21 

Plate,  Professor,  80,  130,  134 

Plateau,  210 

Plausibility  not  proof,  103 


Popular  science,  90 

Pppularity  vs.  right,  96 

Pouchet,  203 

Poulton,  Professor  E.  B.,  113 

Practical  scientists,  116 

Pragmatism,  78 

Property  of  self -adaptation,  172 

Prominence    not    to    be    confused 

with  importance,  60 
Protestant  scientists,  217 
Psychical  research,  103 
Psychology,  22,  35 
Psychology  as  the  connecting  link 

between  thinker  and  observer,  45 
Psychology,  abnormal,  37,  44 
Psychology,   animal,   41 
Psychology,  applied,  42 
Psychology,  genetic,  41 
Psychology  of  history,  42 
Psychology,  philosophical,  35,  70 
Psychology,    physiological,    36,    70, 

81 

Psychology,  racial,  42 
Psychology,  rational,  35,  70 
Psychology  of  religion,  42 
Psychology,   sex,   43 
Psychology,   social,   42 
Psychological    viewpoint    of    life, 

164 

Psychoid,  144 

Psycho-physical  reaction,  64 
Psychopathic  hospitals,  44 
Puiseux,  208,  217 
Purkinje,  203 
Purposiveness,  153 

Quatrefages,  202,  217 
Quenstedt,  212 

Racine,  208 

Ramon  y  Cajal,  39,  203 

Rathke,  204 

Ray,  John,  200 


254 


Index 


Reaumur,   204 

Redi,  204 

Reading  must  be  done  on  both 
sides  if  one  is  to  obtain  an  ac- 
curate basis  for  comparison,  101 

Real  authority,  196 

Reason  the  machine  has  become  a 
machine,  154 

Reasons  why  men  have  gone  from 
philosophy  to  the  laboratory,  33 

Recessives,  53 

Regeneration,   166 

Regeneration  of  hydra,  178 

Regnault,  210 

Reinke,  176 

Reil,  J.  Ch.,  205 

Reinke,   Eugen,  205 

Relationship  of  whole  to  its  parts, 
187 

Relaxing  suspension  of  change,  163 

Religion  and  the  laboratory,  198 

Remak,  204 

Renard,  216 

Repairing,  178 

Reslhuber,   209 

Restitution,  166 

Revealed  religion,  195 

Richelieu,  97 

Rickaby,  184 

Right  and  wrong,  79,  185 

Right   and  wrong,  support  of,  28 

Ritter,  211 

Roesel,  204 

Romanes,  131,  202 

Roux,  125,  205 

Rudimentary  organs,  241 

Saint   Hilaire,   Geoffrey,   113,   119, 

204,  213 

Salamander,   179 
Saltation,  134 
Schaudinn,  204 
Schelling,  205 


Schopenhauer,  Arthur,  205 

Schneider,  205 

Scholasticism,  184 

Scholastics,   76 

Scholastic  philosophy,  78 

Schonbrin,  211 

Schoolmen  of  the  13th  century  an- 
cestors of  physicists,  184 

Schrank,  von,  213 

Schultze,  Franz,  204 

Schultze,  Max,  202,  206 

Schwann,  202,   206,  207,  212 

Schwickerath,  207 

Science,  applied,  88 

Science,  authority  in,  196 

Science  of  consciousness,  64 

Science,  definition  of,  19 

Science  of  mental  phenomena,  64 

Science  depends  on  metaphysics,  79 

Science  finds  its  basis  in  epistemol- 
ogy,  84 

Science  answers  to  "how"  but 
never  to  "why,"  164 

Science,  pure,  193 

Science  of  the  soul,  64 

Science,  starting  point  of,  77 

Science,  what  it  has  done,  90 

Scientist,  practical,  116 

Scientist,  true,  89 

Scott,  134 

Sea  urchin,  166,  172 

Searle,  216 

Secchi,  209,  216 

Sedgwick,  212,  217 

Selection,  geographical,  127 

Selection,  germinal,  123 

Selection,  natural,  105,  113 

Selection,  natural,  substitute  theo- 
ries for,  128 

Selection,  organic,  126 

Selection,  sexual,  127 

Self-evident    truths,    77 

Servetus,  200 


Index 


255 


Severinus,  204 

Smith,  Joseph,  76 

Smith,  Wm.,  201 

Smith,  Dr.  Stephen,  39,  44 

Siebold,  von,  202 

Siemens,  209 

Social  psychology  literature  largely 

worthless,  227 
Sociology,   22 

Soul,  32,  35,  64,  149,  150,  225 
Spallanzani,  179,  206 
Species,  definition  of,  111,  140 
Species,    de    Vries'    definition    of, 

139 

Spencer,  Herbert,  106,  200,  218,  229 
Spirit,  32 

Spontaneous  generation,  176 
Sports  in  nature,  65,  135 
Stahl,  George  Ernest,  204 
Stanley,  Dean,  229 
Starting  points  in  evolution,  102 
Static  evolution,  157 
Steno,  202 

Stokes,   Gabriel,   217 
Strauss-Diirckheim,  204 
Structure  determines  function,  57 
Struggle  for  existence  no  influence 

on  species-forming,  135 
Studer,  212 
Suarez,  146,  201 
Substance,  160 
Superstition,  73 
Survival  of  the  fittest,  120 
Survival  values,  122 
Suspending  possible  change,  163 
Swammerdam,   202 
Swift,   Professor,  218 

Tait,  210,  217 
Taxonomy,  22 
Teleology,  114,  117,  153 
Teleology,  two  kinds  of,  155 
Theology,  196 


Theory  of  constancy,  145 

Thinkers,  30,  31,  103 

Thomas,  of  Aquinas,  146,  229 

Thompson,  Benjamin,  207 

Thompson,  (Lord  Kelvin),  207,217 

Thought-world,   151,   187 

Tiedemann,  F.,  205 

Transmutation  vs.  heterogenesis, 
136 

Trembley,  179 

Treviranus,   G.   R.,  205 

True  vs.  logical,  106 

Truth,  158,  187 

Truth  does  not  depend  on  majori- 
ties, 134 

Tyndall,  89,  200 

Types  of  mind,  25 

Ultra-development,  129 
Understanding  of  nature,  169 
Unimaginable  vs.  unthinkable,  194 
Universe,  death  of,  184 
Universe  as  a  logical  whole,  169 
Universe  as  God,  184 
Unpopular  review,  103 
Use  and  disuse,  119,  122 
Usefulness,  16 

Van  Beneden,  213 
Variations,  111 
Varieties,  112 
Vestigial  organs,  241 
Vesalius,  204,  206 
Vicaire,  208 
Vicq  d'Azyr,  204 
Vierordt,  212 
Vinci,  Leonardo,  204 
Violin  playing,  59 
Virchow,  175,  200,  207,  215 
Vital   force  as  a  verbal  explana- 
tion, 183 
Vital  principle,  144 


256 


Index 


Vital     principle,    different    names 

for,  172 

Vital  processes,  autonomy  of,  157 
Vitalism,  150 

Vitalism,  best  argument  for,  168 
Vitalism,   Driesch's   definition,   163 
Vitalists,  definition  of,  153 
Vitalists,  143,  204 
Vogt,  199 
Volkmann,  212 
Volta,  209 

von  Baer,  201,  205,  206,  207,  213 
von  Bunge,  G.,  171,  206 
von  Hartmann,  Eduard,  205 
von  Humboldt,  Alexander,  205 
von  Martius,  213 
von  Schrank,  213 
von  Siebold,  202 
Vries,  de,  Hugo,  65,  128,  131,  134, 

204 

Waagen,  212,  213 

Wagner,  R.,  205 

Wagner    (physiologist),  212 

Wallace,  89,  200,  229 

Walsh,  Dr.  James,  209,  229 

Ward,  Dr.,  164 

Wasmann,    Erich,    108,    145,    147, 

148,  204 
Water,    chemical    composition   not 

yet  known,  189 

Watson,  Professor  John,  38,  65 
Weierstrass,  208 


Weismann,  122,  123,  167,  202,  218 

Weismann  on  adaptation,  177 

Weismann's  logical  necessity,  176 

What  of  it?  33 

Wheeler,  142,  148,  204 

Whewell,  Dr.,  217 

Whitman,  133 

Whitney,  202 

Wigand,   Albert,   205 

Williams    (biologist),  172 

Williams,  Henry  Smith,  36 

Willoughby,   204 

Wilson,  Professor,  171,  173,  174 

Windle,  Sir  Bertram,  150,  204 

Wolf,    Gustav,   205 

Wolff,  G.,  144 

Wolff,  Caspar  Friederich,  202,  205, 
206 

Wolffs  experiment  on  the  water- 
newt,  180 

Words  mean  different  things  to 
different  people,  227 

Worms,  flat,  166,  180 

Wundt,  Professor  Wm.,  114,  148, 
215 

Wurtz,  211 

Wyman,  Jeffries,  204 


Zahm,  J.  A.,  216 
Zittel,  202,  206 
Zoology,  21 
Zweckmassigkeit,  144 


BACKGROUNDS  FOR  SOCIAL  WORKERS 

BY  EDWARD  J.  MENGE,  M.A.,  PH.D.,  M.Sc. 

Professor  of  Biology t  Dallas  University 
Author  of  "The  Beginnings  of  Science" 


This  book  is  written  for  everyone  possessing  any  interest 
whatever  in  world-betterment.  It  not  only  discusses  such  his- 
toric subjects  as  "Marriage"  and  the  "Family,"  but  such  mod- 
ern problems  as  " Birth-Control, "  "Sex  Hygiene,"  "Steriliza- 
tion of  the  Insane,  Feeble-Minded  and  Criminals,"  "Eugenics," 
the  "Training  of  Children,"  and  gives  the  underlying  reasons 
for  "Right  and  Wrong"  and  tells  how  to  find  whether  a  given 
act  belongs  in  the  one  field  or  the  other,  aside  from  all  creeds 
and  sects.  It  shows  on  what  basis  morality  rests  and  makes  an 
intelligent  discussion  of  the  things  just  mentioned  possible. 

No  professional  man  or  parent  should  be  without  it.  It  is 
not  only  to  be  read,  but  to  be  STUDIED. 


8vo,  cloth,  bound  uniform  loith  "The  Beginnings  of  Science" 
$1.50  net 


RICHARD    G.   BADGER,    PUBLISHER,    BOSTON 


•  "** 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBEAEY, 
BERKELEY 

THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 

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